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Abstract
This thesis is about the macroeconomics of IMF stabilisation and adjustment 
programs which, according to official statements, are designed to “get macroeconomic 
fundamentals right and dismantle government-imposed distortions or put in place various 
institutional features of a modem market economy”. From the resulting macroeconomic 
stability and market liberalisation, high rates of growth and reduction in poverty are to be 
achieved. However, experience has shown without a doubt the inadequacy of IMF 
programs to achieve these objectives. This thesis argues the failure lies in the IMF’s 
underlying view of state-society relations.
The IMF introduced the original financial programming (FP) model, but has since 
picked up neoclassical supply-side theory to address long-term structural issues. 
However, both in absolute terms and relative to concomitant best practice, the 
macroeconomic theory and rationale underlying IMF programmes have been inadequate, 
especially in the context of developmental needs beyond low inflation and positive 
growth rates. IMF programmes have failed to link the short run measures with long run 
objectives, and are totally inappropriate for addressing issues of structural transformation 
as the Ethiopian and Ugandan case studies demonstrate. Despite justifiable criticisms as 
well as inconclusive empirical work on the impact of its programmes, the IMF’s response 
is increasingly to search for developments in neo-liberal political theory to vindicate its 
standpoint. Interest-group pressure and lack of political commitment are seen as causes of 
failure and policy non-adoption, which have left the major weaknesses of the 
programmes unexposed. Zealous approach to financial austerity and neglect of systematic 
intervention and the specificities attached to individual countries have set aside the 
developmental role of the state, despite conclusive evidence that it has contributed to 
industrialisation in other parts of the world, not least East Asia. Under the guise of being 
faithful to the market, IMF programmes are smokescreens behind which highly 
interventionist policies alter state-society relations, yielding a set of confusing paradigms 
in the study of development.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview
The political and economic changes in developing countries not least sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) in the last two decades have inspired a concomitant shift in understanding 
of the intellectual foundations of their economic malaise and its treatment. This led to a 
plethora of studies on the relationship between SSA and the international system 
including the impact of the financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The role of the IMF in stabilisation and structural adjustment has been the 
subject of a number of books, articles, conferences and commentary. This thesis is a 
contribution to this literature. The originality is in the context of bringing together the 
three strands of IMF programmes, specifically the theoretical underpinnings, the impact 
analysis and the political economy of reform, and in showing, with reference to Ethiopia 
and Uganda, that the rationale underpinning IMF programmes has set aside the 
developmental role of the state. This is despite conclusive evidence that state intervention 
has contributed to industrialisation in other parts of the world. Indeed there is a 
theoretical, historical and empirical case for state intervention to guide structural 
transformation. The East Asian developmental states were successful in achieving rapid 
growth not least in the state mobilising finance and because of state-society relations that 
allowed for selective credit, subsidies, protection, and other industrial policies.
1.1 Whence and whither IMF Lending?
The post-WWII global economy faced declining commodity prices and decreases 
in international trade, which resulted horn many countries opting for competitive 
exchange rate adjustments and direct control of imports. This was mainly the result of the 
Great Depression and the effect of the war itself. There was a need for official capital 
flows as the depression also disrupted private capital markets. An international institution
7
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was required to coordinate official financing and monitor exchange rate movements, 
hence establishment of the IMF (Krueger, 1998b). The Conference at Bretton Woods was 
based on the proposals written by John Maynard Keynes representing Europe and Alvin 
Hanson, Jacob Viner, and Harry Dexter White from the United States.1 It is clear that the 
U.S. had leverage over the negotiations, as much of Europe relied on U.S. assistance both 
militarily and in financial aid.2 As stated by Singer (1995, p. 12):
"The guiding principle of the original vision was "Never Again!” Never again to 
permit the conditions of the 1920s and 1930s with their mass unemployment, 
protectionist beggar-thy-neighbour policies, competitive currency devaluations, 
deflation, collapse of commodity prices, stock exchange crashes, etc.”
The purposes of the IMF as specified under its Article of Agreement, Article 1
are:
1. To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which 
provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary 
problems;
2. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute 
thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and 
to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of 
economic policy;
3. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, 
and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation;
4. To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current 
transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions, which 
hamper the growth of world trade;
5. To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily 
available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity; and
6. In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium 
in the international balances of payments of members.
As the IMF was a guardian of the Bretton Woods system, its role was questioned 
following its breakdown.3 The two successive oil price rises in the 1970s paved the way 
for the IMF to extend lending to developing countries and find a new forte. The IMF 
overlooked the oil price increases in 1973 and 1979 and applauded the transfer of surplus 
from oil-exporting countries to deficit countries as indication of a sound financial system.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview
The industrial economies responded by restrictive demand for the purpose of reducing 
inflation. Although commercial banks were able to recycle the surplus from oil exporting 
economies, the consequent debt crisis of the early 1980s in Latin America further 
increased the demand for multilateral finance. As the resources of the IMF are not 
designated to reduce the volume of the debt, the option became planning change in 
domestic policy making through what became to be known as stabilisation policy, which 
mainly consisted of short-term assistance to correct disequilibrium in the balance of 
payments (Kruger, 2000).
Given the economic difficulties faced by most developing countries in the last 
twenty years, there was a need for adjustment with external financial assistance. It is 
precisely the shortage of non-conditional and concessional finance from bilateral and 
private sources that elevated the IMF, and the World Bank, from multilateral sources of 
finance to dominant institutions in development policy making.4 The IMF acquired a 
mandate to prescribe development policies when an unprecedented global problem paved 
the way for the emergence of the neo-liberal ideology -  the oil crisis in the early 1970s.
At the time of the Bretton Woods conference the negotiators were concerned with 
the economic decline described above and not with the question of development. Latin 
American and Asian countries were net creditors and Africa was entirely under colonial 
rule. It is the deterioration in commodity prices, the debt burden in Latin American 
countries and later the emergence of new African states that brought the IMF’s focus into 
development. The subsequent involvement of the IMF in troubled Latin American and 
SSA countries is, therefore, a departure from its initial short-term stabilisation into long­
term commitment through conditional finance.
1.2 Conditional Lending
IMF balance of payments financing is arranged under Stand-by and Enhanced 
Fund Facility (EFF). Since the mid-1980s medium-term Structural Adjustment Facility
9
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(SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF renamed in 1999 as Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility, PRGF) were created specifically for low-income 
countries (see Appendix 1). The IMF’s task over the years has changed from those set out 
in the Articles of Agreement to the new role in direct intervention in most economies via 
conditional finance. The conditional refers to policies a borrowing country must adopt, 
often a complete reversal of policies adopted during the status quo ante. The extension of 
IMF programmes from its traditional focus on stabilisation into more elaborate and 
comprehensive structural reforms has meant long-term financial commitment as well as 
extensive conditionalities (Polak, 1991).5 These policies, as a matter of formal procedure, 
are listed in a letters o f intent and memorandum o f understandings, which are prepared 
by the recipient country and the IMF.
According its recent report (IMF, 2002a, p. 1), the IMF stated: “When a country 
borrows from the IMF, its government makes commitments on economic and financial 
policies-a requirement known as conditionality.” The purpose of conditionality, 
according to the IMF, is to provide assurance that its finances will be used to improve the 
economy of the recipient country (resolve balance of payments difficulties and promote 
economic growth) and that the country will be able to make repayments, so that the IMF 
lends the money to other clients (IMF, 2002c). As members’ quotas in the IMF did not 
grow in line with the growth of world trade, it was necessary to attach conditionality on 
borrowing above quota (IMF, 2001a, 2001b and Khan and Sharma, 2001).6 The IMF 
(2001a) insists that its tranche of financing and conditionality are intended to prevent the 
motivation of governments from pursuing inflationary policies. This is related to the 
moral hazard argument that governments will pursue bad policies if they feel they well be 
rescued by the IMF (Guitian, 1992 and IMF, 2001a). Conditionalities are also used for 
monitoring of programmes; as a signal for indicating when programmes go off-track; as 
an assurance for access to IMF finances; as a sign of commitment to policy change; and 
they provide credibility to reforms (Rodrik, 1989 and Casella and Eichengreen, 1996). 
Conditionalities are guarantee in the absence of some sort of collateral, which 
commercial banks would have used (Sachs, 1989a and Mosley, 1992a and 1992b). Most
10
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important, conditional lending is designed to induce change of development strategy: a 
mechanism for behavioural alteration (Collier and Gunning, 1996).7
Compliance to IMF conditionality is assessed in various ways. Loans Lorn the 
IMF are released in “phased disbursements” or tranching, which gives it leverage over 
the recipient country. Disbursement of funds is in response to performance monitoring 
through (see IMF, 2001b):
□ Prior Actions (PAs): These are actions that a country agrees to take as precondition 
before the IMF loan is approved such as adjustment of the exchange rate.
□ Performance Criteria (PCs): These are conditions, which must be carried through at 
a specific time by a country to be allowed to draw credit from the IMF. These may 
include quantitative floors/ceilings or structural indicators. There are two types of 
PCs:
o Quantitative PCs: these refer to macroeconomic policy variables such as 
international reserves, monetary and credit aggregates, fiscal balances, or 
external borrowing.
o Structural PCs: Measures to restructure key sectors such as public sector 
reform and privatisation.
□ Structural Benchmarks (SBs): Similar to structural PCs and mainly attached to SAF 
and ESAF programmes, SBs focus on concrete structural indicators such as 
institutions changes (for example introducing export promotion agencies and a new 
banking or investment law) and broadening of the tax base,
□ Programme Reviews (PRs): These are periodic reviews to assess progress of 
implementation of programmes and introduce changes that may be necessary in light 
of new developments.
The conceptual foundation underlying conditionalities can be seen as a principal- 
agent problem, in which asymmetry in the availability of information determines the 
relationship between the principal and the agent. In financial transactions, this popular 
theory asserts a borrower (agent or entrepreneur) has better information about capacity 
and opportunity than the lender (principal or financial institution). Such divergence in 
information leads to two negative externalities: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection blurs the distinction between a viable borrower and a potential 
defaulter, while moral hazard provides the wrong incentive for the borrower to engage in
11
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8 * •more risky activities. In this case, concessionary IMF lending may be an incentive for
boirowers to deliberately search out for balance of payments crisis to acquire funding.9 
For the IMF (2001a), its tranche of financing and conditionality are solutions for avoiding 
adverse selection and moral hazard in the form of continuous monitoring and control. The 
justification is further extended, as the agent' in this case is a government, which cannot 
be sued for default because programme outcomes are determined not only by the actions 
of central bankers and finance ministers, but also other stakeholders such as professional 
associations. According to Khan and Sharma (2001, p. 6):
“Like any lender, the IMF thus needs assurances from its borrowers that the 
funds lent to them would be used for the purposes defined by the Articles of 
Agreement, and in a manner that does not jeopardise their contractual servicing 
and repayment. Consequently, many of the finance propositions relevant to 
private financial institutions apply equally to the IMF.”
The analysis of conditionality as an agency problem explains the conflict between 
the IMF and the recipient country, which arises in the process of stabilisation and 
adjustment. It also allows examining the limitations of the incentive structure as well as 
the penalty for non-compliance. What this reveals is the divergence in objectives between 
the IMF and the recipient country. Conditionality appears as a type of agency problem as 
the IMF is the “principal seeking to induce foreign governments (the agents) to undertake 
certain actions in return for access to international capital” (Killick, 1996, p. 27).
The number of conditionalities has been steadily growing since 1990. According 
to the IMF, “in 1987, Fund-supported programmes contained on average two structural 
conditions per programme year; by 1994, this number had increased to 7, rising further to 
an average of 14 structural conditions per programme year in 1999” (IMF, 2001b, p. 9). 
SAF and ESAF/PGRF programmes carry more conditionalities than the traditional one- 
year Stand-by programmes.10 Between 1987-1999 the highest conditionality was 
observed in the fiscal sector followed, in order of high to low conditionality, by the 
financial sector, privatisation, tradable sector, public enterprise reform, exchange system 
and pricing and marketing. Structural conditionalities are also the highest in transition 
economies and non-transition ESAF/PGRF countries, which are mostly the least­
12
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developed countries in the SSA region (IMF, 2001b).11 As Table 1.1 shows the IMF has 
been increasing its conditional lending since 1987 and the total number of programmes 
more than doubled from 32 in 1987 to 96 in 2002. In the same period the amount of SDR 
committed also went up from SDR4,476 to SDR87,242. The IMF increasing involvement 
in structural issues is illustrated from the increasing number of PGRF programmes, which 
went up from 7 in 1989 to 35 in 2002. PGRF programmes make up 51 per cent of total 
IMF programmes and 80 per cent of these are implemented in SSA. Although these 
programmes make up only 9 per cent of the total SDR disbursed under all IMF 
programmes, the increase in monies committed - between 1989 and 2002 - is 77 per cent.
Table 1.1 - IMF Programmes and Financial Arrangements
Number of Arrangements as of April 
30
Amounts Committed Under 
Arrangement as of April 30 
(In millions of SDRs)
Year S-By EFF SAF PGRF Total S-By EFF SAF PGRF Total
1987 22 10 - 32 4,118 358 - 4,476
1988 14 1 15 - 30 1,702 245 670 - 2,617
1989 12 1 4 7 24 2,956 207 427 955 4,545
1990 16 3 3 11 33 3,249 7,627 37 415 11,328
1991 14 5 12 14 45 2,703 9,597 539 1,813 14,652
1992 22 7 8 16 53 4,833 12,159 101 2,111 19,203
1993 15 6 4 20 45 4,490 8,569 83 2,137 15,279
1994 16 6 3 22 47 1,131 4,504 80 2,713 8,428
1995 19 9 1 27 56 13,19
A
6,840 49 3,306 23,385
1996 21 7 1 28 57
U
14,96
7
9,390 182 3,383 27,918
1997 14 11 35 60
D
3,764 10,184 _ 4,048 17,996
1998 14 13 - 33 60 28,32
7
12,336 - 4,410 45,069
1999 9 12 - 35 56
J
32,74
7
11,401 - 4,186 48,334
2000 16 11 - 31 58
/
45,60
£
9,798 - 3,516 58,921
2001 25 12 - 43 80
O
61,30
C
9,798 - 4,576 75,670
2002 26 8 - 35 69
0
74,34 8,697 4,201 87,242
4
Source: IMF (2002c)
In the 1980s the IMF moved into structural or adjustment programmes and away 
from its traditional macroeconomic stabilisation policies and in effect, became party to
13
Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview
and repayment guardian for commercial lenders and got involved in frequent negotiations 
and rescheduling of external debts -  the role of “gatekeeper”. It advises countries in 
formulating debt repayment schedules with official creditors in the Paris Club and with 
private lenders in the London Club. The IMF has become so influential that any other 
bilateral, multilateral, and commercial bank lending and development assistance depends 
on its prior approval of "creditworthiness” of a country -  the so-called “catalyst 
function”. Countries, which for political, ideological reasons or dislike of strict 
conditionalities did not use IMF facilities, have suffered severe shortages of finance not 
only from resources foregone from the IMF but those that follow its approval.
Throughout the 1990s the IMF indulged in issues of poverty, governance, gender, 
and the environment. In his speech, the former Managing Director, said: the IMF strives 
to promote growth, which is based on "equity, poverty alleviation, and empowerment of 
poor people; and growth that promotes protection o f the environment, and respect for 
national cultural values” (quoted in Goldstein, 2000, p. 2). Now the IMF is not only a 
monetary institution but also a “quasi-developmental” body.12 One example is the 
Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which the IMF has designed, in 
conjunction with the World Bank, to reduce multilateral debt. IMF and World Bank 
credits are not eligible for forgiveness as well as rescheduling of arrears. This was much 
to do with keeping their credit rating. The multilateral debt burden is serious and the 
countries ability to pay remains doubtful. What gave rise to the HIPC is precisely the 
unsustainability of multilateral debt.
At the same time, following the balance of payments as well as financial crises in 
Mexico, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the IMF’s role as crisis manger 
and crisis averter became paramount. The Asian financial crisis also brought the IMF’s 
function of surveillance into public debate.13 This function was significantly reviewed in 
the second amendment of the Articles of Agreement in 1977 to take account of 
developments in international financial flows. The IMF’s new role as crisis averter raises 
questions: whether it has enough resources to bail out crisis-hit countries and its failure to 
predict the 1997 crisis in East Asia, in 1994 in Mexico or for that matter the 2001 crisis in
14
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Argentina. The reservation on the crisis averting and crisis managing role of the IMF 
focuses on the fact that the IMF’s traditional approach is not suited to the new problems 
taking place in the world, particularly the transition from central planning as well as 
financial crisis. The question is whether the IMF is institutionally and intellectually 
catching up with the changing conditions of the world economy (Singer, 1995).14
1.3 The Politics of IMF Lending
The IMF has a tradition of making closed deals, failing to practice dialogue with 
key members of society who are affected by its programmes.15 A recent study found that 
the issue of transparency was also a concern among even those who supported IMF 
sponsored programmes used the words “secretive” and “arrogant” (Locke, 2000, p. 5).16 
Accountability of the IMF is questioned as Central bank governors and finance ministers, 
who are not typically elected representatives, have powerful control over it. Stiglitz 
(2000b, p. 5) further states;
“Indeed, it is ironic that in an era in which we are increasingly speak of 
democratic accountability, one of the major international organisations, with a 
tremendous potential effect on the global economy, has been striving hard to 
reduce its accountability. In effect, it has been waging a campaign to reduce its 
own direct accountability to democratic processes. These are matters of 
controversy, but it is a controversy which, unfortunately, has been suppressed for 
too long.”
In response, there has been a change in the thinking of the IMF when it started to 
communicate with civil society including NGOs and trade unions, especially under the 
preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). As far as transparency of 
its operation is concerned, the IMF started publicising country information, Policy 
Framework Papers, Letters of Intents, Public Information Notices, and Executive Board 
summaries mostly in its extensive Web Site.17 In the second half of the 1990s the IMF, 
reluctantly, also recognised that successful programmes are those that are owned by the 
loan recipient country. The three reports which the IMF released in 2001 argued the need 
for refocusing conditionalities that do not conflict with strong country ownership (see
15
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IMF, 2001a, 2001b and 2001c). The programmes must be fundamentally the authorities’ 
own, whereas conditionality is introduced to ensure that the Fund’s resources are used for 
their intended purpose. According to this view, ownership is an essential foundation for 
conditionality: it is the authorities who decide what policies to adopt, including whether 
to seek the financial support of the Fund, and it is the authorities that are responsible for 
implementing the programme.
No matter how many times the IMF reiterates the compatibility of ownership with 
conditionality; the latter is designed to alter the behaviour of governments with regard to 
political structures, social practice, and economic strategy. These conditionalities to the 
highest degree compromise domestic ownership of policies, because a relationship of 
financial dependency is established through IMF programmes. The IMF enjoys 
bargaining power over the recipient government, mainly through tranching of credit. 
Conditionalities, through behavioural modification of the recipient country, establish 
asymmetrical power relationship based on donorship rather than ownership (Stokke, 
1995a). Behavioural alteration through conditionalities is driven by the shareholders of 
the IMF, which are led by the United States (Taylor, 1997). Conditionalities are precisely 
reflections of the conflict between the recipient country’s objectives and the influence of 
powerful nations (Killick, 1997). The outcome usually is in favour of the IMF, whose 
catalytic function and seal of approval give it powerful leverage. For this reason alone, 
conditional lending erodes ownership of programmes. Taylor (1997, p. 145) point out 
that “[Tjheir [IFI’s] emissaries arrive in local capitals with substantial hard currency 
credit lines in hand -  a strong incentive for the authorities to take their proposals to 
heart.”
The IMF’s chief shareholders are the “G-7 or more to the point the G-3 or the G-l 
made up of the United States only” (Taylor, 1997, p. 150). The U.S. selects the Executive 
Board and as shown in Table 1.2, the voting share of 44 countries in SSA is well below 
the share held by Japan, Germany, France, and United Kingdom, while it is a mere 25 per 
cent of the voting power held by the United States. The IMF does not treat all countries 
the same and its surveillance of the rich countries has become a “shadowy affair”, and in
16
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practice the IMF pressure is on the poorer member countries, especially the debt-ridden 
developing countries. Singer (1995, p. 13-14) stresses this point:
“Such global management as exists today would be that exercised by the Group 
of Seven (G-7), the group of the most important Western industrial countries.
This is certainly a regression from multilateralism and indeed from democracy.
The G-7 only represent 12 per cent of the world’s population, leaving 88 per cent 
of humankind totally disfranchised.”
Table .2 -  IMF Voting Power on April 30, 2002
Casting Votes of Total Votes Percent of IM F Total Votes
United States 371,743 17.60
Japan 133,378 6.16
Germany 130,332 6.02
France 107,635 4.97
United Kingdom 107,635 4.97
Sub-Saharan Africa 95,137 4.39
Source: IMF (2002c)
Towards the end of the 1990s “a new consensus” attacked the Washington 
consensus, and particularly the IMF.18 The then influential Chief Economist of the World 
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, at the 1998 WIDER annual lecture, formally introduced what is 
dubbed the “post-Washington consensus” (Stiglitz’s, 1998b). As yet, the interest shown 
to the “new consensus” is scant, perhaps because it offers no radical alternative nor does 
it offer a clear policy menu as far as stabilisation and growth are concerned (Sender, 
1999, Gore, 2000, and Fine 2001a). The New Paradigm according to Stiglitz; “takes its 
core objective development, as the transformation o f society. It recognises that an integral 
part of successful development is increase in GDP per capita” (p. 15).19 In his recent 
book entitled Globalisation and Its Discontents, Stiglitz (2002) also points out that the 
IMF forgets the fundamental objectives of development. In fact “[Djecisions were made 
on the basis of what seemed a curious blend of ideology and bad economics, dogma that 
sometimes seemed to be thinly veiling special interests” (p. xiii).20 As Fine and Hailu 
(2001, p. 3) argue:
“In effect, the analytical contradictions of the old consensus, which were never 
exposed let alone addressed, can be set aside by the new consensus to which 
models underlying IMF financial programming can be interpreted as converging.
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In particular, the extent of the IMF’s commitment to, and acceptance of, the new 
consensus will depend upon the extent to which it frees itself from obsessive pre­
occupation with financial targets at the expense of growth and other non- 
financial objectives. For it is only in its analytical origins in the Polak model and 
in its continuing commitment to financial programming that IMF 
macroeconomics is obstructed from embracing the “post-Washington 
consensus”. In terms of the old joke, wherever the IMF is going, it would have 
done better to have started from somewhere else!”
Most countries in the developing world still need external finance to supplement 
domestic savings. The resource gap or savings gap leads to the emergence of foreign- 
exchange gaps that must be financed with capital flows from abroad. These flows can 
take different forms: aid, multilateral credit, commercial bank loans, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and portfolio finance (equity and bonds). Since international private 
financial markets require credit rating, there is a role for the IMF in terms of both 
financing development and supplementing existing markets. The cycle of capital transfers 
from the developed to the developing world are now turning full circle. Today increasing 
attention is played to the role of private finance in developing countries and new 
mechanisms and initiatives are proposed to increase the flow of funds. This attention has 
historical roots: many countries are undergoing liberalisation of their economies and are 
becoming integrated with the global financial system. As long as there is a predictable 
flow of capital from private sources, the resources from the IMF will only be required in 
times of crisis in upper- and middle-income countries. This is mainly due to the amount 
of loans the IMF can advance, the conditionality attached to its lending as well as its low 
concessionality to upper- and middle-income economies (see Bird, 1999).21
It is, however, deceptive to think that the increasing private capital flows reach 
the least-developed countries. Despite liberalisation of financial systems in most 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the target countries are emerging economies of Asia, 
Europe and Latin America. Hence, the IMF will continue lending to developing 
countries, and will have greater influence in the least-developed economies in particular. 
It is this continuing involvement of the IMF in the developing world, particularly the 
policies and their outcome, which instigated, and justifies the research in this thesis.
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1.4 Organisation of the Thesis
The primary focus of this thesis is to trace the evolving macroeconomic theory 
underlying the stabilisation and adjustment policies of the IMF and identify the missing 
links in successful structural transformation. The thesis places IMF programmes into 
three distinct categories. These are: 1) the conceptual framework or design of 
programmes; 2) the empirical or impact analysis; and 3) the political economy of 
development. These elements of the literature are brought together to show how, both in 
absolute terms and relative to concomitant best mainstream practice, the macroeconomic 
theory and rationale underlying IMF programmes have been inadequate, especially in the 
context of development beyond low inflation and positive growth. More specifically, it 
will be shown how IMF programmes have failed to link the short run measures with long 
run objectives, and how they are totally inappropriate for addressing the issue of 
structural transformation by setting aside the role of the developmental state. This is done 
though a study IMF programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda.
The discussion in this thesis is recognisably concerned with approaches to 
development and the relative influence of internal intellectual developments and of 
external influences (and the relationship between the two). Both of these factors are 
important although their relative weight and nature of interaction cannot be taken as 
fixed. In the context of IMF programmes, distinctions must be drawn between the theory, 
the ideology and the practice, quite apart from the internal and external influences that 
are felt on each of them and on their relationship to one another. In some instances, 
influences are clear, as in the political motives for granting loans, or the incorporation of 
supply-side policies into programmes. At other times, the path taken is less readily 
subject to explanation as in the incorporation of particular variables or models one sort 
rather than another in the case of poverty and governance assessment.
To these conundrums must be added an additional factor -  the internal 
institutional dynamics of the IMF as an institution. We know very little about this, much 
less than about the World Bank, although the reputation of the IMF for Chicago style
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economists is also discerned if not universally uniform. Unlike the World Bank, evidence 
of internal disputes within the IMF is hard to come by.22 Consequently the sociology of 
knowledge of IMF programmes cannot be comprehensively addressed. But it is possible 
to engage in a broad reading drawing upon the materials that are readily available -  the 
publications of the IMF itself, and the broader literature primarily but not exclusively 
focused on stabilisation, adjustment, programme design, implementation, impact analysis 
whether critical or supportive of the IMF. Through such a broad reading, it is possible to 
avoid simplistic impressions of the IMF and its programmes as good or bad, wrong or 
right, theoretical or rhetorical or somewhere in-between. Rather IMF programmes can be 
situated both in terms of their own evolution and in terms of the circumstances.
The literature has grown fast and expanded enormously. It is also widely scattered 
and potentially involves a huge volume of material. What follows in this thesis is neither 
a comprehensive discussion of the IMF’s various functions, nor even an extensive 
exposure of its involvement in each and every developing country. The terminologies and 
concepts used in this thesis are standard in the literature. For instance, stabilisation and 
FP are the same and refer to the short run; adjustment refers to the long run. IMF 
programmes are interchangeably used with neo-liberalism and the Washington 
consensus. The main reference throughout the thesis will be developing countries, with 
particular emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The coverage of the literature is up to 
date, but does not cover PRSPs, which the IMF and the World Bank are now requiring to 
extend further lending and reduce multilateral debt in the least-developed economies.
1.5 IMF Stabilisation Programmes
As such, in this thesis, discussion of the stabilisation and adjustment policies of 
the IMF falls between two stools. The first is limited in ambition in providing an 
organised narrative of the theory of FP and the complementary adjustment policies -  who 
said what about what and when. The second is too ambitious in scope and can only be 
partially addressed in this thesis, mostly as a background theme in the industrial
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development -  namely why has the scholarly rhetoric of IMF programmes set aside the 
developmental state literature. A complete answer could have been supplied to the latter 
if it had conformed to one or other of two polar models. One of these is the notion that, 
subject to lags, FP has responded to the evolution of knowledge itself whether derived 
from theoretical advances or experience of FP in practice. This model is readily shown in 
Chapter 2 to be fallacious since, FP falls for short of best practice both theoretically and 
empirically. But the distance, as relationship, between FP and best practice does not 
remain constant. Consequently this relationship needs to be explained.
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the IMF uses its financial programming model to 
restore macroeconomic balances. The overall objective is, according to the official 
rhetoric, to foster economic growth, keep inflation low and maintain a sustainable 
balance of payments. The formal model applied to achieve these objectives is the FP or 
the Polak model, which emerged out of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments (MABOP). The Polak model shows the determination of the balance of 
payments by using the level of domestic credit as a key policy variable. This is 
demonstrated by a mix of accounting frameworks and behavioural functions for the 
demand for money and the demand for imports. The model leads to a fundamental 
conclusion that when the level of domestic credit (mainly to finance government deficits) 
exceeds the demand for money, the extra spending will be spent on imports causing 
deterioration in the balance of payments. The primary focus is on maintaining internal 
and external macroeconomic equilibrium. Internally, the disequilibrium is between 
government revenue and expenditure, whereas external imbalances refer to the 
disequilibrium between imports and exports. And when an economy exhibits these 
imbalances, corrective measures must be taken. What is commonly known as 
stabilisation prescribes remedial policies, mainly fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies to restrict demand for local as well foreign good. The impact of exchange rate 
changes, mainly through the real balance effect or in reducing domestic absorption, are 
central to the stabilisation process (IMF, 1987 and IMF, 2001a).
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However, FP-based stabilisation, which is mainly concerned with austere credit 
restraint, undermines social objectives as well as damaging the productive capacity of 
developing economies. For the Polak model to work, the increase in output will not be 
spent on extra investment and capacity. The model has a fixation with monetary variables 
or the exchange side of the economy, ignoring the implications of the short run on the 
long run and constructs unrealistic dichotomies between the exogenous and endogenous 
variables. The production side of the economy is completely ignored, while there is no 
place for explaining how firms emerge, how technologies are acquired, how industries 
mature, and what role governments play in the process of development. There is also no 
place for productive capacity in the realm of firm-specific knowledge, differentiated 
products, patents, scale economies, externalities, research and development (Amsden, 
1997 and Taylor, 1997). IMF programmes fail to recognise that mainstream 
macroeconomic policy prescriptions produce non-standard results when applied to less- 
developed countries (LDCs). Monetary restriction and devaluation lead to both recession 
and inflation (Porter and Ranney, 1982 and Taylor, 1981, 1988, 1997). Application of 
standard IS/LM analysis to aggregate demand, where equilibrium between the flow of 
current output and stock of money is established, must also be different in developing 
countries. (Green, 1986).
The burden of cuts in public expenditure often falls on investment in health, 
education, infrastructure and food subsidies, rather than consumption (Comia et a l, 
1987). Fiscal austerity for macroeconomic balance does not take into account high return 
investments that compensate deficits in the long run through increases in tax revenues 
(see Alesina and Perotti, 1996 and Addison and Ndikumana, 2003). No account is taken 
of the fact that credit expansion may be linked through policy with investment and capital 
accumulation (Tarp, 1993). The demands of human development and cautionary 
prudence of financial conservatism are contradictory. Financial conservatism becomes 
less important when faced with key development questions in countries where economic 
and social deprivations are deep-rooted (Sen, 1998).
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1.6 IMF Adjustment Programmes
The original Polak model has been retained because of the imperative of financial 
balance for the IMF. However, in response to the long-standing criticisms, the FP 
package evolved from an essentially short run model to one that deals with long run 
supply-side issues. This raises the following questions. First, what triggered the extension 
of IMF programmes from demand-side into supply-side? And what are the theoretical 
bases for the supply-side or adjustment package? Towards the mid-1980s the IMF began 
to show a widespread interest in supply-side issues. This was motivated by the fact that 
many observers in the profession highlighted the existence of lags in responses and 
underlying distortions in developing economies (see Khan et a l , 1991 and Schadler et 
a l , 1995). According to Khan and Sharma (2001, p. 20), the drive towards extending the 
FP model came about because:
“In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the IMF was criticised for being interested 
only in narrow (balance of payments) outcome and relatively unconcerned about 
growth. Thus the IMF, in response to calls by its membership, began to include 
programmes and policies to remove structural impediments to growth and the 
efficient allocation of resources”
But how IMF programmes have been disaggregated and behavioural equations 
incorporated owe as much to a selective reading of external theory as to internally 
generated imperatives, mainly the neglect of structural change. Initially what was a Polak 
model was transformed into a financial programming framework by bringing in variables 
through disaggregating and with a more behavioural approach in response to data 
problems and criticisms, ultimately leading to a “comprehensive stabilisation model”. 
Chapter 3 shows how the IMF extends its FP framework from that of short-term 
stabilisation to medium- to long-term adjustment objectives. The first is to merge the 
IMF’s FP model with the World Bank’s Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM) 
(Khan et a l , 1990). The adoption of adjustment and structural policies by the IMF 
facilitated the joint operations and the “marrying” of the IMF with the World Bank (Khan 
and Montiei, 1989 and Khan et a l , 1990). The idea behind formulating a merged model
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is to address limitations of the two models. The merged model endogenised real output, 
which the FP model does not, and also determines prices, which the RMSM does not.
It is evident from the policy conclusion of the merged model that it falls short of 
satisfying the continuing theoretical deficiencies and inconsistencies. Polak (1997) 
himself is sceptical about the value of the “marriage”, rendering it inappropriate for 
addressing transition and development. He is also sceptical about the extent to which the 
model can be extended over time or to other policy objectives other than through 
reiteration of guesswork concerning macroeconomic approximation. Effectively, 
stabilisation has been designed around a zero growth rate or an unstable growth path, 
neither of which, surely, is acceptable as the basis for policy making for any, let alone a 
developing economy (Fine and Hailu, 2002). As Polak (1997) notes:
“it is curious that for their medium-term macroeconomic projections both the 
IMF and the World Bank continue to rely on highly mechanical growth models 
of the Harrod-Domar family, first developed in the late 1940s. In these models 
there is no place for what the two institutions themselves consider the most 
important factors determining the growth of developing countries, such as 
outward orientation, realistic prices, privatisation, reform of the financial sector, 
and, in general, government attitude toward the economy” (p. 18)...“In a formal 
sense, it would not be particularly difficult to introduce these three extensions 
into the model. But that would be essentially useless unless it were also possible 
to obtain some order of magnitudes of the coefficients for the variables in the 
newly introduced equations. And that, unfortunately, is not possible. In this 
setting, the IMF has had to forgo the comfort of its own model and base its 
conditionality on a set of ad hoc instruments that seemed plausible in the 
circumstances” (p. 18).
The second extension of IMF adjustment programmes heavily relies on 
developments in the profession to derive distortion-removing policies. The theoretical 
framework is provided by mainstream neoclassical economic thought and is added to the 
stabilisation package in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion. This is clearly discerned as the 
macroeconomics of the IMF uses trade and financial liberalisation, price deregulation, 
and privatisation to restore equilibrium or reduce deviations from it, which are 
extensively discussed elsewhere in the literature (Goldstein, 2000). For the purpose of 
this thesis, Chapter 3 will provide brief outlines for some of these policies. It does not
24
Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview
enter into detailed presentation of the models, as the objective is to show how the IMF 
responded to the critique of FP by drawing on mainstream supply-side economics.
The ad hoc inclusion of adjustment policies focused on financial liberalisation 
along the hypothesis laid by the financial repression models of McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). These models propose that allowing real rates of interest to rise to their 
market clearing level stimulates higher savings and investment, both through raising the 
average efficiency of investment and by enabling rationing of low-yield investment 
projects (World Bank, 1989b and Fry, 1997). The foundations for the financial 
liberalisation hypothesis are weak (see Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994 and Agenor and 
Montiel, 1996 for review of the literature). Saving and investment do not always equate 
and a rise in the former does not necessarily imply increased investment. Investment 
depends on expectations of future demand and prices, which are determined by social 
conflicts and the resulting income distribution (Burkett and Dutt, 1991). The market also 
reflects the actions of banks, consumers, savers, investors, trade unions, government 
departments, and relationships and trust among these institutions is what reduces 
information costs and uncertainty (Soskice, 1991 and Patrick, 1996). The assumption of 
the auctioneer and the absence of institutions are major deficiencies of the financial 
liberalisation model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and Stiglitz, 1989, 1993). It also fails to 
address the particularities of community based local networks and traditional familial 
relationships within grassroots financial transactions (Aryeetey andNissanke, 1998).
The IMF adopted trade liberalisation based on the idea that countries would 
benefit from maintaining their higher share in world trade (Ranis, 1985 and Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985). This implies that high cost and low productivity economies will fall 
short of reaping the gains from trade (Krueger, 1993a and Krueger, 1998a). Thus, the 
IMF encourages trade regimes that usually include the adoption of a low, uniform tariff 
structure, which provides equal effective protection to all producers of tradable. 
However, there are no significant impacts of trade liberalisation on export performance 
and the limit of trade liberalisation is its neglect of structural features (Shafaeddin, 1994; 
Harrison and Hanson, 1999; and Thirlwall, 2000). A recent survey of the empirical
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literature has shown that the direct link between trade liberalisation and economic growth 
is ambiguous, mainly due to suspect methodology and confused econometric analysis 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1991 and 2001). The success of openness depends mainly on 
how comparative advantage is aided by other sector-specific policies. Examples are 
research and development expenditure, technological advances, and improving quality of 
products (Amsden, 1997; McKay et al, 1997; and Winters, 2002).
Currency depreciation is at the core of IMF supply-side programmes based on the 
idea that it increases the domestic currency price of exports, increases foreign demand for 
exports, and raises the domestic demand for and supply of import substitutes (Bird, 1983 
and IMF, 1987). Another argument for devaluation is elimination of rent-seeking and 
wasteful administration activities typically encouraged by overvalued exchange rates and 
the associated import licenses and exchange controls (Krueger, 1974). Overvaluation of 
the exchange rate is blamed for inducing capital flight due to anticipation of further 
devaluation (Sachs and Larrain, 1999 and Shatz and Tarr, 2002). Exchange rate 
overvaluation affects productivity gains and hence growth negatively (Edwards, 1989 and 
Cottani, et al., 1990). However, the assumption that exports and imports are responsive to 
prices so that capital and intermediate goods could be substituted without causing 
disruptions in investment and output is unrealistically based on perfect mobility of factors 
of production. The structural rigidity or inflexibility of developing economies is not taken 
into consideration (Taylor, 1993b). There is also danger of a fallacy of composition effect 
in manufacturing (Cline, 1982 and UNCTAD, 2000) as well as agricultural exports 
(Bleaney, 1993; Akiyama and Larson, 1994; Schiff, 1995; and Weeks, 1995).
The fourth supply-side policy, which the IMF embraced, is privatisation. The 
objectives are to foster private sector participation, improve the efficiency of enterprises, 
and create a competitive environment, and improve the government’s fiscal position 
(Cambell-White and Bhatia, 1998). Public choice, property rights and principal-agent 
theories provide the justification to pursue the transfer of public assets to the private 
sector (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991 and 1995). However, theories of privatisation are 
unduly pessimistic about the motivation of state run enterprises, which often guarantee
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access to basic services by low-income groups. The experience of privatisation suggests 
that there is no evidence that ownership by the private sector is superior over ownership 
by the public sector as far as efficiency of enterprises is concerned (Berg and Shirley, 
1987; Chang and Singh, 1993 and 1997).
The ad hoc appropriation of neoclassical supply-side economics and the 
attempted “marriage” are meant to extricate IMF programmes from the bondage of FP, 
which is short term and monetarist, and enter into long run supply-side eclecticism. It is 
evident that these models fall short of addressing the theoretical deficiencies as well as 
inconsistencies as regards target and instrument variables within the FP framework (Fine 
and Hailu, 2002). This is consistent with neoclassical theory in which macroeconomics is 
treated as a general equilibrium theory with the addition of the monetary sector. Such 
mixing of short-term demand-side and long-term supply-side policies provided the IMF a 
strong weapon while at the same time damaging the potential for meaningful 
development in the countries where these policies are implemented. As Kapur (1998 
p. 128) aptly put it;
“Today, the principles for which the IMF claims to stand are increasingly at odds 
with the way in which it conducts its own affairs. It promotes the virtues of 
democracy-while deeming them impractical, if not downright dangerous, for 
multilateral governance. It derides and discourages state intervention in economic 
affairs-while insisting on its right to restructure from top to bottom the economies 
of the LDCs. And it rejects the need for international controls on capital as 
invidious - while asserting the need for those on labour to be obvious. This welter 
of contradictions serves to highlight the corrosive impact of a long series of ad 
hoc solutions on an increasingly dilapidated system of global governance.”
1.7 The Impact Analysis
The empirical evidence lying at the other extreme to analytical posturing does not 
strongly support IMF programmes. This suggests that FP in theory is simply a 
consequence of the need to serve in the form of a rationale for IMF programmes in 
practice. Indeed, what is striking is the extent to which there is a distance between theory 
and practice. Also this distance, or relationship, between the two has changed over time
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and so must be explained though methodological weaknesses. An influential recent report 
pointed out that IMF programmes are not associated with increased growth performance 
(Meltzer, 2000), while others argue to the contrary (Khan and Sharma, 2001 and IMF, 
2001a). The difficulty of measuring the counterfactual (i.e., what would have happened in 
the absence of IMF programmes) remains a key methodological problem (Guitian, 1981; 
Williamson, 1983c; Goldstein and Montiel, 1986; Conway, 1994; Khan and Ul Haque, 
1998). The specific impact analysis techniques also suffer fi*om methodological 
shortcomings. The before-after approach ignores exogenous factors that may affect the 
pre- and programme periods; the with-without approach does not take account of the 
characteristics of non-programme countries; the actual vs. target approach has a bias 
against programmes because targets may not be achieved, for example, due to incomplete 
programmes and unfavourable external factors; and the regression and structural model 
approaches only show statistical relationships between target and instrument variables 
and assume parameters stay constant over time.
A fresh review of the empirical literature in Chapter 4 comes up with three broad 
conclusions. First, only 35 per cent of the studies found a positive impact of IMF 
programmes on growth. Second, only 49 per cent found a positive impact on the current 
account. Third, only 41 per cent found a positive effect on inflation. Fourth, many studies 
show programmes were not fully implemented. It has been found that 50 per cent of 
Stand-by arrangements, 85 per cent of EFFs and 38 per cent of SAFs were uncompleted 
(Killick, 1984a and 1995a). Conway (1994) also finds that 50 per cent of programmes 
were uncompleted, while Mussa and Savastano (1999) find 34.8 per cent of IMF 
programmes were interrupted. The results also indicate that most of the programmes were 
uncompleted in Africa and Latin America. Non-adoption is attributed to negative external 
environment, such as unfavourable terms of trade (Edwards, 1989; Polak, 1991; Killick, 
1995a; and Mussa and Savastano (1999) as well as severe conditionalities (Kapur, 2001 
and Goldstein, 2000 and 2003). But, the IMF insists, “the data provide no indication that 
more conditionality impairs implementation” (IMF, 2001a, p. 21) and “most programme 
interruptions have been the result of factors outside the funds control - that is, major 
political upheavals and flagging commitment” (IMF, 2001a, p. 56 italics added).
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According to a recent IMF working paper, “ethnic and linguistic divisions, strong special 
interests, and lack of political cohesion contribute to programme failure” (Anayiotos, et 
al, 2001, p. 2). The message is programmes work but political factors impede their 
success.
Besides programme interruptions, some other important issues are identified from 
the review of the impact studies in Chapter 4. The first problem is related to the problem 
of using annual data while IMF programmes start at any time of the year. The second is 
related to arbitrary use of 0-1 dummy variables for the absence and presence of IMF 
programmes. The use of a binary one-zero index does not reflect implementation of 
programmes. Programmes may be scheduled at 6-month frequencies and waivers may be 
granted to permit purchases even when implementation slips. Programme effects must 
not necessarily follow a linear path, and increases in some variables may be offset by 
decline in others, which cannot be captured by a simple search for percentage increments 
in target variables (Bird, 2001). Third, an assessment of programme impact is precisely 
an evaluation of the IMF’s as well as policy makers’ knowledge of the economy. Full 
grasp of economy-wide relationships is unlikely in the face of data problems and paucity 
of economic analyses, particularly in low-income economies. Fourth, the studies report 
success and failure on the basis of statistical significance or otherwise. Significance tests 
based on t-statistics do not tell us much about economic significance in terms of concrete 
development outcomes such as improved earnings or structural transformation. Fifth, the 
impact studies tell us nothing about the cost of improvement in the rate of growth and the 
balance of payments, as these are often achieved by severe deflation. The short run 
damage may have a longer than expected effect on productive capacity.
Survey of the impact literature also reveals that there is evidence of repetitive 
lending to the same countries, what is called “recidivism” (Bird, 2001). The rate of 
repetitive lending is high to economies with serious difficulties, with a probable inference 
that new programmes had to be prescribed because earlier ones failed. Other findings also 
confirm that IMF lending goes to countries favoured by the U.S. The impact of IMF 
programmes seems to be that U.S.-friendly countries are locked into a vicious cycle of
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economic decline and IMF programmes, without any concrete development. It becomes 
clear that the impact analysis is not taken seriously either as an appropriate way of 
assessing effect of programmes or responding to criticisms. To use a medical metaphor - 
there is no feedback from results of treatment to new or continuing patients.
1.8 IMF Programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda
The cross-section impact literature indicates that IMF programmes at best have 
unfavourable outcomes. Applying the before-after and with-without approaches to 
Ethiopia and Uganda, Chapter 5 concludes that IMF programmes did not meet their 
stated objectives nor are these objectives sensible in terms of concrete economic 
development.
Ethiopia and Uganda are two of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which 
adopted eight IMF programmes between 1987 and 2004. The 1987 stabilisation and 
adjustment programme in Uganda was initiated after the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) under Yoweri Museveni overthrew the Obote II government in 1986. Since then 
the IMF and the World Bank identify Uganda as a model of successful reformer. The 
government’s handling of the economy is widely regarded as a success story that earned 
it the name the “show case” (Ddumba-Ssentamu, et al., 1999). In Ethiopia, the Dergue 
regime (1974-1991) resorted to central planning, which has been the dominant thrust of 
economic strategy. In May 1991, the regime was thrown out of office by a coalition of 
ethnically demarcated opposition fighters under the name of the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Consequently, Ethiopia signed a SAF 
agreement with the IMF in 1992 and began implementation of stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes. Both countries devalued their currencies, liberalised foreign 
trade, opened up the financial sector and privatised state-owned enterprises.
There are some grounds for the argument that Uganda and Ethiopia are successful 
reformers. The statistical results demonstrate that the effect of IMF programmes on real 
GDP per capita and real GDP growth rates is significant in the initial three years under
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SAF programmes compared to the previous three years. Nonetheless, growth rates for 
both countries were no better than countries that did not adopt IMF programmes 
(Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, and Sudan are used here as benchmarks for with- 
without comparisons). Uganda reduced its high rate of inflation in the second ESAF 
programme after six years under IMF programme. Ethiopia’s inflation rate is 
significantly reduced compared to the average for countries without IMF programmes, 
but Ethiopia always had historically low inflation rates. The current account deficit for 
Ethiopia and Uganda showed no significant improvement under IMF programmes. In 
some years the current account deteriorated under IMF programmes. These programmes 
have had positive and significant impact on the reserve holdings of both countries, but 
these improvements are not statistically different from those observed in Botswana and 
the countries without IMF programmes. Countries that did not implement IMF 
programmes actually performed better and improved their external sectors.
The empirical results in Chapter 5 also show that no significant difference was 
observed in the flow of domestic credit to government or in fiscal deficits before and 
after programmes. IMF programmes were associated with significant real exchange rate 
depreciations for both Ethiopia and Uganda, while liberalisation of the financial sector in 
Uganda led to real positive interest rates, but not in Ethiopia. These results indicate that 
IMF programmes were not fully implemented in Ethiopia and Uganda. Moreover, 
programme completion is not correlated with performance. We find cases where target 
variables improved even though programmes were not completed and deteriorated where 
programmes were completed.
There is limited and partial evidence to imply that Ethiopia and Uganda fared 
differently from their pre-reform economic state or performed as or better than Botswana, 
Namibia, Seychelles, and Sudan, which never implemented SAF, ESAF and PGRF 
programmes. The question is: what do improvements in growth rates and international 
reserve holdings mean in transforming the two economies in question? The answer is 
simple: behind the seemingly attractive statistics lie economies with negligible structural 
transformation measured as share of manufacturing output in national income. There is
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nothing to differentiate Ethiopia and Uganda from their pre-reform economic 
predicaments as well as from countries which did not implement IMF programmes. A test 
of structural transformation shows that despite recidivism the Ethiopian economy de­
industrialised while Uganda industrial sector stagnated. These conclusions are supported 
by results which illustrate that the share of manufacturing in GDP declined by 1 per cent 
for Ethiopia, comparing the years with IMF programmes with those without. The 1 per 
cent increment for Uganda is significant only when compared to the late 1970s and early 
1980s, which saw sharp declines in the share of manufacturing.
1.9 The Developmental State is the Missing Link
Structural transformations took place in other parts of the world, particularly East 
Asia as a direct result of state intervention. Chapter 6 argues that the missing link in 
countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda is the developmental state, which would mobilise 
finances, create state-society relations for selective credit, subsidies, protection, and other 
industrial policies. The central argument in this thesis is that the failure of IMF- 
programmes to bring about meaningful development is because the rationale 
underpinning it sets aside the developmental role of the state, despite conclusive evidence 
that it has contributed to industrialisation in other parts of the world. Indeed there is a 
theoretical, historical and empirical case for state intervention to guide structural 
transformation.
The East Asian developmental states were successful in achieving rapid growth 
not least the state mobilising finance and because of state-society relations that allowed 
for selective credit, subsidies, protection, and other industrial policies. East Asian 
industrialisation is a result of the state’s stimulating capital formation to accelerate 
structural change under a state-corporatist system of “governing the market” (Wade, 
1990), complemented by acquisition of technology and infant industry protection (White, 
1988; Hoogvelt, 1990; and Chang, 1993), A capable, independent and committed 
bureaucracy that forged productive relationships with especially favoured capitalists
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implemented these non-orthodox policies. Through such relationships the state was able 
to grant selective credit, tax incentives, public-private investment partnerships, high 
government funded research and development, conflict resolution between capital and 
labour, and simple and quick administrative decisions (Johnson, 1982 and 1999). Whilst 
it is important not to over-generalise, the notion of the developmental state has usefully 
been exported to other East Asian countries, particularly South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. At the same time, the prevailing international political 
economy made it possible for South Korea and Taiwan, as satellite nations of the U.S., 
and Japan a significant ally during the cold war, to pursue a mix of state-led and market- 
led policies, mainly because of U.S. tolerance to “distortions” (Evans, 1987; Woo, 1991; 
Kim, 1995; and Lukauskas, 2002).
Four elements marked the emergence of anti-state, neo-liberal ascendancy from 
the early 1970s. First, it combined ideological supremacy and the financial backing from 
industrialised countries. Second, denial of the East Asian state-driven industrialisation 
provided the platform to argue for dis-engaging the state. Third, based on the 
impossibility for the emergence of the developmental state in SSA, the Washington 
consensus concocts a case for a minimalist state vis-a-vis stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes. These three elements are explicit and abound in the literature. The fourth 
element is subtler and is closely related to the impact of IMF programmes. This thesis 
contributes to the literature by highlighting that the IMF’s use of state-society relation as 
explanation for failure and non-adoption of its programmes has been used to vindicate 
failure of IMF programmes as well as adding to the three elements of the anti-state stance 
described above. The inconclusiveness of the impact analysis as well as the findings of 
the two country case studies clearly demonstrate that there is a missing link in IMF- 
supported stabilisation and adjustment programmes. By advocating new political 
theories, which divide society into competing interests, the Washington consensus 
consistently searches for a way out of its dilemma: added to its usefulness to vindicate 
programme failure, blaming interventions as causes of economic crisis provides an extra 
justification for de-linking the state. A fourth dimension is added to already established 
reasons for excluding state-led strategies.
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This represents a warm embrace of a rationale offered to the IMF by external 
developments within the fields of political science. It has allowed its traditional lack of 
interest in programme results, other than ex post rationalisation with weak empiricism, to 
be sustained. A contrast can be drawn with the cosier reception to the goal of high 
income and employment, other than in rhetoric, and the token confrontation and 
incorporation of the voluminous literature on supply-side economics. This additional 
justification to de-link the state has built the capacity of the state in a paradoxical way. Its 
strength was needed to carry out the unpopular stabilisation and adjustment policies, its 
capability to emulate the developmental state through mobilising finance, providing 
incentives and protection has been curtailed. Often implemented by means of repressive 
actions to counter public opposition, IMF programmes nurture a new form of 
dependency, one based on stringent conditional finance, pushed through by a powerful 
political hegemony with little tolerance to markets “distortions”.
Viewed critically, the common feature of IMF programmes is that they lag best 
practice in terms of the theoretical work, sophistication of impact analysis, range of 
policy objectives, and assumptions over political economy of development. However, by 
the same token, it is not possible to be sanguine about the prospects for such critical 
appraisal from whatever quarter to have a major impact on the thinking of the IMF itself 
let alone its policies in practice. For, to the extent that these are relatively independent of 
one another, criticism can be incorporated by the IMF with the result of strengthening the 
rationale offered for otherwise unchanged policies, circumventing rather than 
incorporating critical insights. In future research, it will be interesting to see how PRSPs 
have been incorporated within the IMF models. Ultimately then, the contribution of the 
thesis rests on adding to the field of knowledge an integrated analysis of IMF’s 
conceptualisation of development. As such, it does not otherwise seek to offer an 
alternative general basis for macroeconomic stabilisation and adjustment for developing 
countries. Indeed, it is to be suspected that such a goal is futile given the specificities of 
different countries across time and place. Possibly more than anything else this explains
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the divorce between the theory and practice of stabilisation and adjustment irrespective of 
the questionable events of each.
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Appendix 1: IMF Facilities23
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF): The IMF for many years provided assistance to 
low-income countries through ESAF. In 1999, however, a decision was made to strengthen the 
focus on poverty, and the ESAF was replaced by the PRGF. The interest rate levied on PRGF 
loans is only 0.5 percent, and loans are to be repaid over a period of 5 /2-10 years.
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) are 
set up in March 1996 and December 1987, respectively. These are highly concessional loans to 
support macroeconomic reforms in low-income countries. The expected duration of the 
programmes supported was 3 years, and the repayment period was 5 /2-10 years. Members 
announce their reforms in policy framework papers and the conditionalities were mainly bi­
annual structural performance criteria.
Stand-By Arrangements (SBA): The SBA is designed to address short-term balance-of-payments 
problems and is the most widely used facility of the IMF. The length of a SBA is typically 12-18 
months. Repayment is expected within 2Vi-4 years unless an extension is approved. Surcharges 
apply to high levels of access.
Extended Fund Facility (EFF): This facility was established in 1974 to help countries address 
more protracted balance-of-payments problems with roots in the structure of the economy. 
Arrangements under the EFF are thus longer (3 years). Repayment is expected within 4/2-7 years 
unless an extension is approved. Surcharges apply to high levels of access.
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF): The SRF was introduced in 1997 to meet a need for very 
short-term financing on a large scale in response to loss of market confidence experienced by 
emerging market economies. Countries are expected to repay loans within 2-2/2 years, but may 
request an extension by up to six months. All SRF loans carry a substantial surcharge of 3-5 
percentage points.
Contingent Credit Lines (CCL): The CCL differs from other IMF facilities in that it aims to help 
members prevent crises. Established in 1999, it is designed for countries implementing sound 
economic policies, which may find themselves threatened by a crisis elsewhere in the world 
economy—a phenomenon known as “financial contagion.” The CCL is subject to shorter 
repayment terms than the SRF, and carries a smaller surcharge of 1/2-3V% percentage points.
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF): The CFF was established in the 1960s to assist 
countries experiencing either a sudden shortfall in export earnings or an increase in the cost of 
cereal imports caused by fluctuating world commodity prices. The financial terms are the same as 
those applying to the SBA, except that CFF loans carry no surcharge.
Emergency Assistance: The IMF provides emergency assistance to countries that have 
experienced a natural disaster or are emerging from conflict. Emergency loans are subject to the 
basic rate of charge and must be repaid within 3/4-5 years.
Source: IMF (2002d)
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Notes
The depression of the 1930s led to the collapse of the gold standard. Following the 
international monetary chaos, the IMF became the protector of the new fixed exchange rate 
regime. The initial negotiations at Bretton Woods focused on granting a supervisory role to the 
IMF on all countries symmetrically, while it was possible to detect greater emphasis on surplus 
countries. This had much to do with Keynes’ own previous work. For instance, Keynes proposed 
a tax on surplus countries and a liquidity of 50 per cent of world imports. The first proposal was 
rejected and the second was reduced to 18 per cent (Krueger, 1998b).
2 The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference also discussed the creation of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the World Bank, established to facilitate 
the flow of official financing to those countries that had low saving rates but which guaranteed 
high rates of return to investment. The World Bank also financed reconstruction programs in 
many countries. The Bretton Woods Conference also conceived the creation of the International 
Trade Organisation (ITO) and the United Nations (UN) as the pillars of the post war economic 
order. The ITO was created after three years following the conference in Havana. The UN was 
established at San Francisco in 1945 (Singer, 1995).
3 The post war currency exchange system resulted in fixing of the price of gold and in 
turn pegging other currencies to the dollar. This system known as the Bretton Woods exchange 
rate system became dominant in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s until its collapse in 1971 
after the closing of the “gold window” by President Richard Nixon (Bordo, 1995). The Bretton 
Woods system was a fixed exchange rate system in which the value of a currency was tied to a 
dollar. The value of the dollar was in turn linked to gold at a fixed rate of US$35 an ounce. The 
system was formally known as the Gold Exchange Standard. What was unacceptable to the 
financial authorities in the U.S. was that the increase in the price of gold could only be matched 
by devaluation of the dollar (Aldcroft and Oliver, 1998). The refusal to devalue the dollar meant 
the price of gold remained fixed despite the increase in the cost of producing it  As a result the 
supply of gold could not finance the growing volume of world trade. The first problem was that 
central banks ran out of liquidity. The response was to substitute gold by other assets to maintain 
a healthy reserve holding. Another option was to allow the IMF to increase its lending. Many 
countries, however, chose to use the dollar and pound sterling as both the U.S. and the UK ran 
balance of payments deficits. The second problem was loss of confidence. Too many dollars in 
the foreign exchange market signalled the likelihood that the dollar might be devalued, sending 
fears among central banks that held reserves in dollars. The success of Japan and Germany in the 
export sector further made the dollar relatively overvalued. With its trade deficit the US and 
hence the Bretton Woods system lacked adjustment mechanisms (Eichengreen, 1996)
4 Multilateral development assistance was a key responsibility assigned to the 
International Financial Institutions (IFI’s), In the 1950s and 1960s the attempt was made to 
promote development through execution of large-scale projects with high rates of return. Such 
project-based assistance was, however, soon to encounter its own problems. First came the scale- 
up problem: it turned out that most of the large-scale infrastructural programs could not be 
replicated. Second is the issue of fungiblity: external assistance replaced local investment in 
projects, which recipient governments would otherwise have financed from domestic sources
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without external assistance. Hence, donor money financed marginal investments and not the 
actual project (Collier, 1998a).
5 See Williamson (1983a and 1983b) for an earlier account of IMF conditionalities.
6 Mosley et al. (1991) point out that staff within the Bank influenced the shift from 
project lending to programme lending. Pre-programme lending was a period in which engineers 
had influence and the programme lending in which economists sceptical of project lending take 
over. The economists disliked the macroeconomic environment in which projects operate, 
emphasised the fungiblity problem and the scarcity of supplementary funding from the recipient 
country.
7 The objectives of imposing conditionalities as summarised by Collier and Gunning 
(1996), are: 1) paternalism, which implies the IMF knows what is best for the country; 2) bribery 
for adopting reforms; 3) restraint on policy reversal; 4) signalling for financial flows from other 
sources; 5) monitoring for donor tracking of their finances; and 6) support to reforms.
8 Lane and Phillips (2000, p. 4) note that moral hazard is a;
"feature of insurance and other forms of risk sharing. It rises when the provision 
of insurance increases the probability of the event being insured against, usually 
because it diminishes the incentives for the insured party to take preventive 
actions. Any insurance entails moral hazard when the behaviour of the insured 
party can influence the probability of the event insured against and there is either 
asymmetric information or some other reason the insurer cannot respond fully 
(by adjusting terms or cancelling coverage) to behaviour that leads to an increase 
in the event’s probability.”
9 The amount of the moral hazard or the benefit to borrowers can be calculated as a 
difference between the interest rate at which the country purchases from the IMF and the 
commercial interest rate. The argument also applies to private creditors who over lend to 
countries in anticipation that the IMF will intervene to rescue. According to Bird (1999);
“Moral hazard would not be a problem if there was uncertainty surrounding the 
probability of an IMF bailout; foreign lenders would then need to factor this into 
their risk calculations. However, recent evidence from Latin America and East 
Asia suggests that the probability of substantial IMF lending in the event of a 
crisis is very high for countries that are globally significant. So has the IMF 
almost unwittingly encouraged excess commercial lending and thereby 
contributed to causing the very crises that it then seeks to overcome?” (p.
965)...The IMF’s existing modus operandi does little to help avert crises. But 
can it help when they happen?” (p. 967).
An important question is posed by Lane and Phillips (2000, p. 3): "how important is any 
moral hazard created by the Fund in influencing borrowing countries’ and lenders’ behaviour 
before a crisis?” The authors test for the extent of moral hazard through indicators of market 
expectations of the IMF’s actions and conclude that IMF financing may lead to moral hazard but 
as a cause of crisis in emerging markets is unduly exaggerated.
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10 Conditionalities were so detailed in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea that the IMF 
recommended changes in the price of gasoline and in the plywood market (Feldstein, 1998).
11 More conditionality is said to have a “synergy” effect where “extensive conditionality 
fosters implementation by creating a critical mass that facilitates progress in related areas and 
helps rally support for the reforms as they begin to show tangible effects” (IMF, 2001b, p. 72). 
The IMF argues, however, that the empirical evidence does not support the synergy hypothesis.
12 See Ferguson (1988).
13 See Mussa (1997) on the IMF’s surveillance activities.
14 Giannini (1999) notes that “the better the credibility-enhancing service of the IMF are, 
the less member countries need to rely on highly visible but sometime problematic tools, such as 
exchange rate pegs, to discipline domestic policymaking” (p. 4).
15 Greater transparency was sought at the IMF in relation to the East Asian financial crisis 
(Fischer, 1999).
16 According to Scholte (1998, p. 5);
"academic institutions and business associations have tended to have the easiest 
access to the IMF. Trade unions have generally occupied second place. Religious 
groups (mainly Christian), development NGOs, and environmental NGOs have 
generally come third. Meanwhile, many and other potential—and potentially 
helpful—groups in civil society have had almost no dialogue with the IMF; these 
have included, among others, smallholder organizations and women’s 
movements. Other inequalities in the IMF-civil society dialogue have favoured 
associations based in the North over groups located in the South. Likewise, 
organizations based in urban areas (especially capital cities) have generally had 
greater access than groups in rural areas.”
17 This has begun with the IMF’s then Managing Director, Michel Camdessus’, address to 
the World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the 
World Confederation of Labour in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Among the recommendations to 
improve IMF’s relations with civil society are: 1) clarify its objectives; 2) gather more 
information; 3) consult more with other multilateral agencies; 4) release more documentation; and 
5) integrate a “civil society official” into selected country teams (Scholte, 1998, p. 3). The IMF 
also increased its country resident representation from 20 to 68.
18 Emergence of a “new consensus” has prematurely been heralded by Singer (1997) who 
argued that the “pendulum is swinging back” to some form of Keynesian thinking in the 
development discourse. Singer is obviously referring to the post-Washington consensus and notes 
that as far as the debate is concerned there is;
“no known method or firm empirical basis for an accurate comparison of 
government failure vs. market failure. There may be a noble prize waiting for 
someone who invents such common scale! In terms of policy, this may not matter 
all that much: both schools could agree that it is important to improve both 
government performance and market performance. Today the pendulum seems to
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be swinging back to such an intermediate position” (p. 293)...away from the 
Washington Consensus, although not necessarily directly back to a new 
Keynesian Consensus” (p. 295).
19 Stiglitz (1998b) also adds;
But this is only part of the story, and even this will not be achieved unless the 
country adopts a broader development focus. If successful, the new development 
strategy will not only raise GDP per capita, but also living standards, as 
evidenced by standard of health and literacy. It will reduce poverty-our goal 
should be it elimination, a goal that the more successful economies have actually 
attained (at least by the absolute poverty standard). It will be sustainable, 
strengthening the environment” (p. 15).
20 As Sender (1999) notes;
“the post-Washington consensus” is based on the old aggregate production 
function and did not divorce itself from the Washington consensus’ core 
analytical approach; the “post-Washington consensus” remains wedded to an 
analytical framework that ignores the specific role of the manufacturing sector in 
economic development” (p. 107).
This point is also stressed by Fine (2001a) who notes that although the “post-Washington 
consensus” broadens the development objectives, it is merely based on the existing market 
imperfection theses with imperfect information added as another form of market failure. Its wide 
coverage of development objectives is done;
“by completely by-passing all criticism of its predecessor that is not based on an 
approach tied to its own understanding of market imperfections, and it precludes 
such approaches as alternatives for future perspectives...its intellectual 
narrowness and reductionism remain striking, for it replaces an understanding of 
the economy as relying harmoniously on the market by an understanding of 
society as a whole based on (informational) market imperfections” (p. 4).
21 According to Boughton (2000) the first role of the IMF as crisis averter came in 1956 
during the Suez crisis. There was fear that the closing of the Suez Canal would bring a financial 
crisis after the Egyptian government’s nationalisation of the canal and when Britain, France and 
Italy began a military campaign. Boughton notes;
“what is most striking about the late 1960s, viewed from the perspective of the 
late 1990s, is that the role of the IMF was confined to the realm of economic 
policy and was linked only indirectly to events in financial markets. At no point 
was the IMF involved in the effort to stabilise the gold market, but it did play a 
crucial role in convincing the British and French governments that they could no 
longer escape devaluation, in evaluating the size of the required parity changes, 
in helping to design the accompanying adjustments to macroeconomic policies, 
and in providing large credits until the new policy regimes could take hold” (p.
282).
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22 These issues for World Bank are discussed in Fine (2001b) and others in Gilbert and 
Vines (2001).
23 In the early to mid 1970s, the IMF introduced special financing arrangements under the 
Oil Facility (OF), the Supplementary Financing Facility (SFF) and the Tmst Fund (TF)’ all of 
which are mainly designated for developing countries.
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Chapter 2 
IMF Stabilisation Programmes: 
Demand-Side Policies
2.1 Introduction
The conceptual framework associated with IMF financial programming, 
pioneered by those who researched under the “monetary approach to the balance of 
payments” (MABOP), can be thought of roughly as relationships between domestic 
credit expansion, income and the balance of payments. The framework establishes a 
direct link between the domestic component of the money supply or the level of 
domestic credit and the external sector or international reserves. The primary focus is 
on maintaining internal and external macroeconomic equilibrium. Internally, the 
disequilibrium is between government revenue and expenditure, whereas external 
imbalances refer to the disequilibrium between imports and exports on the one hand 
and capital movements on the other. And when an economy exhibits these 
imbalances, ameliorative measures must be taken. What is collectively termed 
stabilisation embraces the “corrective” measures such as fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies (IMF, 1987).
This chapter reviews and evaluates the influence of the MABOP on IMF’s FP 
and the policy implications associated with it. The exposition starts with a general 
macroeconomic framework and sets out the FP framework starting with the Polak or 
the “Washington” model (Polak, 1957) as well as the Chicago models (IMF, 1977) 
and shows where FP is now, as set out in Khan and Montiel (1989) as well as Khan et 
a l (1990).1 It is clear that the FP model is highly aggregated and gives pride of place 
to monetary variables as key determinants of the balance of payments. Proponents 
often argue that the model is eclectic. As will be shown, however, FP is essentially a 
short run monetary model with significant deflationary implications.
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FP inspired stabilisation policies are not valid neither in terms of the analytical 
nor the historical literature (Taylor, 1997). The Washington consensus assumes that 
macroeconomic disequilibrium, particularly economic difficulties in developing 
countries is caused by internal or domestic policy errors. Thus, external disequilibrium 
is the result of internal policies that allowed aggregate demand to exceed aggregate 
output or income. This position is indefensible, as external causes such as decline in 
the terms of trade or changes in international monetary policy are often the causes of 
macroeconomic imbalances, leading to a fundamental methodological problem in the 
analysis of the crisis and its solution (Gore, 2000). The dissimilarity in the economic 
structure of developed and developing countries must also lead to prescription of 
different policies, which the Washington consensus often overlooks (Porter and 
Ranney, 1982), Application of standard IS/LM analysis to aggregate demand, where 
equilibrium between the flow of current output and stock of money is established, 
must also be different in developing countries. (Green, 1986).
Mainstream macroeconomic policy prescriptions, which the Washington 
consensus relies on, produce non-standard results when applied to LDCs. Monetary 
restriction and devaluation lead to both recession and inflation. The net impact of 
monetary contraction is a fall in output and an increase in the price level (Taylor, 
1981, 1983 and 1988). These contrasts with the impact on developed economies 
where output falls and the price level also falls. This implies that the stabilisation and 
adjustment process is not necessarily smooth and has an element of stop and go 
(Mosley, 1991a). The usual stabilisation policies have very different, and in general less 
attractive, effects in developing countries than in developed economies. First, it is difficult to 
solve the balance of payments crisis and inflationary pressures, except through severe 
deflation to cut back import demand. Second, all macro policies have effects on the 
government budget and the balance of payments, which affect the monetary base. This in turn 
strictly limits ability to adjust economic conditions in more than the short run. Third, most 
restrictive policy is likely to worsen income distribution.
Although the rhetoric calls for reducing “unproductive” expenditures to restore 
fiscal balances (Tanzi, 1989a and 1994), reductions in public expenditure often fall on 
investment rather than consumption (Comia et al., 1987). Restraint on government
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budgets mean reduction in much needed public investment in health, education, 
infrastructure and food subsidies. Fiscal austerity for macroeconomic balance does not 
take into account high return investments that compensate deficits in the long run 
through increases in tax revenues (see Alesina and Perotti, 1996 and Addison and 
Ndikumana, 2003). The demands of human development and cautionary prudence of 
financial conservatism are contradictory. Financial conservatism becomes less 
important when faced with key development questions in countries where economic 
and social deprivations are deep-rooted. The impact of social development through 
education and health, for instance, has been given less attention in modem economies 
when dealing with growth (Sen, 1998).
The FP framework, however, incorrectly sees the budget deficit as adding to 
demand at a higher level of employment and prescribes budgetary austerity to already 
impoverished countries (Dell, 1982 and Sachs, 2000). The Washington consensus is 
stuck with the idea that growth suffices to reduce poverty, regardless of the 
assumptions and where no targeted subsidies, credit and social safety nets exist (OAU, 
1981; UNECA, 1989; and Mkandawire, 1998). No account is taken of the fact that 
credit expansion may be linked through policy with investment and capital 
accumulation (Tarp, 1993). Getting prices right is a cmel medicine and the short- to 
medium-term deflation certainly falls upon income.
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the case 
made for stabilisation and adjustment programmes on the part o f the IMF and 
advocates of neo-liberal reforms. Section 2.3 outlines the general macroeconomic 
framework as a background for the FP model. Section 2.4 examines the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments, pinpointing its origins and additional influences. 
Section 2.5 extends the discussion of this approach and shows how the IMF built its 
financial programming model. Section 2.6 shows how FP is deflationary and 
inappropriate to address the development challenges faced by many developing 
countries. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 2.7
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2.2 Why Stabilisation and Adjustment?
According to Williamson (2000, p. 252-253) the elements o f the Washington 
consensus are:3 a) fiscal discipline; b) redirection of pubic expenditure priories 
towards health, education and infrastructure; c) tax reform, including the broadening 
of the tax base and cutting marginal tax rates; d) interest rate liberalisation; e) 
competitive exchange rate; f) trade liberalisation; g) liberalisation of inflows of 
foreign direct investment; h) privatisation; i) deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry 
and exit); and j) secure property rights. These policy measures are commonly divided 
into demand-side (stabilisation) and supply-side (adjustment) policies with the 
exchange rate having a supply as well as demand effect. Fiscal and monetary measures 
are categorised as demand-side policies while trade liberalisation, deregulation of 
markets, privatisation, and institutional reforms fall under supply-side policies. The 
thinking behind the IMF approach is to stabilise the economy in the short-run by 
demand side policies, while in the medium to long run adjusting or reforming the 
structure of the economy by supply-side policies.
The need for stabilisation arises due to the following: a country with a fixed 
exchange rate and a balance of payments equilibrium may be facing a rate of increase 
in its prices more than the increase in the foreign price level. This could be due to 
various reasons including wage inflation, excess monetary expansions, and a fiscal 
deficit. The consequence is to shift domestic demand towards imported goods while 
the world demand for exports of the country in question declines. This will result in 
pressures on balance of payments, particularly the current account balance, which 
could be financed by borrowing from abroad or running down international reserves. 
As is also apparent from discussion in the next chapter, orthodox adjustment policies 
base their argument for reform on government failure. These involved regulation of 
prices, which led to loss of international competitiveness; exchange controls, which 
led to illegal transactions; import-substitution policies, which focused on encouraging 
domestic manufacturing capability through import controls; overvalued exchange 
rates; binding ceilings on interest rates; and a heavy dose of public ownership. The
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argument is that these policies required state administration and intervention, which 
turned out be an avenue for self-interest.
Thus, given the above case for stabilisation, there are two policy options. First, 
most developing countries pursued a strategy of exchange control and quantitative 
restrictions to suppress the demand for imports and as the same time lessen the 
pressure on reserves. This, according to proponents of IMF stabilisation programs, 
resulted in inefficient rent-seeking; over-invoicing and under-invoicing of imports and 
exports respectively; smuggling; exaggerated tourist expenses; overpayments for 
overseas obligations; and errors and omissions in trade statistics. Quantitative 
restrictions also, resulted in severe shortages of vital inputs such as petroleum, 
machinery and fertilizers (see Krueger, 2000). The second option, which is favoured 
by advocates of the IMF stabilisation approach, is the deflationary option: Using 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies the demand for imports can be restrained 
and the pressure on reserves relieved. Earlier studies of IMF stabilisation programmes 
outline the conceptual framework and show how demand-side policies can be used to 
restore equilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate supply (Crockett, 1981, 
Khan and Knight 1981, 1985 and 1987, and IMF, 1987).
The central premise of the deflationary option states that the rate of growth of 
aggregate demand needs to be consistent with the rate of growth of aggregate real 
supply plus net capital flows from abroad. If the economy runs a rate of growth of 
demand in excess of the rate of growth of real supply of output, the price level and the 
deficit in the balance of payments increase. Hence, equilibrium is restored via FP, 
which restrains aggregate demand. It is essential to note that IMF programmes are 
designed under the assumption that the “crisis” in stabilising and adjusting countries 
is internal or domestic in nature. The line of reasoning follows that; first, external 
disequilibrium is the result of internal policies that allowed aggregate demand 
(absorption) to exceed aggregate output or income. Second, government-induced 
distortions resulted in inefficient allocation of resources. It means external causes such 
as decline in the terms of trade, the debt overhang and trade barriers are ignored. The 
emphasis on internal factors rests on the argument that the existence of external 
factors does not mean there is no need for domestic adjustment. External economic
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factors are part of the benign and malign of global economics. As key IMF officials 
argued during the heydays of stabilisation, the emphasis on internal factors is because 
that is what a country can influence and for what it can obtain financial assistance 
(Quattara, 1986).
2.3 The General Macroeconomic Framework
Financial programming models often make reference to a small open economy 
under a fixed nominal exchange rate regime. The analysis starts with a 
macroeconomic framework, in which the economy is divided into four sectors. 
Namely the private sector, the public or government sector, the foreign sector, and the 
monetary sector. The macroeconomic assumption is that for any sector, income 
generated from production plus net transfers must equal expenditure plus savings of 
the sector in question. It is also assumed that savings are channelled to borrowing and 
the two together equal physical and financial asset acquisition.4 As shown below, FP 
models take the Keynesian general macroeconomic framework of national income; 
savings and investment; public sector deficit; and balance of payments deficit as their 
starting point. The venture is adding financial models to explain changes in the 
balance of payments.
2.3.1 The Private Sector
The private sector consists of households and firms. Its income (Yp) is 
generated from workers’ wages (co); capitalists’ profit (7e); net transfer from the 
government (TRgp) in the form of welfare and other benefits; and net transfer from 
the foreign sector (TRfp). The private sector’s expenditure (Ep), on the other hand, is 
composed of consumption (Cp), taxes (T<£), interest payment on foreign debt (IPpf) 
and savings (Sp). Therefore, income and expenditure for the private sector can be 
stated as follows:
Yp = go + 7t + TRgp H- TRfp
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Ep -  Cp + Td + IPpf + Sp
Private sector savings plus domestic credit (t/DCp) plus borrowing from the 
foreign sector (fi©fp) or net private sector assets are held in the form of private 
investment (tfrCp), money (<iM), net private borrowing to the government (f/Bpg) and 
net foreign assets fr/FAp). Where d is the first difference operator, which denotes a 
one period change (e.g. dDC -  DCi - DCo), the following identity can be formulated:
Sp + JDCp + r/Bfp = JKp + t/M + <fBpg + c/FAp
The budget constraint of the private sector expressed in terms of the resource 
gap (Sp - (fKp) is, therefore, equal to:
2.1
Sp - <^Kp- Yp - Cp - Td -  IPpf - <^ Kp
= t/NI d* t/Bpg T dFAp - dDCp - t/B jp
2.3.2 The Government Sector
The government revenue or income comes from direct and indirect taxes (T); 
revenue from state-owned enterprises such as utilities (SEg); and transfer from the 
foreign sector (TRfg), in the form of aid, for instance. Government expenditure (Eg) is 
on consumption (Cg); net transfer to the private sector (TRgp) as described above; 
interest payment on loan from the foreign sector (IPgf) and savings (Sg). Income and 
expenditure for the government sector can be expressed as follows:
Yg = T + SEg + TRfg
Eg -  Cg + TRgp + IPgf + S g
Government savings plus borrowing from the private and foreign sectors or net 
public assets are held in the form of public investment and net foreign assets. The
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government obtains credit from the domestic monetary system and loans from the 
private sector.
Sg + dDCg + t/Bpg + dBfg ~ d¥Lg + dFAg
The budget constraint of the government sector is expressed in terms of the 
fiscal deficit (Sg - dKg);
2.2
Sg -  dKg = Yg - Cg - TRgp - IPgf - dKg 
= dFAg - dDCg - dBpg - dBfg
2.3.3 The Foreign Sector
The foreign sector gets income (Yf) from its exports or imports of the 
domestic economy (Z), interest payments from the private (IPpf) and government 
sectors (IPgf). Expenditure (Ef) by the foreign sector is on exports (X) from the 
domestic economy or its imports, net transfers to the private (TRfp) and government 
(TRfg) sectors, respectively, and foreign savings (Sf). The foreign sector’s income and 
expenditure can also be expressed as follows.
Y f= Z + IPpf + IPgf
Ef = X + TR fp + TR fg + Sf
Where e\ denotes the exchange rate and R the level of international reserves, 
foreign savings or net accumulation of assets by foreign residents against the domestic 
economy is equivalent to the liabilities of the same economy.
Sf= - (dFAp + dFAg + e\ddA)
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Since the current account is defined as exports of goods and services less 
imports of goods and services including interest payments and net transfers, the 
foreign sector’s budget constraint can be expressed as:
2.3
CA =X - Z - IPfp - IPgf + TRfp + TRfg 
or
CA = cfFAp + t/FAg + ettfR
2.3.4 The Monetary Sector
As the domestic monetary sector does not generate income, expenditures 
cannot be identified nor a budget constraint specified. The role o f the monetary sector 
is intermediary. Its primary function is to disburse domestic credit to the private and 
government sectors (DC = DCp + DCg) and deposit international reserves (etR). 
Hence the monetary system can be expressed in terms of a balance sheet identity with 
credit and reserves as assets and money (M) as liability. Equation 2.4 is the foundation 
for MABOP or financial programming and shows the relationship between the 
domestic economy and the balance of payments.
2.4
t/M = aDC + e\dR
2.3.5 National Income and Absorption
Summing equations 2.1 to 2.3 and subsuming interest payments and other 
transfers into exports and imports-for simplicity-and where G is government 
expenditure the overall balance equation or the national income identity is given by:
2.5
Y = C + cffC+G + X - Z
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Equation 2.5 can aiso be written as:
2.6
C + ttti + G = Y + Z - X
Equation 2.6 tells us that the amount of absorption (C + dK  + G = A) of goods 
and services in the economy is financed by income from domestic production (Y) or 
from the external sector (Z - X). Another way of looking at equation 2.5 is in terms of 
the trade or current account balance. Where the consumption function is Keynesian (C 
= a + bY), the change in the trade balance, is given by;
2.7
X - Z = Y - (C + e/K+ G)
X - Z = Y - A  
C A = Y - A 
dCA = (l-b)dY - dA
The absorption approach is a simple stabilisation model, in which the 
behavioural content is broad and country specific. It does not show a cause and effect 
mechanism. For instance, if imports exceed exports or the current account balance is 
negative, the economy is absorbing more from the external sector than domestic 
production. The analysis focuses on the view that depreciation of the exchange rate 
leads to expenditure-reduction on domestic output. Put differently, the higher the 
average propensity to import and the lower the price elasticity of demand for imports, 
the deflationary impact of devaluation is considerable. On the other hand, if export 
supply responds to the devaluation positively, the deflationary impact may be offset or 
is small as a result of increased demand for domestic output, generated in the export 
sector.
The choice between the two deflationary options, that is domestic credit 
restraint and devaluation, depends on a number of factors. For instance, where 
industry relies on credit finance, monetary control is not preferred, at least in high
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magnitudes. Second, if the economy exhibits large unemployment and low output, 
exchange rate depreciation is preferred anticipating that it will bring about relative 
price changes and increase in demand for exports and import substitutes or 
expendeture-switiching (see the next Chapter for extended discussion of exchange rate 
policy for expenditure-switching). Third, it is technically easer to devalue the currency 
with just one public announcement. Finally, devaluation is favoured for its effect on 
changing expectations as well as for its uniform impact cross sectors (Bird, 1983).
In the case of expenditure-reduction, devaluation must either increase income 
(Y) or decrease absorption (A) to improve the current account balance (CA). These 
are the demand- and supply-side effects of exchange rate policies. The effect on 
income could be through increased demand for and supply of exports as well as a rise 
in the demand for import substitutes as well as the terms of trade effect. On the other 
hand, the impact on absorption is firstly through the Pigou effect where an increase in 
prices of imports leads to a fall in wealth and consumption.5 Secondly, depending on 
the response of money wages to the increase/decrease of profitability in the tradable 
and non-tradable sectors as well as factor intensities and factor mobility in the tradable 
sector, devaluation could result in a redistribution of income from wages to profit. 
This is under the assumption that a higher proportion of savings are made out of profit 
than wages. Wage earners and profit earners differ in their marginal propensities to 
spend, redistributing income from labour to capital (Krugman and Taylor, 1978). If 
the supply of exports increases due to devaluation, the deflationary impact may be 
offset if the government raises revenue and hence expenditure by taxing new profits. 
However, it has been found that, at least in the short run, devaluation has a 
redistributive effect as well as changes the domestic terms of trade (Krueger, 1978 and 
Bautista, 1982). Expenditure is also affected as devaluation increases the domestic 
currency cost of debt-servicing significantly (Bird, 1983).
2.3.6 Savings and Investment
The relationship between savings, investment and the balance of payments can 
also be analysed from the above equations.6
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2.8
X - Z = (Y - C) ~ dK - G 
X - Z  = S - d K - G  
diC + G = S - ( X - Z)
<fKp + dKg + G — Sp + Sg - (X - Z)
Equation 2.8 shows that if savings from the private as well as the government 
sectors fall short of the levels needed to finance investment and autonomous 
government expenditure, resources must come from the negative external resource 
balance. The link between savings and the balance of payments can clearly be seen 
from the following relationship. By adding equation 2.1 and 2.2 and using the balance
n
of payments identity we obtain:
2.9
(Sp - JKp) + (Sg - </Kg) = dM. + JFA - dDC 
(Sp - ^Kp) + (Sg - dKg) = dFA + e\dR.
The implication of this analysis is that if  an improvement in the current 
accounts is sought, private or government savings must rise relative to investment. An 
increase in aggregate savings, therefore, is crucial to improve the balance of payments 
as well as promote long-term growth through financing fixed capital formation. This 
is one of the aspects that gave rise to the MABOP. Raising aggregate savings relative 
to investment requires a monetised economy and a well functioning financial sector, 
which is lacking in most developing countries. Hence, the policy option focused on 
manageable monetary variables such as the level of domestic credit.
2.3.7 Public Sector Deficit
As shown in equation 2.2 the government fiscal deficit can only be financed by 
borrowing from the foreign and private sectors as well as credit from the domestic
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monetary system. The change in net foreign assets takes place through foreign 
borrowing by the government or decreasing reserves through (equation 2.4).
2.10
Sg H" dK.g ~ c/FAg - isBpg - t/Bfg - t/DCg
Equation 2.10 can be rewritten as the government budget deficit to show the 
mechanisms through which a deficit can be financed.
2.11
Sg - <iKg — cffCp - Sp ■+■ dFA + (fifM - ^/DC)
Equation 2.11 states that the government fiscal deficit is also financed when 
private savings exceeds private investment or by an increase in foreign indebtedness 
(i.e. a decrease in net foreign assets) or an increase in domestic credits which are in 
excess of the demand for money. This last method may imply monetisation of the 
deficit. The relationship between the fiscal deficit and the balance of payments is 
bome out when the deficit is financed through running down international reserves. 
Unless there is a counter movement in the current account through for example, an 
increase in exports or demand for import substitutes, the balance of payments will 
deteriorate due to the method of deficit financing. Capital flight also has a direct effect 
on the balance of payments, which implies a reduction in net private borrowing to the 
government and an increase in net foreign asset of the private sector (Equation 2.10). 
This process has implications for the public sector borrowing requirement and 
consequently to the balance of payments if the deficit is monetised. Once again 
reduction o f government deficit, via imposing ceilings on the level of domestic credit 
expansion, becomes an easy policy option where an increase in exports and the 
demand for import substitutes is not feasible in the short run.
2.3.8 Balance of Payments Deficit
Equation 2.3 can also be written in terms of resource balance as follows:
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2.12
X - Z = (IP - TR) + dFA + etdR
The above equation states that if interest payments (IP) by the private as well 
as the government sector are too high, a negative resource balance is only possible if 
net transfers (TR) exceed interest payments or international reserves can be utilised. 
Net transfers can exceed interest payments if  additional foreign borrowing or aid is 
available. Manipulating equations 2.3 and 2.4 shows the link between the domestic 
monetary system and the balance of payments:8
2.13
C A = X - Z - IP + TR = dFA + etdK  
dFA + etdR = Y - A - IP + TR 
e^dK -  (Y + TR - dFA - IP) - A = dM  - dDC
Equation 2.13 implies that the amount of domestic absorption A exceeds 
income plus net transfers by the same amount by which domestic credit exceeds the 
domestic demand for money. The central conclusion of this analysis is that the 
imbalance between aggregate supply (domestic production) and aggregate demand 
(absorption) and the resulting inflationary pressure is the result o f liberal credit 
expansion, hence a deterioration in the balance of payments or a fall in international 
reserves. This gave rise to the MABOP.
2.4 The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments 
(MABOP)
Models that link the balance o f payments with financial variables have 
developed within the IMF’s Research Department and are mainly associated with the 
monetary theory commonly known as the Mundell-Fleming model. The essence of the 
model is set out in Polak (1957) and Polak and Argy (1971).9 Later in the 1970s, 
under the title The Monetary Approach to the Balance o f Payments, the models were
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further popularised by Chicago researchers in Frenkel and Johnson (1976), Johnson 
(1977) and IMF (1977). Polak (2001) argues that the “Washington” or the Polak 
model and the Chicago model differ in their inspiration and in the way they treat the 
time horizon for the adjustment mechanism or the multiplier effect of expansion in 
domestic credit. The Polak model stemmed from an attempt to explain income and the 
balance of payments with monetary factors under the assumption of “a regime of par 
value”. On the other hand, the Chicago model was formulated to investigate the 
impact of exchange rate changes, mainly devaluation, on the balance of trade based on 
the absorption approach. Both models, however, link the balance o f payments with 
monetary variables where policy allows the latter to influence the former.
2.4.1 The Polak Model
The approach to the balance of payments associated with Polak (1957) differs 
from the conventional thinking (i.e. the elasticities and absorption approaches) 
because of its emphasis on the effect of domestic credit on the balance of payments 
and the role of the government deficit as the generator of domestic credit. Polak 
argued;
“the multiplier analysis was a simplification that seemed particularly 
appropriate in the depression conditions of the 1930s when the demand for 
money was highly elastic. This particular simplification is much less useful 
in dealing with developing countries, where money is kept almost 
exclusively for transaction purposes and its demand is not very elastic"
(Polak 1957, p. 2).
Polak also argued that when the demand for money is elastic, policy makers 
cannot afford to ignore monetary variables and rely exclusively on the multiplier. A 
key element in the emergence of MABOP is its rejection of the Keynesian assumption 
that changes in the level of domestic credit can have an impact on net foreign lending 
via changes in the interest rate. The fundamental concept behind MABOP is that when 
monetary expansion from domestic sources exceeds the demand for money, further 
spending, particularly on imported goods and services will cause deterioration in the 
balance of payments via the money supply and international reserves. According to
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Polak (2001) domestic credit is a combination of business investment that is not self- 
financed or not financed by sales of shares and bonds; consumer spending financed by 
credit from the banking sector; and most importantly government deficit spending 
financed by the domestic financial system.
Given the above background, equations 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.10, namely the 
national balance, the external balance, the monetary balance and the fiscal balance 
provide the framework to the Polak model. However, these equations are referred to 
as the “empty framework”, mainly because they are macroeconomic identities and do 
not show a transmission mechanism due to the absence of behavioural equations. As 
Tarp (1993, p.60) notes, these “identities do not give clues how ex ante gaps (i.e. 
differences among the “intentions” or “plans” of the various sectors at the beginning 
of a period under study) must close during the period so that they are in balance ex 
p o s t” The contribution of Polak, therefore, is to include the two behavioural 
equations (the demand for money and the demand for imports) in the general 
macroeconomic framework outlined above. In doing so Polak identified a mechanism 
through which policy makers can affect the balance of payments.
The principles involved in the Polak model are relatively simple. First, there is 
a stable relationship between the supply of money and the level of nominal income 
determined by expenditure -  extra income leads to extra spending. Second, 
expenditure can either be made on domestically produced goods or on imports. Third, 
if imports exceed exports, then there will be a balance of trade deficit, which will have 
to be covered by an outflow of foreign reserves at the expense of the domestic money 
supply (and inflow for balance of trade surplus). Fourth, with a new level of money 
supply established, the whole process is continuously repeated. One immediate 
implication is that increases in the domestic supply of credit will lead to an increase in 
imports and a corresponding outflow of foreign reserves restoring the overall money 
supply to its initial level (Fine and Hailu, 2001),.
As a monetarist approach the model assumes that all markets can work 
perfectly.10 Other implicit assumptions include no capital mobility, savings equate 
investment at all times and endogeniety of the money supply. The characteristic of the
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country in which the Polak model operates is a small open economy with a fixed 
nominal exchange rate. Using the balance sheet approach, as was illustrated in 
Equation 2.4 above, Polak explains the changes in the money stock (M) as the change 
in the assets items-foreign assets of the banking system (etR) and domestic assets of 
the banking system (DC).11 Therefore,
2.14
dMSi = etdR + dDC
By treating net transfers (TR) less interest payments (IP) less the change in net
12
foreign assets (dFA) as “non-trade related foreign currency inflows” dF for 
simplicity, equation 2.12 can be expressed as:
2.15
etdR = X - Z - IP + TR - dF 
et^R = X - Z + dF
Thus the change in the stock of money can be expressed as follows;
2.16
dM  = X - Z + dF + dDC
In addition to the assumption of supply-side detemiined output, the key 
assumption of the Polak model is constant velocity of circulation of money (v), which 
is the frequency with which money changes hand is constant, which forms a 
proportional relationship between the change in the money stock and income. In other 
words, the velocity of circulation is institutionally determined at least in the short­
term. Thus;
2.17
dM  = Yt - Yt„i = dY
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Equation 2.16 combined with equation 2.15 gives the formal equation for the 
determination of income.
2.18
Yt ^  Yt-1 + + X - Z + dF
Besides domestic credit the other variable that determines income and the 
balance of payments, identified by Polak, is the level of exports. Since exports are 
treated as exogenous-determined by foreign demand-most of the variation in the 
balance of payments occurs through changes in imports. It follows that, if  the increase 
in domestic credit is used entirely for expenditure on locally produced goods, income 
increases in the same proportion. At the other extreme, if the increase in domestic 
credit is used for expenditure on imports, the effect on income will be insignificant.
This leads to the introduction of the two behavioural relationships in the model 
-  the demand for money and import functions. The demand for money function in this 
model is restricted in a sense that it excludes the effect of expected inflation and the 
rate of interest. It also relies on nominal income as the main determinant of money 
demand. The justification for the exclusion of the rate of interest is on the basis that in 
most developing countries the capital market, which enables the transition between 
money and real assets, is underdeveloped. Therefore, changes in the rate of interest do 
not stimulate changes between money and real assets, effectively ruling out the effect 
of fiscal and monetary policy on the balance of payments as set out in the Mundell- 
Fleming model. The demand for nominal money balances Mtd, where v is a constant 
income velocity of money, is stated as follows:
2.19
Mtd v = Yt 
(/Mtd = v"1 dYt
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The demand for money equation is derived from quantity theory-under the 
treatment of output as an exogenously determined variable. In the above model, 
“flow” equilibrium in the money market is assumed to hold, that is the public “will 
succeed in adding to its balances at the desired rate during the programmes period”
(Khan et a l , 1990, p. 159). Therefore the demand for money is at constant equilibrium
d swith the supply o f money (<fMt = cMt = Agenor and Montiel (1996) formalise 
this as;
2.20
Mtd = vt_1yt - v t-l'V t-l
The treatment of imports in this model is such that imports are specified as a 
fraction of nominal income where \x is marginal change in the value of imports due to 
a change in nominal income. In Polak (1957), the current level o f demand for imports 
is dependent on the previous level of nominal income.13 The import function in the 
Polak model is similar to that of the Keynesian multiplier although the effects of 
consumption, investment and savings are excluded (savings are taken to be 
immediately invested, S=I at all times).
2.21
Zt = p Y t
The Polak model is a simultaneous model consisting of the above four 
equations namely the balance sheet identity (equation 2.14), the external balance 
(equation 2.15), demand for money (equation 2.19) and imports (equation 2.21). The
1 • 14reduced form of these equations can be written as:
2.22
et<*. = X - n(Yt - dMtdv) + dF
Equation 2.22 shows how the transmission mechanism from domestic credit to 
the balance of payments takes place. An increase in domestic credit increases the
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money supply through equation 2.14. Since the money market is in equilibrium the 
increase in the money supply implies a proportional increase in the demand for 
money. This, through equation 2.19, leads to a rise in income. Similarly, as indicated 
by equation 2.21 the demand for imports will rise. Finally, this will cause a fall in 
international reserves until it restores the money supply at its previous level via 
equation 2.14. The transmission mechanism of any change in the exogenous variables 
can be shown to be that, in the short-run, income will change by a multiplier.
Forty years after his original model was specified, Polak (1997), states;
“One Key characteristic of the model is its simplicity. There were two good 
reasons for this. First, at the analytical level, simplicity was inevitable in our 
view of the paucity of basic economic data such as national income in the 
early post-war years for many of the Fund’s member countries, the total 
absence of econometric models to describe their economies, and indeed the 
probability that this situation would not be remedied for decades ahead.
Hence the choice of the model that needed as inputs only two sets of 
statistics that were generally available-like banking data and trade data.
Second, and even more important, simplicity kept the model focused on the 
key variable that governments could control-domestic credit creation-that 
was seen as crucial to the correction of the balance of payments problems for 
which IMF assistance had been invoked” (p. 16)...“The standard IMF 
conditionality thus evolved the inclusion of a double monetary prescription: 
setting a ceiling on the expansion of the domestic assets of the central bank 
to achieve an acceptable balance of payments result (a flow concept) and a 
floor under the central bank’s holdings of net foreign assets (a stock concept) 
to bring about a satisfactory level of foreign reserves, and to ensure that the 
central bank would not use excessive intervention to counter market 
pressures for a more depreciated exchange rate” (p. 17-18).
Polak also stated that the model has both Keynesian and monetarist elements. 
The former is borne out as a multiplier model with a marginal propensity to spend and 
the latter via the assumption of constant velocity of money circulation. Polak also 
notes that the model has changed and embraced new variables. For instance, domestic 
credit was divided into “credit to the private sector (usually to be encouraged) and 
credit to the government sector (usually to be discouraged)” (p. 17). Moreover, a 
typical financial programming model distinguishes between harmful and necessary 
taxes, judgements on defence expenditure, debt, and concern with human capital, 
social safety nets and poverty.
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2.4.2 The Polak Model and Real Variables
The original Polak model was expressed in nominal terms implying no 
distinction between a change in prices and a change in real income. The following 
equations include prices and thus real variables to define the model in real terms. The 
inclusion of real variables shows the transmission mechanism clearly. For instance, 
depreciation of the exchange rate raises the domestic price level. This in turn increases 
the demand for nominal money balances. As the money supply is affected through 
reduction in domestic credit and changes in international reserves, stock equilibrium 
in the monetary sector is achieved.
The inclusion of real variables is shown as follows. Income now is expressed
as:
2.23
Yt = Ptyt 
dY = dPyt-\ +P t-iy t
When price is included in the demand for money function, it becomes identical 
with the equation for the quantity theory of money .
2.24
Mdtv = Pt yt
When equation 2.24 is expressed in terms of first difference it becomes:
2.25
dMd = v-1 d( Pt yt) 
c/Ivfd = v~^(dPdy+ Pt-i d y+  c/Pyt-l) 
tflVfd = v"*(dP yt + Pt-l d y)
Given Yt = Yt-i + dY  the import function becomes:
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2.26
Zt = n(Pt.yt)
dZt = jn (dP yt + Pt-l d y) 
t/Zt = p [Pt-l(y + K -l)l + M- Yt ^
Using equation 2.14, and 2.25, international reserves can be expressed in terms 
of real variables as follows:15
2.27
e\dK = v-1 dP yt + y - (<iDCp + dDCg)
Setting desired values for the price level, real output and international 
reserves, the model is used to solve for credit expansion. If prices and output are 
determined outside of the system, then there is a one-to-one relationship between 
changes in domestic credit and international reserves: the same result as the model in 
nominal terms.
Similarly, using equation 2.15 (et^R = Xf - Z* + dF) and substituting 2.26 for 
Zf we obtain:
2.28
etdR = (Xt + d F ) -n  (P t-ld y + y t-l)  + ^ y t dP
Equation 2.28 is the same as writing the Polak model expressed in nominal 
income (equation 2.21) in terms of real variables, that is international reserves as a 
function of prices and real income.
Using the above equations and the equilibrium condition in which the demand
d sfor money and the supply of money are equal (Mt -  Mt ) the model serves to 
investigate the effects of changes in the exogenous variables (domestic credit and 
exports) on the endogenous variables (imports and income). For instance, an increase
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in the level of domestic credit will result in an increase in the money supply. Such an 
increase in the money supply will raise income and expenditure. The dynamics of the 
transmission mechanism works under the assumption that the government takes no 
action to sterilise the effect on the money supply. In this model the restriction is as 
follows: domestic credit expansion is only permitted when it is equivalent to the 
difference between the demand for money that is triggered by growing nominal 
income and the amount provided by reserve accumulation. If there is a lasting increase 
in domestic credit, the short-term effect is a rise in income followed by an increase in 
the money supply and consequently a rise in imports, hi this process, however, 
international reserves continue to fall, as there is no matching increase in exports.
The decline in international reserves, therefore, is equal to the extra domestic 
credit injection. In the long-term this leaves nominal income and imports unchanged 
from their original level. This conclusion confirms the link between the domestic 
monetary system and the external sector.
Polak asserts the implication of the transmission mechanism in which a lasting 
increase in domestic credit leads to a rise in imports and a fall in international reserves 
as follows:
“The economic development could have been financed by higher taxes or 
foreign loan. The factories might have been built by restriction of 
consumption or by the repatriation of capital. In all these situations, the 
desire to spend for a particular purpose would not have led to a payments 
problem. In a real sense, the credit expansion is the cause of payments 
problem” (Polak, 1957, p. 13).
The policy conclusion from the above argument is as follows: in order to 
achieve a set target for the balance of payments, particularly the current account, 
domestic credit must be restrained. Particular emphasis is placed on credit to the 
government. It is often assumed that much of the domestic credit is absorbed by the 
public sector. Equation 2.10 shows that if public expenditure is in excess of public 
savings it must be financed by credit creation-assuming foreign assets are 
predetermined and limited public borrowing from the private and the public sector 
(riKg - Sg = c/Bpg + JBfg + riDCg -  riFAg)
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On the other hand, if there is a lasting increase in exports income is assumed 
to increase by the same proportion. Since the demand for money is a function of 
income, given the velocity of circulation, the quantity of money also increases. If the 
excess money supply is spent on domestic goods and services, money or nominal 
income increases. However, the changes in prices and income depend on whether 
there is excess capacity in the economy or not. If the economy has excess capacity 
there may be little or no increase in prices and real income could rise. If the economy 
is operating under full capacity, on the other hand, domestic prices rise relative to 
world prices and real income falls or demand shifts to imports -  with little or no 
improvement in international reserves. The Polak model can also be used to analyse 
the effect of exogenous increase in the level of imports (or a fall in exports) - an 
increase in imports reduces income, with a corresponding fall in reserves and the 
money supply.
2.4.3 The Chicago Model
The theory of the monetary approach to the balance of payments is closely 
associated with papers contained in Frenkel and Johnson (1976) and is commonly 
referred to as the Chicago model. This model is similar to Polak5 s version as it 
assumes the balance of payments to be entirely a monetary phenomenon. The policy 
implications of the two models are similar. According to the Chicago version of the 
model, the link between the domestic component of the money stock (domestic credit) 
and international reserves allows domestic credit to be a policy variable that can be set 
at a desired level of the balance of payments. Both the Polak and the Chicago models 
assume perfect substitution between goods, wage and price flexibility and the country 
is taken as a price taker-who sets prices, however, is one of the most contentious 
issues. The difference between the two models lies on the assumption of full 
employment (which rejects the Keynesian flavour unlike the Polak model) and the law 
of one price by the Chicago model. Polak (2001, p. 12) states that in the Chicago 
model “money is not brought in as a contributing factor in the explanation of the 
balance of payments. It enters at the very begimiing of the story, as a kind of anti-
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Keynesian manifesto”. Another departure of the Chicago model from the Keynesian 
tradition is also the claim that the authorities cannot sterilise the effect of 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments in the short-run. Hence, using the money 
supply as a short-run policy variable provides the perfect solution. Key to the Chicago 
model is also the assumption that autonomous domestic demand or the excess 
domestic credit has no effect on the demand for money. This is because, in the long 
run, instantaneously clearing markets will restore equilibrium back to the original 
starting point.
Thus, the Chicago approach separates nominal income from real income 
through the inclusion of the domestic price level Pd as a product of the exchange rate 
(e) and the foreign price level Pf in line with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory. 
Thus,
2.29
Pd = ePf
Real income in this model is exogenously determined by the neo-classical 
aggregate supply function and, contrary to the Keynesian approach, does not rely on 
aggregate demand. Its growth over time, drawing on Solow’s (1956) vintage model, is 
dependent on some residual, such as technical progress. The demand for money 
function in this model is similar to the original Polak model except that the demand 
for money is now dependent on real income rather than nominal income. The velocity 
of circulation is set equal to one and the equilibrium condition in the money market 
holds. Therefore;
2.30
Mdt=pdtfoy
2.31
etR = Pd t f(yt)-DC
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To determine the rate of change in international reserves, equation 2.31 is 
differentiated with respect to time (t).16 If the foreign price level, the exchange rate 
and real output are assumed to be constant, the change in reserves is given by;
2.32
dR/dt = - dDC/dt
Equation 2.32 implies the rate of change of international reserves is equal to 
the rate of change of domestic credit. Although the Chicago model assumes the 
economy to be at full employment, the expansion in domestic credit does not lead to 
an increase in prices. This is because of the assumption of the law of one price. If the 
domestic price level rises, demand would shift to foreign goods, as the world price, 
under a fixed exchange rate, is now lower than the domestic price level. The 
transmission mechanism in the Chicago model is quick adjusting, that is the fall in 
international reserves is matched by a decline in the supply of money so that the 
balance sheet identity holds. This implies any excess supply of money is eliminated 
instantaneously. This process is clearly demonstrated in equation 2.33 in which the 
world price level, real income and the exchange rate determine the supply of money 
exogenously.
2.33
Mst= ePf f(y,)
Differences between the Polak and Chicago models also include, for the latter 
model, the absence of an import function, the assumption of full employment and 
capacity output at all times. This implies that any disequilibrium in the money market 
leads to changes in the price level or changes in international reserves without changes 
in income as the Polak model suggests. Nevertheless, the policy conclusion of the 
Chicago model is consistent with the conclusion of the Polak model, namely balance 
of payment targets can only be achieved through restriction of domestic credit in line 
with the level of demand and thus with the level of growth of output. Any movement 
below or above this equilibrium will result in movements in the opposite direction 
than necessary to restore the monetaiy balance. If the rate of expansion in domestic
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credit exceeds the demand for money, international reserves will fall and consequently 
the balance of payments will deteriorate.
2.5 A Complete Model for IMF Financial Programming
It is surprising to note that there are only limited writers who present the 
complete model of IMF’s financial programming. The IMF itself has also raised this 
point:
“based largely on oral tradition. There is surprisingly little readily accessible 
written material on its theoretical undeipinnings, in particular, on the 
interaction among policy measures in achieving the ultimate objectives ...
Since the early 1970s, however, the conception and the structure of 
adjustment programmes have gradually evolved and expanded” (IMF, 1987, 
p. i).
The complete model of financial programming is a quantitative modelling 
framework used by the IMF for determining policy targets, which in turn have to be 
consistent with a set of macroeconomic objectives. Hence, it is a consistency 
framework that attempts to ensure that the balance of payments position is 
sustainable, that growth and inflation objectives are consistent with monetary targets 
and that the budgetary expenditures are also consistent with projected financing. The 
stated objectives of the IMF in its financial programming exercise are to bring about 
sustainable balance of payments position and control inflation. These objectives-to be 
consistent with the Meade-Tinbergen-Mundell principle ~ however, cannot be 
achieved with one instrument: the domestic credit.
The Meade-Tinbergen-Mundell principle focuses on the need for a one-to-one 
concordance of policy instruments and targets. The principle was bom out of the post 
World War II analyses of policy making in an open economy. The problem tackled by 
Meade (1951), Tinbergen (1952) and Mundell (1960) was to device a method for 
working out combinations of policy instruments to achieve desired changes in target 
variables. The basic tenet of the principle focused on building a model of an economy 
whereby a number of instrument variables could be consistent with an equal number 
of policy targets. If the equations in the model are consistent and independent, one
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could specify desired values for target variables by solving the model with an equal 
number of instruments. The principle was based on three ideas: 1) assigning each 
instrument where it is most effective to affect the target variable; and 2) distinguishing 
between fixed and flexible exchange rates when assigning instruments to targets. 
Under a fixed exchange rate system it was argued that fiscal policy was most effective 
to correct internal imbalances, while monetary policy was effective to correct the 
deficit in the external sector (see Friedman, 1988 andNiehans, 1968).
Khan et. al. (1990, p. 162), in providing a complete FP framework, point out 
that “[T]he use of the exchange rate as a policy tool provides a way out of this [target- 
instrument] dilemma.” Hence, the MABOP (Polak and Chicago) models can be 
specified by introducing the price equation;
2.34
-  (1-0 ) c/Pd + Gi/ePf
Where 0 is “the share o f importable goods in the overall price index”, equation 2.34 
adds a new policy instrument [de\ (ibid., p. 162). Substituting equation 2.34 into 
equation 2.30 and setting d?td  yt = 0 or ignoring second-order terms yields:
2.35
= v~* ^  ) ^ d  + yt OdePf + v~^Pt-iyt
Khan et al. (1990) introduced the concept of valuation change in variables 
affected by changes in the exchange rate. Valuation change is defined as a change in, 
for instance, the foreign currency value of the stock of international reserves, the stock 
of imports and exports at the previous period multiplied by the change in the exchange 
rate. These would be Rft-/<iePy; Z t-\de? f and Xt-1de?f respectively. Thus, the money 
supply identity can be written as:
2.36
dMs = et dR  + + dDC
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Substituting the demand for money (equation 2.35) and the supply of money
d s(equation 2.36) functions into the equilibrium condition (Mt = Mt ) and solving for 
etdR. yields:
2.37
e\_dR = v"1 P t-lt/y+ [v  * yt Pf 0 - Rft_i]^e - dDC + v~* yt (1- 0 ) cfPd
Khan et al. also change the more restricted import function as specified by 
equation 2.26 by expressing the import volume equation (Zq) as a function of income 
and relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods. Thus;
2.38
Zq = t|0 + r|l y - r|2 ePf/Pd
Given Zt — dZ + Zt-l and assuming dZ is composed of changes in import 
volume due to a additional payment for imports and a valuation change due to 
exchange rate movements (Zt-l dePf), the change in imports can be specified as;
2.39
dZq = T\\d y - p2 deTf + T|2cfPd + Zt-l de Pf 
Where Pd = dPf =  1, Zt is given by:
2.40
Zt = Zt-l + r |id y  + ri2 dPd + (Zt-l - r\2)dePf
Similarly, export volume is assumed to be a function o f the relative price of 
foreign goods in terms of domestic goods. Hence;
2.41
Xq -  <|>ePf/Pd
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Given X = X t-1 + dX  and valuation change Xt-ldePf, the change in exports -
dX  is:
2.42
dX = §deFf- §de¥<x
Therefore;
2.43
X = X t-l + (X t-1 + $)de?f - tydPd
Foreign capital inflows in local currency are equal to foreign capital inflows in 
foreign currency multiplied by the exchange rate, that is;
2.44
F = eFf 
dF = edFf 
dF = (et-l+ de)dFf
When the import (equation 2.40), export (equation 2.43) and the net foreign 
asset (equation 2.45) functions are substituted into the balance of payments identity 
(<?tdR = X - Z + dF), we obtain an extended version of the MABOP models:17
2.45
etdR. = [X t-1 - Zt-l + dFf £?t-l] + [(X t-1 - Zt-l + 0l2 + <|>)) Pf - ^Ff] de - p i  d y  - (p
2 + « d P d
Equations 2.37 and 2.45 can be rearranged to derive equations for afDC (riDCp 
+ dDCg) and de. This enables to obtain values for these policy instruments by 
specifying desired values for the target variables d?& and et<7R. Hence;
2.46
dDC -  v"1 P t-l^y+[v"^ yt P f 0 - Rft-l]ffe + v"1 yt (1- 0 ) <iPd - e\,dR
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And for the exchange rate;
2.47
de = etdR  - [X t- 1  - Zt- l + dFf  et-l] + m  d y- (r|2+ <j>)riPd / [(X t-1 - Zt-l + (t\2 + <!>)) 
Pf - d¥f]
The complete model of FP illustrated above shows where the MABOP reached 
today. The policy conclusion remains the same, but an additional policy instrument, 
the exchange rate, now features prominently. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
expenditure-reduction effect of devaluation, while the level of domestic credit is still a 
major policy instrument. In sum, IMF’s FP framework closely follows the Polak and 
Chicago models in its monetary and fiscal policies, whereas the absorption approach 
emerges as a major framework in exchange rate policies. Credit restraint through 
monetary policies as well as control of government expenditure (under the assumption 
that domestic credit in developing countries is mainly to the public sector) is a major 
policy prescription. The role of the absorption approach in IMF stabilisation policies 
can for example be depicted from the impacts of exchange rate devaluation. The effect 
of devaluation is on domestic absorption rather than directly on the current account 
through the real exchange rate effect. In other words the effect of devaluation is to 
reduce absorption via the real balance effect. This implies exchange rate adjustment is 
primarily to manipulate international reserves rather than the current account through 
growth o f exports. Devaluation also increases the world price level. This in turn will 
increase the domestic price level; reduce the real value of financial assets and real 
wages. As a result wealth and expenditure or absorption fall (IMF, 1987).
2.6 Critique of IMF Stabilisation Programmes
The IMF and its FP-based policies in developing countries have been received 
with criticism in policy making as well as in the international academic circles. The 
critique, which began in the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America, has been revived 
through its application in other regions. According to Radha (1995) critics of
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adjustment programmes can be classified into four groups: the “eclectics”, the 
“structural adjustment with a human face”, the “dependency theorists” and the 
“structuralists”-  ranging from a critique of its theoretical inconsistency to its 
ideological persuasion. Kapur (1998) calls to mind that “if the IMF had a dollar for 
every criticism of its purpose and role by the Right, the Left, and the Centre, it would 
perhaps never again have to approach its shareholders for more money to sustain its 
operations” (p. 115). For instance, Taylor (1988, p. 7) notes the objectives of 
stabilisation should be:
1. “To maintain socially acceptable levels of capacity utilisation and growth, 
especially in sectors and regions dominated by their political base;
2. To keep inflation down to a rate tolerable in terms of the country’s own history of 
price increases and social defences against them -  a “tolerable” rate might range 
from something pretty close to zero in India to 100 per cent in South America’s 
Southern Cone;
3. To alter national wealth and income distribution in line with their regime’s own 
ideological predictions and political constraints;
4. To maintain some degree of self-reliance in trade and external financial 
relationships; and
5. To strive for the first four goals in an environment free from undue economic 
shocks.”
In summary, the main point of the critique is that the Washington consensus, 
based on the neo-classical economic rationale, is justifiable neither in terms of the 
analytical, nor the historical literature. First, it states that macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, particularly economic difficulties in developing countries, is caused by 
internal or domestic policy errors. The Washington consensus departed from earlier 
“dirigiste” strategies through making internal factors largely responsible for economic 
trends. Its reference to the benefits of development emanates from global experiences, 
while its explanation of impediments to this objective are confined to internal factors. 
The assumption is that; first, external disequilibrium is the result of internal policies 
that allowed aggregate demand (absorption) to exceed aggregate output or income; 
and, second, exports from SSA, for instance, are always demanded and foreign 
markets are favourable, but exchange rate overvaluation and trade protection are 
obstacles to successful export-led growth (Gore, 2000). The orthodoxy treats external 
causes such as decline in the terms of trade or changes in international monetary 
policy as having limited responsibility for macroeconomic imbalances. The fact that
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declines in the growth rate of low-income countries being associated with the 
recession in developed economies is ignored. Various studies find that international 
demand impacts upon export growth for small countries (Faini et a l, 1992; 
Mukhopadhyay, 1999; and UNCTAD, 2000.
The position of the Washington consensus is methodologically untenable. 
While the case for stabilisation is made from a globalisation point o f view (external), 
the analysis of constraints remains national (internal). On the other hand, ahistoric 
explanation of success provides the justification for prescribing stabilisation policies, 
while development can only sensibly be measured through study o f structural and 
societal transformations. As Gore (2000, p. 792) put it:
“rather than combining normative economic nationalism with 
methodological internationalism, the Washington Consensus was its mirror 
image. It combined normative economic internationalism with a 
methodologically nationalist form of explanation which attributed what was 
happening within countries mainly to national factors and policies (p. 792).
The transition from historicism to ahistorical performance assessment 
started...[since] criterion used to measure performance was current or recent 
GDP growth rate, and macroeconomic stability, indicated by fiscal and 
external payments balance and low inflation” (p. 794). The goal of structural 
transformation has been replaced with the goal of spatial integration” (p.
795).
Second, the approach to stabilisation in developing countries must also be 
different from that adopted in developed countries. There is dissimilarity in the 
economic structure of developed and developing countries, which in turn must lead to 
prescription of different policies. The structure of developing countries or the 
“standard LDC model” as noted by Porter and Ranney (1982), is characterised by:
• Oligopolistic market structure, which is the result of small non-tradable market 
and protection of the tradable market from foreign competition;
• Imperfect labour market where nominal wages are fixed in the short run;
• High external dependence related to low elasticity of demand for imports. Imports 
prices are fixed. Imports and domestic goods are poor substitutes;
• Excess capacity and surplus labour, which implies the absence of diminishing 
returns to labour. Under-utilised capacity exists because of foreign exchange 
shortage;
• Pricing is based on variable-cost mark up, which means the profit motive is less 
apparent;
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• The ratio of money to GDP is low and money is largely held for transaction 
purposes;
• Income taxes are small relative to developed countries;
• Dual financial sector where the curb market is significant in financing investment; 
and
• Large informal sector.
The above peculiarities of developing economies suggest that the aggregate 
supply and aggregate demand schedules are different from developed countries (Porter 
and Ranney, 1982). Application of standard IS/LM analysis to aggregate demand, 
where equilibrium between the flow of current output and stock of money is 
established, must also be different in developing countries. The aggregate supply 
curve for developing countries is flatter and the slope is determined by the cost of 
working capital (the interest rate) and the exchange rate (through import prices). The 
demand for money also depends on the exchange rate and the level of wages through 
their influence on firms’ variable costs. The assumption of constant velocity of 
circulation of money for several countries does not hold. The level of domestic credit 
and the money supply being below or above real national income is a norm rather than 
an exception (Green, 1986). Therefore, the LM curve appears to be steeper in 
developing countries.
As far as equilibrium in the real sector is concerned, the distinctiveness of 
consumption, investment, government expenditure and net exports in developing 
countries is clearly borne out. Same as the standard model consumption depends on 
the marginal propensity to consume and the MPC out of wages is higher than the 
MPC out of profits. Therefore, consumption is determined largely by labour’s share of 
income and taxes. Investment in developing countries is financed by loans from the 
formal and the informal sector and the former, under a repressed financial system, is 
the same as direct government lending or expenditure. Government spending largely 
consists of wage payments and public sector investment, which is fixed in the short 
ran, The former fluctuates with changes in prices, and falling real wages mean 
decrease in government spending. On the other hand, export prices are determined 
exogenously, and the supply elasticities of exports as well as the demand elasticity for 
imports are small. Trade barriers, taxes/subsidies and the exchange rate also determine
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exports and imports. Due to these features of the economy the IS curve is also 
steeper.18 Mainstream macroeconomic policy prescriptions, which the Washington 
consensus rely on produce non-standard results when applied to LDCs (Taylor, 1988).
Monetary restriction and devaluation are particularly suspect, as they are likely 
to produce both recession and inflation. The use of monetary policy is less effective as 
the financial sector is underdeveloped. The monetary authorities can use monetary 
policy as far as changes in the reserve requirement or liquid-asset requirements of 
commercial banks. They are less able to control the monetary base, which is 
determined by the budget and current account deficits. Because o f the low interest rate 
elasticity of money demand, an increase in the reserve requirement ratio reduces the 
money supply and the decrease in the availability of low interest commercial bank 
loans reduces retained earning. Monetary contraction affects both aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply. The net impact of monetary contraction is a fall in output and 
an increase in the price level (Taylor, 19981). These outcomes contrast with the 
impact on developed economies where output falls and the price level also falls.19
The net effect of fiscal restraint is a decrease in the price level and a small 
increase in output. The latter is because the demand for imports is inelastic and 
remains unaffected. The fiscal restraint reduces the fiscal deficit, leaving the external 
balance unaffected. This means that the monetaiy base is lowered, which brings us 
back to the monetaiy effect where output falls. The impact of exchange rate 
depreciation is also a fall in output and an increase in the price level. Aggregate 
supply is affected through an increase in variable costs. At the same time devaluation 
reduces the monetary base. This implies that the stabilisation and adjustment process 
is not necessarily smooth and has an element of stop and go (Mosley, 1991a). Porter 
and Ranney (1982, p. 762) conclude:
“the traditional stabilisation policies have very different, and generally less 
desirable, effects in LDCs than in advanced country models. Most notably, 
contractionary policy is likely to fuel, rather than dampen, inflationary 
tendencies...First, it is difficult to attack the balance of payments crisis, 
except through serious recession to cut back import demand. Second, all 
macro policies have effects on the government budget and the balance of 
payments, which affect the monetaiy base. This in turn severely limits
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policy-makers’ ability to alter economic conditions in more than the short 
run. Third, most restrictive policy is likely to worsen the income 
distribution”
Third, the impact of inflation on growth can, theoretically be established as 
negative as well as positive. Both Keynesian and monetarist views suggests that 
inflationary finance can mobilise resources for capital accumulation. The mechanism 
is through redistribution of income from wages to profit or consumption to savings 
due to the propensities to save out of profit being higher. According to the monetarist 
view inflation is a tax on real money holdings, while the Keynesian view is that 
inflation lowers real interest rates, which in turn raises nominal rate of return on 
investment. Conventionally, it has been assumed that inflation is equal to the rate of 
monetary expansion. However, if income is increasing and the demand to hold money 
is rising at the same time, a portion of the money supply will be non-inflationary 
(Thirlwall, 1974). On the other hand, unanticipated inflation leads to confusion 
between relative and aggregate price changes, which lead to the misallocation of 
scarce resources. Unanticipated inflation also causes uncertainty in future expectation 
of price and interest rate changes as well as investors’ decision (Moosa, 1997). The 
debate on inflation is far from exhausted and the literature is rapidly growing, while 
there is no conclusive evidence as far as the harmful effects of inflation are concerned. 
In the past three decades developing countries witnessed positive growth and at the 
same time became more prone to inflation (Thirlwall, 1999).
The theoretical debate has led to what might be called threshold empirical 
analysis', an empirical search for an inflation rate above which growth is harmed. 
Most studies have used cross-section regression analysis similar to that of Barro (1991 
and 1996). The econometric evidence on the growth effects of inflation, however, 
remains inconclusive, mainly related to methodological problems (Temple, 2000). In a 
study of 127 countries over 1960-1992, Bruno (1995) as well as Ghosh and Phillips 
(1998) find a positive relationship between inflation and per capita growth up to 5 per 
cent inflation rate. Beyond this rate per capita growth begins to decline. In a study of 
87 countries over 1970 and 1990, Sarel (1996) also finds a positive relationship 
between growth and inflation up to 8 per cent rate but a negative relationship beyond 
this rate. Barro (1996) identifies a negative impact on growth above inflation rate of
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15 per cent. The finding by Bruno and Easterly (1996) sets the threshold at 40 per cent 
and shows that “growth falls sharply during the high-inflation crisis” and “growth 
after the end of the high-inflation crisis was higher than before the crisis, even though 
inflation had returned to about the pre-crisis level or slightly higher” (p. 213). This 
confirms the earlier finding that not only high inflation is bad, but also once a higher 
level is reached there tends to be no return. The high inflation rate will persist and the 
economy will be characterised by “dynamic instability” (Bruno, 1995).
Stiglitz (1998a) also stresses that it is hyperinflation that policy makers should 
worry about. In fact, an inflation rate of 40 per cent can be taken as a norm. Focus on 
the threshold analysis neglects an important structural feature of developing 
economies. This is related to the flexibility of factors of production. If these are rigid, 
expanding and declining sectors inevitably will be inflationary. In most primary 
exporting countries, a decline in the terms of trade leads to inflation if wages are 
downward rigid (Paul et ah, 1997). As Stiglitz (1998a) notes “greater humility” is 
needed on behalf of the Washington consensus for “sometimes misguided” policies 
and for unduly focusing solely on increases in GDP, macroeconomic stability and 
prudence, while the focus should have been on improving living standards and 
eliminating unemployment. Financial conservatism should not be the same as “anti­
deficit and anti-inflation radicalism” and balanced budget does not mean zero 
inflation (Sen, 1998). The absolute inflation figure tells not much and the Non- 
Accelerating Inflationary Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), even in the developed 
economies, was not achieved (Phelps, 1993 and Bruno, 1995). The key lesson is to 
avoid persistent instability and severe deflation. The question therefore becomes what 
is the opportunity cost of reducing inflation? Clearly this cost is related to foregone 
investment in social development.
Fourth, the rhetoric calls for reducing “unproductive” expenditures that do not 
result in improving basic human needs including military expenditure, subsidies that 
favour “urban middle classes” and expansion of public employment at the expense of 
real wage reductions (Tanzi, 1989a, 1994 and Green, 1991). Orthodox programmes, 
however, have no “human face”: the reduction in public expenditure falls on 
investment rather than consumption (Comia et aL, 1987).20 Public investment in
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health, education and food subsidies suffer with major implications for poverty. 
Stewart (1991, p. 1861) found that adjustment policies have contributed to the 
reduction in “the welfare of the poor, slowing and sometimes reversing progress in 
nutrition, health and education”.21
The above findings are consistent with the experiences of IMF-supported 
policies, which shift the burden of the crisis onto the poorer segments o f society. The 
urban poor suffer from loss of earnings and are forced to the informal sector to 
outweigh falling standard of livings (Logan, and Mengisteab, 1993). Reduction in the 
purchasing power of the real wages and rising unemployment are common outcomes, 
which in some cases have provoked political reactions (Taylor, 1997). There is 
naivety and over-optimism in forecasting the performance of an economy in the short- 
to medium-term, mainly on the expansion of traditional as well as non-traditional
exports and the response of savings and investment to financial liberalisation and
00interest rate policies plus expectation of foreign direct investment (Helleiner, 1992).
Similarly, a fall in domestic credit, particularly to the public sector, works
• * 23against “crowding-in” the private sector as investment on infrastructure is reduced. 
Strict requirements for fiscal balance are incompatible with increased donor aid for 
capital expenditure. Often, aid earmarked for investment has to be matched by 
increased recurrent spending, which often lead to a further increase in taxes. Fiscal 
austerity for the sake of macroeconomic balance does not take into account high 
return investments that compensate deficits in the long run through increases in tax 
revenues (see Alesina and Perotti, 1996 and Addison and Ndikumana, 2003).
The demands o f human development and cautionary prudence of financial 
conservatism are contradictory. Financial conservatism becomes less important where 
economic and social deprivations are severe. The impact of social development 
through education and health, for instance, has been given less attention in modern 
economies when dealing with growth.24 As Sen (1998) argued Spending on social 
development contributes indirectly to productivity and income increases as well as 
directly by increasing people’s capabilities to accomplish what they could not without 
literacy and good health. The latter concept is related to the impact of education in
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enabling women to enter the labour market, which allows them to gain independence 
and change their status within the household. Targeted education and health 
expenditure will bring about a “low-fertility-low-mortality society.” Per capita income 
increases tell us nothing about changes in quality of life, inequality and demographic 
change. Broadening of social development also widens the benefits gained from 
increased social spending. This in turn makes financial conservatism less appealing 
and the emphasis on human capital as a factor input in the growth process has 
sidelined the importance of social “development as freedom” (Sen,2001).
There is an “implicit prejudice”, which suggests that human development is “a 
kind of luxury that only richer countries can afford”. However, human development is 
pro-poor and financial conservatism should be the “nightmare of the militarist, not of 
the school teacher or the nurse” (Sen, 1998, p. 739-40). A large budget deficit may be 
a response to the low level of business activity, leading to reduced government 
revenues and higher government transfers, as in the case of most low-income 
countries. The Washington consensus, however, mistakenly sees the budget deficit as 
adding to demand at a higher level of employment (Dell, 1982).25 As Sachs (2000) 
notes:
“[T]he IMF starts with the truth that budget deficits should remain small in 
order to preserve macroeconomic stability. Then it demands budgetary 
austerity of impoverished countries to the point where those countries can’t 
even keep their poor alive—so depleted are the budget resources for public 
health, food transfers to the poor, and the like. In addition, the IMF has 
repeatedly insisted on debt servicing that exceeds the combined spending of 
the health and education ministries. And yet, when the world complains 
about the disasters of IMF conditionality, the IMF’s response is that the 
protestors are obviously macroeconomic illiterates” (p. 3).
The time span for short-term deflation to be offset by long-term growth and 
whether the same groups affected by short-term adjustment costs gain in the long-term 
is also unknown (Addison and Demery, 1985 and 1987). It is not clear how poverty, 
which is more often than not a result of dysfunction in the labour market 
(unemployment and low wages), can be eradicated in a model where full employment 
and perfectly working labour markets are the underlying assumptions. The 
Washington consensus is stuck with the idea that growth suffices to reduce poverty,
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regardless of the assumptions and where no targeted subsidies, credit and social safety 
nets exist. In the case of SSA, for instance, the arguments contained in OAU (1981) 
and UNECA (1989), which pointed out that the importance of food self-sufficiency, 
industrial and human resource development, regional trade expansion, diversification 
of exports, food subsidies, are not taken into consideration.26 The policy of restraining 
domestic credit flows results in shortages of working capital and reduction in 
investment. As noted by Tarp (1993, p.63) “no account is taken of the fact that credit 
expansion may be linked through policy with investment and capital accumulation, 
which might have positive effects of their own.” Rhomberg and Heller (1977, p. 4, 
quoted in Fine and Hailu (2001), state;
“The apparent simplicity of the monetary approach to the balance of payments 
is, however, deceptive. Even for many purposes the demand for money can be 
conveniently expressed as a function of a small number of variables, it is still 
just as much the resultant of all the influences that come to bear on the 
economy, as are national income and expenditure. Again, domestic credit, 
which is often taken as being determined exogenously, may in fact be 
systematically influenced by factors determining the demand for money or by 
some of the events whose monetary effects are being examined. These 
considerations do not invalidate the monetary approach; they merely draw 
attention to the possibility that it will be seen, on further examination, to be 
not quite so superior in terms of simplicity of application as had first been 
thought”.
Finally, devaluation increases import prices and the consequent fall in 
absorption could have negative effects on investment and output. As the demand for 
imports by developing countries tends to be inelastic, the absence o f local alternatives 
for industrial as well as agricultural inputs is what makes the demand for imports less 
responsive. Dependence on imported capital and intermediate goods as well as 
fertiliser inputs is not recognised within the FP framework. Influential studies have 
shown that devaluation has serious distributional implications as propensities to save 
differ between low-income urban wage earners and high-income profit earners 
(Krugman and Taylor, 1978; Loxley, 1986 and Taylor, 1988 and 1993b). As Helleiner 
(1983a) put it; the “short- to medium-term burden of adjustment inevitably fall 
disproportionately upon income and the volume of imports” (p. 352).
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter it has been shown that the conceptual framework associated 
with IMF financial programming has evolved from the simple Polak model to a 
complete model of stabilisation applied to correct macroeconomic imbalances, mainly 
the deficit in the external sector by demand-side measures, hi IMF’s vocabulary: 1) 
high inflation rates discourage savings and investment and, as a result, economic 
growth slows down; 2) an overvalued exchange rate undermines competitiveness of 
exports and import substitutes; and 3) expansion in domestic credit, particularly to the 
public sector, is a culprit in accelerating inflation and current account deficits. Crudely 
put, the policy implications are to devalue the nominal exchange rate to achieve 
export competitiveness, restrain domestic credit to control inflation and 
simultaneously achieve real exchange rate depreciation as well as an improvement in 
the reserve position. If these policies succeed, there will be an improvement in current 
account deficits as exports rise and imports fall. This process is aided by a fall in 
demand for imported goods caused by devaluation. This simultaneous relationship 
between external and internal resource gaps can simply be demonstrated as follows;27
2.48 Z - X = (I - S) + (G - T)
Equation 2.48 shows that an internal disequilibrium caused either by a 
shortfall in savings or low level of tax revenue is reflected by disequilibrium in the 
current account and vice versa. Shortfalls in savings (high level of consumption) can 
be financed by external borrowing. In stabilisation programmes, however, it is not 
clear how external financing is sustained as resulting increases in investment may not 
necessarily increase capacity to service debt. On the other hand, if external borrowing 
is used directly to finance investment, at least the marginal return from it must be 
greater than the cost of borrowing. IMF stabilisation programmes seem to doubt the 
capacity of most developing economies to generate such a return in the short-term. 
Specifically, external borrowing above assumed sustainable levels is not an option in 
stabilisation programmes simply because reduction of debt burden itself has become 
an objective to which targets are set. Similarly, taxation cannot be increased in the 
short-term as it requires structural policies to increase income, not least the problem of
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low tax base in most developing countries. As a result of the rural, small-scale 
character of production and distribution, particularly in SS A, most market transactions 
go unmonitored by the authorities. Even legal transactions are virtually impossible to 
measure directly.
As clearly indicated in earlier studies from IMF staff (Khan and Knight, 1981 
and Zulu and Nsouli, 1985, Khan, et al., 1990), the short-term feasible policy in the 
typical stabilisation programme is to reduce aggregate consumption and investment 
commonly referred to as aggregate demand or absorption. This is a typical orthodox 
policy recommendation, which tackles price increases and the demand for imports via 
reduction of aggregate demand. The logic is that a fall in aggregate demand leads to a 
decline in the price of non-tradable goods and services. It follows that prices of 
tradable goods and services rise relative to non-tradable goods and services, this in 
turn leads resource shifting into export and import substituting sectors. In the FP 
framework domestic credit is a key policy variable for deflationary policies. The 
complete model of FP brings in the exchange rate as another crucial policy variable. 
The effect of devaluation, mainly through the real balance effect or in reducing 
domestic absorption, is part and parcel of the stabilisation package. This is based on 
the assumption that exports do not quickly respond to exchange rate changes.
FP is essentially a short run monetary model with significant deflationary 
implications. The reduction in the level of credit to the public sector results in 
shortages of working capital and fall in public investment, particularly in social 
services. The demands of human development and cautionary prudence of financial 
conservatism are contradictory. The Washington consensus inspired stabilisation 
policies are not valid neither in terms of the analytical nor the historical literature. 
External and internal imbalances are not necessarily the result of inflated absorption, 
but the direct result of the capacity to increase supply. The standard deflationary 
policies applied in developed countries do not work in developing countries, mainly 
due to their particular structural features. Mainstream macroeconomic policy 
prescriptions produce non-standard results when applied to developing countries. The 
net effects of monetary contraction are falls in output and increases in price levels.
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The attempt to solve the balance o f payments crisis and inflationary pressures with 
severe deflation reduces output and worsens income distribution.
Whether the Washington Consensus results in a superior economic 
performance has been seriously questioned in the literature. As Dombusch (1990, pp. 
42) noted: stabilisation is “not a ticket to prosperity.” In response to the critique, the 
IMF began to extend its short-term demand-side stabilisation concern into medium- 
and long-term supply-side issues. As will be shown in the next chapter, this took place 
via embracing mainstream orthodox supply-side economics, both conceptually and in 
policy.
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Notes
1 Polak (2001) also argues that the Fund or the “Washington” model is Keynesian 
and dubs it the “evolutionary” approach. Polak also refers to the Chicago model as 
“Johnsonian”, after Harry G. Johnson and calls it the “revolutionary” approach.
2 Bird (1997) points out:
“There is, of course, a problem here since economists do not fully understand 
what it is that determines economic growth. Nor is there a consensus about 
how economies work, or whether they all work in the same way. This is 
highlighted by the debate between “new classical” and “new Keynesian” 
macroeconomics with the latter argument that prices are “sticky” in the short 
run. Excess confidence in a particular model therefore reflects more of an 
article of faith on the Fund’s part than a scientific judgement. It is this excess 
confidence, captured by the Fund’s willingness to be exceedingly precise in 
terms of the quantification of macroeconomic policy targets, that is a source 
of concern, as well as a source of conflict between the Fund and borrowing 
countries” (p. 186).
3 Williamson (2000) notes that “I invented the term “Washington consensus” to refer 
to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington- 
based institutions to Latin America countries” (p. 251).
4 See Tarp (1993) and Khan et al. (1990) for analysis of sectoral income and 
expenditure for the four major sectors.
5 Under the assumption that consumption is the function of disposable income and 
real wealth (C = f (Y, W/p), consumers respond to increases in prices and the following 
decrease in wealth by reducing future consumption.
6 Income that is not used for consumption is saved i.e. Y - C = S
7 From AM = + ADC , it follows AM - ADC = e\d$L
SX - Z = Y - A
9 See Blejer et al. (1995) for an account of the IMF’s research activities and the 
contribution of its publications to international economics.
10 In the economics profession the tradition has always been to analyse 
macroeconomic issues under the assumption of perfect product and factor markets. However, 
there exists a literature that does highlight imperfectly competitive product and factor 
markets in macroeconomic analysis associated with Aswicahyono et al. (1995), Ng (1980 and 
1982), Hillier et al (1982), Hart (1982), Dixon (1987), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), 
Mankiw (1988), Stiglitz (1989), Manning (1992), Dixon and Ranking (1994), Damania and 
Madsen (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and many others. These studies are meant 
to correct assumptions of Walrasian competitive markets in microeconomics, which are the 
basis to build on the neoclassical as well as Keynesian macroeconomics (see Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki, 1987 and Mankiw, 1988). However, these studies, besides being theoretically 
complex, mainly focus entirely on developed countries.
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n For the sake of consistency, notations of variables may be different from the 
original Polak (1957) paper,
12 See Tarp (1993, p. 61)
13 Without providing clear reasons, most writers argue that imports are functions of 
present income rather than income from the previous period. Here, we use because <7Yt 
can be significant and cannot be ignored as in the Polak model (note: Yf- = dYi + Y ^). 
Polak (2001, p. 6) restates that;
“No explicit lags are shown in the behaviour equations, but the model 
acquires its dynamic character from the fact that while the flow variables in 
it (Y, Z, X, F) are measured as totals over the unit period selected; the shock 
variables (M, R and DC) are measured as amounts outstanding at the end of 
the period.”
The notations of the variables in this quote are different from Polak (2001). This is 
meant to make them consistent with the rest of the notation in the thesis.
14 Yt_i -  Yt - dYi
15 In Khan et al (1990) it is assumed dP^d yt are “small, so the second-order term” 
dPdtd yt “can be neglected” (footnote 10, p. 159). Tarp (1993) on the other hand, argues, 
“since y  is an exogenous variable that is projected separately, this assumption is not 
necessary” (Note 42, p. 181).
16 See Tarp (1993, p. 60) for further discussion of the Chicago model.
17 Khan et al (1990) assume that dPf = 0, P p  1 and et-1 = 1.
18 Therefore the aggregate demand curve for developing countries is also steep.
19 The increase in the price level in LDCs is because of the flatness of the aggregate 
demand curve. Monetary contraction moves the aggregate demand curve towards the origin, 
but it is insignificant to lower the price level. Monetary contraction also moves the aggregate 
supply curve upwards though the increase in the interest cost on variable inputs. Restrictive 
fiscal policy such as decrease in government spending shifts the demand curve towards the 
origin and the aggregate supply curve downwards. The impact of exchange rate depreciation 
is to shift the aggregate supply curve to the origin and the aggregate supply curve upwards.
20 For the literature on the impact of macroeconomic policy on income distribution 
and poverty see Knight (1976), Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982), de Melo and Robinson 
(1982), Johnson and Salop (1980), Sisson (1986), Kanbur (1987), Harriss and Kusi (1992), 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992), Sahn (1992), Killick (1995b), Sarris (1996), Elson and 
Cagatay (2000), and Dollar and Kraay (2000).
21 Others highlight:
“Whatever we may conclude about distributional effects, there must be a 
strong presumption that, other things being equal, macroeconomic 
contraction will worsen poverty. While the relationship is not tight, and there 
is a room for offsetting policies, there must be a presumption that the greater
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is the reduction in overall absorption the greater is the adverse impact upon 
poverty” (Helleiner, 1987, p. 1506).
“It does not always follow, however, that those who bear the short-run costs 
of adjustment will also benefit from the advantages of improved growth 
performance should it occur” (Addison and Demery, 1987, p. 1495).
22 Stiglitz (1998b) argues the previous development strategies:
“Most of these have focused narrowly on economics. Economics is 
important: after all, one of the features, which distinguish more developed 
from less developed countries, is higher GDP per capita. But the focus on 
economics has confused not only means with ends, but cause with effect. It 
has confused means with ends, because higher GDP is not an end in itself, 
but a means to improved living standards and a better society, with less 
poverty, better health, and improved education” (p. 5) “saw development as a 
technical problem requiring technical solutions-better planning algorithms, 
better trade and pricing policies, better macroeconomic frameworks. They 
did not reach deep down into society, nor did they believe such a 
participatory approach was necessary. The laws of economics are universal: 
demand and supply curves and fundamental theorems of welfare economics 
applied as well to Africa and Asia as they did to Europe and North America.
These scientific laws were not bound by time or space” (p. 7).
23 Taylor (1988, p. 20) points out:
“What usually happens under a demand-reduction programme is that the 
price mechanism is short circuited. The cut-back in real purchases makes 
production fall, cutting import needs directly...Indeed by holding down 
domestic investment, austerity may make repatriation of foreign incomes 
unattractive.”
24 Sen (1998) notes that Adam Smith (1976) dealt with the concept of human capital 
and highlighted the importance of skills and specialisation. Later Harrod-Domar and 
Neoclassical theories of growth, however, put aside the importance of human capital. The 
issue once again became the focus of attention with the advent of endogenous growth theory 
(Romer, 1987).
25 The critical questions are: what are the consequences of reducing aggregate 
demand? And who is taking the burden of such contractions in absoiption? As Dell (1982) 
notes:
“A permanent solution to the problem of cost inflation cannot be obtained by 
seeking to play on the fear of rising unemployment among those who try to 
protect themselves against increases in the cost of living by demanding 
higher wages (p. 599). Demand deflation, if taken far enough, will ultimately 
have an impact on cost inflation — there is no dispute about that. What is in 
question is the need for the heavy social and economic costs that are 
involved” (p. 608).
26 Collier (1998a, p. 5) notes:
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“Whereas growth will eliminate mass poverty, and well-designed growth 
policies will eliminate it quite rapidly, there are important groups for whom 
growth will not be enough. That is why all developed societies have evolved 
sophisticated public welfare, health and pensions programmes. The design of 
redistribution systems, and especially of quick-acting social safety nets, in 
low and middle-income countries will require a lot of skill.
27 The equation is obtained by manipulating the national balance equation (Y = C + 1 
+ G -T  + X -Z).
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Chapter 3 
IMF Adjustment Programmes: Supply-Side Policies
3.1 Introduction
As shown in the previous chapter, the initial economic model attached to financial 
programming is associated with FP, which formulates relationships between domestic 
credit expansion, income and the balance of payments. In response to criticism the IMF 
sought to address supply-side issues via two avenues. The first involved a union between 
the IMF and the World Bank, through a less successful conceptual “marriage” between 
the IMF’s FP and the World Bank’s Revised Minimum Standard Model models (Khan 
and Montiel, 1989 and Khan et a l, 1990). FP primarily focuses on stabilisation of the 
balance of payments and prices within a monetary framework. In contrast, the RMSM 
focuses on growth through investment dependent on domestic savings and external 
finance aided by removal of trade and other market barriers (see Chenery and Strout, 
1966). The idea behind formulating a merged model is to address limitations of the two 
models. The merged model endogenises real output, which the FP model does not, and 
also determines prices, which the RMSM does not. The merged model has four 
instrument variables: taxes, government consumption, the level of domestic credit, and 
the exchange rate and target three variables: income, prices and the level of reserves. The 
model is then used to determine values for the endogenous variables and the three policy 
instruments (Khan et a l, 1990). Operationally, the functions of the IMF and the World 
Bank overlapped. While the IMF began to restate structural issues the World Bank began 
to stress the importance of macroeconomic stabilisation (see Mosley et a l, 1995 and 
Krueger, 1998b).
However, it is not clear how complex issues such as growth can be captured with 
such simple restrictive models in the first place and the subsequent more complicated 
merged model (Polak, 1990). The short run stabilisation content of the model is still 
overriding with no growth dynamics supplied. The model does not have a long run
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steady-state solution as growth from increased exports and other exogenous factors are 
excluded. Even if the model is corrected for steady-state balanced growth, it turned out to 
be unsound and unsuitable for examining long run adjustment issues (Fine and Hailu, 
2002).
Second, besides the attempt to merge the IMF’s and the World Bank’s models, 
mainstream supply-side policies were embraced to address long run adjustment issues. 
Although these policies do not appear as coherent models, they are based on mainstream 
economics that emphasises on the expenditure-switching aspect of devaluation, financial 
and trade liberalisation, and privatisation. In a recent survey Goldstein (2000, p. 4) 
defines IMF’s structural programmes as:
“policies aimed not at the management of aggregate demand but rather at either 
improving the efficiency of resource use and/or increasing the economy’s 
productive capacity. Structural policies are usually aimed at reducing/dismantling 
government-imposed distortions or putting in place various institutional features 
of a modem market economy. Such structural policies include, inter alia: 
financial sector policies; liberalisation of trade, capital markets, and of the 
exchange rate system; privatisation and public enterprise policies; tax and 
expenditure policies; labour market policies; transparency and disclosure 
policies; poverty-reduction and social safety-net policies; pension policies; 
corporate governance policies (including anti-corruption measures); and 
environmental policies”.
The structural or supply-side policies of adjustment programmes stem from the 
assumption that economies that need adjustment exhibit distortions in the general 
equilibrium sense. The argument is as follows: government interventions that go beyond 
correcting private distortions, as in the supply of public goods for instance, but fail to 
correct them, are welfare-reducing in a Pareto optimum framework. Hence, eliminating 
government interventions that do not correct market distortions is welfare-raising. 
Towards the mid-1980s, therefore, the IMF started to complement its short-run 
stabilisation models with long-tem adjustment policies (Demery, 1994).
The first supply-side policy is based on interest rate adjustment in the financial 
sector drawing on the hypothesis laid by the financial repression models of McKinnon
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(1973) and Shaw (1973). These models propose that allowing real rates of interest to rise 
to their market clearing level stimulates higher savings and investment, both through 
raising the average efficiency of investment and by enabling rationing of low-yield 
investment projects. Financial liberalisation is seen as a reversal of “repression” that 
taxed and distorted the sector through interest rate controls and directed credit allocation 
programmes. Repression makes financial assets, especially bank deposits unappealing 
and lead to low level of financial flows into the banking system (World Bank, 1989b and 
Fry, 1980, 1997).
The foundations for financial liberalisation are weak. Saving and investment do 
not always equate and a rise in the former does not necessarily imply increased 
investment. Investment depends on expectations of future demand and prices do not clear 
instantaneously. Effective demand is determined by social conflicts and the resulting 
income distribution (Burkett and Dutt, 1991). The assumption of the auctioneer and the 
absence of institutions are major deficiencies of the model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and 
Stiglitz, 1989, 1993). Country experiences show that financial liberalisation was aborted 
in many Latin American economies due to its negative consequences (Capiro et al, 
1994). While governments in East Asia influenced interest rates, managed credit 
allocations as well as the flow of credit to the export-sector (Wade, 1990 and Amsden 
and Euh, 1993). Liberalisation fails to address the particularities of community based 
local networks and traditional familial relationships within grassroots financial 
transactions (Aryeetey and Nissanke, 1998).
Another core component of IMF supply-side adjustment programmes is trade 
liberalisation, based on the idea that countries would benefit from maintaining their 
higher share in exports (Ranis, 1985 and Helpman and Krugman, 1985). This implies that 
high cost and low productivity economies will fall short of reaping the gains from trade 
(Dombusch, 1974). The model under which the above interactions take place is a general 
equilibrium model, built upon the choices of individual agents interacting solely through 
the market (see Krueger, 1998a). The hypothesis is that trade liberalisation reduces anti- 
export bias and makes exports, more competitive in international markets, mainly by
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reducing exchange rate distortions and export duties (Bhagwati, 1988 and Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan, 1999). Trade liberalisation not only increases the volume of goods and 
services traded, but also benefits the economy through knowledge embodied in the 
products traded (Grossman and Helpman, 1991 and Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). 
Trade liberalisation improves economic performance and positively affects the poor in 
developing countries due to their special structural features (Buffie, 2001). Thus, the IMF 
encourages trade regimes that usually include the adoption of a low, uniform tariff 
structure which provides equal effective protection to all producers of tradable goods and 
the elimination of QRs such as quotas, bans, export and import licensing, and state 
trading monopolies.
However, prices do not necessarily reflet social-costs as the proponents of free 
market advocate. Imperfection are related to factor markets associated with inter-sectoral 
wage differencials, divergence between market and shadow wages as well as sector- 
specific minimum wages (UNCTAD, 1989; Agosin, 1991; and Rodrik, 1992). Many 
studies find no significant impact of trade liberalisation on export performance and 
showed the structural limits of trade liberalisation on export growth (Shafaeddin, 1994; 
Harrison and Hanson, 1999; and Thirlwall, 2000). A recent survey of the empirical 
literature has shown that the direct link between trade liberalisation and economic growth 
is ambiguous, mainly due to suspect methodology and confused econometric analysis that 
failed to distinguish exogenous and endogenous sources of growth (Rodriguez and 
Rodrik, 2001). The success of openness depends mainly on how comparative advantage 
is aided by other sector-specific policies. Examples are research and development 
expenditure, technological advances, and improving quality of products (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995 and Amsden, 1997). Liberalisation in sub-Saharan African economies has 
not been followed by favourable responses because the reforms needed to ensure that 
world prices are transmitted to producers were not in place (McKay et al, 1997 and 
Winters, 2002).
The third supply-side policy, which the IMF adopted, is exchange rate 
depreciation for expenditure-switching via encouraging production for export. The idea is
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that currency depreciation increases foreign demand for exports and raises the domestic 
demand for and supply of import substitutes (Bird, 1983). The case is based on the 
experiences of many developing countries where the overvaluation of the exchange rate 
is seen as pro-imports and ani-exports (IMF, 1987). Another argument for devaluation is 
related to rent-seeking and wasteful administration activities typically encouraged by 
overvalued exchange rates and the associated import licenses and exchange controls 
(Krueger, 1974). Overvaluation of the exchange rate also induces capital flight among 
domestic citizen anticipating further devaluation. As a result, less foreign exchange is 
available for imports (Sachs and Larrain, 1999 and Shatz and Tarr, 2002). Exchange rate 
overvaluation affects productivity gains and hence growth negatively (Edwards, 1989 and 
Cottani, et aL, 1990). These findings have also been ascribed to low growth, low 
investment, low level of savings, and low-level of trade in SSA (see Ghura and Grennes, 
1993; Elbadawi and Majd, 1996; Clement, 1994; and Azam and Devarajan, 1997).
However, the assumption that exports and imports are responsive to prices so that 
capital and intermediate goods could be substituted without causing disruptions in 
investment and output is unrealistically based on perfect mobility of factors of 
production. The structural rigidity or flexibility of developing economies is not taken into 
consideration (Taylor, 1993a and 1993b). Inflation and balance of payments problems are 
inherently related to the structure of production and distribution in an economy and the 
response of primary exports need more than just relative price changes. Policies such as 
investment programmes and targeted subsidies must be considered (Taylor, 1997). 
Devaluation sidesteps the production side of the economy required for building a modem 
and competitive production base through firm-specific knowledge, differentiated 
products, patents, scale economies, externalities, research and development (Amsden, 
1997). There is danger of a fallacy of composition effect in manufacturing (Cline, 1982 
and UNCTAD, 2000) as well as agricultural exports (Bleaney, 1993; Akiyama and 
Larson, 1994; Schiff, 1995; and Weeks, 1995). Little evidence was found to substantiate 
the claim that exchange rate liberalisation has removed the bias against exports, thus 
encouraging export expansion to fuel economic growth in SSA economies (McKay et al, 
1997).
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The fourth supply-side policy, which the IMF embraced, is privatisation. The 
objectives are to foster private sector participation, improve the efficiency of enterprises, 
and create a competitive environment, and improve the government’s fiscal position 
(Cambell-White and Bhatia, 1998). Public choice, property rights and principal-agent 
theories provide the justification to pursue the transfer of public assets to the private 
sector (Vickers and Yarrow, 1995). These theories assume that internal efficiency at a 
firm level and allocative efficiency at economy wide level hold through equating of 
prices with marginal costs. At the same time the government’s fiscal balance improves 
through gains from sale of enterprises, savings made from subsidising unprofitable 
enterprises, and new tax revenues from the privatised enterprises (Cambell-White and 
Bhatia, 1998). In most SSA countries state-owned enterprises have been privatised on the 
basis that they performed poorly, mainly through political interference in management 
decisions as well as protection from competition (Tangri, 1995).
However, theories of privatisation are unduly pessimistic about the motivation of 
state-run enterprises, which often guarantee access to basic services by low-income 
groups. The experience of privatisation suggests that there is no evidence that ownership 
by the private sector is superior over ownership by the public sector as far as efficiency of 
enterprises is concerned (Berg and Shirley, 1987). Private ownership is not necessarily 
better and large private enterprise can equally be bureaucratic and extremely inefficient 
(Chang and Singh, 1993 and 1997). Privatisation actually leads to concentrated market 
structure, mainly due to scarcity of capital, as confirmed by increasing interest shown to 
purchase less competitive industries (Commander and Killick, 1988 and Kikeri et a l , 
1992). Privatised firms can also be inefficient and bureaucratic due to the “free-rider” 
problem in shareholder monitoring. Widespread ownership makes monitoring firm 
operations difficult (Fine, 1997). The experience of SSA is consistent with findings in 
other regions, which shows that fast privatisation was found to be not effective (see 
Stiglitz, 1998a; Solnick, 1998; and Nellis, 1999). In general, privatisation in SSA has 
been hasty and careless, where weak post-privatisation regulatory frameworks,
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undermine its success (Ramamurti, 1997; Cramer, 2001; and Castel-Branco, Cramer and 
Hailu, 2003).
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 examines how the 
merged model of the IMF is constructed and shows how it fails to emerge as a “growth- 
oriented” model for IMF programmes. Section 3.3 discusses the merits of financial 
liberalisation and its constraints. Section 3.4 extends the discussion of IMF supply-side 
policies and examines trade liberalisation, doubting its applicability to primary 
commodity producing low-income countries. Section 3.5 will turn to argue that, exchange 
rate policy, which is meant for expenditure-switching fails to materialise. Section 3.6 
discusses the privatisation experiences of developing countries to demonstrate how the 
private sector alone cannot tackle major structural issues. Concluding remarks are 
provided in Section 3.7
3.2 The Search for a “Growth-Oriented” Model
Towards the mid-1980s an attempt was made to eliminate the link between short- 
run stabilisation measures aimed at “restoring balance of payments' equilibria” and 
longer-term measures aimed at “reforming the structure of an economy and increasing 
growth rates”.1 In operational terms, the introduction of the Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF) in 1986, mainly destined for the least developed economies, was the first 
sign of a move towards addressing structural constraints in the balance of payments 
position. Similarly, the establishment of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) in 1987, and renamed Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF) in 1999, 
signalled a change in rhetoric. According to the IMF the objective of SAF and ESAF 
programmes, which address supply-side issues, are: 1) raising saving rates; 2) securing 
financial stability; 3) liberalising and opening economies to foreign trade; 4) reducing 
state intervention and making markets more efficient; 5) reorienting government 
spending and improving revenue collection; and 6) mobilizing external resources (IMF, 
2001a and 2001b).
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The IMF’s move towards a more supply-oriented adjustment is the reflection of 
the thinking in the profession in the early to mid-1980s as well as a response to criticism 
of FP as described in Chapter 2. Even for Polak (2001, p. 15) the approach:
“by focusing on the balance of payments as residual, it turns a blind eye to 
exogenous impulses originating in the balance of payments. With exports, and 
more recently also capital movements, as the dominant autonomous determinants 
of all the largest economies, any approach that ignores these aspects risks 
incurring a heavy cost in terms of relevance.”
The new thinking and criticism focused on supply-side policies as more 
conducive to output expansion than demand deflation that could cause irrecoverable 
decline in output in the short-term. Moreover, the political change in Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as Soviet Union allowed the IMF to engage in extensive transition and 
transformation of economic systems (IMF, 2001b). Structural adjustment after the 1981 
Berg Report was a terrain left to the World Bank while short-term stabilisation was that 
of the IMF (see Mosley et a l, 1995).2 The conventional distinction between the former’s 
role as a development and project lender and the latter’s balance of payments financier is 
no longer applicable. Krueger (1998b) sites one example of the beginning of joint 
thinking by the IMF and the World Bank: by order of the United States, the World Bank 
was lending to Argentina in the mid-1980s while the IMF refused on grounds that the 
macroeconomic policies were not in line with its prescriptions. This has led to the 
decision by the Boards of the two institutions to co-ordinate their lending policy and 
produce joint papers when a country needs assistance. According to Killick (1995a, p.76), 
the move towards supply-side adjustment by the IMF;
“could also be seen as a Fund response to the movement by the World Bank into 
the area of macroeconomic policy, with the growth during the 1980s of its 
structural adjustment lending; and the increased growth of the debt problems in 
the early 1980s, with an associated emergence for the first time of a problem of 
countries falling into arrears in servicing their past IMF credits.”
The union between the IMF and the World Bank took two forms. The first, and 
less publicised, union between the IMF and the World Bank was on conceptual ground to
96
Chapter 3 Adjustment and Supply-Side Policies
“marry” the FP model and the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM) of the World 
Bank, an earlier version of which is found in Chenery and Strout (1966). The objective is 
to formulate a framework for “growth oriented adjustment programmes” or consolidate 
the short-term models of the IMF with long-term supply side models (see Khan and 
Montiel, 1989 and Khan et a l, 1990). The second involved both institutions crossing 
each their traditional territory and when the IMF begun to provide lending and advice in 
financial, trade and exchange rate liberalisation as well as privatisation.
3.2.1 The World Bank Model
According to Khan et a l (1990, p. 175-176) the idea behind formulating a merged 
model lies in that the “integration of the Fund and Bank approaches into a unified model 
goes a considerable way towards addressing what are perceived to be the principal 
weakness of the two models.” The merged model endogenises real output, which the FP 
model does not and also allows the determination of prices, which the RMSM does not 
address. Similarly, while the FP leaves output to be determined exogenously by a 
neoclassical aggregate supply function, the merged model assumes output to be 
determined endogenously by the Harrod-Domar production function. Others attempted to 
merge the FP framework with some sort of output models in an attempt to relax the 
assumption of exogenous determination of output. The paper by Chand (1989) extended 
the basic FP model by treating nominal income as endogenous within the FP framework 
itself. A more recent paper by Mikkelsen (1998) conducted an empirical exercise for El 
Salvador using the FP models with a neoclassical model of output determination. As 
discussed below the merging of the FP and RMSM models, however, received little 
attention and remains unrealistic both conceptually and operationally.
Financial programming of the type set out in the previous chapter primarily 
focuses on stabilisation of the balance of payments and prices within a monetary 
framework. In contrast, the World Bank’s RMSM focuses on growth through investment 
dependent on domestic savings and external finance aided by removal of trade and other
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market barriers (see Chenery and Strout, 1966). The model of growth associated with 
RMSM is the Harrod-Domar production function in which constant returns to production 
is assumed and the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) is given by a fixed 
coefficient. Full employment is the long run equilibrium, which means that the amount of 
investment needed to catch up with the natural rate of growth is also exogenously derived 
by the growth of the labour force (n). Hence, if the economy is to stay at its long run 
equilibrium, it must follow a steady-state balanced growth (SSBG) where the warranted 
rate is equal to the natural rate of growth. This can be seen from the following 
expressions, where s is the saving rate, a  is incremental capital-output ratio, the 
warranted rate of growth, s/a is given by;
3.56
s/a = n
Although SSBG implies that the rate of growth of all variables remains constant, 
it became clear that this may not hold as the rate of growth of the labour force, the 
savings rate and the ICOR are determined independently of each other. Hence, the 
possibility of SSBG occurring becomes a question. The problem is not only of SSBG’s 
existence but also its stability. The warranted growth rate is tied to the rate of savings and 
incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR). Where investment is also equal to savings, 
income is given by;
3.57
d y t = a**^  d¥L 
dK = aY t - a Y t- l
Equation 3.57 shows that the growth rate is positively related to the investment or 
savings ratio and negatively related to the ICOR, In other words as the economy saves 
and invests out of its given income the higher its growth rate will be. As noted above, the 
growth rate of the economy is related to the growth rate of the labour force, which is
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fixed by various factors some of which are non-economic. The model’s assumption is 
that for full employment of labour with growing productivity, output must grow at the 
same rate as labour. Thus, SSBG is a special case where;
3.58
d y t = a  * dK = n
To guarantee the SSBG, s, a , and n must be varied. Even if these policy options 
are possible, the stability of SSBG cannot be guaranteed leaving the whole process on the 
“knife-edge” as the rate of growth varied from the ratio of savings to ICOR. The 
economy grows at a rate that may be inflationary when it is greater than capacity or 
unemployment when it is below capacity. This implies that SSBG relies on the 
assumption that increases in demand will grow in line with changes in the capital stock. 
The instability problem arises as firms, who are unable to predict the growth of demand 
accurately, do not adjust the capital stock. This problem is also associated with the 
assumption of fixed parameters in the model. For policy purposes, influencing the growth 
of the labour force in the short-run is not feasible as broad social and economic policies 
are negotiated. This leaves the ICOR and the savings rate as viable policy alternatives. 
The mechanisms by which changes in the saving rate can take place are suggested by 
many such as Kaldor, who divided savings into portion saved by workers and capitalists 
(see Fine and Murfin, 1984). However, the Harrod-Domar growth model does not take 
the contribution of technical progress into consideration implying no convergence or 
catching up by developing economics. The model is too aggregate and no structural 
change is shown.
The World Bank’s RMSM is based on the variations in savings, but relies on the 
framework put forward by the Harrod-Domar model. Where Yj is treated as real output, 
from the national accounts identity and where the import function is given by equation 
2.21 in Chapter 2 (Z  ^= pY^), investment can be specified as;
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3.59
<*K = (Yt -C ) + (pYt -X)
Equation 3.59 implies that investment has two components: domestic savings (Sd 
= Yf - C) and foreign savings (Sf ~ pYt - X). Therefore, domestic savings as a function of 
changes in income is given by;
3.60
Sd = (a  + ja)JYt - pYt-1+ X
Equation 3.60 determines what is commonly referred to as the “savings-gap” or 
the amount of savings required to sustain the growth of output. Where Sa  is autonomous 
savings, domestic savings can alternatively be specified as a behavioural function as 
follows
3.61
S d ^ S ^ + s Y t  0 < s < l
In addition to the volume of savings determined by the savings rate (s), the 
autonomous savings required to maintain an increasing capacity output is given by; (see 
Agenor and Montiel, 1996);
3.62
§4 = (a - (ji + dYt ~ (5 -ji)Yt- 1 + X
Khan et al. (1990) expanded the above analysis by introducing a consumption 
function and disaggregating savings into private, public and foreign sectors. Therefore;
3.63
Cp = (1 - s) (Yt-Td)
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Substituting equation 3.63 and the import equation (Z  ^ = pY^) into the national 
identity equation and solving for dK  yields;3
3.64
dK = (s - n)Yt + (1 - s) T - Cg - X
The “foreign exchange gap” in this two-gap model can be calculated from the 
balance of payments equation (dF — X - Z - <7etR )• This is done by modifying the import 
and export functions as follows: where p and 5 are parameters.
3.65
Zt = pYt -p e
And
3.66
Therefore, the foreign savings (rfSp) required to sustain increments to output is 
specified as follows:
3.67
c/Sf = -p-Yt + (P + 5)e - e\dK
Substituting the modified import function (equation 3.65), the export function 
(equation 3.66) and the consumption function (equation 3.63) into the national income 
identity (Yt = Cp + Cg + <7K + X - Z) yields a target value for output under the RMSM.
Hence;
3.68
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dYt = 1 /a '1 - 5 - n [(s + n )Y n  + (1 - jt)T - Cg - (5 - 0)e
The RMSM has two target variables: income and international reserves (dYt and 
et<2R) and three policy instruments: government consumption, taxes and foreign savings 
(Cg5 T and dSF). Therefore, using the instrument variables, desired values for the output 
and international reserves can be set. Via foreign savings and budgetary decisions both 
output and the level of international reserves can be determined. The authorities can 
influence the flow of foreign savings, the rate of taxation and government consumption to 
determine income and international reserves. While, the exchange rate also serves as an 
additional policy instrument through its expenditure-switching effect. At an operational 
level, the model allows projections of foreign aid and borrowing, of which the World 
Bank is one source. The RMSM is a mix of accounting identities with additional 
behavioural equations, which links the national accounts with the balance of payments. 
The emphasis is on projecting financing mechanisms to close the savings and foreign 
exchange gaps. However, the RMSM has no place for the determination of prices, which 
triggered the merging with the IMF’s FP.
3.2.2 The Merged Model of FP and RMSM
For Khan et al (1990) the motivation for the merging of the FP and RMSM 
models, which support the lending activities of the IMF and the World Bank, is “because 
of the potential operational relevance -  a starting point for the design of more realistic 
developing country models that deal with adjustment and growth” (p. 156). It is 
surprising to note that there is little written material on the formal models of the two 
institutions, which sharply contrasts with the enormous interest the subject matter 
attracted over the last three decades. For those who endeavoured to merge the two models 
the motivation rests on the premises that: 1) the models are complementary and can be 
put together to formulate a general framework for linking the external sector with the real 
sectors of an economy; and 2) the task is straightforward as the FP focuses on monetary
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variables and the RMSM on real variables. As shown above, the RMSM is a two-gap 
model in which the level of foreign exchange that can be financed determines the 
potential level of output. It takes the price level as exogenous. On the other hand, FP is a 
model, which focuses on changes in the balance of payments and the level of nominal 
income. Therefore, the attraction to merge the two models stems for a mathematical 
necessity to close the FP by output variable as detennined in the RMSM, and to close the 
RMSM with prices as detennined in the FP framework.
Khan and Montiel (1989) attempt to merge the IMF’s FP framework with a model 
that formulates the expansion of capacity as a linear function of real investment. This 
model is similar to the basic Harrod-Domar function specified above (dy t = ao + airiK). 
The constant ao captures the effects of autonomous increases in output, and a i, the 
coefficient on investment, is the marginal product of capital. Under the assumption of 
capacity as a linear function of real investment, the merged models begins by specifying 
equation 2.1 in Chapter 2, that is the private sector’s budget constraint, as an expression 
of investment by substituting the consumption function (equation 3.63);
2.1a
Yp - Cp - T(i - IPpf - riKp — cfM + ^Bg f^FAp - <iDCp - dOBfp 
cfKp = s(Y t-1 dY t - Td) ” IPpf - dfM - dQg - riFAp ■+■ riDCp + d?Bfp
Similarly, equation 2.2 in Chapter 2, that is the government’s budget constraint, 
can also be specified as an expression of investment;
2.2b
Yg - Cg - riKg - TRgp - IP g f- dFAg - riDCg - riBpg - t/Bfg 
cfKg ^  Yg - Cg - TRgp - Ipgf - ^FAg -f- riDCg c/Bpg + riBfg
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Khan et al. (1990) assume that the public sector’s income (Yg) comes only from 
taxes and its expenditure consists of consumption (Cg), and “[I]t does not engage in any 
investment” (p. 157). Therefore, aggregate investment (<iKp + dKg) is given by;
3.69
dK = s(Ytgp - T) + (T - Cg) - TRgp - IP - (dM + dFA - dDC) + t/Bpg + <7Bfg + Bpg +
c/Bfp
From the RMSM we have the output-ICOR relationship where investment is now 
deflated by the aggregate price level.
3.70
d y t = a  dK / Pt-1 + dP
Where price is given by equation 2.23 in Chapter 2, substituting for the demand 
for money equation (equation 2.19) and equation 3.69 into 3.70 yields;4
3.71
d y t = a ^  [ ( j - v h r f Y t+ P  -j)T  - Cg+ s Yt-i - TRgp - IP - dFA + dDC] / Pt-l + dP
If, for simplicity, the term (1 - s)T - Cg+ sYt-\ - TRgp - IP - dFA + dDC, that is 
the “autonomous” part, is denoted by n and substituting real GDP for nominal GDP (i.e. 
Yt = P ty t or dYt = dP\yt_x + Pt-i d y t ) into Equation 3.71 and multiplying both sides by 
the current price level yields the following equation for the determination of real GDP;
3.72
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d y t = dP ty( l (s -v + 71: / a"^ - (s - v~^)
Solving the above equation for price, after substituting equation 2.34 for dPf
gives;
3.73
dPd = [{dyt - f t ) ori1 - (s - v-1) / {s - v"1) (1 -0)] - 0riePf
Finally, substituting 2.34 (the price equation) into real GDP (dY t = dPtytx + Pt.i 
d y t ), then into 2.19, then both 2.19 and 2.14 into the equilibrium condition for the 
monetary sector, yields the following equation for the determination of the balance of 
payments;
3.74
e,rfR = [(1 -9) dPd y , . t + 6rfePf + PM d y ,  - £®C] v '1
The merged model has instrument variables: taxes, government consumption, the 
level of domestic credit, and the exchange rate (T or Cg, <7DCp, riDCg, and do) and target 
variables: income, prices and the level of reserves {dyt , dPd, and riR). The model can be 
used for “adjustment with growth” policy formulation “given chosen values for the target 
variables, two of the policy instruments can be chosen arbitrarily and the model will then 
determine values for the endogenous variables and the three remaining policy 
instruments. This is the model’s “programming” mode, which is “very transparent and 
thus easily understood. They also require very little information behaviour and are easy to 
apply” (Khan et al., 1990).
How the IMF’s moves towards adjustment by model extension are to be fruitful, 
however, depends upon whether a angle is taken that is forward-looking from the original 
model of FP based on the Polak (1957) model. The merged model remains concerned
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with the short run, with correcting the balance of payments through a squeeze on 
domestic credit creation. In his reply to the “marrying” of the two models, Polak (1990) 
argues that the attempt, firstly, “incapacitates each from doing its own job”, secondly “the 
simplicity that accounted for part of attraction of the two models is lost in their merger” 
(p. 184) and finally apart from intellectual curiosity “it adds little to our knowledge on the 
crucial issues of growth-oriented adjustment” (p. 186).
Polak (1997), in reviewing the place of his model after forty years, remains 
unconvinced about the worth of general, universally applicable models that merely seek 
to provide a framework within which guesswork can be employed. He is also doubtful 
whether his original model can be extended over time or to other policy objectives other 
than through reiteration of speculation concerning macroeconomic estimates. Polak 
argues for retaining his original model by emphasising dependence upon a constant 
income velocity of money, little requirement for data, and simplicity of the model, but 
also stresses the limitations of the approach, rendering it inappropriate for economies in 
transition for example. Similarly, the Development Macroeconomics text of Agenor and 
Montiel (1996), does not give attention to the merged model FP, mainly in view of its 
irrelevance.5
Sadly, the “marriage” between the IMF and the World Bank on an increasingly 
sophisticated macroeconomic modelling remains backward-looking. The outcome of the 
merged model is that stabilisation has been designed around a zero growth rate or an 
unstable growth path. The policy implications of the merged model are the same as the 
standard FP framework. In the short run ceilings on the level of domestic credit and 
devaluation will stabilise inflation and the balance of payments. From this policy 
exercise, however, it is not clear where and how the growth features. The merged 
model’s instrument and policy variables as well as its policy conclusions are the same as 
that of FP, which means that the short run stabilisation content of the model is still 
dominant with no growth dynamics provided.6 In a critical assessment of the merged 
model described in Khan and Montiel (1989), Fine and Hailu (2002), point out that 
setting ao greater than zero makes steady-state long mn growth impossible.
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The short run and pessimistic nature of the model can be demonstrated by the 
following example. From equation 3.66, investment can be stated as follows:
3.74
dK = s(Y t - T ) - pYt + (T- Cg) - X
Here it is clear that steady-state balanced growth is possible only when T, Cg, and 
X are proportional to income. A one time period short run change in these variables 
above trend growth will not have significant impact on growth. Where w is the warranted 
growth rate, the long run outcome can be demonstrated by;
3.75
w = d y t / y t = ao + ct\s + T (1 - ais) - Cg - X
The long run outcome will be that savings will be transformed into real 
investment, while government expenditure and exports make no contribution to growth. 
The assumption that ao is equal to zero is critical to obtain steady-state balanced growth, 
where the growth rate will approach the Harrod-Domar warranted growth rate [a\d¥Jyt ( 
a i j)]} because: [dyt f y t = ao! y t + aidK7yf]. The assumption that ao is greater than 
zero makes the model heavily skewed towards the short-term precluding long-term stable 
growth. The model does not have a long run steady-state solution as growth from 
increased exports and other exogenous factors are excluded. Even if the model is 
corrected for steady-state balanced growth, it turned out to be unstable and unsuitable for 
analysing long run adjustment issues. This is mainly due to the application of a discrete 
and not a continuous time, which is in effect examining a one time period change in 
variables. This raises the question of the distinctions as well as the definitions of what the 
short run and long run are. Essentially a short-run model it does not identify the sources 
and causes of growth, the long-run is damaged by the policy implications attached to the 
model as well as by retaining the restrictive assumption of the FP model. For instance, an
107
Chapter 3 Adjustment and Supply-Side Policies
increase in output, including exports, will only provide temporary relief to the balance of 
payments since the rise in income will eventually increase the demand for higher imports. 
For this result to hold, the economy must be restricted, where no extra investment and 
capacity from the increased output are added. There is also no place for accommodating 
the rise in savings from the output expansion, nor is there analysis of any dynamic 
economies of scale and scope.
It is remarkable to see the logic of the merged model as the short run inevitably 
taking care of the long run — a kind of “pennies and pounds philosophy” applied to short 
run balance of payments stability leading to long run growth (Fine and Hailu, 2002). This 
approach is surprising given the critique of stabilisation has always highlighted the 
harmful effects of shot-term deflationary policies on output and public investment, the 
latter representing a key link to future output expansion. The search for long-term supply- 
side measures fails to take shape through the merger of the FP and RMSM, precisely 
because the macroeconomics attached to the merged model, is based upon the most 
tenuous of analytical foundations to withstand even the briefest critical examination. The 
merger fails mainly because of its obsession with monetary variables; its dependence on 
market perfection and full employment as an organising concept, the artificial division 
between the short and long run; and the equally sharp and artificial division between 
exogenous and endogenous factors.
The fact that the merger has had little reception among practitioners in the field 
shows that it falls short of addressing the problems of development and growth. The 
IMF’s another attempt on supply-side economics relied on mainstream economic analysis 
of financial and trade liberalisation, and privatisation, which are extensively discussed 
elsewhere in the literature. For the purpose of this thesis, the following will provide a 
critical review of some of these policies. The purpose is not to provide a detailed 
discussion, but to show how the IMF responded to the critique of FP by drawing on 
mainstream supply-side economics.
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3.3 Financial Liberalisation
It is widely recognised that the financial sector and particularly financial 
intermediation is crucial to development. This aspect has been captured by early 
literature, which argued the importance of financial sector development for 
industrialisation and growth (Goldsmith, 1966 and Cameron, 1972). The financial sector 
contributes to capital accumulation through mediating between savers and investors. The 
key benefits are: 1) transaction costs of matching savers with investors is reduced; 2) 
inteimediation creates liquidity by borrowing short-term and lending long-term; 3) 
intermediation minimises the risk related lending to investment via reducing information 
costs; 4) diversification of lending means loss from one lending is compensated by 
another; 5) large investment projects can be financed with relatively few savings; and 6) 
investment is directed in the most productive sector of the economy (for review of the
n
literature see Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994 and Agenor and Montiel, 1996).
The primary objective of supply-side policies of the IMF is to improve the overall 
process of financial intermediation by deregulating markets. The main instrument of 
reform is the nominal rate of interest, normally accompanied by measures to raise overall 
credit available to the private sector, for example through the reduction in bank reserve 
requirements and ceilings on the borrowing capacity of the public sector. The basis for 
financial liberalisation comes from the argument that when developing countries face an 
inter-temporal budget deficits, they resort to inflation tax and at the same time reduce the 
cost of interest through financial repression. Repressed interest rates, however, do not 
reflect the tine cost of borrowing and lead to low levels of resource mobilisation. Under 
repressed interest rates savers prefer to hold real rather than financial assets, or to engage 
in unproductive investments or resort to capital flight (see IMF, 1987). The argument for 
interest rate adjustment in the financial sector draws on the conceptual foundations laid 
by the “financial repression models” of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973); in essence, 
these models suggest that allowing real rates of interest to rise to their market clearing 
level induces higher savings and investment, both through raising the average efficiency 
of investment and by enabling rationing of low-yield investment projects.
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The underlying assumption of the mainstream approach, on which the IMF 
heavily relies, is that the financial system is taken as a neutral intermediary between 
savers and investors. The function of the financial sector is the collection of savings and 
their allocation for investment. The key assumptions of this approach include a perfectly 
competitive market; hill employment of factors of production at all times; and these 
factors of production are paid according to their marginal productivity; the supply of 
savings is determined by the inter-temporal preference of individual economic agents as 
well as the level of the real interest rate; the level of investment is also determined by 
marginal productivity of capital and the interest rate; and there is full infoimation 
available to savers and entrepreneurs on the viability of their investment.
The benefits of financial intermediation take place through banks as well as equity 
markets such as stock exchange, depending on how developed the country is. More 
developed economies use equity markets more than less developed economies. The 
financial liberalisation thesis, however, focuses mainly on commercial banks as other 
forms of financial intermediation are small in many developing countries. Bond markets 
are small and the role of development banks is minimal (Fry, 1997). Existing equity 
markets such as stock exchanges are not instrumental in mobilising funds for investment 
and simply serve as casinos (Singh, 1997). The typical programme of financial 
liberalisation involves two main components. First, there is an attempt to allow interest 
rates to be determined by the market. Thus control on both deposit and lending rates are 
abolished or lowered. Second, liberalisation involves reducing quantitative controls in an 
attempt to allow financial intermediaries greater control over the use of their liabilities 
(subject to certain minimum controls maintained for prudential supervision). 
Liberalisation is seen as a reversal of “repression” that taxed and distorted the sector 
through interest rate controls and directed credit allocation programmes (McKinnon, 
1989 and Fry, 1980 and 1997).
Repression of the financial sector has become the focus as many countries 
exhibited negative real interest rates, which was the direct result of controlling nominal
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interest rates at a low level. The justification for compulsory credit allocation is to 
finance priority areas identified as key sector for industrialisation and growth. Credit 
allocation also means imposing certain regulations on the financial sector. These include 
lending requirements, loans to preferred areas on preferential interest rates, refinancing 
schemes, and credit guarantees. There are plenty of cases where governments own 
commercial and development banks enabling them to disburse loans on a preferential 
basis Advocates of financial liberalisation argue that in the face of financial control the 
sector will be inefficient. First, repression will result in proliferation of informal or curb 
markets. These markets may serve a positive purpose, but are outside of the formal 
regulatory body. Second, repression makes financial assts, especially bank deposits 
unattractive and leads to low level of financial flows into the banking system. This in turn 
means low level of financial intermediation, which would otherwise lead to higher 
investment and growth (World Bank, 1989b).
The working of the model is simple: savings are positively related to the rate of 
interest as well as income, while investment is inversely related to it. The higher the rate 
of interest the higher the level of savings and the lower the level of investment. To be 
consistent with equilibrium, there is a unique rate of interest that equates the demand for 
savings and investment. In a typical market-based system, financial institutions allocate 
savings at this equilibrium rate to satisfy the demand for investment, at the same time 
allowing for their profit as a spread between the lending and saving rates. Financial 
repression or government intervention that puts ceilings on the interest rate creates excess 
demand for investment leading to rationing of available funds. In other words the market 
is distorted and the actual interest rate is below the equilibrium rate. The objective of IMF 
financial liberalisation policies is, therefore, to remove this distortion and restore 
equilibrium. Hence, higher savings will satisfy the demand for investment and this in turn 
will bring about market- and investment-driven development and growth. Projected at the 
macroeconomic level, the policy objective is increasing the equilibrium level of savings 
or the ratio of savings to national income (see Stiglitz, 1989 and Arestis and Demetriades, 
1999).
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The theory of financial liberalisation commonly referred to as the McKinnon- 
Shaw Hypothesis, sets out the relationships among investment, real interest rate, savings 
and income. Equations 3.76, 3.77 and 3.78 show the formal relationships, where I  is 
investment, r is the rate of interest, S  is savings, and Y is national income, M  is money, P 
is price (see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973 and Fry, 1982).
3.76 1 = 1 (r) where, dllck < 0
3.77 S -  S (r and Y) where, dS/dr > 0 and dS/dY  > 0
3.78 M/P = /  (Y, I/Y, r*) where dM/?/dVY > 0 and dVY/d r* > 0
The above relationship is best illustrated using Figure 3.1. At a level of income 
(Y3) if real interest rates are market detennined the equilibrium in the financial sector 
will be at point E where the interest rate is r* and the level of investment is I*. If  the 
government intervenes in the market and introduces a ceiling on nominal deposit interest 
rates (Repression 1), real interest rate will be rl, and II level of savings (or investment) 
will be forthcoming at a level of income (Yl). The financial institutions will charge r3 on 
their lending and their profit margin is the difference between the lending and the deposit 
rates (r3 -  rl), which they will use for non-price competition such as opening new 
branches and improving services. Figure 3.1 also shows the outcome if lending rates are 
also repressed. At Repression 1, the lending rate is fixed at r2 and savings will be at II, 
leaving the demand for savings (AB) unsatisfied. Such intervention is rationing of 
available savings. Some profitable investment projects will not have access to credit both 
because they are not identified as priority areas and also because they tend to be high risk 
investments. Therefore, the impact of ceiling on the lending rate is to prevent credit from 
being disbursed to high risk but high profitability areas and encourages lending to low- 
yielding investments.
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Figure 3.1 -  Model of the McKinnon-Shaw Hypothesis
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The case made for financial liberalisation can also be illustrated using Figure 3.1. 
If the government decides to ease the repression and fixes the interest rate r2 (Repression 
2), savings will be at 12 as high-yielding investment also raises income to Y2. At the new 
level of interest rate the unsatisfied demand for investment is reduced to CD. In this 
mainstream comparative static model, policy makers are presented with the clear option: 
either to continue interest rate ceilings or liberalise the financial sector to achieve high 
savings and increased investment in profitable projects. Liberalisation of interest rates is 
also followed by privatisation of state owned banks to increase competition and bring 
about efficiency via decreases in interest spreads (Fry, 1988 and McKinnon, 1989).
Financial liberalisation has been taken up by the Washington consensus as far as a 
rise in deposit rate increases the supply of credit for working capital as well as fixed 
capital formation. In a more formalised way it has been argued that financial 
liberalisation attracts more savings not only from those who previously preferred to hold 
real assets but also those invested in low-yielding projects. The latter group will be 
attracted to savings as the deposit rate increases due to liberalisation. Therefore, higher
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savings in the aggregate economy allows increased investment and growth (Galbis, 
1977). The use of the interest rate as a stabilisation policy tool is preferred compared to 
the traditional direct reduction in the money supply through credit squeeze as shown in 
the financial programming model. In the latter case output falls because of the low 
interest rate elasticity of money demand. Credit squeeze or an increase in the reserve 
requirement ratio reduces the money supply and reduces the availability of loans in die 
financial sector (Porter and Ranney, 1982). Financial liberalisation, therefore, is a counter 
movement to the fall in loanable funds, which is often followed by opening domestic 
financial sector to foreign investors as well as liberalising the capital account. Inflows of 
capital increase in a liberalising economy for two reasons. First, the new deposit rate will 
be above the world rate and marginal productivity of capital will be higher (Bacchetta, 
1992). The dilemma is increased capital inflows will undermine the stabilisation 
objective of controlling inflation. For the policy maker the message is financial flows 
must be anticipated when designing stabilisation programmes (Kapur, 1983 and 
Mathieson, 1980).
So to increase output or maintain it at same level, the initial stabilisation can 
increase the deposit rate and the money supply at the same time, as long as the demand 
for money does not outstrip its supply. The rise in the interest rate will dampen the 
inflationary pressure brought about by the monetary expansion. However, a typical 
stabilisation programme also involves exchange rate policy. Devaluation signals a capital 
outflow as agents expect further devaluation. The increase in the deposit rate counters 
such outflows, assuming that the impact of devaluation on import prices is not significant 
to change output (Kapur, 1983). Such assumptions are highly restrictive as imports are 
demand inelastic in most developing countries. Another avenue is that the money supply 
can be restrained and the currency can be overvalued to control inflation and reverse 
expectation of further devaluation, in effect signalling overvaluation, to maintain capital 
inflows. This would mean deposit rates should not rise significantly above the necessary 
level to eliminate credit rationing. Such stabilisation will maintain output increases 
through availability of loanable funds (Mathieson, 1980).
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What is clear from the relationship between financial liberalisation and growth is 
that the addition of the exchange rate introduces a policy dilemma as devaluation affects 
the price level and capital inflows. The response to such policy conundrum has been to 
argue for sequencing and timing of financial liberalisation. Specifically, the emphasis has 
been on the relative merits of liberalising the capital account first and then the current 
account or vice versa (see McKinnon, 1973, 1991 and Choksi and Papageorgiou, 1986). 
The popular argument is for liberalising the current account first, on the grounds of 
avoiding real exchange rate appreciation that follows capital inflow (see Edwards, 1992). 
On the issues of gradual versus rapid reform the experience of China and East European 
countries particularly Russia is instructive. China managed a gradual reform due to the 
strength of the government and the rapid growth in agricultural income, whereas in 
Russia rapid liberalisation led to two-tier pricing strategy and a squeeze in the state sector 
and fall in output (McKinnon, 1993 and Stiglitz, 2002). The idea is to seek an optimal 
sequencing of financial liberalisation, capital account liberalisation, trade liberalisation 
and domestic real sector liberalisation.
The search for optimal sequencing path is motivated by the need to reduce the 
unwanted effects of liberalisation. As discussed above, devaluation implies capital 
outflows, which must be prevented by higher interest rates. If controls on the capital 
account remain the need for higher interest rates would not have risen. The implication is 
that financial liberalisation should be carried out after real sector liberalisation and before 
capital account liberalisation. It is sensible to liberalise the real sector first as the model 
requires undistorted prices. Real sector liberalisation takes the form of removing 
domestic price controls, removal of subsidies and privatisation. However, sequencing of 
the other reforms is less clear. If the financial sector were liberalised before trade 
liberalisation, credit would flow to the tradable sector only because the sector is 
profitable due to trade barriers. If trade liberalisation is carried out first, then the tradable 
sector will not be able to obtain investable funds from the repressed financial sector. 
Another conundrum is related to fiscal policy. Under repressed financial regime 
governments raise revenue through taxing and direct control of the financial sector. 
Liberalisation means loss of revenue in the short run until the increase in investment and
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output increase tax revenues. In the meantime tax reforms or alternative revenue; usually 
foreign aid is necessary (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994).
3,3,1 Financial Liberalisation Contested
The link between financial liberalisation and development as described above is 
questionable. Financial transactions do not conform to the mainstream analysis and 
banking crises are recurrent (Nissanke, 1991; Goldstein and Turner, 1996; Adams, et aL, 
2000; and Arestis, Nissanke, and Stein, 2003). Early evidence indicates that there is only 
a weak interest elasticity of aggregate domestic savings for both developed and 
developing countries (Giovannini 1983). The critique of financial liberalisation comes 
both on the theoretical foundation and the practice or the experience on the ground. The 
critique focuses on the assumption of always equilibrating competitive market, which is 
the central thesis of neo-classical economics (Singh 1997). Financial liberalisation along 
the McKinnon-Shaw line has led to banking crises precisely because of the weak 
foundations of the theory, which fails to take account of institutional requirements for 
building and transforming financial systems for economic development. In the context of 
SSA, Aryeetey and Nissanke (1998) find that, unlike the “financial repression 
hypothesis”, personal relations, and social cohesion at community level influence 
perception of risk. This is consistent with other findings which underline that a large 
proportion of credit transactions take place within the village and between traditional 
networks, which minimises transaction costs (Udrey, 1993). Analysis of social structures 
and institutions is necessary to understand financial transactions beyond simple market 
equilibrium.
Within the Keynesian tradition it has been argued that savings and investment do 
not always equate and a rise in the former does not necessarily imply increased 
investment. Within the alterative paradigm, it is argued that interest rates are determined 
in the money market and investment very much depends on expectations of future 
demand. In the financial liberalisation model prices clear instantaneously and buyers and
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sellers meet for transaction purposes only. Such assumptions are devoid of institutional 
and historical contexts in which financial market operate. The market reflects the actions 
of banks, consumers, savers, investors, trade unions, government departments, etc. 
Relationships and trust among these institutions is what reduces information costs and 
uncertainty (Soskice, 1991 and Patrick, 1996). As the post-Keynesian critique pointed 
out, the role of effective demand in determining investment does not feature in the 
financial liberalisation model. Effective demand is detennined by social conflicts and the 
resulting income distribution.
First, a rise in deposit rates raises the marginal propensity to save (MPC). As the 
MPC is higher for capital the overall effect is a fall in effective demand. The fall in 
demand is not offset by a rise in investment. The fall in output further depresses 
investment and the rate of profit. The effect of liberalisation is worse on output than the 
case under financial repression. In the long-term high lending rates discourage investment 
and mark-up prices increase, which further deflates demand as real wages fall (Burkett 
and Dutt, 1991). Second, interest rate increases also overvalue the exchange rate due to 
increased demand for savings denominated in the currency of the liberalised economy, 
which affects export performance. Third, banks may loose out as the interest rate spread 
is reduced. The margin for banks is the difference between the lending and the deposit 
rate. Often banks lend long-term on fixed interest rate and pay interest on short-term 
deposits, what is called maturity transformation. If deposit rates rise due to liberalisation 
the banks margin declines further depressing effective demand. Fourth, if liberalisation 
removes taxes on the financial sector government deficit is likely to increase. 
Liberalisation worsens the deficit as government debt repayments also increase following 
interest rate rises. Effective demand is affected through loss of revenue (Dutt, 1991). 
Fifth, market clearing interest rates should not necessarily be positive or very high. 
Experience has shown in Latin America that investment is not forthcoming in the face of 
uncertainty and low expectations. In addition, even under the repressed rate, which may 
be very low, financial savings may be higher as households opt for liquidity preference 
than holding real assets under the face of uncertainty and high inflation. What happens 
under liberalisation is what is commonly known as “upward financial repression”
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(Beckerman, 1988). Either banks will hold excess liquidity or bad loans. The latter is the 
result of excess supply of loanable funds implying the economy is short of profitable 
investment projects.
As the neo-structuralist critique points out, financial liberalisation reduces the 
total supply of credit in the economy through increasing bank deposits that are subject to 
reserve requirements. As savings that were taking place outside of the banking system, 
either in unproductive assets such as precious metals or antiques or in the informal or 
curb market, are incorporated into the formal sector, reserve requirements reduce the total 
available credit (Taylor, 1983).8 The effect of liberalisation may also be to shift currency 
holdings into time deposits, which will increase total credit availability. The effect on the 
informal sector is much more significant than the transformation of unproductive assets 
and currency into bank deposits (van Wijnbergen, 1983a and 1983b). The implication of 
the fall in total credit is decline in output and increase in prices, which makes financial 
liberalisation stagflationary.
At a microeconomic level the financial sector does not work as the typical 
mainstream analysis suggests. Particularly equilibrium is not instantaneous during 
liberalisation. Even under a competitive financial market where loan markets reflect true 
social costs credit rationing may persist (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 and Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). More fundamentally, the neo-classical assumption of the auctioneer and 
the absence of institutions are major deficiencies of the model. This is to do with the 
existence of asymmetry of information leading to moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Stiglitz, 1989 and 1993). Lenders do not have full information on the profitability of 
their borrowers and the projects they are funding. The reason for not having perfect 
information is the sheer size of their loan portfolio and the cost of finding out borrowers 
profitability. One instrument of identifying profitable projects is to increase interest rates. 
However, borrowers with less risky projects prefer not to borrow at high levels of interest 
given the low level of return. Therefore, the loan market will be dominated by risky 
projects changing the portfolio of banks. The banks response will be to ration credit,
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anathema to the liberalisation school. The implication is that liberalisation will not 
reverse credit rationing.
A related concept is also that a stable Financial sector is a public good. A failure 
of one institution spreads across sectors, as the role of financial intermediation is crucial 
to the economic system (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). Another issue is the presence of moral 
hazard. If financial institutions take it the government will rescue them, they tend to 
engage in risky lending. Before instability is spread throughout the sector the government 
must intervene to correct the market failure associated, for example, with imperfect 
information. As a public good, financial stability must be maintained through appropriate 
supervision. The market alone cannot guarantee efficient allocation in the face of market 
failures such as economies of scale and economies of scope. Liberalisation of interest 
rates and privatisation of state-owned banks might not necessarily result in allocative 
efficiency. The result may be a much more concentrated firm structure. Banks cannot be 
small and at the same time diversify their products. If they opt to diversify they lose the 
economies of scale and scope associated with specialisation: the optimal bank size 
remains ambiguous (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994).
What does the empirical evidence show? Various studies have highlighted the 
negative effects of financial liberalisation. Latin American countries have had a bad 
experience and the liberalisation process was aborted in many cases (Capiro et al, 1994). 
Financial liberalisation was followed by increased demand for credit by the private 
sector, which was not matched by increased savings. As a result loan rates went up, 
households continued financing expenditure on consumer goods out of savings, while 
firms engaged in speculative investment knowing that the government would bail out the 
banks. Most lending practices after liberalisation focused on short-term lending to 
investors often located in the urban sector, leaving out the rural sector (Stiglitz and Uy 
1996 and Griffith-Jones and Cailloux 1999).
Financial liberalisation increased volatility and crises in the sector (Akyuz and 
Comford, 1999). The banks also increased interest rates further to compensate for
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increased risk. While domestic savings did not increase significantly, foreign savings rose 
and the economies became dependent on international capital and the associated volatility 
(see Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). As the experience of Chile demonstrated the 
financial sector is characterised by market failures in the credit market under the absence 
of effective supervision (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985 and Araya-Gomez, 1990). The failure of 
financial liberalisation is also due to lack of coordination among other macroeconomic 
policies as was the case in Turkey (Qapoglu, 1990). The experience of Asia is rather 
different. The liberalisation process was managed by government intervention. The 
government influenced interest rates, managed credit allocations, kept real interest rates 
positive, and coordinated the flow of credit to the export-sector (Amsden and Euh, 1993 
and Wade, 1990).
The experience of Latin America and Asia gave rise the revision of the financial 
liberalisation thesis. The review was not a fundamental shift from the theoretical 
underpinning but focuses on implementation. The failure of liberalisation has been 
blamed on wrong sequencing and attention focused on liberalising the real sector first 
(McKinnon, 1991 and 1993). The simultaneous liberalisation of sectors will inevitably 
conflict one another. For instance, high interest rate may cause the exchange rate to 
appreciate and exports to fall (Sachs, 1988).
Financial repression that imposes lending rate ceilings may also lead banks to 
manage their deposit liabilities effectively. Banks may find that the only way to increase 
profit is to increase the volume of credit and deposits. Therefore the repression actually 
may bring about increased deposits through expansion of banking services as the case of 
South Korea aptly demonstrates (Demetriades and Luintel, 1996 and Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1997). Financial liberalisation also made emerging economies more 
susceptible to both currency and banking crises by allowing more liquidity, which finds 
its way into non-productive and speculative projects, thereby increasing the chance for 
borrower default. The institutional aspect of financial transactions is completely ignored. 
For instance, the approach also fails to take account of consumption bubbles, speculative 
behaviour, which in some cases led to major financial crises (see Diaz-Alejandro, 1985,
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and Stiglitz, 1989). The theoretical foundations of financial liberalisation are found to be 
weak and even under strong regulatory and supervisory capacity it may result in financial 
crisis (Arestis and Demetriades, 1999). Strong institutions only abate the severity of the 
crisis but fundamentally what brings about crisis is the liberalisation itself.
In South Korea, premature liberalisation that did not take account of weaknesses 
in institutions resulted in crisis. Financial liberalisation where excess liquidity exits and 
when the real sector cannot absorb liquidity leads to speculative investment (Demetriades 
and Fattouh, 1999). The crisis in Thailand was also the result of financial liberalisation in 
the face of weak institutions (Alba, et aL, 1999). Often liberalisation of both the external 
and internal markets results in financial flows both to the productive and speculative 
sectors. However, the mismatch between the slow growths of the real sector compared to 
the financial sector diverts capital to the speculative sector, which in turn results in 
banking and currency crisis. The outflow of international capital and the chance of a 
crisis occurring in response to changes in short-term loans are greater after financial 
liberalisation (Weller, 2001).
As witnessed in Madagascar in the 1990s, credit flowing to the private sector after 
financial liberalisation was falling although the banking system was on an excess 
liquidity position. The reasons for falling credits; first, is associated with austere 
monetary policy introduced as anti-inflationary measure. Monetary policy resulted in 
higher interest rates and increases in reserve requirements. Second, financial 
liberalisation did not tackle the fundamental issues concerning the risk faced by banks as 
well as the increase in non-performing loans. This was mainly related to asymmetric 
information and adverse selection (Gautier, 1999). Financial liberalisation in Malawi led 
to the removal of credit ceilings and interest rate controls and opened the banking system 
to new competition. The results show that financial liberalisation has significantly 
reduced repression with respect to the depth of the financial system, reduction in 
monopoly power, increase in savings mobilisation and relocation of credit to the 
neglected sectors. However, due to macroeconomic instability during the adjustment 
period, elements of financial repression remain as reflected by a fall in real interest rates,
121
Chapter 3 Adjustment and Supply-Side Policies
increase in intermediation margins and a fall in the relative share of loans and advances 
in total assets (Mlachila and Chirwa, 2002). Financial sector liberalisation measures 
implemented in the early 1990s in Zambia led to a permanent shift in the demand for 
narrow money, which undermined the efficacy of money-based stabilisation efforts 
(Adam, 1999). Liberalisation fails to capture the particularities of community based 
indigenous networks and traditional kinship relationships, which provide insurance to 
private agents and the significance of grassroots financial transactions (Aryeetey and 
Nissanke, 1998).
There is a voluminous econometric work purporting to address the link between 
economic growth and financial liberalisation by examining interest rate elasticities in 
saving, investment and growth equations. Faster rates of growth, high physical capital 
accumulation has been associated with financial development (see World Bank, 1989a; 
King and Levine, 1993 and Fry, 1997). However, it is known that econometrics evidence 
suffers from inappropriateness of using average date for cross-country studies. Overall 
the empirical evidence is very mixed, mainly explained by data problems. Savings data in 
most developing countries suffer from measurement errors and there is evidence of 
constant updating. There are also methodological problems related to using reduced form 
equations for econometric testing. The equations may not be correctly specified and may 
omit relevant variables (Evans, 1995b and Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). Improved 
governance is more important to attract less volatile capital inflows. The success of East 
Asian financial liberalisation is attributed to state intervention and gradual liberalisation 
in response to structural problems such as supervisory capacity. Contrary to the evidence 
in Latin America, where the evidence shows that increased financial flows into 
developing countries have caused consumption volatility, which is the preferred measure 
of welfare improvements (Vos, 1994). The theory that developing countries transfer their 
consumption risk by opening up their economies through increased savings and 
technological transfer is suspect. As Prasad et al. (2003, p. 5) note:
“a systematic examination of the evidence suggests that it is difficult to establish
a strong causal relationship. In other words, if financial integration has a positive
effect on growth, there is as yet no clear and robust empirical proof that the effect
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is quantitatively significant...financial integration should be approached 
cautiously, with good institutions and macroeconomic framework viewed as 
important.”
3.4 Trade Liberalisation
Another core component of IMF supply-side adjustment programmes is trade 
liberalisation. The removal of disincentives to imports and exports is meant to restore the 
external balance, as well as on grounds of efficiency and welfare gains. Associated with 
the idea of trade liberalisation is the reinstatement of classical theory, which claims that 
free trade is the best regime for the whole world. The central facet of this theoretical 
approach is the claim that trading partners always gain from unfettered transactions and 
trade between nations is the same as trade within nations. The theoretical ballast is 
provided by comparative advantage and comparative cost arguments (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985 and Krueger, 1998a). For instance, a country with lower costs arising 
from higher productivity, better technology, lower wages etc., will have guaranteed 
success. What is important is liberalisation and countries with generous natural resources 
would benefit from maintaining their higher share in exports (Ranis, 1985). This implies 
that high cost and low productivity economies will fail to reap the gains from trade. The 
argument for trade liberalisation states if two countries trade and if one of them has 
higher costs of production, under a fixed exchange rates system, the high cost country 
will have a deficit in the balance of payments. As a deficit means an outflow of money, 
the domestic price level will decrease. Lower prices will make the country competitive 
and its trade balance will improve. Under the case of a flexible exchange rate system, it is 
the exchange rate, which adjusts. The deficit country would see its currency depreciate, 
which also means the price of its exports decreases. This will make the country’s exports 
competitive and the trade balance improves. The model under which the above 
interactions take place is a general equilibrium model, built upon the choices of 
individual agents interacting solely through the market (Dombusch, 1974 and Krueger, 
1993a, 1993b and 1998a).
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Krueger (1998a) presents the following reasons why openness is good:
1. Developing countries are dependent on imported good for their structural 
transformation from agriculture to industry and from household production to 
production for trade. In addition, these countries depend on imports for the 
“preponderance” of manufactured goods used domestically. Therefore, the trade 
regime determines the direction in which resources are allocated as well as 
determines the pattern of production, especially in manufacturing.
2. Growth in devolving countries is heavily dependent on capital goods, which are 
usually imported according to comparative advantage. Most developing countries are 
assumed to have comparative advantage in labour-intensive production. If barriers are 
imposed and high cost local production substitutes for imported capital goods, it 
precisely means pulling resources out of labour-intensive areas (or moving away from 
comparative advantage). This means, “slower growth because a given fraction of 
national income saved implies a lower level of real investment as the prices of capital 
goods are higher” (ibid. p. 1515);
3. Developing countries are characterised by low per capita income and this implies 
markets are small beyond housing and food markets. Protecting these markets results 
in low-quality high-cost production beyond that warranted by comparative advantage. 
This is often the result of concentrated market structures and lack of competition. 
While, liberalisation results in low-cost production as well as market destination for 
foreign consumption;
4. The demand for foreign exchange grows faster than the supply of foreign exchange 
earned from exports. As protection attracts resources into import-substituting sectors, 
which are also import intensive, there will be sever shortages o f foreign exchange. 
Persistence to increase the price of foreign exchange leads to more restrictive import 
licensing and exchange control as well increased illegal activity such as smuggling;
5. The consequent authority bestowed upon bureaucrats to allocate scarce foreign 
exchange based on their own discretion and judgement is inefficient. The assumption 
of such power leads to corruption and rent-seeking; and
6. Continuous protection to preserve-import substituting strategies becomes transforms 
into a complex set of trade regime that consumes civil service time, the opportunity 
cost being the development of other institutions and infrastructure.
In summary, if governments intervene and introduce trade barriers, which is 
transferred into higher prices, the market will not work. In other words, an overvalued 
exchange rate is caused by trade protection that misaligned the relative price of non­
traded in terms of traded goods (Shatz and Tarr, 2002). Reversing strategies associated
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with inward-looking and import-substituting policies and introducing liberalisation of 
trade is aimed at restoring market equilibrium and fuelling economic growth. The basis 
for the analysis is the hypothesis that trade liberalisation reduces anti-export bias and 
makes exports, especially non-traditional ones, more competitive in international markets 
(Bhagwati, 1988 and Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1999). The basis for the argument against 
protections is that import-substituting industrialisation that consisted of high tariffs, 
import controls, subsidies; and exchange controls forms an anti-export bias, which results 
in large welfare losses (de Melo and Robinson, 1982).
Import-substituting strategies, by pulling resources into import-competing 
industries, result in export earnings growing less rapidly than the demand for foreign 
exchange and real GDP. The consequence is to impose restrictive import licensing to 
counter foreign exchange scarcities and resort to trade barriers. The famous example of 
countries that abandoned such restrictive measures and witnessed rapid growth of exports 
and imports are Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Krueger, 1998a). Earlier 
studies that argued on the same line include Little et a l (1970), Balassa (1978) and 
Krueger (1978). The message is protection nurtures inefficiency: 1) Protectionism does 
not solve market and product imperfections as these are the results of domestic policy 
errors. The first-best policy is to use domestic polices as protection produces unnecessary 
rent related activities.; and 2) No need to intervene as wages are largly determined by 
technology and technical change because of free trade (Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1993; 
Bhagwati, 1994; and Robert and Tybout, 1997).
Trade liberalisation not only increases the volume of goods and services traded, 
but also benefits the economy through knowledge embodied in the products traded. At 
the same time, increased imports augment the spillover of international technical know­
how (Grossman and Helpman, 1991 and Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). Exposure to 
external competition encourages domestic forms to adopt newer and most efficient 
technology or to use the same technology with less waste or less x-efficiency and 
compete against international firms (Nishimizu and Robinson, 1984). Moreover, the 
removal of less efficient firms, previously able to operate inefficiently because of
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protection, results in lower average costs and higher productivity. The firms that remain 
in the industry must adjust by expanding their scale of production, exploiting economies 
of scale, and reducing technical efficiency. Because domestically produced goods cannot 
replace imported intermediate and capital goods in developing countries, imported inputs 
tend to increase knowledge and improve technical efficiency. Liberalisation, therefore, 
has significant effects on productivity (Harrison, 1994).
Similarly, trade liberalisation improves economic performance and positively 
affects the poor in developing countries due to their special structural features (Buffie, 
2001). The effect on the poor relies on the notion that economic growth ultimately benefit 
society as a whole and availability of new types of imported goods or increase in market 
size (Blackburn and Hung, 1996); through reductions in export taxes that help primary 
commodity producers; and increases in factor income depending on factor intensity of the 
trade sector (Winters, 2002). Trade liberalisation has impacted upon relocating decisions 
of industries from high trade barriers countries to more open ones. A survey of 
manufacturing firms in developing countries demonstrated that trade liberalisation has a 
positive impact on location decisions of firms (Amiti, 1998). Although the largest 
proportional gains are to the urban self-employed, there are significant gains in 
agriculture that benefit almost all categories of rural household (Blake, et a l , 2002)
Trade liberalisation also impacts upon the fiscal balance as revenues in most 
developing countries rely on trade taxes, such as export tax on a primary commodity 
exports. The effect of trade liberalisation on the fiscal balance depends on the nature of 
the trade barrier as well as the method of revenue financing. For instance, largely import 
tax financed fiscal balance will be unstable as imports fluctuate with the ability to import 
(Tanzi, 1989a). Generally, trade liberalisation measures are said to have a positive impact 
on revenue as they replace quantitative restrictions (QRs) by rationalised tariff structure. 
This is because QRs such as quotas and bans provide no revenue and stimulate rent- 
seeking as well as illegal transactions (Ebrill et a l , 2002). The positive impact on 
revenues works if the abolition of QRs leads to higher imports and if exchange rate 
changes also lead to increased exports and increased official transactions as well as
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increased imports. Thus the elasticity of the demand for imports and elasticity of tire 
supply for exports determine the outcome on the fiscal balance. Administratively the 
adoption of uniform tariff structures minimise tax evasion and ease the burden on tax 
administrators (Ebrill et al., 2002). Moving farther away from trade taxes, particularly 
taxes on exports, which is often levied as a substitute for income tax in sectors difficult to 
impose such taxes, must also be accompanied by other taxes such as VAT to compensate 
for the fall in revenue. Empirical findings purport that trade liberalisation in most 
developing countries was associated with increased fiscal revenue (Ebrill et al., 1999).
The argument in favour of trade liberalisation also comes from the correlation 
between openness and improvements in other policy areas (Krueger, 1990). This finding 
is supported by correlation of openness with low inflation (Romer, 1993). At the same 
time it has been shown that large and rapid liberalisations have been sustainable (Choksi 
et al, 1991). In the case of SSA, particularly in Nigeria and the CFA zone, it was shown 
that reductions in tariff rates or relaxation of quotas reduced the price of importable 
goods (Collier and Gunning, 1992). The resulting disequilibrium will be the emergence 
of excess demand for money and a deficit in the balance of payments. Restoring 
equilibrium, therefore, requires increases in the demand for money through devaluation 
and increased donor programme aid to finance the deficit until money market equilibrium 
is restored. The message is greater compatibility among policies including trade 
liberalisation is necessary (Collier and Gunning, 1992). The timing and sequencing of 
trade liberalisation in phases with other policy nmseares is also significant for its success. 
Timing and sequencing in phases for instance, trade liberalisation immediately after 
macroeconomic stabilisation sends a clear signal for credibility. Similarly, trade 
liberalisation well before capital account liberalisation will minimise the destabilisation 
assciated capital movements (Falvey and Kim, 1992).
Based on the above argument for free trade a number of countries under the IMF 
and World Bank tutelage have liberalised their trade regime. First, liberalisation focused 
on elimination of export duties, and administrative and other non-quantitative barriers. 
Second, tax concessions and duty drawback schemes were introduced. Third,
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administrative barriers such as export and import licensing were lifted. Fourth, 
liberalisation changed laws and regulations to encourage the flow of FDI. Fifth, export 
promotion and development agencies have been established. Sixth, foreign exchange 
retention schemes were introduced. Seventh, anti damping tariffs were enacted. In 
general, the IMF encourages trade regimes that usually include the adoption of a low, 
uniform tariff structure which provides equal effective protection to all producers of 
tradable goods and the elimination of QRs such as quotas, bans, export and import 
licensing, and state trading monopolies. Tariffs tend to be described as preferable to 
quantitative restrictions, because they insulate domestic producers from world market 
conditions and stimulate “rent-seeking and Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking 
behaviour (DUP)” as argued by Krueger (1974), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) and 
Bhagwati (1982).
3.4.1 Trade Liberalisation Contested
The critique of trade liberalisation has, for most of the 1970s and 1980s, focused 
on market imperfections that neccesitated intervention pioneered by Chamberlain (1929) 
and Robinson (1931). The argument challenged the traditional veiw of market structure 
as two extremes: perfect competition and pure monopoly. The critique shows that prices 
do not necessarily reflect social-costs as the proponents of free market advocate. In the 
1980s the imperfection was related to factor markets associated with inter-sectoral wage 
differentials, divergence between market as well as shadow wages and sector-specific 
minimum wages. As the unfair trade school shows free trade has implications for both 
the developed and developing countries. Free trade depresses wages for unskilled labour 
in the developed world as was the case in Mexican wages bringing down US wage rates 
(Perot and Choate, 1993).9 Under this theme free trade negatively impacts on the 
environment, labour standards as well as unfair trade in the sense of trade protection by 
the developed countries themselves through damping and subsidies. At the theoretical 
level relationship between trade and growth poses a paradox for neo-classical theory
128
Chapter 3 Adjustment and Supply-Side Policies
because trade liberalisation produces only limited level effects, not long-run growth 
effects, as predicted in neo-classical growth models (Lucas, 1988 and House, 2000).
Empirical evidence of the effect of trade liberalisation on export performance has 
been mixed. The staunch advocates argue that open economies grow faster (Edwards, 
1993). Case studies such as Weiss (1992) on Mexican manufacturing exports, Joshi and 
Little (1996) on India, and Ahmed (2000) on Bangladesh have shown a positive link 
between trade liberalisation and export performance. On the other side of the debate 
works such as UNCTAD (1989), Agosin (1991), Rodrik (1992), Shafaeddin (1994), 
Harrison and Hanson (1999) and Thirlwall (2000) find no significant impact of trade 
liberalisation on export performance and showed the limits of trade liberalisation on 
exports and growth. A recent survey of the empirical literature by Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001) has shown that the direct link between trade liberalisation and economic growth is 
ambiguous, mainly due to suspect methodology and confused econometric analysis that 
failed to distinguish exogenous and endogenous sources of growth. Success of openness 
depends mainly on how the movements towards comparative advantage lead to activities 
that promote economic growth. Examples are the level of research and development 
expenditure, diversification of exports, and improving quality of products. The message 
is those economies that benefited from openness did so not just by dismantling trade 
barriers such as tariffs and QRs but through a concerted marrying o f the opportunities 
offered by the international market with domestic investment capability. As witnessed in 
East Asia, China and India success was guaranteed through gradual opening of the 
economy to foreign products and investment and domestic institutional development. The 
positive relationship between open trade regimes and economic performances is seriously 
questioned (Sachs and Warner, 1995),
Particularly the absence of institutions and complementary policies constrain the 
impact of trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation and integration of developing 
economies in the global market means greater exposure to external risk such as the cost 
of implementing World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards and requirements, which 
requires large economies with developed institutions. In fact, trade liberalisation is to be
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seen more than changes in tariff structures but as a broad institutional and policy change. 
Examples are solid property rights created by tariff bindings under international trade 
agreements (Rodrik, 1998). Similarly, trade liberalisation has impacts beyond narrow 
specification of growth as is common in the literature. Trade reforms affect income 
distribution, poverty and the environment (see Corden, 1997). For instance, tariff 
reduction on exports of logs, in the absence of other substitutes, leads to excessive 
deforestation. It has been found that reduction in Mongolia’s export tax on cashmere has 
led to excessive grazing of common pastures (Anderson, 2002).10 Policy should focus on 
defining property rights appropriately and building the institutional environment. One 
such example is the distinction made between trade liberalisation and outward- 
orientation. The former can roughly be thought of as replacing QRs with tariffs, while the 
latter is a strategy based on the growth of domestic economic activity in response to 
producer incentives that closely mirror international prices. Therefore, outward- 
orientation necessitates policy towards developing infrastructure such as transportation 
and communication. Rodrik (2002, p. 3) also notes that trade liberalisation:
“goes beyond particular levels of tariffs and QRs: it sets new rules and 
expectations regarding how these policy choices are made and implemented, 
establishes new constraints and opportunities for economic policy more broadly, 
creates a new set of stake holders while disenfranchising the previous ones, and 
gives rise to a new philosophy (alongside a new rhetoric) on what development 
policy is all about.”
It is right to argue that given the small size of the market and heavy dependence 
on imported goods Africa needs to export for its development and increased investment 
(World Bank 1994 and UNCTAD, 1998, 2000). However, inconsistent macroeconomic 
policies and weaknesses in institutions, infrastructure, and available human resources 
constrain export performance. Even if macroeconomic policy is consistent and firms 
respond to the right incentives, the resulting productivity gains could be offset by, other 
developments such as declines in factor accumulation (Elbadawi, 1992; Martin, 1992; 
and Helleiner, 1995). The impact of trade liberalisation on export growth in developing 
countries varies across continents. In most countries it was found that export duties have 
a small detrimental effect on export growth, while relative price changes and world
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income growth have the expected signs. In the case of Uganda where unilateral 
liberalisation of import tariffs took place, especially in agricultural commodities, the 
findings are: 1) the impact of multilateral liberalisation appears to be slight, albeit 
positive, largely because there is only a minor impact on the world prices of the 
agricultural commodities it exports; and 2) the principal gains actually arise from trade 
reforms that are essentially unilateral in nature (Santos-Paulino, 2002).
In Zimbabwe trade liberalisation that took place in the 1990s removed 
quantitative restrictions but left tariff rates intact. The results show that tariffs on 
intermediate goods have held back production in traded sectors. Thus, the nature of the 
trade reform taken contributed to more deindustrialisation than necessary. The results 
also show that there has been a trade-off with respect to the fiscal balance, which points 
to the revenue reducing impact of trade liberalisation (Mabugu, 2001). The argument for 
trade liberalisation ignores why protectionist policies were placed in the first instance. 
Besides a commitment to catch-up with developed countries through infant-industry 
development, protectionism had a defensive character. First, tariffs still make up a 
significant source of revenue where direct income taxes and indirect business taxes are 
not adequate due to low tax base and large informal unmonitored transactions, especially 
in the least developed economies. Second, import tariffs and exchange controls were 
introduced in response to balance of payment crises which resulted from falling 
commodity prices, falling aid flows and world recession (Santos-Paulino, 2002).
The evidence indicates that liberalisation has not been followed by a favourable 
response in sub-Saharan African economies. Examples from Cote dTvoire and Tanzania 
indicate that trade liberalisation alone does not create the incentives for increased 
agricultural production. Additional sector specific reforms are needed to ensure that 
world prices are transmitted to producers and that producers’ ability to respond is 
facilitated (McKay et al, 1997). There are losers from trade liberalisation, which arises 
from local producers being unable to compete with imported goods. The case of 
Zimbabwe and Zambia illustrates that infrastructural and credit support must go hand in 
hand with trade liberalisation (Winters, 2002). In Central American countries, where
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trade liberalisation created incentives for the agricultural sector, the impact has not been 
associated with improved agricultural performance. The failure of agriculture to respond 
positively to policy changes can in part be explained by an unfavourable trend in world 
prices of the region's major tradable commodities (Weeks, 1999). The impact of trade 
liberalisation in small economies is significant. This is because small states rely on the 
tradable sector given the domestic low market and limited resource base to sustain 
domestic production and consumption. Small states are open to counter the diseconomies 
of small size such as the inability to diversify exports, however they also face severe risks 
in terms of trade changes (Armstrong and Read, 1998).
In their critical survey of the literature as well as through analyses of the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of trade liberalisation, Ocampo and Taylor 
(1998) argue that the new theories of trade, which describe international markets as 
imperfectly competitive and focus on economies of scale and technological rents, have 
not influenced the design of IMF stabilisation and adjustment programmes. These models 
have very different policy implications from those of the neo-classical theories at the 
heart of trade reforms advocated in adjustment programmes. Ocampo and Taylor (1998, 
p. 1543) conclude that;
“good productivity performance in the Asian economies has been associated with 
outward-oriented, but distinctly not liberal trade regimes... Their histories show 
that trade and other interventions are not always harmful; indeed, at least in terms 
of economic performance, they can promote substantial good.”
3.5 Exchange Rate Policies and Expenditure-Switching
Depreciation of the exchange rates is not only a deflationary policy as in 
expenditure-reduction discussed in the previous chapter, but also as an instrument for 
expenditure-switching via encouraging production for export. Currency depreciation, 
under IMF programmes is prescribed as it increases foreign demand for exports, lowers 
the domestic demand for imports expressed in foreign exchange, and raises the domestic 
demand for and supply of import substitutes. All these changes, however, depend on the
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demand and supply elasticities. For instance, a country, which produces coffee, where the 
price is fixed internationally, cannot influence the price through depreciation. In this 
scenario the export demand elasticity has no role to play. The supply elasticity is what 
determines the outcome depending on the gestation period of the commodity, the 
availability of investment finance, factor mobility, and excess capacity (Bird, 1983).
For small developing countries that can sell as much as they like at the going 
world foreign market, price elasticity must exceed zero on the export supply side, if the 
supply of foreign exchange is to increase. On the import demand side, price elasticity 
must also exceed zero to decrease the demand for foreign exchange. Export supply and 
import demand together, and under the assumption that both foreign demand for exports 
and import supply are infinitely elastic, the Marshall-Leamer condition reports that 
devaluation will improve the current account given that the sum of the price elasticity of 
export supply and import demand exceeds one. In the case of a country, which sets prices 
for its exports, or if the small country assumption is relaxed, the elasticity of supply for 
exports must exceed unity to satisfy the supply of foreign exchange, when the rate is 
depreciated. If this holds, the current account will improve. However, if the supply 
elasticity of exports is less than unity, the demand for imports must fall significantly to 
improve the external account. In most developing countries it has been found that the 
elasticity of demand for imports is inelastic. Unless the elasticity for supply of exports 
exceeds unity, the impact of depreciation will be negative (Bird, 1983). The elasticities 
condition, however, assumes that the balance of payments is in balance, which is unlikely 
in most developing countries.
Export competitiveness is the key to successful supply of foreign exchange and to 
this, distinction must be made between the nominal and real exchange rate. Change in the 
former is what policy makers announce, but competitiveness requires the domestic price 
level to be lower than other competitors or the real exchange rate must also depreciate. 
Similarly, where trade liberalisation is simultaneously implemented the effective 
exchange rate change may be less than the nominal devaluation. The impact of currency 
deprecation on domestic prices is through imports. The transmission mechanism works in
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such a way that import prices feed into domestic inflation. Mainly this is the result of 
inelastic demand for imports and the fact the developing countries cannot individually 
affect import prices. Reference to such scenario is a small import dependent economy. 
However, the extent of domestic price rises due to devaluation depends on 
implementation of other policies sequentially or simultaneously. If trade liberalisation 
removes import controls such as quantitative restrictions and tariffs, which inflate import 
prices, their removal lessens or offsets the impact of devaluation (Krueger, 1978).
Exchange rates devaluation or removing the parallel market premium is key to 
IMF supply-side adjustment programmes. The case is based on the experiences of many 
developing countries where the overvaluation of the exchange rate is seen as pro-imports 
and ani-exports. This is because overvalued exchange rates subsidise imports and 
importers pay less per unit of foreign currency. The anti-export bias arises when an 
implicit tax is imposed on exporters who receive less when they convert their foreign 
exchange earnings into local currency at a rate, which is administratively set and 
overvalued. Exporters will have no incentive to engage in cost-reducing technologies to 
compete in the international market. Hence, the demand for cheap imports and the fall in 
official exports leads to a widening gap in the trade balance, which can only be financed 
by running down reserves or donor import-support (IMF, 1987). Low level of reserves 
means a poor balance of payments position. The fall is official exports also means 
reductions in trade related tax revenue. Public revenue is also affected by selling foreign 
exchange cheaply to importers. The local currency equivalent of foreign savings could 
have been higher if the exchange rate was determined by the market or is devalued. In the 
face of falling revenue governments resort to deficit financing which leads to inflation. 
The fall in the implicit government revenue, which is financed by purchasing foreign 
exchange cheaply from exporters, is compensated by selling foreign exchange obtained 
from donor import-support at a devalued rate (Jamal, 1991).
Another argument for devaluation is related to rent-seeking and wasteful 
administration activities typically encouraged by overvalued exchange rates and the 
associated import licenses and exchange controls. Devaluation reduces benefits to
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. favoured groups that have access to rationed foreign exchange and import licenses and 
eliminates inefficient rents that accrue to middle- and upper-income urban groups 
(Krueger, 1974), The general argument in favour of exchange rate policy is that the 
alternatives focuses on frustrating imports, while devaluation is designed to encourage 
exports. The alternatives to explicit devaluation are selective taxes and subsidies, 
multiple exchange rates, capital control and exchange controls. These are criticised for 
being inferior to exchange rate depreciation for a number of reasons. First, identification 
of the areas, which need fiscal stimulus, involves various information costs as well as the 
cost of implementing and monitoring taxes and subsidies. Devaluation is preferred for its 
uniformity in impact (Laker, 1981). Policies, which can be manipulated within central 
banks or the ministries of finance and with less need for legislative sanction or complex 
institutional planning, and to which political barriers are smallest, are preferred (Mosley, 
1991a).
Second, the use of multiple exchange rates, for instance, a high exchange rate for 
key export commodities and essential imports and low exchange rate for infant-industry 
exports and luxury imports, proves to be administratively difficult due to linkages among 
these sectors (Streeten, 1976b). Third, exchange controls, have direct impact on imports 
through encouraging necessary items and discouraging unnecessary ones. By 
discriminate among imports, controls cannot possibly differentiate between essential and 
no-essential imports and the administrative costs in any case are high. Controls lead to 
corruption and rent appropriation by government officials as well as illegal trade such as 
smuggling (Killick, 1978 and Killick, 1980). It has also been found that domestic firms 
will not have the incentive to expand their scale of production and attract extra foreign 
exchange (Stem and Falcon, 1970). Exchange controls also constrain the expansion in 
exports, as imported inputs for export production are limited. Exchange controls, by 
discouraging imports of non-essential goods in fact encourage domestic production of 
such substitutes as well as encouraging capital-intensive production in labour-surplus 
economies (Krueger, 1978 and Bhagwati, 1978).
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Fourth, overvalued exchange rates discriminate against exports and shields 
domestic producers from international competitions. Overvaluation induces capital flight 
among domestic citizen anticipating further devaluation. As a result, less foreign 
exchange is available for imports. Foreign exchange may be rationed and allocated 
inefficiently and efforts to defend an overvalued exchange rate through tight monetary 
and wage policy may cause recession as prices and wages are inflexible (Sachs and 
Larrain, 1999 and Shatz and Tarr, 2002). However, consistent efforts to defend the 
exchange rate through trade protection are futile, as ultimately falling reserves will force 
devaluation (Shatz and Tarr, 2002).
Fifth, due to exchange rate misalignment productivity gains and hence growth 
will be curtailed in export and import-substituting sectors. Exchange controls and trade 
restrictions exacerbate the situation (Edwards, 1989 and Cottani, et al., 1990). These 
findings have also been attributed to low growth, low investment, low level of savings, 
and low-level of trade in SSA (see Ghura and Grennes, 1993). Particularly the fixing of 
the CFA franc to the French franc up to 1994 in francophone West Africa, which 
experienced higher growth, is said to have led to slow growth (Elbadawi and Majd,
1996). The CFA zone was growing favourably until 1986, but saw a declining growth as 
the French franc appreciated and the terms of trade deteriorated (Clement, 1994). Those 
severely affected by the overvaluation, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, saw an improved 
growth after the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 (Azam and Devarajan, 1997).
3.5.1 Expenditure-Switching Contested
The IMF’s approach is based on the standard theory of the exchange rate -  the 
price of the currency -  and its adjustment in order to correct a balance of payments 
surplus or deficit. The focus is on the relationship between the exchange rate and the 
country’s trade flows, or its imports and exports -  similar to the traditional elasticities 
approach discussed above. The basic idea is that the equilibrium exchange rate balances 
the country’s foreign trade. If there is a trade deficit, and import expenditure exceeds
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export earnings, then the price of the currency needs to decline. This would make exports 
cheaper, and foreign demand for them will increase; at the same time, imports become 
more expensive, and domestic demand for them declines. This process should continue 
until the trade balance is established. This approach assumes that international capital 
flows are not autonomous and, therefore, only arise to meet imbalances in trade flows. 
The assumption behind IMF policies is that exports and imports are responsive to prices 
so that capital and intermediate goods could be substituted without causing disruptions in 
investment and output. This is based on extremely restrictive assumptions. In the 
mainstream analysis, to increase the production of one commodity, say, coffee, one other 
commodity must be sacrificed. However, unless other unrealistic assumptions of perfect 
mobility of factors of production and free trade are introduced, there is no guarantee there 
will be smooth expenditure-switching (Weeks, 1995 and 1999).
Exchange rate liberalisation -  based on the assumptions of flexible economies and 
instantaneously clearing markets -  has serious limitations. Too much emphasis on the 
mainstream neoclassical aggregate supply functions fails to take account of peculiarities 
of developing economies. The structural rigidity or flexibility of developing economies is 
not taken into consideration (Taylor, 1993b). The models do not also take changes in 
relative prices and the terms of trade (Katseli, 1983). First, inflation-cum-balance of 
payments problems are inherently related to the structure of production and distribution; 
and second, the response of primary exports need more than just relative price changes. 
Policies such as investment programmes and targeted subsidies must be considered. 
Policy prescriptions should fully capture bottlenecks and rigidities in the process of 
production and consumption (Taylor, 1988).
Devaluation sidesteps the production side of the economy disproportionately 
focusing on the exchange side. The Washington consensus associates correcting market 
failures in exchange with correcting market failures in production. Successful East Asian 
economies adopted a strategy for building a modern and competitive production base 
through “getting prices wrong” and purposeful formation of “distortions” to expand 
investment in productive capacity in the realm of firm-specific knowledge, differentiated
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products, patents, scale economies, externalities, research and development (Amsden, 
1989 and 1997). Similarly, for the least developed countries of SSA, new agricultural 
technology spurred by research and development is found to be one of the significant 
inputs necessary for successful export-led growth (Sanders et al, 1990). Agricultural 
policy can induce rural household demands and facilitates backward linkages through 
agricultural development (Vogel, 1991). Increased agricultural productivity via 
technological diffusion and higher rural income produces additional rural household 
consumer demand and increased food supply for nurturing industrialisation (Adelman, 
X 984). If export promotion is the strategy, structural problems must be improved through 
export subsidies and public investment (Stewart, 1994).
Constraints to export expansion in developing countries are not only prices but 
also income related. External demand determines exports more than relative prices do. 
With the adoption of common stabilisation programmes-hence more devaluation by a 
majority of identical commodity producer countries-there is danger of a fallacy of 
composition effect. This is related to die demand for developing countries’ exports in 
developed countries and the latter’s absorptive capacity. In discussing whether the East 
Asian model of development can be generalised, Cline (1982), found that if all 
developing countries increase their manufactured exports, consumption capacity in the 
G7 countries being limited, provokes retaliation thorough protective measures. Cline 
notes that since South-South trade is weak, their bargaining position is also weak. Even 
diversification of developing country exports as well as growth in developed countries 
would not be adequate as high penetration ratio (15 per cent at the time) was reached. 
Cline (1982, p. 88-89), notes:
“the market in industrial countries would grow along with income but would not 
reduce the estimated import penetration ratios even with a time dimension in the 
analysis, because GDP levels in developing countries (and therefore the base for 
their manufactured exports) would also be growing overtime, probably more 
rapidly than income and markets in industrial countries...Other developing 
countries would be well-advised to adopt similar policies but ill-advised to 
expect free market policies to yield the same results that were achieved by the 
East Asian economies, which took advantage of the open-economy strategy 
before the export field became crowded by competition from other developing 
countries, and did so when the world economy was in a phase of buoyancy.”
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The constraints imposed upon developing countries’ export growth by 
international demand are real as confirmed by a recent report from United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2000). A study of manufacturing 
export demand functions from a partial equilibrium point of view finds that the elasticity 
of export demand is small. For 23 developing counfries another study finds that 
international demand impacts upon export growth for small countries (Faini et al., 1992). 
Less technologically advanced and labour-intensive exports are vulnerable (Martin, 1993 
and UNCTAD, 2000).11 Almost 80 percent of the benefits of exchange rate depreciation 
disappear when other developing countries’ competitors pursue similar policies. China’s 
membership of the WTO and entry of other South Asian economies into the export 
market also created extra supply in labour-intensive manufacturing. The terms of trade 
for labour-intensive manufacturing has been worsening especially for those low-skill and 
low technology manufactures. Fallacy of composition has also been found to be dynamic, 
related to the structural change and aggregate demand conditions in both the exporting 
and importing countries. China, for instance, is currently occupying the market vacated 
by the East Asian economies. As the latter moved to high-skill and high technology 
intensive exports, following the move by the developed G7 countries into information 
and communication industries, China moved into less skill and technology intensive 
export market (Mayor, 2002).
Identical commodity export expansion, particularly coffee, cotton, cocoa, banana, 
tea, tobacco, copper and petroleum; by, for instance, SSA countries leads to the fallacy of 
composition problem and reduced prices turning the terms of trade against exporters 
(Bleaney, 1993; Akiyana and Larson, 1994 and Schiff, 1995). The advice of IFFs to a 
number of SSA countries to liberalise and increase exports of traditional commodities has 
been unfavourable (Weeks, 1995). Little evidence was found to substantiate the claim 
that exchange rate liberalisation has removed the bias against exports, thus encouraging 
export expansion to fuel economic growth in SSA economies. Because of dependence on 
primary commodity exports trade liberalisation alone could not be an incentives to 
agricultural producers. Complementary agricultural sector reforms are necessary to
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ensure that world prices are transmitted to producers and that producers' ability to 
respond is facilitated (McKay et al, 1997). The same point is made by (Singer, 1995, p. 
17), who stated:
“The slippage of global management out of the multilateral system has also 
affected the impact of stabilisation/structural adjustment programme. IMF and 
World Bank missions proceeds on a country-by-country basis, without much of a 
general overview. A mission in Ghana may recommend increased “outward 
orientation” involving more cocoa exports, at the same time that missions in 
Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Brazil or Indonesia make similar recommendations. This 
amounts to a “fallacy of composition”: Ghana might benefit if it alone increased 
cocoa exports, but if all the countries do the same, the predictable result will be 
over-supply and a collapse of cocoa prices, with general immiseration”
The timing of devaluation is also critical since tree-crops and minerals depend on 
harvest and gestation periods. Moreover supply response to devaluation depends on the 
characteristics of commodities (crops or minerals). The implication is that structural 
characteristics determine adjustment outcomes (Loxley, 1990). The idea that devaluation 
releases exportable goods from local consumption and prevents imports from competing 
with locally produced goods is questionable. Lack of vital inputs such as fertilisers and 
transport infrastructure constrain export diversification. In this case the trade balance 
denominated in domestic currency widens, resulting in an increase in the proportion of 
imports in gross national income (Cline, 1983). Empirical work is yet to determine the 
degree of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods. As noted by Katseli 
(1983), initial increases in production costs in non-tradable sectors might reverse desired 
outcomes against the desire to increase prices of tradable goods relative to non-tradable 
goods. Alternatively, prices of non-tradable goods might also increase by the same 
proportion as devaluation, if wages are fixed or indexed to consumer prices.
As far as long-term growth is concerned primary commodity production on the 
one hand and long-term growth objectives such as technological learning, human capital 
development, industrial development and regional trade (which require increased public 
expenditure and co-ordination) are incompatible, as pointed out by the export pessimism 
literature (Stewart, 1992).12 Competitive advantage must go beyond the concept of 
market share. Successful trade depends on the productivity labour and capital, which
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includes the four “diamonds” that increase productivity and improve competitiveness: 
factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries and firm 
strategies, structures as well as rivalries. The relationship within the "diamond”, mainly 
vertical (buyers and suppliers) and/or horizontal linkages (common customers, 
technology and channels), information flows, innovation, and new entries from spin-offs 
from related industries; determine competitiveness (Porter, 1998).
Long-term diversification objectives can only be achieved by designing 
technology policy, improving organisational, marketing skills and human development, 
which the market cannot guarantee, and only an orchestrated public expenditure 
programme, unfettered by IMF stabilisation and adjustment programmes, can achieve 
these objectives (Wangwe, 1994). For instance, Cheru (1992) points out where state 
support to farmers is reduced, it has led to destruction of the environment due to 
shortages of arable and cultivable land.
Unless tight monetary and fiscal policies are introduced, the short-term impact of 
devaluation may be its deflationary impact (Bird, 1983). Whether the inflationary 
pressure continues and builds up as a permanent cost-push inflationary pressure depends 
on the extent of import intensity of domestic production, the ability of domestic firms to 
pass on the price increases to domestic consumers, how strong money-illusion persists as 
well as bargaining power of wage earners, and how the government responds to restore 
wages through credit creation. In many cases it has been found that prices continued to 
rise as domestic credit expansion continued after devaluation, rendering the effort to 
change relative prices futile (Taylor, 1988).
3.6 Privatisation
This section is intended to cover the important issues in privatisation, which the 
IMF is increasingly pushing forward as part of its adjustment programmes. The 
discussion below assesses the theoretical and empirical foundations of privatisation
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policies and evaluates its compatibility with the broader objective of stabilisation and 
adjustment. The aim is to show the IMF’s broadening of objectives through adoption of 
neo-liberal thinking without having developed a framework to incorporate adjustment 
policies formally. The IMF argues that investment programmes should flow to “directly 
productive sectors”, with emphasis on businesses financed mainly by domestic private 
investment and foreign capital. The objectives, among others, are to reduce state 
interference; foster private sector participation; broaden ownership of assets; improve the 
efficiency of enterprises, cultivate a culture of competition; and improve the 
government’s fiscal position (IMF, 1987 and World Bank, 1995a).
Broadly, privatisation is defined as the transfer of productive assets as well as 
provision of property rights to the private sector with full control over production, pricing 
as well as profits in previously state dominated domains. The forms of privatisation 
include out-right sale of public enterprises, divestiture, leases, management buy-outs, and 
sub-contracting. State assets can also be sold at zero prices through voucher schemes or 
services can be contracted out to the private sector such as park cleaning. The method of 
privatisation depends who buys the enterprises, which includes foreign investors, 
domestic individuals, shareholders, managers, employees, banks, mutual funds and 
corporations. The sale decision also depends of how to transfer assets or entitlements, 
which include tenders, auctions, private negotiations, and stock market floatation. 
Governments also enter into joint ventures, majority or minority stakes (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1991).
As the “market failure” argument gave rise to public ownership of certain 
enterprises, the “government failure” logic also led to privatisation. The latter was 
supported by developments in mainstream economics under the New Institutional 
Economics, New Political Economy and the Austrian School, which emphasised public 
choice, property rights and principal-agent theories as justification for private ownership 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1995). The theoretical framework underlining privatisation is based 
on welfare economics and is described as the New Synthesis (Fine, 1997). These theories 
together provide the intellectual justification to pursue the transfer of public assets to the
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private sector. The central conclusion of the synthesis is that privatisation improves the 
efficiency of enterprises, increases competition, improves the government’s fiscal 
position, develops the private sector, reduces political interference and reverses tine 
ideology of state-ownership. For the IMF, privatisation is attractive as it relieves the 
short-term fiscal imbalance. In the long run the economy will move towards a 
competitive environment by dismantling distortions associated with government 
intervention.
As far as the efficiency enhancing aspect of privatisation is concerned, proponents 
argue that it enhances productive as well as dynamic efficiency. The former refers to the 
opportunity created to engage in low cost current production techniques, and the latter 
refers to improving overall performance through new techniques and novel production 
processes. These static and dynamic efficiency types bring about internal efficiency at a 
firm level and allocative efficiency at economy wide level, where production meets social 
need signalled by the equating of prices with marginal costs. At the same time the 
government’s fiscal position improves through gains from sale of enterprises, savings 
made from subsidising unprofitable enterprises, and new tax revenues from the privatised 
businesses (Cambell-White and Bhatia, 1998).
With the neo-liberal ascendancy state-owned enterprises have been singled out for 
price distortions and the fiscal crisis, despite consistent reforms introduced to improve the 
sector. Among the causes for poor performance of enterprises, political interference in 
management decisions as well as shielding enterprises from competition have been 
mentioned as the two most important (Tangri, 1995). Among the privatisation methods 
used in SSA, sales of shares through competitive tender as well as formal liquidations 
and asset sales were the most pervasive. There is evidence that public assets were sold by 
undervalued price for the purpose of widening share ownership. In some cases the 
voucher scheme also transferred public enterprises free of charge to employees. These 
reflect the fragile state most enterprises were in terms of profitability and efficiency 
(Cambell-White and Bhatia, 1998).
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Theories of privatisation are unduly pessimistic about the motivation of state-run 
enterprises, by assuming that governments are individual utility concerned. Social 
welfare goals such as access to basic services by low-income groups can successfully be 
organised by state-owned enterprises (Singer, 2001). As Vickers and Yarrow (1991) note: 
“public ownership may have the advantage if externalities are larger and the pursuit of 
personal agendas is more constrained, for example by a well-functioning political 
system” (p. 113-114). The impact of privatisation and the transformation of enterprises 
into a full-fledged efficiency driven capitalist firms is not explicitly addressed. For 
instance, private ownership is not superior and large private enterprise can equally be 
bureaucratic and highly inefficient (Chang and Singh 1993 and 1997). Privatisation may 
actually lead to concentration of the market structure, as there is scarcity of capital 
particularly in less-developed countries. This is also confirmed as the private sector often 
shows interest in sectors with less competition (Commander and Killick, 1988 and Kikeri 
et al., 1992). Privatisation may lead to competition at firm level but it is not clear how 
that can be aggregated at the national level. Privatised firms can also be inefficient and 
bureaucratic due to the “free-rider” problem in shareholder monitoring. Various interests 
and particular institutional cultures determine shareholder’s decisions and widespread 
ownership make monitoring firm operations complex (Fine, 1997).
The theory and practice of privatisation suffers from neglect of sectoral and 
national allocative efficiency as well as ill-defined demarcation between state and private 
ownership. The experience of privatisation suggests that there is no evidence that 
ownership by the private sector is superior over ownership by the public sector as far as 
efficiency of enterprises is concerned. Privatised films showed no significant difference 
in performance compared to state-owned enterprises (Berg and Shirley, 1987). Studies in 
Latin America show that state-owned enterprises actally ouperformed the private sector 
(Saulniers, 1984 and 1985). Large state-owned enterprises are linked with low economic 
growth, rendering the hypothesis of downsizing the state sector irrelevant from growth 
perspective (Jalilian and Weiss, 1997). In practice privatisation does not also mean 
government intervention is completely terminated. There are cases where strict regulation
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as well as subsidies continued even after privatisation as was the case with Chrysler in 
the US and Leyland in the UK (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991).
The privatisation process in SSA Africa is not uniform; some have adopted quick 
and large privatisations such as Mozambique, while others such as Ethiopia opted for 
slower and privatisation of small to medium enterprises.13 In some cases where large 
privatisations took place the state also maintained a majority ownership. The overall 
evidence on privatisation in developing countries shows that not enough privatisations 
were actually carried out in the 1980s contrary to the IFI’s rhetoric (Gelb and Gray, 
1991). The same is true for the 1990s, although the privatisation process was speeded up; 
only small enteiprises have been privatised (Amsden et al., 1994). Particularly, 
privatisation in SSA has been slower than other regions (Bennell 1996 and 1997 and 
Ramamurti, 1999).14 A survey of a number of SSA countries also shows that the post­
privatisation period, in terms of profitability and efficiency, was not markedly different 
compared to the pre-privatisation period. The only effect has been an increase in capital 
expenditures (Boubakri et al, 2002). Nellis (1999) notes;
“the association between private ownership and restructuring (changes 
positioning the firm to survive and thrive in competitive markets) is weak or non­
existent; firms that are partially owned by the state perform better than privatised 
companies; few differences are discernible between the performance of state- 
owned and private firms; clear performance improvements are evident only in the 
few firms that have been sold” (quoted in Carlos, Cramer and Hailu, 2003).
The success of privatisation is limited where institutions are weak. In four case 
studies of telecommunications and water sectors in Africa it was found that the 
performance of privatised industries is determined by how much other institutions are 
developed such as contract enforcement, competition and regulation policy (Shirley and 
Adam, 2002). The experience of SSA is consistent with findings in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, which shows that fast privatisation was found to be not 
effective (see Stiglitz, 1998a, 1999a, 2002, Solnick, 1998 and Nellis, 1999). Privatisation 
has been less successful in Central and Eastern Europe because of legal and institutional 
weaknesses and because mass privatisation techniques, though widely employed, were
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poorly conceived for delivering performance improvement in such an environment 
(Estrin and Goldstein, 2002). Weak post-privatisation regulatory frameworks, under 
concentrated market structure, undermined the success of privatisation (Ramamurti,
1997).
There are plenty of cases where transactions have been concluded through 
uncompetitive methods. The privatisation process more often than not suffers from lack 
of accountability and transparency (Adam et al., 1992 and Cambell-White and Bhatia,
1998). Various country experiences reveal that the award of concessions and contracts -  
and hence the process of privatisation -  is a major source of corruption (Hall, 1999). 
Although the public sector is vilified for corrupt practices, the private sector can be 
equally corrupt (Haque, 1996). Privatisation must be seen as a political process where 
rewards are made and major distribution of wealth from public ownership to private 
capital takes place (AppialiKubi, 2001). The relationship between the level of 
privatisation and the level of corruption exhibits an inverted U-shape (Laffont and Meleu,
1999). This is due to the interest shown by government officials to be compensated by the 
newly created firms, for the loss of revenue due to privatisations.
For instance, Mozambique's privatisation has been one of the largest, by number 
of transactions, in sub-Saharan Africa and this is the main basis for claims that the 
programme has been one of the most successful. However, privatisation has been hasty 
and careless. Contrary to the public finance objectives of privatisation, there has also 
been a form of subsidy to the private sector, through payment deferral and default. This 
subsidy is indiscriminate, unplanned and highly inefficient (Cramer, 2001 and Castel- 
Branco, Cramer and Hailu, 2003). Zambia’s privatisation was also held as a showcase 
(Cambell-White and Bhatia, 1998), But it is a deeply flawed experience, which allowed 
for corrupt acquisition of assets by those linked to the ruling elite, reflecting the political 
and economic environment. This required the Zambian government to balance, on the 
one hand, the demands of the IFIs that international capital should be provided with an 
attractive and secure environment for investment and, on the other hand, those in the 
ruling party and urban capitalists who regarded privatisation as an opportunity for
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personal accumulation (Craig, 2000). The incidence of corruption is closely connected 
with contracting-out and concessions, where multinationals stand to gain from profitable 
businesses. The encouragement of privatisation and the involvement of multinationals 
require greater political transparency to remove the secrecy under which corruption 
flourishes, and resistance to the uncritical extension of privatisation (Hall, 1999),
The losers from the privatisation process often are workers (Galal et al, 1994). 
The post-privatisation period has a negative effect on morale, as workers felt less secure 
of their jobs (Haque, 1996). The privatisation process also creates new alliances and new 
conflicts among various social classes. For instance, public sector trade unions have been 
in conflict with governments in defence of cuts in the labour force. In many countries 
trade unions have developed their own models and proposals for modernisation of public 
services, but these often fell on deaf ears (Waghome, 1999). The effects of privatisation 
and deregulation of the Dar es Salaam transport system on transport supply was non- 
compliance with safety rules, inefficiencies in the fare structures and exploitative 
conditions of employment (Rizzo, 2002). Although governments gained large sums of 
money from privatisation, high outstanding credit sales, high costs of divestiture and high 
outstanding liabilities of privatised firms eroded much of the gain, particularly in Latin 
America (Ramamurti, 1992 and 1996a). Privatisation simply reduces the role of state to 
regulatory functions and neglects the role governments need to play in providing vital 
services such as sanitation, electricity, water, light, health, education as well as 
formulating industrial policy and foster capital accumulation through intervention (Adam 
et a l, 1992). One example is the stance on privatisation whereby state intervention is 
required to prevent monopoly profits. As Stiglitz (1999a, p. 3) notes the Washington 
consensus relied too much on textbook economics;
“Textbook economics may be fine for teaching students, but not for advising 
governments trying to establish a new market economy-especially since the 
typical American style textbook relies so heavily on a particular intellectual 
tradition, the neoclassical model, leaving out other traditions (such as those put 
forward by Schumpeter and Hayek) which might have provided more insights in 
to the situations facing the economies in transition.”
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
As shown above, IMF programmes, since the mid-1980s, began to address 
structural issues under adjustment policies, which fall outside of its original mandate. 
Such broadening of objectives would logically lead to extension of the formal models. 
However, there is no evidence that this is taking place. The IMF still displays the basic 
financial programming model as its key conceptual tool while the other policies are 
added on ad hoc basis. The economic models attached to the adjustment package are 
based on mainstream exchange rate, trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation. What 
is clear from the analysis is that the supply-side contents of IMF policies, which have 
been prescribed with the FP framework, are not coherent models and rely on 
developments in macroeconomic theory. This development has been heavily influenced 
by neo-liberal considerations, which it self is subject to many flaws as is evident from the 
critique.
Conceptually, the inclusion of supply-side adjustment policies has also involved 
the attempt to integrate the FP framework with the World Bank’s RMSM. This attempt, 
in contrast to borrowing ad hoc from mainstream economics, is an attempt to close the FP 
model so that long-term growth determinants are included. However, the merging of the 
two models remains an esoteiic theoretical adventure, rather than a comprehensive 
stabilisation and adjustment model. This is manifested by: 1) the lack of interest in 
merging the models by other concerned researchers, aside from staff of the Fund’s and 
the Bank’s Research Departments; and 2) its theoretical inadequacy to formulate balance 
of payments and growth framework.
The Theory of the Second Best pioneered by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) seems 
to have not been taken up by the advocates of adjustment programmes. The Theory 
implied that in the presence of many market imperfections or distortions the removal of 
any one of these would not make the economy work better. The mainstream assumption
148
Chapter 3 Adjustment and Supply-Side Policies
and the empirical wizardry seems to suggest that few distortions are better than many 
(Chang, 1999), As Mosley (1991a, p. 227) notes:
“but there is nothing in economic theory to tell us which distortions should be 
removed in which order, or even that it will necessarily help if any one distortion 
is removed...whereas it is common ground between all parties that aggregate 
demand needs to be reduced (whether through cutting expenditure or raising 
taxes) if an economy’s balance of payments or inflation problem is to be 
stabilised, there is no common ground concerning the right way to increase 
aggregate supply for those wishing to embark on a structural adjustment 
programme; there is no analogue on the supply side, wither in the World Bank or 
any where else, to the IMF’s “Polak Model”, which prescribes the amount by 
which domestic absorption must be reduced if the balance of payments is to be 
improved by $%.”
Improving the overall process of financial intermediation by deregulating markets 
and raising real interest rates through financial liberalisation is a slow-acting remedy. 
Investment depends on expectations of future demand and prices do not clear 
instantaneously as predicted by the model. Country experiences show that financial 
resources mobilization requires intervention to influence interest rates and manage credit 
allocations. Special attention need also be given to the peculiarities of community based 
local networks and traditional familial relationships in financial transactions. Although 
trade liberalisation is beneficial and can be an “engine of growth”, reduction of QRs and 
other barrier do not necessarily improve trade balances. The market need to be 
augumented by sector-specific policies such as research and development expenditure, 
technological advances, and improving quality of products. Depreciation of the exchange 
rates also fails to switch expenditure if both exports and imports are not responsive to 
price changes. Removing key structural rigidities, targeted investment programmes and 
subsidies need to be constituted. Private sector participation is productive only if the state 
has adequate regulatory capacity, if the privatisation process is not marred by corrupt 
practices, and if a truly competitive environment is installed. However, the experience 
shows these not to be the case.
It is, therefore, neither justifiable nor effective to continue prescription of 
orthodox macroeconomic policies. The question is whether a need for appropriateness,
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relevance and efficacy of IMF programmes amount to alternative policy packages. This is 
a big question that can only be answered in one way: before the alternative is embraced, 
there should be strong empirical evidence that shows whether IMF stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes work or not in practice. The concern of the next chapter is 
exactly that: to review the empirical literature and examine the evidence on the impact of 
IMF-supported programmes.
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Notes
1 Recently Khan and Sharma (2001, p. 20) argued for more extensive intervention in 
stabilisation policy because of lags in responses and underlying distortions in economies 
precluding adjustment. Earlier Schadler et ai (1995, p. 50) noted that conditionality has been 
extended beyond demand restraint to include supply-side measures, which focus on “saving, 
investment, and output during the adjustment phase” As far as development is concerned, 
however, the division between demand side stabilisation and supply side adjustment is an 
artificial one. As Bird (1995, p.70) asks “[Wjhere does one end and the other begin?”
2 The Berg Report is the same as World Bank (1981).
3 Note: dK = (Yt - T - Cp) + (T - Cg) + (Z - X) and substituting for Cp and Z [<iK = s(Yt - 
T) + (T - Cg) + (juYt - X)] yields equation 3.64.
4 Note: Yt = Yt-1 + dY and all borrowings (<®pg + oBfg + Bpg + t/Bfp) between sectors 
are omitted for simplicity.
5 Agenor and Montiel (1996) state;
“We do not believe that economic agents in developing countries behave 
differently from those in industrial economies in ways that are inconsistent with 
the rational optimising principle of neoclassical microeconomics; rather, we 
believe that they behave similarly to their industrial counterparts, but operate in a 
different environment. Our perspective is that the standard analytical tools of 
modem macroeconomics are indeed of as much relevance to developing 
countries as they are to industrial countries, but that different models are needed 
to analyse familiar issues” (p. 11-12, quoted in Fine and Hailu (2001).
6 Khan et al. ignore the emphasis of the merged model on the short run and focus on 
other limitations, for instance, the exclusion of an analysis of the interest rate and wages. 
However, the authors also claim an inclusion of such variables complicates the model, to which 
simplicity is said to have been its important attribute. Mikkelsen (1998) also notes that the FP 
framework could be modified and “an external debt bloc would be useful in order to give a more 
complete description of the debt dynamics” (p. 16).
7 The relationship between financial development and economic growth has been further 
strengthened through endogenous growth models (Hermes and Lensink, 1996 and Levine, 1997).
8 As the neo-structuralist critique also points out prices are determined by mark-up 
decisions, wages are determined by conflict between labour and capital, and the informal 
financial sector is significant in developing countries. Unlike the Post-Keynesian model, neo­
structuralist explicitly takes the credit market into consideration. The former school assumes the 
demand for money is endogenous, which excludes explicit analysis of the demand for credit.
9 This effect is known as the Factor Price Equalisation theorem or the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorom.
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10 The reverse argument is also that the environment can be protected by creating 
incentives and disincentives in the production and export of a particular commodity through trade 
liberalisation.
11 The fallacy of composition effect is also similar to Bhagwati’s (1958 and 1968) 
“immeseizing growth” that demonstrated economic growth, which increases a country’s exports, 
can lower its welfare (see also Bhagwati and Onitsuka, 1974). The welfare loss could be offset if 
a country sets the optimal trade tax to neutralise the terms of trade effect. Expanding the analysis 
to multi-country exports Bandyopadhyay (1996) finds that exporters must achieve tacit collusion 
to set the optimal trade tax to offset the welfare loss. From general equilibrium perspective fallacy 
of composition argument have been challenged. Increases in exports by developing countries 
raises their income as well as their demand for imports from the developed economies. Thus, if 
technological advances and investment back export growth, the fallacy of composition may not 
hold (Havrylyshyn, 1990).
12 See Sarkar (1992) and Deaton (1999) for an account of the relationship between 
commodity prices and growth in developing countries, particularly SSA.
13 See Jones and Kumssa (1999) on the merits and de-merits of a shock therapy model for 
liberalisation of markets including privatisation.
14 Latin American economies gained a large sum of revenue from privatisation. However, 
in terms of numbers Europe and Central Asia comes first (Ozkaya and Askari, 1999).
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of IMF Programmes: 
The Empirical Evidence
4.1 Introduction
Despite the proliferation of IMF programmes, the economic ills in the least 
developing countries continue to baffle all interested parties. The recoveiy question 
and particularly the popular “remedies”, stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes, have attracted academic as well as professional attention. One of the 
most researched areas is the impact of these programmes on various economic and 
social variables. An examination of the various statistical studies of the last three 
decades on the impact of IMF programmes shows that the results to be hopelessly 
inconclusive and beset with serious methodological problems.
As we have seen from the previous chapters the analytical framework for 
formulating IMF programmes focus mainly on short-term macroeconomic 
stabilisation, while long-term structural adjustment and other broader objective are 
constantly incorporated. An influential recent report pointed out that despite many 
attempts it has not been possible to link IMF programmes with increased growth 
performance (Meltzer, 2000). Yet Khan and Sharma (2001, p. 12) argue, “on average, 
IMF-supported programmes and the conditionality they incorporate, have been 
reasonably effective in achieving their main macroeconomic objectives”. The claims 
and counter claims around the efficacy of stabilisation and adjustment programmes 
have produced a rich empirical literature. Earleir survey of the literature on 
determinants of ex ante IMF lending, design and implementation and ex post impact is 
found in Khan and U1 Haque (1998) and IMF (2001a) and Joyce (2002). Through a 
fresh survey of the available impact literature, this thesis finds that none of the studies 
come to definitive conclusion, not to mention the methodological pitfalls.
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The major issues in assessing the effectiveness of stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes are set out in Guitian (1981) and Williamson (1983c). The problem of 
measuring the counterfactual (i.e., what would have happened in the absence of IMF 
programmes) is one of the most important aspects addressed in the literature. Since 
the counterfactual is unobservable and impossible to measure directly, the consensus 
is to identify a methodology that allows approximation. But the problem remains 
unresolved, as one cannot compare the approximation with the counterfactual, which 
is not known in the first place.
The studies employed various methodologies to assess the effect of IMF 
programmes, which included the before-after, the with-without (also referred as the 
Control-Group), the modified with-without (Generalised Evaluation Estimator, GEE) 
the multiple regression/structural model, the actual vs. target approaches, as well as 
studies to determine programme continuity, compliance and sustainability. The 
before-after approach compares the change in target variables between pre-programme 
and programme periods usually for one year. The counterfactual is assumed to be the 
pre-programme period. The major shortcoming of this approach is that it ignores 
exogenous factors such as changes in the terms of trade and international interest rates 
that affect macroeconomic performance. If, for instance, the terms of trade were 
deteriorating in the pre-programme and improves in the programme period, it is likely 
that studies which compare the before and after changes in target variables will 
overstate the true effect of the programme and vice versa.
Another methodology is the with-without approach, which compares changes 
in target variables for programme countries to a group of non-programme countries. 
Here, the counterfactual is represented by outcomes in countries without IMF 
programmes. Nonetheless, since countries implement IMF programmes because they 
experience macroeconomic problems, those countries that are not implementing such 
programmes can hardly be a good measure of the counterfactual (Krueger, 1998b). 
This is one of the problems of the with-without approach, which does not take account 
of systematic differences between programme and non-programme countries. In other 
words the technique suffers from selectivity-bias. Selectivity-bias means that the 
failure to control for systematic differences between programme and non-programme
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countries. Since programme countries are likely to have identical macroeconomic 
difficulties, for instance, suffer from an unsustainable current account deficit, the 
selection represents a non-random sample. A technique acquired from the literature 
on labour training evaluation, the Generalised Evaluation Estimator (GEE), attempted 
to incorporate numerous factors to accurately capture the counterfactual (Goldstein 
and Montiel, 1986). Although the GEE technique controls for observable differences 
between programme and non-programme countries, sample-selectivity bias would 
remain because unobservable differences between programme and non-programme 
countries remain.1
Other researchers use the multiple regression approach, which uses a single or 
simultaneous regression equation to determine each target variable. The method uses a 
standard dependent-independent variable regression model and the choice of 
independent policy variables and expectations of the signs on the coefficients are 
determined by the theoretical framework in which the model is tested. This approach 
has some limitations. Firstly, it does not explicitly weigh up the impact of IMF 
programmes nor does it measure the counterfactual. It merely demonstrates statistical 
relationships between target and policy variables. This approach does not make clear 
whether the test is on statistical dependence, or on the goodness of the 
macroeconomic model or the hypothesis concerning the country. Secondly, the Lucas 
critique applies to it, that the coefficients econometricians estimated may not be 
constant if policy makers change their policy: the models up to that point were wrong. 
This is because coefficients incorporate agents’ knowledge about the way that policy 
reactions occur. Therefore, it is possible that the coefficients will also vary with 
changes in policy. The exercise becomes pointless, as no parameter remains fixed. 
This critique is damaging especially to forecasting, because parameter constancy is 
imposed on macroeconomic models when deriving predictions (Lucas, 1976). In 
addition, the possibility of capturing individual country differences by aggregated 
cross-section analysis is problematic. Each country has a distinctive political 
characteristic, a distinct institutional makeup, and a particular combination of policies. 
A principal question for the impact studies is whether aggregating individual country 
perfonnance in a single standardised model gives accurate results; the answer is to the 
negative (Dicks-Mireaux et al., 2000).
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Another, and less popular, technique of impact analysis is the actual vs, target 
approach, which compares ex post actual outcomes in target variables with targets set 
ex ante. This technique avoids the issue of the counterfactual and concentrates on 
whether the IMF’s and the authorities have met what they have set out or not. But, the 
adequacy of the actual vs, target method is also doubtful, as targets may be set at 
unrealistic level or their attainment is hindered by exogenous factors. The IMF’s 
broadening of objectives in adjustment as well as its increasing interest in poverty may 
also mean proliferation of targets and instruments that encourages partial 
achievement. For instance, setting targets for reduction in the level of domestic credit 
and devaluation of the local currency by a certain percentage may fail to achieve an 
improvement in the balance of payments due to unfavourable terms of trade effect. 
However, if, at the same time, targets were set to the interest rate, privatisation, 
domestic price liberalisation etc., some of the objectives may be achieved justifying 
claim for success or damning criticisms.
A survey of the empirical evidence in this thesis comes up with three broad 
conclusions (see Table 5.1 below). First, out of the 26 studies surveyed only 9 found a 
positive impact of IMF programmes on growth. Out of the 9 positive results 2 were 
found to be statistically insignificant, while 9 studies found negative impacts and 8 
found no effect at all. Second, out of the 23 studies 11 found a positive impact on the 
current account, while 7 studies found negative impacts and 5 studies found no effect. 
Third, out of the 22 studies that examined the impact of IMF programmes on inflation, 
9 found positive effects. Out of the 9 positive results 1 is found to be statistically 
insignificant, while 6 studies found negative effects and 7 found no effect. Fourth, an 
interesting finding of the impact literature is that absence of private capital flows 
following IMF programmes. Empirical studies have also shown that there is no 
evidence to verify the catalytic effects of IMF programmes, particularly private capital 
inflows (Rodrik, 1996b; Edwards, 2000; and Bird and Rowlands, 2001). The finding 
in this thesis compares and contrasts with an earlier survey of the empirical evidence, 
which suggests that the impact of IMF programmes on the current account is positive. 
The impact on inflation is not yet conclusive and as far as economic growth is 
concerned the studies find a decline in the short run and an increase in long run (Khan
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and U1 Haque, 1998). The survey in this thesis agrees with the comment on inflation 
and not with the current account and growth.
The diversity of the results obtained by the published studies is surprising 
since most of the researchers seem to have based their estimates on similar economic 
theories, seem to have used approximately the same data series, and applied similar 
methodologies. The questions, therefore, are why their results produce quite dissimilar 
results and how successes or failures are explained. The answer for the first question 
will become apparent from methodological weaknesses as well as the inadequacy of 
the programmes themselves. The latter issue is discussed in the previous chapter as 
part of the critique of IMF programmes. The answer to the second question is the 
(mis)use of state-society relations to explain success or failure, that interest groups 
and rent-seeking impede successful implementation of IMF programmes (this issue 
will be taken up in Chapter 7). The main concern of this chapter will be on the 
methodological weaknesses.
A methodological problem affecting all statistical studies in this survey is 
related to the problem of using annual data while IMF programme may start at any 
time of the year. All of the studies reviewed include data on annual basis even though 
programmes are negotiated mid-year and in effect running for less than twelve 
months. The second issue is the validity of a 0-1 dummy variable for the absence and 
presence of IMF programmes during simulation exercises. The use of a binary one- 
zero index does not mirror implementation of programmes. Programmes may also be 
scheduled at 6-month frequencies and waivers may be granted to pennit purchases 
even when implementation slips. A third problem is related to the implementation of 
World Bank programmes simultaneously with IMF programmes and the attempt to 
disentangle the separate effects of each (Dicks-Mireaux et al., 2000). The effects of 
IMF programmes must not necessarily follow a linear path, and improvements in 
some variables may be offset by decline in others, which cannot be captured by a 
simple search for percentage increments in target variables (Bird, 2001). Empirical 
studies report that there is a clear trade-off between growth and the current account 
(Baqir et al, 2003).2 Besides, an assessment of programme impact is precisely an 
evaluation of the IMF’s as well as the in-country policy maker’ knowledge of the
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economy. Forecasting and programme design necessitates understanding of financial 
programming, both the accounting frameworks, but most importantly the behavioural 
relationships. Such full perceptive reasoning is highly unlikely, where accurate data 
problems and analyses exist, particularly in low-income economies. The negative 
impacts of IMF programmes are inherent policy design and discovery of these is 
hardly an accomplishment.
Other methodological issues are related to implementation. A number of 
studies have also found that compliance with IMF conditionality have been 
problematic and a significant proportion of programmes have not been completed 
casting doubt on the value of the impact assessment (Killick, 1995a; Mussa and 
Savastano, 1999; and Bird, 2001). The results show that out of the 305 programmes 
studied 53 per cent were uncompleted. At a more disaggregated level 50 per cent of 
Stand-by arrangements, 85 per cent of EFFs and 38 per cent of SAFs were 
uncompleted (Killick, 1984a and 1995a). Conway (1994) also finds that 50 per cent of 
programmes were uncompleted, while Mussa and Savastano (1999) find 34.8 per cent 
of IMF programmes were interrupted. Earlier, Edwards (1989) showed that 50 per 
cent of fiscal and monetary targets for policy instruments were not complied with. The 
results also indicate that most of the programmes were uncompleted in Africa and 
Latin America. The IMF, however, insists that programmes failures are related to 
political disruption and fading commitment (IMF, 2001a). Similarly, a recent study by 
IMF staff members stated that ethnic fractionalism, linguistic divisions, special 
interest groups, and lack of political unity cause programme interruptions (Anayiotos, 
et a l, 2001).
Despite the findings that programmes do not work and there is no catalytic 
effect of IMF credit, the IMF continues its lending, particularly to existing borrowers, 
what is commonly known as “recidivism” (Bird, 2001). Repetitive IMF lending has 
been the practice particularly in countries with low growth, balance of payments 
crisis, high inflation, overvalued exchange rate, primary export dependence, and high 
debt burden (Edwards and Santaella, 1993; Conway, 1994; Knight and Santaella, 
1997; Conway, 2000; Bird et a l , 2002; and Joyce, 2002). This implies that new 
programmes are implemented to reverse previous failures of same type of
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programmes, leading to a vicious circle of IMF lending and economic decline. This is 
explained by political and institutional factors that reinforce the supply of and the 
demand for IMF loans. These are related to IMF’s wish to assert its position, 
manifested by increases in its staff size and resources (Vaubel, 1994 and Willet,
2001). It has also been found that a member country’s political stance that conforms to 
that of the IMF or the United States determines the probability of loan approval 
(Thacker, 1999 and Barro and Lee, 2001), what is called the “political proximity 
hypothesis”. On the other hand, governments seek IMF leading in the aftermath of 
political elections, mainly as they gain political legitimacy to push through unpopular 
reforms (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2001). Similarly, governments adopt IMF 
programmes to gain external political and financial support to fend off local political 
opposition (Vreeland, 1999 and 2001; Drazen, 2001 and Mayer and Mourmouras,
2002).
There are some important issues that emerge from the impact literature. First, 
the continuous search for the counterfactual diverts the fundamental problem of 
development. The counterfactual is clearly a situation where the terms of trade remain 
unfavourable. An impact assessment would be instructive if, rather than measurement 
of short-term financial relief; it deals with the fundamental causes of economic 
decline and how these have been resolved. Second, the studies report success and 
failure on the basis of statistical significance or otherwise. Significance tests based on 
t-statistics do not tell us much about economic significance in terms of concrete 
development outcomes such as improved standard of leaving or structural 
transformation. Third, the impact studies tell us nothing about the cost of 
improvement in the rate of growth and the balance of payments, as these are often 
achieved by severe deflation. The short run damage may have a longer than expected 
effect on productive capacity. Fourth, it is a disappointment that the impact analysis 
has not been taken seriously either in developing a complete methodology or as a 
response to criticism of IMF programme or as a way of feedback to policy 
formulation. To use a medical metaphor there is no feedback from results of treatment 
to new or continuing patients.
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The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 examines the 
methodological difficulties in capturing the impact of IMF programmes. Section 4.3 
reviews the empirical evidence, which uses the before-and-after technique. Section 4.4 
reviews the empirical evidence, which is based on the with-and-without methodology. 
Section 4.5 reviews the empirical evidence, which uses the modified with-and-without 
technique and discusses the remaining biases in the methodology. Section 4.6 surveys 
the results from studies, which use multiple regression and structural model 
approaches, while highlighting major deficiencies of these techniques. Section 4.7 
reviews the evidence from studies, which employed the actual versus target approach. 
Section 4.8 discusses studies, which examine how IMF programmes are actually 
implemented. Section 4.9 reviews studies that look into the determinants of the supply 
of and demand for IMF programmes. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 
4.10
4,2 Why We Don’t Know Whether IMF Programmes Work or Not
As shown in the previous chapter, proponents of stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes argue that IMF polices work, while there is no theoretical case to do so. 
Empirically, the major issues in assessing the effectiveness of stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes are set out in Guitian (1981) and Williamson (1983c). The 
problem of measuring the counterfactual (i.e., what would have happened in the 
absence of IMF programmes) is one of the most important aspects addressed in the 
literature. If the counterfactual is known it would be easier to answer the question “do 
IMF programmes work?” As Williamson (1993c) notes the positive and negative 
effects of stabilisation and adjustment programmes must be evaluated against the 
potential outcome and the counterfactual “in which case one would not be justified in 
giving either a blanket endorsement or an outright condemnation of Fund 
performance.” (p. 132). Krueger (2000) also adds that:
“Hardship endured after the start of a Fund programme are generally blamed 
on the programme, without regard to the counterfactual trajectory of 
economic variables that would have occurred had there been no Fund 
programme and the economy continued its downward spiral” (p. 12).
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Since the counterfactual is unobservable and impossible to measure directly, 
the consensus is to identify a methodology that allows its closest approximation. But 
the problem remains unresolved, as one cannot compare the approximation with the 
counterfactual, which is not known in the first place. Given this conundrum a number 
of studies employed methodologies, which included the before-after, the with-without 
(also referred as the Control-Group), the modified with-without (or GEE), the 
multiple regression/structural model, the actual vs. target approaches, individual 
country case studies as well studies to determine programme continuity, compliance 
and sustainability. Most of these studies employ standard statistical tests and 
econometric simulations using cross-section data set. The standard measure of 
performance is to evaluate the changes in target variables.
4.3 The Before-After Approach
The before-after approach looks at the period before the implementation of 
programmes as what would have happened in the absence of programmes or as a 
measure of the counterfactual. Implicit in this approach is the assumption of ceteris 
paribus, that is the difference between the pre-programme and programme period is 
the implementation of the programme but nothing else. The major shortcoming of this 
approach is that it ignores exogenous factors such as changes in the terms of trade and 
international interest rates that affect macroeconomic performance. If, for instance, the 
terms of trade were deteriorating in the pre-programme and improves in the 
programme period, it is likely that studies which compare the before and after changes 
in target variables will overstate the true effect of the programme and vice versa.
4.3.1 Empirical Evidence from Before-After Studies
The earliest study that applied the before-after approach is that of Reichmann 
and Stillson (1978), which tested non-parametric statistical significance of changes in 
policy instruments (expansion of overall credit and credit to the public sector) as well
161
Chapter 4 IMF Programmes: The Empirical Evidence
as changes in net foreign assets (or the balance of payments), prices and economic 
growth, between one year before and after the programme periods. Non-parametric 
tests are used when the data is not normally distributed and non-parametric tests 
determine whether the values of an observation from one group are significantly lower 
than the observation from the other group. The authors used quarterly data for the 
period 1963-72 and looked at 79 programmes under the IMF upper credit tranche 
Stand-by arrangements.3
The results show that in 29 out of 79 cases there were reductions in the growth 
rate of overall domestic credit. Similarly there were reductions in the growth rate of 
credit to the public sector in 36 out of 79 cases. Improvement in the net foreign assets 
was registered only in 24 per cent of cases.4 As far as the results for prices concerned, 
the change was insignificant: in 7 cases there were decreases, in 6 cases increases and 
no change in 16 cases. The effect on GDP was also inconclusive. In 28 cases there 
was a decline, in 33 cases an improvement and no change in 9 cases. Reichmann and 
Stillson (1978, p. 303) note that according to the results, in the short-term, there is 
“[N]o evidence that programmes systematically affected the level of economic activity 
within the periods considered.” In a similar study, Reichmann and Stillson (1977) 
obtained similar results and concluded, “most of the unsuccessful programmes failed 
because of fiscal problems and, in particular, because the limits on credit to the public 
sector were exceeded” (p. 25).
Killick (1984a) also used the before-after approach to evaluate the effect of 
IMF programmes. The data are based on 38 programmes agreed between 1974-79 
with non-oil developing countries and effects were studied for both one and two years 
before and after programmes.5 The study used the non-parametric method to observe 
the significance of changes in the rate of growth of GDP, the rate of inflation, current 
account, international reserves and domestic credit and the money supply. The results 
obtained by Killick indicate that in the first year there was a decrease in total domestic 
credit, but it disappeared in the following year. On the target variables there was an 
increase in the current account deficit and a fall in international reserves, while the 
overall balance of payments remained constant.6 The results on the impact of IMF 
programmes on economic growth imply an improvement in the first year, but not in
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the second. The results on the inflation rate also indicate a deceleration in the first year
n
but acceleration in the second. The impact of programmes on income distribution is 
also studied but no conclusive evidence is obtained as to the positive or negative 
outcomes.
Zulu and Nsouli (1985) have compared achievements against the previous year 
performance for 22 African countries under 35 Stand-by and EFF arrangements for the 
period 1980-81. Their results indicate that the rate of economic growth declined in 
most and the rate of inflation worsened in half of the countries. The current account 
and the overall balance of payments as a proportion of GDP did not improve for most. 
No change was reported in savings and investment as a proportion of GDP. 
Instruments such as government expenditure as a proportion of GDP declined or 
remained unchanged while government revenue increased in most cases. Net growth 
of credit to the government declined or remained unchanged while credit to the private 
sector was exceeded in most cases. External debt ratio as a proportion of GDP is 
reported to have increased in all cases.
Pastor (1987), on the other hand, analysed the effect of IMF programmes on 
income distribution to investigate whether programmes redistribute income away from 
the less powerful class to the elite. The argument is based on the theory that 
redistribution of income is determined by whether labour or capital is the dominant 
means of production, who benefits from a fall or rise in the growth rate and the 
relationship between the propensity to save between classes. Pastor looked at 18 Latin 
American countries under IMF upper credit Stand-by arrangements covering the 
period 1965-81. The methodology employed both absolute and relative comparisons, 
that is one year before and after and the with-without approaches (results for the later 
methodology are discussed in the following section). In both cases parametric and 
non-parametric significance tests were applied.8 The variables studied are the balance 
of payments, the current account, the rate of inflation, the rate of growth, dependency 
measures and labour’s share of income.9
The results for the absolute changes between pre-programme and post­
programme periods are summarised as follows. Growth and the current account ratio
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did not improve, while the overall balance of payments improved at 0.598 and 0.055 
significance levels respectively. Inflation is reported to have accelerated in the 
programme period where no evidence was found for the stagflationary effect of 
programmes. Exports as well as imports rise during programmes compared to the 
previous period. Most importantly, the labour share of income falls during the 
programme period at 0.040 significance level. The last result supported the argument 
advanced by Pastor (1987) that the cost of stabilisation and adjustment programmes 
are borne by the working class as wages are restrained, prices liberalised, subsidies 
reduced and import prices increased due to devaluation. Pastor also argues that the 
elite in society are taken into consideration in the design of programmes and protected 
from the costs. The results confirm the proposition that IMF programmes redistribute 
income away from workers to capitalists. As local elites gain the surplus and increase 
their profitability, foreign capital is attracted, but this “paints a rosy picture of balance 
of payment improvement, but beneath lies worsening income distribution, exacerbated 
social tension, and little or no improvement in the inflation, current account, and 
growth fundamentals” (p. 259).
Khan (1990) employed the before-after methodology in his study of 69 
countries under upper credit tranche arrangements over the period 1973-88. For 
programme countries, 315 observations were collected. The target variables under 
study are the balance of payments, current account balance, inflation and growth. The 
results for the one-year before and after comparisons indicate that there appeared to be 
a substantial improvement in the current account. Progress is also achieved in the case 
of the overall balance of payments and the rate of inflation but the coefficients are 
insignificant. The rate of growth fell in the programme year but the coefficient was 
also statistically insignificant. Khan concludes that on “the basis of standard statistical 
criteria however, it would appear that programmes lead to an improvement only in the 
current account position” (p. 213).
Schadler et a l (1993) looked at the experience of 19 (15 are African) countries 
under the ESAF arrangement between 1987-1992.10 The target variables under study 
are the rate of economic growth, balance of payment “sustainability” and structural 
change. The before-after approach is used to assess whether the objectives are met or
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not in SAF/ESAF compared to pre-SAF/ESAF period. The study did not test for 
statistical significance and simply compared the means and medians in the target 
variables before and after the implementation of the programmes. The authors also 
argue that the success of post-SAF/ESAF period must be compared against the 
unfavourable initial conditions due to, for example, the deterioration in the terms of 
trade. This point, however, is later contested by Killick (1995a, p. 83) as only 2 of the 
19 countries adopted IMF programmes for the first time: “[I]t is only partial 
exaggeration to say that the before-after comparisons in OP 106 are testing whether 
SAF-ESAFs work better than Stand-by arrangements. Unfortunately, the report is too 
flawed to permit a conclusion on this.” 11
The results reported by Schadler et a i (1993) indicate that 11 countries out of 
the 19 moved closer to balance of payments “viability”, while for the remaining 8 
progress was constrained by rising debt ratios and interest payments. The 11 countries 
that moved to balance of payments viability have also had an increase in real GDP, 
and exports as well as a reduction in the rate of inflation. For the whole sample real 
GDP growth rate averaged 4 per cent and 3 per cent during the SAF and ESAF period, 
respectively, compared to 2 per cent in pre-SAF/ESAF period. Similarly, the rate of 
inflation fell, savings and investment as a proportion of GDP and the level of 
international reserves improved. The only negative result obtained is the worsening of 
the current account deficit, which is attributed to the deterioration in the terms of 
trade.12 In sum, “[LJargest improvements in macroeconomic performance occurred in 
countries that undertook the most forceful reforms and suffered the least from 
weakening terms of trade” (p. 39, italics added).
Killick (1995a) also uses the before-after approach to examine the effects of 
IMF programmes on 16 developing countries covering the period 1979-1985. The 
main variables under study include balance of payments, inflation, economic growth 
and total absorption. The study deals with three comprehensive issues. It attempts to 
look at the sustainability of programmes up to four years; tests whether programme 
completion/non-completion makes any difference; and tests whether implementation 
of another programme, just before the new programme under observation, influences 
outcomes or not.
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The results indicate that the effect on the balance of payments was positive and 
significant especially the current account for countries, which completed 
programmes.13 But the evidence on the catalytic role of the IMF is weak: the “average 
net effect is a reduced capital inflow” (p. 71). The results also indicate that 40 per cent 
of programmes were characterised by an increase in the rate of inflation even in the 
long-term. As regards the rate of growth, the results are weak whether the programmes 
are completed or not. The effect on absorption is summarised as follows: in the 
“absence of any strong catalytic effect, absorption has to be reduced relative to GDP if 
the balance of payments is to be strengthened. That programmes are associated with 
such a reduction is among our strongest results, with substantial and significant 
changes over the entire post-programme period” (p. 72). Finally, the results show that 
countries’, which had implemented programmes, immediately after another 
programme is completed, fared well in balance of payments and current account 
improvements. On the other hand, countries with no previous programmes in place 
saw a reduction in total absorption and particularly fixed investment, domestic credit 
and imports in the first year of the programme.
4.4 The With-Without Approach
The approach in the with-without or control-group method is a comparison of 
countries with stabilisation and adjustment programmes and those without. The basic 
idea is to estimate the counterfactual in programme countries by the macroeconomic 
outcomes observed in non-programme countries. This approach overcomes the 
problem in the before and after technique, that is both programme and non­
programme countries are selected under the assumption that both groups face the same 
external environment. This makes possible distinguishing programme from non­
programme effects on target variables. This indicates that the bias in the before and 
after approach is removed, although at the cost of introducing a new source of bias, 
which is the characteristics of non-programme countries (Goldstein and Montiel, 
1986).
The drawback of the traditional with-without approach is the failure to control 
for systematic differences between programme and non-programme countries. Since
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programme countries are likely to have identical macroeconomic difficulties, for 
instance, suffer from an unsustainable current account deficit, the selection represents 
a non-random sample. This is the famous problem of sample selectivity-bias. hi this 
case, any improvement during or after a programme is likely to be overstated or vice 
versa. This difference exists as long as determinants of programme selection are 
correlated with non-programme factors that determine the change in the target 
variables in the absence of programmes.
4.4.1 Empirical Evidence from With-Without Studies
Donovan (1982) used the with-without approach in his study of 35 countries 
under 78 upper credit tranche Stand-by arrangements with the IMF for the period 
1971-1980.14 The study observes the changes in the current account, rate of inflation, 
rate of growth, savings, investment and real consumption in programme countries.15 
The study also looks at changes in variables both at one and three years before and 
after the implementation of programmes and compares the figures with the 
performance of non-oil developing countries (NODCs). The results show that the 
current account and the balance of payments performance for programme countries 
were better than NODCs. As regards inflation, programme countries performed better 
only in the long-term. The effect of stabilisation policies on growth is found to be 
neutral. This point was qualified by Donovan (1982, p. 196): *‘[A]s regards the rate of 
economic growth, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that there was any 
significant downward bias in the performance of programme countries. By and large, 
performance seemed overall to be associated with a broadly neutral outcome, insofar 
as the economic growth variable was concerned.” Since growth was not affected, the 
study concludes that the increase in savings was not at the expense of real 
consumption. Similarly, the decline in the ratio of investment to GDP is interpreted as 
increases in productivity.
Loxley (1984) conducted an empirical study to examine the performance of 38 
least-developed countries (LLDCs) under IMF programmes between 1971-82. The 
study defines LLDCs as countries with per capita income of $690 or less in 1980.
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Loxley's objective was to test the applicability of Donovan's results to LLDCs.16 The 
results show that for LLDC programme countries the ratio of current account balance 
to GNP on average declined by 0.4 and 2.6 per cent on both the one-year and three- 
year measures, respectively. For all LLDCs the ratio fell by 0.9 and 2.2 per cent, 
respectively. For Non-Oil Developing Countries (NODCs) the ratio declined by 0.4 
and 0.8 per cent in both one and three year measures, respectively. The overall 
conclusion is that the performance of the current account for LLDCs was well below 
Donovan’s programme countries in both one-year and three-year measures. Compared 
to all LLDCs the performance of the current account was better on one-year and worse 
on three-year measure.
As regards inflation, LLDC programme countries performed better than 
Donovan's programme countries. For LLDCs the rate of inflation changed by 0.4 and 
0.2 per cent in one and three year measures, respectively. On the performance of 
growth Loxley (1984, p. 15) concludes that the “growth performance of LLDC 
programme countries as a whole seems to support Donovan's argument that there is no 
evidence of either sharp contractions or sharp increases in growth rates.” For LLDCs 
the change in the growth rate was -0.2 and -0.5 and for Donovan programme countries 
the change was -0.3 and -0.4 on the one-year and three year measures, respectively.17 
The significance and conclusion of Loxley's study is that no major difference was 
detected between the performance of LLDC programme countries and all LLDCs with 
95 per cent confidence level. Similarly, the performance of LLDCs under upper-credit 
tranche was not significantly different from those under Stand-by arrangements. 
Loxley argues that Donovan obtained favourable results due to the composition of his 
samples, which included “major exporters of manufactures” and “net oil exporters” 
(Loxley. 1984, p. 27 ).18
The results obtained by Pastor (1987) were discussed in the previous section 
under the absolute comparisons. The results for the relative comparisons between 
programme and non-programme countries indicate that the overall balance of 
payments improved for programme countries while the change in the current account 
was insignificant. These results confirm the proposition that the balance of payments 
improve due to the capital rather than the current account. This is the result of the
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capital account showing the “catalytic” effect of IMF programmes or as Pastor argues 
the “debt trap”. It is found that inflation accelerates for programme countries while no 
evidence was found to support the argument that programme countries fared worse in 
terms of growth than non-programme countries. As regards the dependency measures 
an increase was seen in programme countries and labour share of income declines or 
rises in slower rates compared to non-programme countries.
Gylfason (1987) also uses the with-without approach in his study of 32 
countries under upper credit tranche Stand-by arrangements. The year 1977 is the pre­
programme period, 1978 the programme period and 1979 post-programme period. The 
basic methodology consists of non-parametric statistical tests of significance of the 
differences in the outcomes of target variables between programme and non­
programme countries (or the reference group). The theoretical underpinning in 
Gylfason's study does not only focus on the effect of changes in domestic credit on 
demand but also on supply: credit is taken as working capital and the interest rate as 
its cost. In other words, credit policy is part of a production function.
Gylfason evaluates the changes in target variables for programme countries 
over the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 before comparing them to non-programme 
groups. The results show that during the programme year (i.e. 1978) domestic credit 
as well as money supply fell significantly. As a result both the overall balance of 
payments and the current account improved. The interesting result is that output 
growth remained unchanged. Gylfason criticises Donovan's (1982) country 
composition and chose to compare programme countries with non-oil developing 
countries that had a current account problem between 1975-1977. The fall in the 
domestic credit and the improvement in the balance of payments were statistically 
significant while no significance was found on the changes in the growth and inflation 
rates. Gylfason (1987, p. 28) states that the “direct negative effects of credit restraint 
on output growth were apparently offset by other factors such as devaluation or 
structural adjustment. It thus appears that the experience of these Stand-by 
arrangements does not give occasion for grave concern about the short-term 
contractionary or even stagflationary consequences of adjustment programmes 
supported by the Fund.” (p. 30).
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Khan (1990) has also carried out an empirical investigation using the with- 
without approach. The data and the period of analysis remain similar to that of the 
before-after approach discussed in the previous section. The only addition is the 789 
observations for non-programme countries. The results show that the performance of 
programme countries in terms of the current account, overall balance of payments and 
inflation was better than non-programme countries. In the case of economic growth, it 
is reported that programme countries achieved progress relative to non-programme 
countries. However, this result was found to be statistically insignificant.19
4.5 The Modified With-Without Approach
As mentioned above the major shortcoming of the traditional with-without 
approach is that it does not take account of systematic differences between programme 
and non-programme countries. This sample-selectivity bias is removed if either the 
programme group is selected randomly or the correlation between the determinants of 
programme selection and the outcomes in the counterfactual are separated. If not, the 
real impact of IMF programmes will not be known. The modification is to obtain 
unbiased estimates of IMF programme effects in the face of non-random selection of 
programme countries. The technique is to control for observable differences between 
programme and non-programme countries. Goldstein and Montiel (1986) formulated a 
simultaneous model for modification of the traditional approach. The technique 
acquired from the literature on labour training evaluation, commonly known as the 
General Evaluation Estimator (GEE), incorporates exogenous factors that affect 
macroeconomic outcomes. Its special feature is that it introduces a policy reaction 
function and a function that determines the probability that a country adopts 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes. The policy reaction function models the 
determinants of macroeconomic policy changes initiated by the authorities in the 
absence of programmes. While Corbo and Rojas (1992) and Bagci and Perraudin 
(1995) use instrumental variables, and Garuda (2000) introduces “propensity score 
estimation” method to correct sample-selectivity bias.
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The modified approach also has some limitations. As Goldstein and Montiel 
(1986, p. 322) acknowledge they only “control for observable differences between 
programme and non-programme countries. Sample-selectivity bias would remain 
because of unobservable differences between programme and non-programme 
countries.” Moreover, since countries implement IMF programmes because they 
experience macroeconomic problems, those countries that are not implementing such 
programmes can hardly be a good measure of the counterfactual (Krueger, 1998b).20 
The modification fails to capture the decisions, which determine to adopt IMF 
programmes. This is because a loan recipient country’s decision to adopt IMF 
programmes and the IMF’s position to lend are correlated with the downturns in the 
country’s economy. The assumption that macroeconomic policy choices can be easily 
formulated in a simple reaction function with available data and that the 
counterfactual can be estimated for non-programme countries by the reaction function 
is too simplistic. According to Garuda:
“This process of “balancing” programme and non-programme observations 
by propensity score controls for systematic differences between the two 
groups prior to the decision whether to participate in a Fund programme. In 
particular, countries seeking the Fund’s assistance typically face an unstable 
pre-programme economic climate than those who do not. Failure to control 
for these pre-programme differences would bias our measures of the Fund’s 
impact.” (p. 1032),
4.5.1 Empirical Evidence from the Modified With-Without Studies
Goldstein and Montiel (1986) use the modified model to examine the effects 
of 68 IMF programmes on 58 developing countries under Stand-by as well as EFF 
arrangements over the period 1974-81 with 397 observations. The study calculated the 
before-after changes in the target variables in programme countries and compared the 
results with the changes in non-programme countries, while testing statistical 
significance. The target variables under study are the current account, the balance of 
payments, and economic growth. The policy instruments are total domestic credit and 
real effective exchange rates. The evidence shows worsening current account, balance
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of payments and growth performance for programme countries. Goldstein and Montiel 
argue that the above results support their expectation that the traditional with-without 
approach provides a biased estimate of programme effects. The test of pre-programme 
difference between programme and non-programme countries appeared positive: the 
“difference between programme and non-programme countries was the single most 
robust empirical finding of our tests” (p. 335). Although the authors point out that the 
modified estimators are far from perfect, they went on to say: “[W]e have, however, 
demonstrated that point estimates of programme effects are not robust when variables 
are included that measure the pre-programme characteristics o f countries, and that the 
direction of change in estimated programme effects is as expected a priori” (p. 338).
Khan (1990) also estimates the effect of IMF programmes using the modified 
approach or the GEE. The dependent variable is a vector that consists of changes in 
the current account, balance o f payments, inflation and the rate of growth. The 
independent variables include one period lagged target as well as instrumental 
variables and variables that represent external factors.21 The results for the GEE show 
an improvement in the current account, the overall balance o f payments and inflation 
but a decline in the growth rate relative to non-programme countries in the short-term. 
The results also show that the long-term positive effects on the current account and 
inflation become stronger and the negative effects on growth lessened.22 This 
contrasts with the results obtained from the traditional with-without approach, which 
provides a biased estimate of programme effects.23 Khan also investigated 
macroeconomic and growth stability and differences in the effect of IMF programmes 
between the 1970s and 1980s. The results show negative relationships between 
inflation, the real exchange rate and growth, on the one hand, and a positive 
relationship between fiscal deficits and growth, on the other. On the performance of 
growth, the 1970s were found to be no different from the 1980s.
Corbo and Rojas (1992) also use the modified approach to estimate the effect 
of adjustment policies in 77 developing countries for the period 1970-88.24 The idea is 
not to compare and contrast programme with non-programme countries but to use the 
latter group's performance as the counterfactual scenario. The variables under study 
are the rate of growth of GDP, the ratios of gross domestic saving, investment and
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total exports to GDP. Corbo and Rojas argue that the traditional equation provides a 
biased estimate of programme effects because the variable that determines programme 
selection (i.e. the dummy variable) is endogenous. Thus, they attempt to solve such 
selectivity-bias by using an instrumental variable.25 The results show that under the 
traditional with-without approach only the rate of growth of GDP appears to have 
improved during 1985-88 compared to 1970-80 and 1981-84. The coefficients for the 
other variables were insignificant. Under the modified approach however, it was 
found that programmes resulted in significant increases in the rate of growth and the 
ratio of exports have significantly improved relative to the previous two periods. In 
the case of savings, improvement was shown in 1985-88 compared to 1981-84 period, 
but it was insignificant compared to 1970-80. The results for investment indicate a 3.5 
percentage decline between 1970-80 and 1985-88, but the change between 1981-84 
and 1985-88 was not significant. Corbo and Rojas (1992, p. 33) state that the “impact 
of the programmes on investment should, however, be interpreted carefully. Since 
adjustment is not estimated to have reduced growth, it must have increased the 
average efficiency of investment and utilisation of capital.”26
Bagci and Perraudin (1995) argue that “self-selectivity” bias can be eliminated 
if the decision to adopt programmes is put into a formal model and use full Maximum 
Likelihood methods for estimation. The model is used to test IMF programme effects 
in 68 countries under Stand-by and EFF arrangements during 1973-92. The target 
variables under study are the balance of payments, the current account, inflation and 
GDP growth. The policy instruments include the budget surplus and domestic credit. 
The results indicate that under the traditional with-without approach (without 
selectivity adjustment) the performance of programme countries in terms of the 
balance of payments and the current account were better than non-programme 
countries. The reduction in the inflation rate and improvement in the growth rate were 
found to be insignificant. Under the modified estimates (with selectivity adjustment) 
significant improvements were shown in the balance of payments, the current account, 
and the rate of growth for programme countries relative to non-programme countries. 
Bagci and Perraudin suggest that these results are sustained up to two years after 
programmes and conclude, -  “ignoring selectivity effects tends to suggest that 
although programmes result in improvement in target variables, these are not
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significantly different from the performance of non-programme countries. Our results 
show that without the adjustment for self-selection, the benefits of [IMF] programmes 
are actually u n d e rs ta te d (p. 12 italics added).
Dicks-Mireaux et a l  (2000) estimate a similar model to that of Goldstien and 
Montiel (1986) for 61 ESAF implementing countries over 1986-1991. The study took 
the growth rate of real GDP, consumer price inflation, and the ratio of debt to exports 
as target variables. The policy instruments included the deficit o f the central 
government in relation to GDP, the growth of net domestic assets of the banking 
system, and the change in the nominal effective exchange rate. The authors support 
the choice of the ratio of external debt to exports as a measure of external viability 
because a significant number of economies in the sample approached the IMF with 
large debt burdens. The instruments included in the model are central government 
deficit in relation to GDP, the growth of net domestic assets of the banking system 
and the change in the nominal effective exchange rate. Dicks-Mireaux et al. find that 
IMF programmes have a positive statistically significant impact on growth and the 
external debt/service ratio, but not inflation. The impact was statistically significant 
with respect to growth at the 5 per cent level and the external debt/service ratio at the 
10 per cent level.
4.6 The Multiple Regression and Structural Model Approaches
The multiple regression approach is the use of a single or simultaneous system 
of equations in a standard dependent-independent variable model. Usually the choice 
of independent policy variables and expectations of the signs on the coefficients are 
determined by the theoretical framework in which the model is tested. The regressions 
for the impact study always follow a statement of theory or hypothesis. The 
hypotheses often tested are those set out in the previous chapters, which, for instance, 
stipulates that the current account will improve due to exchange rate devaluation; 
reduction in government fiscal position improves the balance of payments etc. Then, 
the econometric model is specified to test the hypotheses. The basic model can be 
specified as equation 4.79.
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4.79
4yt ~ Po + Pixt +&t
Where Ayt is a vector of target variables; xt is also a vector of instrument 
variables; fio is a constant and pi is a coefficient for each instrument variable and 0t is 
an error term. Depending on the theoretical underpinning of the model, additional 
instrument variables, for instance, the initial level of target variables, lagged 
instrument variables and dummy variables can be included.
Similarly, regression approaches have been incorporated in structural models 
used in evaluating adjustment programmes is associated with the work of Khan and 
Knight (1981 and 1985). The simultaneous structural regression model relates specific 
policy instruments to targets and consists of five behavioural equations (inflation, 
balance of payments, government sector, real income and inflation) and three 
identities (domestic credit, money supply and real money balances).
According to IMF (2001a) the confounding problem in the before-and-after 
approach can be eliminated through regression estimation; first, by estimating the 
economic model and policy reaction function of the participating country and during 
the IMF programme; or second, by pairing programme countries with non­
programmes countries and attributing differences in performance to IMF programmes. 
The disadvantage is the model indicates neither performance nor outcome of 
programmes (Khan, 1990). Firstly, it does not explicitly assess the effect of 
programmes and only shows statistical relationships between target and instrumental 
variables. Although econometrics provides the tools used in estimating coefficients 
and forecasting changes in variables, it is not clear how impact of programmes is 
measured, hi a widely taught textbook in econometrics it is stated that the “key idea 
behind regression analysis is the statistical dependence of one variable, the dependent 
variable, on one or more other variables, the explanatory variable” (Gujarati, 1988). 
The multiple regression models used in impact analysis, however, do not make clear 
whether the test is on statistical dependence, or on the goodness of the 
macroeconomic model or the hypothesis concerning the country. Secondly, it still has
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the problem set out in the Lucas critique that the coefficients econometricians estimate 
when computing macroeconomic models may not be constant if policy makers alter 
their policy: the models up to that point were wrong. This is because coefficients 
incorporate agents’ knowledge about the way that policy reactions occur. So, if policy 
changes, it is possible that the coefficients will also change. The exercise becomes 
erroneous, as no parameter remains fixed. The critique is damaging especially to 
forecasting, because parameter constancy is imposed on macroeconomic models when 
deriving predictions (Lucas, 1976).
4.6.1 Empirical Evidence from Multiple Regression and Structural Studies
Using the structural model referred to above, Khan and Knight (1981) carried
out a multiple regression exercise for 29 developing countries under IMF Stand-by
arrangements covering the period 1968-75. The results indicate that for an average
“representative” country a 10 per cent increase in the money supply increases output
by 0.05 percent and reduces international reserves by the same amount as the
monetary expansion. Similarly, a 10 per cent increase in capacity output leads to a rise
in employment and real output and an initial decrease in the domestic price level by
about 5.05 per cent in the first two years. The model incorporates financial variables
and does not consider the effect of capital accumulation or wealth on long-term
growth.27 Khan and Knight (1985) construct another structural model slightly different
from the 1981 variety and state, but does not focus on the effect of individual policy
changes and the main concern is to show the effect of supply-side policies. The results
show that if only demand-side policies are implemented, the growth rate of GDP
declines in the first year and starts to rise in the second until the initial level is restored
28in the third year, inflation accelerates and the current account improves. The most 
important conclusion of the structural simulation exercise is, therefore, not only that 
the combination of demand- and supply-side policies reduce the short-term cost of 
adjustment, but also that the overall package succeeds in putting the economy on a 
higher capacity growth and “raise the growth rate permanently by increasing secular 
growth path.” (p. 23). The cost minimizing effect of supply-side policies as stated by 
Khan and Knight (1985) is as follows.
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“The output costs can be reduced significantly if appropriate supply-side 
measures are introduced simultaneously with the demand-management 
package. Assuming that this supply-side policies raise investment and 
thereby the economy's trend growth rate of capacity output (in the present 
illustration by 0.5 percentage point a year), the actual growth rate would also 
start to rise” (p. 22 italics added).
Doroodian (1993) used a multiple regression model in evaluating the effect of 
IMF programmes on 27 programme countries compared to 16 non-programme 
countries under upper credit tranche Stand-by arrangements for the period 1977-83.29 
The target variables include the current account, rate of inflation and output growth. 
The instruments are the real exchange rate, the public fiscal position, the interest rate 
and the rate of growth of domestic credit. The results of the regression indicate that 
IMF programmes improve the current account significantly and inflation moderately. 
A regression of the same type of equation for non-programme countries reveals that 
programmes had no impact on economic growth that is different from non-programme 
countries. Doroodian also analysed the effect of each policy instrument and concluded 
that the interest rate was the most effective instrument followed by the unanticipated 
growth in domestic credit, the fiscal position and the terms of trade.30
Conway (1994) examines the effects of IMF programmes through control of 
external factors important in determining outcomes and comparing the remaining 
performance and policy records of programme countries with non-programme 
countries. The study uses a simulation model and covers the period 1976-1986 to 
examine IMF programmes in 74 countries. The estimation is based on a mix of cross- 
section and time series data. The target variables studied include growth, the current 
account and inflation. The policy variables include government consumption, the rate
31of growth of domestic credit, government deficit and the real exchange rate. The 
results indicate that the current account and inflation improved, while growth fell for 
programme countries. The finding on growth, however, was statistically insignificant. 
The fall in the growth rate is attributed to a decline in the domestic investment ratio. 
The other findings show that both public and private investment fell, government 
expenditure declined and the real exchange rate depreciated. Conway (1994, pp. 381- 
382) notes that:
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“Reduction in public expenditure is the most clearly differentiable policy 
response to participation in IMF lending programmes, and accounts for the 
significant impact of participation on the current account. That this reduction 
is centred in public investment expenditure during this period explains both 
falling investment and growth. It is surprising, however, that the monetary 
control and real depreciation conditions central to many IMF programmes do 
not lead to significant policy effects.”
The paper by Havrylyshyn et a i  (1998) employs a simple regression model 
similar to the one found in the economic growth literature to investigate changes in 
rate of change of real GDP. The explanatory variables include: the inflation rate, 
structural reform index, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, initial 
condition representing macroeconomic distortions, socialist development and related 
distortions, initial level of per capita income, the degree of industrialisation, and 
effectiveness of the legal framework. Havrylyshyn et a l investigate the factors that 
determine growth in 25 countries for the period 1990-97, in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Baltic, and Russia, which are in transition. The paper found that structural 
reforms, macroeconomic stabilisation, and reduction in government expenditures have 
positive effects on growth. The authors also argue that the short-term “pains”, new 
buyer’s market and austere budget cuts that signal cutbacks in production during the 
initial years of reform, are outweighed by the long-term gains.
Recently Barro and Lee (2001) applied a multiple regression model to test for 
the impact of IMF programmes on economic growth by using the instrument-variable 
technique: the instruments being institutional and political variables such as the size 
of a country’s quota at the IMF, the size of the national staff at the IMF, and a 
countiy’s political proximity to the U.S. The use of this technique is to avoid 
parametric restrictions on the distribution of error terms in a typical multiple 
regression model. Using panel data for 130 countries over for the period 1975-2000, 
Barro and Lee (2001) found that participation in an IMF programme is associated with
32lower per capita growth.
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4.7 The Actual versus Target Approach
As the name indicates the actual vs. target approach compares actual outcomes 
in target variables to targets set by the IMF or domestic policy makers ex ante. Unlike 
the methodologies discussed above the actual vs. target approach does not focus on 
measuring the counterfactual. The limitations of this approach are the bias against the 
IMF because targets may not be achieved for example, due to incomplete programmes 
and unfavourable external factors. Similarly targets may be under- or over-predicted 
depending on the model and the forecasting technique used. The adequacy of the 
actual vs. target method is also doubtful, as targets may be unrealistic or inadequate. 
The moves from stabilisation to adjustment as well as the IMF’s increasing interest in 
poverty may also mean proliferation of targets and instruments that encourage partial 
achievement. For instance, setting targets for reduction in the level of domestic credit 
and devaluation of the local currency by a certain percentage may fail to achieve an 
improvement in the balance of payments due to unfavourable terms of trade effect. 
However, if, at the same time, targets were set to the interest rate, privatisation, 
domestic price liberalisation etc., some of the objectives may be achieved justifying 
claim for success or incrimination for failure. An appropriate method would be a 
comparison of actual outcomes with the best possible outcome, although subjectivity 
is increased (Williamson, 1983c). Further work should take into account waivers 
granted by the IMF and modifications made to programmes, which significantly alter 
programme targets (Khan and U1 Haque, 1998). Krueger (2000) also remarks that;
“Macroeconomic outcomes are uncertain: unforeseen or unpredictable 
future events (such as the prices of key exportable commodities or the 
weather), unpredictable or unanticipated (in terms of timing as well as of 
magnitude) responses of consumers and producers to altered relative prices, 
serious strikes, and changes in the government, can all affect the speed of 
response” (p. 11).
4.7.1 Empirical Evidence from Actual vs. Target Studies
The earliest use of the actual versus target approach is that of Reichmann 
(1978). For the period 1973-1975, 21 Stand-by programmes for 18 countries were
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examined. On the balance of payments, 7 programmes were considered successful. In 
19 cases, the target growth was achieved. However, the impact on prices was 
undetermined. The conclusion arrived by Reichmann is that given the economic 
climate of the mid 1970s, the outcome of Stand-by programmes was satisfactory, 
“...most of them were able to arrest a worsening economic position and all of them 
prevented the crisis situation that would have developed had no programme been in 
effect” (p. 41).
Zulu and Nsouli (1985) have also compared actual outcomes with targets for 
the current account, balance of payments, inflation, economic growth, savings and 
investment for 35 African countries over the period 1980-81. Their result indicates 
that the rate of economic growth and the current account fell short o f targets in most 
cases. In the case of the balance of payments half achieved targets while the results 
for inflation, savings and investment were close to targets. In most cases the ratio of 
government expenditure to GDP and the budget deficit exceeded the targets while 
government revenue was close to its desired level. Targets on net growth of credit to 
the government as well as the private sector were not met. In a majority of cases the 
external debt ratio as a proportion of GDP exceeded the target.
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4.8 Are IMF Programmes Implemented As Agreed?
The impact analyses discussed in the previous sections mainly focus on 
outcome on target variables to assess the effect of IMF stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes.33 At the same time other studies of crucial significance appeared related 
to implementation issues. Recently, Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000) 
examined whether successful compliance with IMF conditionality by transition 
countries results in better performance on growth. The authors tested the hypotheses 
that commitment to reform will result in proper follow-up of conditionality set by the 
IMF which in turn results in better growth performance. They found a positive 
relationship between the index of compliance with performance criteria and growth. 
More specifically, 84 per cent of the countries that complied with performance criteria 
conditionalities experienced sustained growth.34
However, a number of other studies found that compliance with IMF 
conditionality has been problematic, rendering futile the results from analysis of 
outcome. A large proportion of programmes have not been completed due to violation 
of programme criteria, shortage of capital inflow, lack of political commitment, poorly 
designed programmes, and external conditions. Beveridge and Kelly (1980) looked at 
105 programmes over 1969-78 and showed that fiscal and monetary conditionalities 
were met in 55 per cent of the programmes. Edward (1989) found that of the 34 
programmes implemented over 1983-85, 50 per cent of fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments were not complied with. Polak (1991) studied 161 IMF programmes and 
found that credit ceilings were implemented in 78 per cent of standby agreements but 
only in 38 per cent of EFF programmes. Fiscal performance targets were adhered to in 
62 per cent of standby agreements but only in 29 per cent of EFF programmes. 
Conway (1994) found that only 50 per cent of IMF approved credits were drawn, 
indicating incompletion of programmes.
Killick (1995a) defines uncompleted programme, as a programme in which 20 
per cent or more of the total credit agreed between the IMF and a country is undrawn. 
His results show that out of the 305 programmes studied over 1979-1993, 53 per cent
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were uncompleted. At a more disaggregated level 50 per cent of Stand-bys 
arrangements, 85 per cent of EFFs and 38 per cent of SAFs were uncompleted. The 
results also indicate that most o f the programmes were interrupted in Africa and Latin 
America. Killick (1984a) also evaluates the difference between Stand-by and EFF 
arrangements in affecting target variables. However, apart from a high propensity of 
programme discontinuity in EFF arrangements the impact on target variables 
exhibited no significant difference.
By defining interrupted programme as a programme in which 25 per cent or 
more of the total credit agreed between the IMF and a country is undrawn, Mussa and 
Savastano (1999) also show that only 34.8 per cent of IMF programmes were 
complete, out of the 615 programmes reviewed over 1973-1997. The disaggregated 
findings also show that only 39 per cent of Stand-by arrangements, 9.5 per cent of 
EFF’s and 32.4 per cent of SAF/ESAF’s were completed. Mecagni (1999) defines 
programme interruption as 6 months delay in programme reviews and found that 77 
per cent of the programmes reviewed in 36 countries were interrupted. Edwards 
(2001) found that, o f the 347 programmes agreed over 1979-1995, 60 per cent were 
fully complied with, while the IMF suspended 40 per cent of the programmes.
It is evident that a large proportion of programmes are not completed, while 
nearly all of the studies, which focused on outcome, assume that they have been 
completed. Among the studies reviewed here only Killick (1995a) explicitly took 
account of programme completion, but found that no statistically significant 
difference was found between completed and uncompleted programmes. Assessing 
the impact of IMF programmes without taking account of which countries complied 
with conditionalities or which completed programmes definitely provides confusing 
results. However, measuring programme incompletion as the undrawn SDR balance 
fails to take account that countries may achieve targets quicker than previously 
forecasted. In this case the rational decision is not to draw the remaining IMF balances 
as it implies increased debt burden (Joyce, 2002). For instance, if a country borrows 
from the IMF on a three year loan agreement due to a temporary terms of trade 
decline, and if the terms of trade improves in the second year the country may not 
continue with the programme. On the other hand, countries may be allowed to
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continue to withdraw from approved IMF credit, despite evidence that the 
programmes are not working. This is supported by the IMF’s frequent actions to grant 
waivers and introduce modifications to programmes. These issues imply that either 
way programme outcomes would be overestimated or underestimated (Bird, 2001).
Nonetheless, the findings indicate that high rate of non-adoption is the norm 
and the reasons provided vary. Waivers and modifications as well as early success in 
meeting targets are few and far between to vindicate programme incompletion. Non­
adoption in the 1980s is attributed to negative external environment, such as 
unfavourable tenns of trade (Edwards, 1989 and Polak, 1991). Higher percentage of 
programme non-completion in Africa and Latin America is due to structural 
weaknesses and the terms of trade effect in the former and the debt overhang in the 
later (Killick, 1995a). Given these factors, it was difficult to cut budget deficits and 
devaluation raised the local currency value of debt, hence failure to meet many of the 
targets specified under IMF programmes.35 Mussa and Savastano (1999), in their 
review of 615 IMF programmes over 1973-1997, found that 37 per cent of the 
programmes were interrupted and disbursement not completed due to unanticipated 
external environment, but over 75 per cent of uncompleted programmes were due to 
the recipient country not meeting IMF conditionalities.
High rate of non-adoption is reported because conditionalities conflict with 
governments’ capacity to implement policies and their wish to present policies as 
home-grown (Kapur, 2001 and Goldstein, 2000 and 2003). The IMF, although 
acknowledging non-compliance and conceding the need for “streamlining” its 
conditionalities and enhancing local ownership (IMF, 2001c), also insists “the data 
provide no indication that more conditionality impairs implementation” (IMF, 2001a, 
p. 21) and “implementation rates vary widely, but they are essentially uncorrelated 
with the extent of conditionality” (IMF, 2001b, p. 72). For the IMF “most programme 
interruptions have been the result of factors outside the funds control - that is, major 
political upheavals and flagging commitment” (IMF, 2001a, p. 56 italics added). 
Similarly, an IMF working paper stated, “ethnic and linguistic divisions, strong 
special interests, and lack of political cohesion contribute to programme failure” 
(Anayiotos, et al., 2001, p. 2).
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Another interesting finding of the impact literature is the absence of private 
capital flows following IMF programmes. The IMF argues its programmes have a 
“three pronged approach”, where stabilisation, adjustment and capital inflows ensure 
improved performance (IMF, 2001a). This is because IMF conditionality provides 
borrower credibility and signals reform commitment to private capital. However, 
empirical studies have shown that there is no evidence for the catalytic effects of IMF 
programmes, particularly private capital inflows (Rodrik, 1996b and Bird and 
Rowlands, 2001). The only effect observed is that private lenders may reschedule debt 
in response to IMF programmes (Edwards, 2000). The conclusion is that not only IMF 
programmes do not work both in tenns of stabilisation and adjustment, but they also 
are not implemented fully and they also fail on the third aspect: no catalysis has been 
identified.
4.9 Who Adopts IMF Programmes and Why?
Despite these findings, there is an increasing flow o f IMF credit and new 
programme arrangements both to new borrowers and existing clients, which is known 
in the literature as “recidivism” (Bird, 2001). The rate of repetitive lending remains 
high with a probable inference that new programmes had to be prescribed because 
earlier ones failed. Empirical work has confirmed “recidivism” through; first, lagged 
IMF programmes are significantly correlated with current programmes; and second, 
there is a strong link between economic downturn and adoption of IMF programmes. 
It has been found that repetitive lending is not associated with improved performance 
(Easterly, 2002). The data for SSA show that Cote d ’lvore had 26 adjustment loans 
but per capita growth rates averaged -1,4 per cent, Ghana had 26 loans and an average 
growth rate of 1.2 per cent, Senegal had 21 loans and an average growth rate of 0.1 
per cent, Uganda had 20 loans and an average growth rate of 2.3 per cent, and Zambia 
had 18 loans and average growth rate of -2.1 per cent. Conway (2000) studies 90 
developing countries for the period 1974-1992 and concludes “the greater the time 
spent in preceding years in IMF programmes the lower the probability of ending the 
crisis in any period” (p. 4). Conway (2002 and 2003) shows that if an old programme
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does not meet IMF conditionalities, a new one will have more stringent 
conditionalities or the programme will be suspended, depending on who has the 
greater bargaining power. Surely, repetitive lending negates the IMF’s fundamental 
principle behind conditionalities that its funds are meant to rotate.
So the question becomes why the IMF continues lending and why the recipient 
countries adopt its programmes. In other words what determines the demand for 
IMF’s resources and its supply?36 This thesis classifies the literature into three 
schools, which deal with both supply of and demand for IMF programmes. These can 
be classified as the economic, the institutional and the political schools. For the 
economic school, IMF programmes are supplied and demanded because the recipient 
country faces low growth, balance of payments crisis, high inflation, overvalued 
exchange rate, and high debt burden (Edwards and Santaella, 1993; Conway, 1994; 
Knight and Santaella, 1997; and Mussa and Savastano, 1999).
For the institutional school, the IMF has an incentive to advance its loans to 
maximise its power and justify its existence. According to Kapur (1998) the ‘‘absence 
of rules designed to ensure self-restraint, its staff-like that of any other 
bureaucracy-wili always push the hind toward policy prescriptions that give then 
greater prominence and influence” (p. 126). This has been manifested by increases in 
its staff size and resources (Vaubel, 1994 and Willet, 2002). The IMF is interested in 
power, prestige and amenities. To achieve these objectives the IMF maximizes its 
budget, staff, and conditionalities. This means that the IMF is not interested on who 
boiTows as long as the recipient countiy meets simple criteria such as exchange rate 
liberalisation. The absences of eligibility criteria as well as imposing conditionalities 
ex post fail to solve moral hazard problems. Hence, the IMF suffers from bureaucratic 
efficiency and lack of external scrutiny (Vaubel, 1996). Moreover, it has been shown 
that the higher the quota of a country, it is more likely an IMF loan is advanced, and 
the larger the number of IMF national staff, the higher the probability of lending. 
These conclusions are based on “institutional and geopolitical” variables namely the 
size of members’ quota, and the size of the national staff within the IMF (Vaubel, 
1994 and Willet, 2002).
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For the political school the determinants of supply of and demand for IMF 
programmes are political factors within the recipient country and around the large 
shareholders of the IMF, mainly the U.S. Empirical evidence shows that a member 
country’s political stance that conforms to that of the IMF determines the probability 
of loan approval (Thacker, 1999). Using data for the years between 1975-1999 for 131 
countries that agreed a loan with the IMF under Stand-by and EFF arrangements, 
Barro and Lee (2001) find that the nearer members’ proximity to the U.S.-led political 
view, the higher the probability of lending, what is called the “political proximity 
hypothesis”.37 Recent studies also found that IMF decision-making creates an 
opportunity for U.S. policy makers to influence IMF lending. These are based on both 
interest group politics and foreign policy objectives. Loan disbursements between 
1985 and 1998 were responsive to American pressure and larger loans went to 
countries in which American banks were highly exposed and to governments 
intimately allied with the U.S. (Oatley and Yackee, 2000). Internally, governments 
demand IMF resources in the aftermath of political elections, mainly because they 
gain political legitimacy to push through unpopular reforms (Przeworski and 
Vreeland, 2001). Similarly, governments adopt IMF programmes to gain external 
political and financial support to fend off local political opposition (Vreeland, 1999 
and 2001). This is because introducing reforms is difficult where diversity includes 
political fragmentation, ethnic fractionalism, and political conflict. (Drazen, 2001; 
Ivanova, et a l , 2001; Mayer and Mourmouras, 2002).
The conclusion by all three schools can be used to explain why IMF 
programmes continue to flourish as well as their sustenance or abandonment. The 
economic school reinforces the view not only do economic crises determine first time 
IMF lending, but also repetitive lending to the same country as is the case in most 
countries (Conway, 2000 and Bird et a l , 2002). Repetitive lending is also linked to 
lower per-capita income, primary commodity exports, and landlockedness (Joyce, 
2001). Institutionally, the IMF tolerates non-compliance for maintaining its own 
credibility due to large financial commitments as well as to protect international 
capital markets (Edwards, 2001). Programme interruptions do not occur in countries 
with large quota because these countries are too important to go off track, such as 
Korea (Joyce, 2003). This is consistent with the finding that most interruptions take
187
Chapter 4 IMF Programmes: The Empirical Evidence
place in low-income countries. The political school confirms that countries closely 
allied with the U.S. face little threat of programme suspension (Stone, 2002). Joyce 
(2003) using data for 384 programme fully implemented in 77 developing countries 
over 1975-1999, find that government that stayed in power for longer period find 
adoption difficult as interest groups are solidified; and a government which is 
ideologically divided with each group having veto power find it difficult to adopt IMF 
programmes. Joyce (2003) also finds that open (trade and capital) economies adopt IMF 
programmes successfully than less open ones, while new and democratic governments find 
adoption easier.
4.10 Concluding Remarks
By exploring existing methodologies, the purpose of this chapter has been to 
look into the impact of IMF stabilisation and adjustment programmes. Despite the 
explosion of these programmes in the last three decades, no conclusive evidence has 
been found as to their impact. The above survey of the available evidence indicates 
that less than 40 per cent of the programmes had positive impact on the growth rate, 
the current account and prices. This thesis finds that none of the studies comes to 
definitive conclusion, not to mention the methodological pitfalls. Several studies 
employed methodologies, which included the before-after, the with-without (also 
referred as the Control-Group), the multiple regression/structural model, the actual vs. 
target approaches, as well as case studies to detennine programme continuity, 
compliance and sustainability, which found that more than half of IMF-programmes 
were interrupted in SSA and Latin America.
The major concern in the literature is measuring the counterfactual. The 
before-after approach is too simple to provide a detailed analysis of programme 
effects and approximate the counterfactual, mainly because it fails to take account of 
differences in the pre-programme and post-programmes periods. Similarly, the 
traditional with-without approach does not control for differences between programme 
and non-programme groups, which is referred to as sample selectivity-bias. Under the 
modified with-without approach some studies attempted to correct for sample and
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selectivity-bias, but unobservable differences between programme and non­
programmes countries persist. The overall result indicates that there are no systematic 
differences between the pre-programmes and programme periods. Similarly, 
programme countries are not systematically different from non-programme countries. 
The multiple regression model approach, although providing a causal relationship 
between target and instrument variables, falls short of evaluating effectiveness of 
programmes. The studies based on structural models looked the mechanics of 
programmes without providing answers to success/failure. The methods used by the 
actual vs. target approach also produce mixed results at the same failing to consider 
difficulties involved in setting targets ex ante and achieving them in the face of 
external and internal shocks.
Some important issues are identified from the discussion in this chapter. The 
first problem is related to the problem of using annual data while IMF programmes 
start at any time of the year. The second is related to arbitrary use of 0-1 dummy 
variables for the absence and presence of IMF programmes. The use of a binary one- 
zero index does not reflect implementation of programmes. Programmes may be 
scheduled at 6-month frequencies and waivers may be granted to permit purchases 
even when implementation slips. Programme effects must not necessarily follow a 
linear path, and increases in some variables may be offset by decline in others, which 
cannot be captured by a simple search for percentage increments in target variables 
(Bird, 2001). One such finding is the trade-off between growth and the current 
account (Baqir et a l, 2003). Third, an assessment of programme impact is precisely 
an evaluation of the IMF’s as well as policy makers’ knowledge of the economy. Full 
grasp of economy-wide relationships is unlikely in the face of data problems and 
paucity of economic analyses, particularly in low-income economies.
Fourth, the attempt to find optimal values for target variables is futile simply 
because they are mutually inconsistent or there are “trade-offs” between them 
(Williamson, 1983c). As often seen in the empirical literature, the possibility of 
capturing individual country differences by aggregated cross-section analysis is 
problematic. Each country has a unique political characteristic, a distinct institutional 
makeup, and a particular policy mix. As Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000) point out:
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“First, an important question for the empirical application is whether 
individual country behaviour can be sensibly aggregated in a uniform model 
that is stable across countries and over time. Specifically, differing 
institutional characteristics (e.g., the degree of policy discipline inherent in 
specific exchange rate arrangements or the relationship with a major donor), 
changing political conditions, or varying severities of economic distress are 
likely to result in countries formulating different or changing constraints.
Another question is whether it is appropriate to assume that the policy 
reaction function of a programme country, had it not received IMF support, 
is identical to that of a non-programme country that did not seek IMF 
support. For example, the counterfactual for a country receiving IMF support 
may involve the imposition of trade or exchange restrictions, while countries 
that do not seek IMF support may contain themselves to “IMF-type” policies; 
i.e., avoiding the use of trade or exchange restrictions” (p. 499).
Fifth, most of the findings base their criteria for success and failure on 
statistical significance, which does not necessarily mean economic significance. The 
success of IMF programmes cannot be vindicated by t-tests without explaining what 
their significance in real terms means. Significance tests based on t-statistics do not 
tell us much about economic significance. For instance, reduction in the level of 
domestic credit may have a statistically significant effect on reducing the current 
account. Similarly, an increase in the domestic rate of interest may have a statistically 
significant positive impact on savings. But these results do not tell us economic 
significance. The question is, are the improvements in the balance of payments and 
savings significant in the economic sense? In other words, do these improvements 
increase per capita income or the rate of growth or lead to structural transformation? 
The results reported above lag best practice as they neither show economic 
significance nor inform us how the conflicting results come about. The search for the 
counterfactual fails to address the fundamental problem of development. The 
counterfactual is plainly a situation where the terms of trade remain unfavourable. An 
impact evaluation would be informative if, rather than assessment of short-term 
financial relief; it addresses the fundamental causes of economic decline and how 
these have been resolved.
Sixth, the impact studies tell us nothing about the cost of improvement in the 
rate of growth and the balance of payments, as these are often achieved by severe 
deflation. The short run damage may have a longer than expected effect on productive
190
Chapter 4 IMF Programmes: The Empirical Evidence
capacity. As shown in the previous chapters the IMF has extended its programmes 
from stabilisation to adjustment and structural issues. However, the impact analysis 
still focuses on programme effects on growth, current account and inflation. 
Improvements in these variables may be achieved with austerity, but there is no 
guarantee that the economies productive capacity has improved or not or whether 
there has been significant structural transformation.
It is a disappointment that the impact analysis has not been taken seriously as a 
way of feedback to policy formulation. The impact of IMF programmes seems to be 
that U.S.-friendly countries are locked into a vicious cycle of economic decline and 
IMF programmes, without any concrete development. Bearing the limitations and 
depending on the availability of information the case study approach is probably the 
most appropriate for application to a single country. Achievements and shortfalls in 
meeting targets can be explained by identifying special characteristics of a country by 
a case study, at a risk of failure to generalise lessons. This issue will be the main 
concern of the next two chapters, which will examine IMF programmes in Ethiopia 
and Uganda.
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Notes
1 The issue of sample-selectivity bias is closely associated with the Nobel Prize 
winner James Heckman who pioneered a method for removing the bias in modelling wage 
determination in the labour market (see Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985),
2 Baqir et al (2003) find no trade-off between inflation and the current account and 
between inflation and growth.
3 Reichmann and Stillson (1978) observed the changes both at four and eight quarters 
before and after IMF programmes.
4The authors acknowledge that due to trade liberalisation a decline in net foreign 
assets is expected.
5 Killick (1984a) argues that assessment of programme effects in one and two years is 
consistent with Stand-by arrangements and one can see the effect before exogenous factors 
develop. However Killick also notes one to two years assessment is not consistent with EFF 
and does not indicate whether the effect of programmes is sustained or not.
6 The effect on the overall balance of payments is attributed to the catalytic effects of 
IMF programmes.
7 A once-and-for-all increase in prices is expected in the short-term if price 
liberalisation is part of the programme.
8 Pastor (1987) points out that although there is a danger of committing Type II error, 
one-tail test is used.
9 Balance of payments and the current account are measured as a percentage of GDP, 
the rate of inflation as GDP deflator, dependency measures are exports plus imports as a 
percentage of GDP, and labour share is measured by labour's share of income in net GDP.
10 Schadler et al. (1993) note that the “ESAF was designed to promote adjustment 
and reform in eligible countries by supporting particularly vigorous macroeconomic and 
structural change with a larger scale of resources on the same concessional terms as the S AF”
(p. 1).
11 OP 106 refers to Occasional Paper No. 106, which is the same as Schadler et al
(1993).
12 See Table 9 in Schadler et al. (1993) for a complete list of the results.
13 See Table 3.5 in Killick (1995a).
14 Out of the 35 countries 15 were from sub-Saharan Africa.
15 Balance of payments is measured, firstly, as the ratio of current account balance to 
GNP/GDP in domestic currency terms and, secondly, as the ratio of the overall balance of 
payments to exports expressed in dollars. The perfomiance of inflation is measured by 
changes in the rate of consumer prices. Changes in the rate of growth of GDP (at constant
prices) are used to indicate the perfomiance of growth. GNP measures the savings rate less
aggregate consumption as a proportion of gross national income. The investment rate is
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measured by gross fixed capital formation plus changes in inventories as a proportion of 
gross national income. Finally, real consumption is measured by aggregate consumption 
deflated by changes in the consumer price index.
16 The differences in Donovan's and Loxley's approaches are: firstly, Loxley applied 
significance tests while Donovan only looked at changes in averages. Secondly, Loxley 
included all LLDCs with IMF Stand-bys under first as well as upper credit tranches, while 
Donovan included (excluded) some countries without Stand-by arrangements (some countries 
with Stand-by arrangements). Thirdly, in Loxley's methodology a programme period is 
defined as one that exceeds three months, while in Donovan's study if a programme exceeds 
twelve months it is taken as a two-year programme. Finally, Loxley compares programme 
LLDCs with all LLDCs, while Donovan compares his programme countries with NODCs.
17 LLDC programme countries compared to all LLDCs performed better in terms of 
overall balance of payments, inflation and growth, but worse in terms of investment on both 
one and three year periods. Compared with NODCs, LLDC programme countries appear to 
have performed better in terms of overall balance of payments and inflation, but worse in 
terms of investment over both one and three year periods. Not much difference is exhibited in 
the performance of LLDCs and Donovan programme countries with respect to changes in 
savings, investment and consumption.
18 Loxley states “A close look examination of his [Donovan's] programme countries 
shows, however, that many of them either did not draw at all on Fund facilities in their years 
in question (e.g., Honduras 1971, 1972, 1973; Morocco and Korea 1971; Panama 1971, 1978, 
1979) or else drew only from the lower credit tranche (e.g., Zambia 1977; Tanzania 1975, 
1976). At the same time, other upper credit tranche programme countries are inexplicably 
overlooked (e.g., Madagascar 1978, Guyana 1976, 1977; and Bangladesh 1979, 1980)” (pp. 4 
-5).
19 World Bank (1989a) and Mosley and Weeks (1993 and 1994) have also used an 
approach similar to the with-without method to assess the effect of World Bank policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank divided countries into “strong adjusting”, “weak 
adjusting” and “no reform programmes”. This type of classification however, has been 
criticised for its failure to define clearly what is weak and strong and identify which countries 
are strong or weak adjusters. Mosley and Weeks (1993, p. 1586) note that the “simple mle of 
any such empirical test, no matter how sophisticated or simple, is that the criterion for the 
division of a sample into two parts must be prior to and independent of the outcome of the 
empirical calculations... (i.e., one must have an ex ante division of the sample.” Based on the 
methodology described above, the World Bank argued the late 1980s are associated with a 
“recovery” in sub-Saharan Africa, Mosley and Weeks (1993) using the same perfomiance 
measures namely real GDP, investment and export growth for the period 1980-90 compare 
countries with World Bank programmes and those without. Their results suggest that 
programmes had a neutral effect on the rate of growth, a positive effect on export growth and 
a negative effect on investment compared to non-programme countries. Mosley and Weeks 
(1993) also find that improvement in the performance measures is positively related to 
completion of programmes. Their results for the social indicators also suggest that 
programme countries have higher per capita food production and higher infant mortality 
relative to non-programme countries. This last point is supported by the decline in 
expenditure on social services. See Parfitt (1990) for a further critique of the approach 
adopted by the World Bank.
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20 The issue of sample-selectivity bias is closely associated with the Nobel Prize 
winner James Heckman who pioneered a method for removing the bias in modelling wage 
determination in the labour market (see Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985).
21 The balance of payments, the current account and the fiscal deficit are measured as 
proportions of GDP. The rate of inflation, the rate of growth, the rate of growth of domestic 
credit and changes in the terms of trade are expressed as percentage changes. Other variables 
include a dummy variable; the real effective exchange rate lagged one period and a trend 
variable that reflects the benefits of growth on other markets.
22 See Table 3 in Khan (1990) for a complete report of the results.
23 Khan (1990) acknowledges that one-year comparisons are too short to capture 
complete programme effects or sustainability. Conversely too long period comparisons mn 
the risk of including non-programme factors in the analysis. Therefore, Khan argues that the 
results for two and three year comparisons indicate that the positive effects on the current 
account, the balance of payments and inflation are increased, and the negative effects on 
growth decreased.
24 The countries are divided into three groups: early-intensive adjustment lending 
countries; programme countries and non-programme countries. The period was also divided 
into three: 1970-80, 1981-84 and 1985-88. The counterfactual was compared with the actual 
outcomes in the 1985-88 periods.
25 The argument is that since the decision to adopt programmes is under the 
expectation that there will be an improvement in the target variables, the treatment of 
programme-participation variable (i.e. dummy variable) as exogenous will provide a biased 
estimate of IMF programmes. However, Mosley (1992b) pointed out that the dummy 
approach itself does not tell the full story of programme implementation, that is values of 1 
and 0 are extremes and indicate that programmes are either implemented fully or are not 
implemented at all. However, there are cases where programmes are partly implemented and 
abandoned (see Killick 1995a).
26 Mosley (1992b, p. 38) commented that Corbo and Rojas “leave out three crucial 
elements in the investment story” - “compression of the government development budget”, 
“expenditure switching” (from investment to consumption) and “private sector knock-on 
effects” (the crowding-in argument).
27 According to Khan and Knight (1981) —  “the excess demand for money, however, 
creates a balance of payments surplus that increases the money stock, so that gradually the 
price level turns around and there is a period of both rising prices and rising output that 
continues until current output has increased by 10 per cent and domestic prices have risen to 
their initial level” (p. 66).
28 The hypothetical demand side policies are defined as a 10 per cent reduction in the 
growth rate of domestic credit, nominal government expenditure and devaluation of 10 per 
cent. The supply side policy is defined as an increase of 2-3 per cent in the investment/GDP 
ratio.
29 Similarly, the World Bank (1994) and Mosley et al. (1995) employed a single 
regression model to assess the effect of IMF/World Bank adjustment programmes in sub- 
Saharan Africa to analyse the effect of changes in macroeconomic policy variables on 
changes in GDP per capita between 1981-86 and 1987-91.
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30 Doroodian (1993, p. 855-856) gives a theoretical justification for the mathematical 
signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients. For instance, real devaluations are said to 
have “expansionary effects”... “as suggested by the traditional model”; reduction in fiscal 
deficit is said to have a positive effect on growth and the current account and a negative 
effect on inflation; the interest rate is reported to have a positive effect on growth and the 
current account (via capital inflow, savings and investment) and a negative effect on inflation 
and domestic credit is said to have an inverse relationship with growth and the current 
account and a positive relationship with inflation. Doroodian (p. 857) argues that this last 
result is “consistent with Rational Expectation hypothesis: increases in the money supply 
would fuel domestic inflation and cause a deficit in the current account balance.” ... This 
findings support the IMF position that external disequilibrium is the consequence of 
excessive domestic demand.”
31 The current account, government consumption and the deficit are measured as a 
share of GDP, while growth is measured by domestic investment ratio.
32 The regression model is similar to that employed in Barro (1991).
33 There is a vast volume of case study material, which examines stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes in almost all programme countries. One example the use of survey 
data to evaluate the effect of policy reforms, particularly on poverty. One such study, Demery 
and Squire (1996 and 1997), investigated how changes in macroeconomic policy are 
conducive to poverty reduction. The head count index is analysed in relation to specific 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy changes. Demery and Squire (1996, pp. 45-46) 
argue that their analysis; “presents the most compelling evidence to date that improvements 
in the macroeconomic policy regime of the kind usually associated with World Bank and 
IMF-supported adjustment programmes are consistent with a decline in the incidence of 
poverty overall.” However, the use of survey data in such a context proves difficult mainly as 
the data are initially constructed for a different purpose and by different methodologies (see 
Weeks 1997).
34 The study looks at 26 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic, and 
Russia over 1993-1997.
35 Out of the 305 programmes 251 were Stand-bys, 33 were EFFs and 21 were SAFs. 
The study also looked at programme non-completion by period of implementation and 
income of countries. The highest non-completion was recorded in the period 1990/91 - 
1992/93, i.e. 61 per cent; 1986/87 - 1989/90, 56 per cent; 1983/84 - 1985/86, 41 per cent; and 
1979/80 - 1982/83, 44 per cent (see Table 3.3 in Killick, 1995a).
36 Stiles (1990) found that bargaining and compromise characterise IMF decision­
making and debtors with long years of relationship and large debt to the IMF tend to control 
their national policy making, while small countries are dominated by IMF’s conditionality.
37 The variable for the political proximity of a member country to the U.S. is proxied 
by the votes a country casts in the U.N. General Assembly along with the U.S.
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Chapter 5 
IMF Programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda
5.1 Introduction
Does the IMF achieve its stated objectives? The studies reviewed in the previous 
chapter applied various impact assessment methodologies to cross-section data and came 
up with conflicting and inconclusive results. This chapter uses the before-after and with- 
without approaches to assess the impact of IMF SAF, ESAF and PGRF programmes in 
Ethiopia and Uganda. In total, Ethiopia and Uganda implemented two SAF, four ESAF 
and two PGRF programmes between 1987 and 2004. These programmes introduced a 
number of macroeconomic policy measures including restraining the flow of domestic 
credit to the public sector; exchange rate and trade liberalisation; privatisation of state- 
owned enterprises; and financial liberalisation.
In Uganda, IMF programmes under SAF were initiated after the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986. In May 1987, under the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP), the reforms were broadened and refined with a view to 
increasing long-term growth (see World Bank, 1995b; 1997).1 Since then the IMF and the 
World Bank identify Uganda as a model of successful reformer (IMF, 1996; World Bank, 
2000a). The government’s handling of the economy is widely regarded as a success story 
that earned it the name of “show case” (Ddumba-Ssentamu, et al., 1999). In its 
assessment of Uganda’s economic reform in the 1990s, the IMF asserts: “Uganda’s 
reform and stabilisation programme has been a major success...Exports became more 
diversified, with noncoffee exports representing about 30 per cent of the total” (IMF 
Survey, 1996, p. 3). Similarly the World Bank pronounces: “Uganda’s economic 
perfoimance over the last decade has been impressive. The Government’s reform 
programme has had considerable success in establishing fiscal discipline, restructuring 
public expenditure, opening up the economy and anchoring its reliance on market forces” 
(World Bank, 2000a, p. i).2 By the mid 1990s the Ugandan development strategy focused
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mainly on poverty reduction (MFPED, 2001b; Dijkstra and Donge, 2001). The Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which was initiated in 1997 and revised in 2001, sets 
out the broad agenda for pro-poor policies. The PEAP, according to the government of 
Uganda, is its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) as well as its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which is based on four key pillars: 1) fast and 
sustainable economic growth and structural transformation; 2) good governance and 
security; 3) increased ability of the poor to raise their income; and 4) increased quality of 
the life of the poor (MFPED, 2001b).
In Ethiopia, from 1974 to 1991 the Dergue regime resorted to central planning, 
which had been the dominant thrust of government strategy.3 In May 1991, the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) threw the regime out of office. Ten 
months into office the EPRDF introduced its economic strategy under the title 
“Ethiopia’s Economic Policy During the Transitional Period.” The document set out the 
broad agenda which included: 1) changing the role of the state from direct producer to 
facilitator; 2) promoting private sector investment; 3) mobilising external resources; 4) 
continuing state ownership land; and 5) changing macroeconomic policies to suit these 
objectives (see TGE, 1991; Abegaz, 1994b; Hansson, 2001). In 1992, Ethiopia signed a 
SAF agreement with the IMF and began implementation of stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes.4 The subsequent reforms under the ESAF and PRGF focused on adjustment 
and poverty reduction (IMF, 1999a). In June 2002 these strategies have been 
complemented by the PRSP known in the country as the “Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Programme” (MOFED, 2002).
The impact assessment here avoids the use of cross-section data, which enjoys 
popularity among researchers surveyed in the previous chapter. Instead a case-by-case 
study of macroeconomic performance in the two countries will be employed. The 
statistical tests will be accompanied by analysis of the two economies to provide context 
to numerical results and statistical significance or otherwise. Statistical methods known 
as the Mann-Whitney U-test and One-Way ANOVA test are used to assess the impact of 
IMF programmes.
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The empirical assessment in this chapter reaches two conclusions. First, the 
findings broadly correspond with the survey of the empirical evidence in the previous 
chapter. The results confirm that there is only partial evidence to suggest that Ethiopia 
and Uganda fared differently from their pre-reform economic predicaments or performed 
as or better than Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, and Sudan, which never implemented 
IMF SAF, ESAF and PGRF programmes and used here as benchmarks for with-without 
comparisons. In statistical terms, the short-term assessment, which is three years before 
and three years after programmes, shows that the impact of IMF lending is positive and 
significant on real GDP growth rate and real GDP per capita growth rate. However, the 
ESAF and PGRF programmes, beyond the first SAF bear little difference on both real 
GDP growth and real per capita GDP growth. The longer period comparisons, up to 
fifteen years before and ten years after, show that a significant improvement in both real 
GDP and per capita GDP growth rates for Uganda but not for Ethiopia.
The results for inflation indicate reduction for the post-programme period but they 
are statistically insignificant. Subsequent IMF programmes made no difference in the 
case of Ethiopia but for Uganda the reduction in the rate of inflation was significant. For 
Uganda subsequent programmes made no difference on the rate of inflation and the result 
was insignificant. The long-term comparisons' show insignificant differences between the 
periods with IMF programmes and those without.
The results for the current account were statistically insignificant for the first SAF 
programmes in the post-programme period. For both countries the subsequent ESAF and 
PGRF programmes actually resulted in deterioration and the results are significant The 
long-term comparisons of changes in the current accounts show insignificant changes for 
both countries. The results for the accumulation of international reserves in Ethiopia, 
measured in months of import coverage, imply that there has been a significant 
improvement in the first SAF but deterioration in the second ESAF. For Uganda the 
changes in international reserves were insignificant for the entire post-programme period.
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The with-without comparisons show that there is no significant difference in real 
GDP growth and per capita growth of Ethiopia and Uganda under IMF programmes 
compared to growth rates observed in Botswana. Additional with-without comparisons 
show that there are no significant differences in inflation for Ethiopia and Uganda under 
IMF programmes compared to the inflation rates observed in Botswana. With-without 
comparisons also show that there are significant differences in the current account 
deficits and international reserve holdings of Ethiopia and Uganda, which deteriorated 
under IMF programmes compared to Botswana. Comparing outcomes in target variables 
for Ethiopia and Uganda with the average outcome for Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, 
and Sudan, shows that no statistically significant difference was found in real GDP and 
GDP per capital growth rates. The inflation rate for Ethiopia is positive and significant 
compared to the average for countries without IMF programmes, but not for Uganda. The 
current account deficit is low and statistically significant for Uganda compared to the 
average for countries without IMF programmes. No significant difference is observed in 
the current account balance for Ethiopia compared to the average for countries without 
IMF programmes. As regards to international reserves both Ethiopia and Uganda exhibit 
lower and statistically significant coverage for months of imports compared to the 
average for countries without IMF programmes.
Recidivism, discussed in the previous chapter, was evident in both countries but 
made little difference to target variables. The findings in this chapter are consistent with 
those in the literature that repetitive IMF lending has been the practice in countries with 
low growth, balance of payments crisis, high inflation, overvalued exchange rate, primary 
export dependence, and high debt burden (Edwards and Santaella, 1993; Conway, 1994; 
Knight and Santaella, 1997; Conway, 2000; Bird, 2001 Bird et a l , 2002; Joyce, 2002). 
Recidivism meant that programmes are implemented to reverse previous failures of 
similar types of programme, leading to a vicious circle of IMF lending.
Failure to comply with conditionality and programme interruptions are often cited 
as leading to poor performance in target variables, and survey of the literature in the 
previous chapter has also found that compliance with IMF conditionality has been
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problematic and a significant proportion of programmes have not been completed 
(Killick, 1995a; Mussa and Savastano, 1999; Bird, 2001), Here we also find that the first 
SAF in Uganda was not completed where 29 per cent of the approved loan was not 
drawn, and the subsequent ESAF and PGRF programmes were extended by 34 months 
from their expiry date. In the case of Ethiopia 67 per cent of the ESAF and 31 per cent of 
the PGRF loans were not drawn and the programmes were extended by 12 months.
When each of the SAF and ESAF/PGRF is compared to the preceding 9-10 years 
without IMF programmes, the results show that in the case of Uganda both the SAF and 
ESAF/PGRF make positive and significant differences in real GDP growth and per capita 
GDP growth rates compared to the years without IMF programmes. The results for the 
SAF are positive even though the programme was incomplete. For Ethiopia the findings 
are to the contrary. The period with the SAF and ESAF/PGRF, compared separately, 
made no statistically significant difference from the years without IMF programmes, even 
though the SAF was completed with no interruption or extension. The results for inflation 
show that only the second IMF programme or the ESAF made a difference in Uganda, 
where the programme was completed but with extension. None of the SAF programmes 
or ESAF/PGRF programmes made significant differences in the current account deficit 
compared to the period without IMF programmes. The ESAF in Uganda and all 
programmes in Ethiopia led to significant improvements in accumulation of international 
reserves despite incomplete and extended programmes. The findings here correspond 
with those in the literature that high rate of non-adoption is the norm and completion may 
or may not impact upon outcomes in target variables (Killick, 1984a, 1995a; Mercer- 
Blackman and Unigovskaya, 2000). The IMF often grants waivers and introduces 
modifications to programmes, which must be taken into account in impact analysis to 
qualify overestimation or underestimation of programme effects.
The findings in this chapter also show that over half of fiscal and monetary targets 
for policy instruments were not complied with. The before-after comparisons reveal that 
for both Ethiopia and Uganda no significant change was found in the flow of domestic 
credit to the governments before and after IMF programmes. In Uganda domestic credit
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as a share of total domestic credit began to fall only after six years of IMF programme. In 
fact a significant deterioration in the overall fiscal deficit as a share of GDP was found 
under the SAF and ESAF programmes in Uganda. The tests for Ethiopia are insignificant 
but show that the fiscal deficit has remained constant for both the ten years with and 
without IMF programmes. The real effective exchange rate significantly depreciated 
under both the SAF and ESAF programmes in Ethiopia compared to the period without 
IMF programmes. In contrast, the first SAF in Uganda did not impact on the exchange 
rate but only a significant depreciation was achieved under the second ESAF programme. 
The long-term before-after comparisons also show depreciation in the exchange rate for 
both Ethiopia and Uganda. The change in real interest rates after IMF programmes was 
insignificant in Ethiopia but positive and significant in Uganda.
The second conclusion is that an impact assessment is only instructive if, rather 
than measurement of short-term financial relief, it deals with the fundamental causes of 
underdevelopment and how these have been resolved. This leads us to question: what do 
improvements in some macroeconomic variables at some point in time but not throughout 
the programme period mean in transforming the two economies in question? The finding 
is that behind ostensibly fascinating statistics on growth rates we uncover economies with 
little structural transformation. High growth, low inflation and external financial transfers 
are not ends in the development process. This chapter will illustrate that despite 
numerous programmes, both countries have shown little structural transformation, 
measured as changes in the share of manufacturing in gross national product, putting in 
question the sensibility of the IMF objectives. The test results show that a statistically 
significant decline of 1 per cent in the share of manufacturing for Ethiopia under IMF 
programmes comparing the years without IMF involvement. The results for Uganda 
indicate no significant difference in the structure of the economy between the years with 
IMF programmes and those without since 1965. A statistically significant 1-percentage 
point improvement was observed, but only when the period of high industrialisation 
(1965-1971) is discounted.
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The contribution of this chapter is in assessing impact of IMF programmes to 
country cases as well as in moving away from a presumption of negative and positive 
effects of IMF programmes to identifying whether the objectives set by the IMF are 
sensible or not. The results show that real GDP and GDP per capita growth rates as well 
as reserve holdings have improved, but there is little evidence to suggest that IMF 
programmes meet all their objectives or they brought about significant changes in the 
economic development of Ethiopia and Uganda. Both countries adopted IMF 
programmes with the advent of new regimes and at a time when protracted civil wars 
ended. The changes in the macroeconomic target variables - good or bad - may or may 
not be due to IMF programmes but due to other factors that coincided not least with 
change of government and polices that would have been adopted in some form in any 
case.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 sets out the before-after and with- 
without approaches and identifies key methodological as well as data-related issues. 
Section 5.3 discusses the results obtained by applying statistical tests for the target and 
instrument variables included in IMF programmes. Section 5.4 argues the objectives set 
out by the IMF are far from sensible as they fail to translate economic reform into 
structural transformation. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.5.
5.2 Methodological and Data-Related Issues
A simultaneous model for evaluation of IMF stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes is set out below similar to that found in the literature.5
Where y tj denotes the jth outcome for target variable observed in a country i (e.g. 
the current account balance, rate of inflation and the rate of growth); xt is (j)-element
Ay, = fi0J + + A W'a.. +
A*,- = y[y f  - O h ) - i ]  + 77,-
(5.1)
(5.2)
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vector of policy variables that would be observed in country i in the absence of IMF 
programmes (e.g. level of domestic credit, real exchange rate, and fiscal deficit); W is <p- 
element random vector of world non-programme variables (e.g. the terms of trade). 
Equation 5.1 shows the change in the macroeconomic target variable is a function of the 
change in the policy instruments that would have occurred in the absence of IMF 
programmes (Ax,.), the change in the exogenous non-programme variables (IV), the effect 
of IMF programmes (P ^F) and other random shocks (£,y). The dummy variable dj 
assumes a value of 1 if a country has IMF programmes and a value of 0 otherwise. The 
parameter p !PF is therefore what measures the impact of IMF programmes during the 
programme period on the target variables denoted byyiy.
Equation 5.2 assumes that policy makers react to perceived disequilibria in 
macroeconomic target variables. Therefore, the change in country /'s policy instruments 
before and after IMF programmes will be a function of the difference between the desired 
value of the target variables in the post-programme period, y f , and their actual value in 
the pre-programme period, yti-n- The coefficient y  indicates the responsiveness of the 
policy instruments to target disequilibria. The parameter/?^ thus implies that the policy 
instruments denoted by x. measure the policies adopted in the absence of IMF 
programmes. The value for vector x i is observed from data for pre-programme period and 
for countries without IMF programmes, which are counterfactual values. For programme 
periods or for countries with programmes, the value for vector xf is estimated by equation
5.2 or the policy reaction function and shows the determinants of macroeconomic policy 
changes initiated by the authorities in the absence of programmes. By modelling the 
behaviour of policy makers, the above equations assess the effect of stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes by estimating the counterfactual implied by the pre-programme
period and non-programme countries. The assumptions here are that/?oy, /?,y anda,y are 
uniform before and after IMF programmes and across countries.
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Using the above model the before-after estimator captures the effect of IMF 
programmes as specified in equation 5.3, which assumes all the coefficients in equation
5.1 are zero except j3-jiF.
where superscript BA denotes before-after and P is the set of programme countries, the 
before-after estimator compares the mean outcome of the macroeconomic target variables 
between the pre-pro gramme and the programme periods to calculate the effect of IMF 
involvement.
The with-without or control-group approach compares countries with programmes 
and those without. The basic idea is to estimate the counterfactual in programme 
countries by the macroeconomic outcomes observed in non-programme countries. Where 
(Ay,),, and (Ay; ) N are mean changes in the target variable for programme and non­
programme countries and superscript WW denotes with-without, J3™F is estimated by;
The difference in the mean changes in the target variables is obtained by running 
statistical tests for both programme and non-programme countries. Where A denotes a set 
of programme and non-programme countries, J30 is a constant and di is a dummy 
variable, the following equation is tested to obtain the mean values for both groups.
The value for the estimated coefficient/fA/F’l,/|!/, shown in Equation 5.5, measures the 
difference between the mean changes of the target variables for programme and non­
programme countries ((Ay,.) p -  (Ay; ) N ).
i e P (5.3)
(5.4)
(5.5)
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The above models are applied to the countries under study and the significance of
the programme estimators F'BA and p l^ F-mv are statistically tested using the Mann-
Whitney U-test and the One-Way ANOVA test. The Mann-Whitney U-test, extensively 
applied in the literature to assess impact of IMF programmes, compares two groups of 
observations, especially when measurements are not normally distributed. The One-Way 
ANOVA method tests for differences between the means of independent samples by 
using analysis of variance, which partitions the total variance into comparable 
components, in our case between years and countries with IMF programme and those 
without. Standard t-tests are used where the data pass normality tests.
Statistically significant ^ F'BA and p ,FlF'ww imply that the mean changes in the
target variables between pre-programme period or programme countries are significantly 
different from the changes in post-programme periods or non-programme countries. 
Since we are looking for any difference in target variables, an increase, or a decrease, our 
test is a two-tailed hypothesis test. The chosen level of confidence is 0.05 where two-tail 
probability value is the actual probability of the differences occurring by chance, be it 
under the before-after or with-without comparisons. The two-tail results confirm that the 
Ho must be rejected and the Ha accepted in both tests. Here we formally test whether the 
IMF programme significantly changed target variables, for instance real GDP per capita 
growth rates in Uganda and Ethiopia before and after programmes or compared to 
countries that did not adopt IMF programmes. The null-hypothesis and alternative- 
hypothesis are tested as follows:
Before-After Tests:
Ho = the IMF programme had no effect - there is no difference between target or policy 
variables for Ethiopia and Uganda before and after IMF programmes.
Ha = the IMF programme had a significant effect - there is a difference between target 
or policy variables for Ethiopia and Uganda before and after IMF programme.
205
Chapter 5 IMF Programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda
With-Without Tests:
H0 = the IMF programme had no effect - there is no difference between target variables 
for Ethiopia or Uganda and for Botswana or for countries without IMF 
programme.
Ha = the IMF programme had a significant effect - there is a difference between target 
variables for Ethiopia or Uganda and for Botswana or for countries without IMF 
programme.
The data for the target and policy variables are obtained from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Bank Africa Databases. Real GDP per capita growth 
and real growth of GDP are given as annual percentage growth rates. Inflation is 
measured by the consumer price index, which reflects annual percentage changes in the 
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services. The 
current account is measured as share of national income. International reserves are in 
months of imports of goods and services. Flow change in domestic credit to government 
includes changes in net claims on central government, and changes in claims on state and 
local government as well as on non-financial public corporations. The data are annual 
flows in local currencies. The overall deficit excludes all grants and it is calculated as a 
share of GDP. The real effective exchange rate is based on a nominal rate adjusted for 
relative changes in consumer prices. Real interest rates are nominal deposit rates deflated 
by the consumer price index.
5.3 Statistical Tests and Results
Table 5.7 shows that between 1987 and 2004, the period covered under this study, 
Ethiopia and Uganda implemented two SAF, four ESAF and two PGRF programmes in 
total. The statistical tests begin with the conventional approach representing an IMF 
programme as a dummy variable signifying whether a programme was ongoing or not. 
As noted above, the effect of IMF programmes on real GDP per capita growth, real 
growth of GDP, the inflation rate, the current account and international reserves is
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estimated using the before-after and with-without approaches. The IMF programme is 
captured through expected changes in the three policy variables: the flow of domestic 
credit to the government, the overall fiscal deficit and the real exchange rate.
A complete set of statistical results are reported in the tables under Appendix 5.1. 
This section will refer to the results but, to conserve space, only the relevant coefficients 
and parameters are reported. Four types of tests are conducted. The first test relates to the 
period three years before and three years after all IMF programmes. Second, the tests 
examine the long-term effect of IMF programmes, typically up to ten years before and ten 
years after programmes. Third, tests apply the with-without approach to a single country 
or one-to-one comparison as well as to one-to-many comparisons. The one-to-one 
comparison takes Botswana as the counterfactual or benchmark and compares its values 
for macroeconomic variables with each of the countries under study: Ethiopia and 
Uganda. The one-to-many comparison compares the average macroeconomic outcome 
for Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, and Sudan (countries without IMF programmes) with 
Ethiopia and Uganda. The final test focuses on assessing the impact of IMF programmes 
by type, that is, the individual effects of the SAF and the ESAF are evaluated. The test 
results are presented below.
5.3.1 Test Results for Real Per Capita GDP Growth and Real Growth of GDP
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the short-term, three years before and three years after, 
effects of IMF programmes. In statistical terms, the first three years of IMF’s presence is 
associated with positive and statistically significant effects on both real per capita GDP 
growth and real growth of GDP for both Ethiopia and Uganda. These positive outcomes 
were achieved under the first (or SAF) programmes in both countries. Subsequent short­
term comparisons show that the ESAF and PGRF programmes, beyond the SAF, did not 
significantly change real GDP growth and real per capita GDP growth. The results 
indicate that no statistically significant difference is observed between the growth rates 
achieved under the first SAF and successive ESAF and PGRF programmes.
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Table 5.10 and 5.11 show that under long-term comparisons, up to fifteen years 
before and ten years after IMF programmes, the improvements in both real GDP per 
capita growth and GDP growth rates for Uganda were statistically significant. The results 
for Ethiopia are insignificant, even though there have been increases in real GDP per 
capita growth and GDP growth rates in the years with IMF programmes compared to the 
years without IMF programmes. However, per capita income remains low in both 
Ethiopia and Uganda at US$298 and US$120, respectively.6
Comparing individual programmes, SAF and ESAF, with the years without IMF 
programmes reveals that both programmes made positive and significant contribution to 
real GDP per capita growth and GDP growth rates for Uganda. As Table 5.12 and 5.13 
show none of the SAF and ESAF programmes made a significant contribution to 
Ethiopia’s real growth rate of GDP per capita and real GDP growth. These results are 
consistent with those obtained by short-term comparisons for Ethiopia, that only the first 
SAF programme was associated with positive and significant growth rates.
The one-to-one with-without comparisons show that neither Ethiopia nor Uganda 
exhibited statistically different growth rates in real GDP per capita growth and real GDP 
growth compared to Botswana (see Table 5.14). The one-to-many comparisons also show 
that no statistically significant difference was found between the growth rates of Ethiopia 
and Uganda compared to the four countries’ average or countries without IMF SAF and 
ESAF programmes (see Table 5.15).
Largely the effect of IMF programmes on real GDP per capita and real GDP 
growth rates is only significant in the initial three years under SAF compared to the 
previous three years for Ethiopia. Overall Uganda performed better than Ethiopia under 
IMF programmes, particularly on longer-term comparisons. However, both countries 
performed no better than countries that did not adopt IMF programmes.
In the previous chapter we dealt with the question “who adopts IMF programmes 
and why?” Among others, the economic school argues that IMF programmes are supplied
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and demanded because the recipient country faces low growth rates, balance of payments 
crisis, high inflation, overvalued exchange rate, and high debt burden (Edwards and 
Santaella, 1993; Conway, 1994; Knight and Santaella, 1997; Mussa and Savastano, 
1999). It is the case that both Ethiopia and Uganda adopted IMF programmes at the time 
their economies were in crisis. It is no surprise that the first three years of IMF financial 
injection as well as the end of conflicts and wars brought about improvements in growth 
rates that might have been expected in any case. It is difficult to ascertain whether growth 
and low inflation are policy induced or simply resulted from restoration of peace and 
stability.
5.3.2 Test Results for the Rate of Inflation
As depicted in Table 5.8 and 5.9, the results for short-term tests show that both 
countries reduced their inflation rates under IMF programmes, but the results are 
statistically insignificant. Subsequent IMF programmes made no difference in the case of 
Ethiopia but for Uganda the reduction in the rate of inflation became significant in the 
second ESAF programme. The third programme or the ESAF made no difference on the 
rate of inflation and the result was insignificant. The results for Uganda become 
significant as the inflation rate was reduced from 153 per cent for the pre-ESAF period 
(1987-1989) to 19 per cent for the ESAF and post-ESAF period (1990-1997).
The long-term comparisons in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show insignificant differences 
in inflation rates between the years with IMF programmes and those without for both 
Ethiopia and Uganda. The test results for individual programmes show that none of the 
SAF and ESAF programmes significantly contributed to reductions in the inflation rate 
for Ethiopia. For Uganda the results are consistent with the short-term test findings that 
the second programme or the ESAF significantly reduced the inflation rate and the 
reduction was statistically significant (see Tables 5.12 and 5.13).
The with-without comparisons in Tables 5.14 and 5.15 show that there is no 
significant difference in the inflation rates for Ethiopia and Uganda under IMF
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programmes compared to the inflation rates observed in Botswana. Comparison of 
inflation rates for Uganda with the average outcome for the four countries without IMF 
programmes (Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, Sudan) shows that no statistically 
significant difference was found. The results for Ethiopia are significant.
Overall two conclusions can be made on the impact of IMF programmes on the 
inflation rate. First, for Uganda the reduction in the rate of inflation is significant and this 
has been achieved in the second ESAF programme after six years of IMF engagement. 
Second, the inflation rate for Ethiopia shows a significant difference compared to the 
average for countries without IMF programmes, mainly because Ethiopia always had 
historically low inflation rates. Ethiopia’s inflation rate averaged 6.2 per cent between 
1966 and 2001 compared to 15.7 for the four countries without IMF programmes.7 The 
low inflation rates in Ethiopia can hardly be attributed to IMF programmes. In fact, the 
Ethiopian economy exhibited deflationary tendencies throughout the 1990s (Hailu, 1997).
As shown in Table 5.1, there were deflations in prices of food, household items, 
clothing, transportation and medical care between 1993 and 1997. In the year 1997, 
prices of food and household items fell by as much as 7.1 per cent and by 10.4 per cent, 
respectively. Prices of clothing fell by 8.1 per cent and 0.8 per cent in 1994 and 1995, 
while prices of transportation fell by 3.8 per cent in 1997.
Table 5.1 - Trends in Inflation Rates, 1990/91 - 1996/97
Years Food
Household
Items Clothing Transportation
Medical
Care
General
CPI
1991 23.3 23.0 10.4 3.1 0.9 12.1
1992 24.9 15.3 14.0 -0.9 5.9 11.8
1993 8.1 -2.2 55.4 24.9 60,9 29.4
1994 1.2 1.6 -8.1 17.8 35.0 9.5
1995 18.3 0.0 -0.8 2.1 33.0 10.5
1996 -0.3 6.6 2.6 3.5 -17.3 -1.0
1997 -7.1 i h—» o 4*. 7.6 -3.8 -15.5 -5.8
1998-2002 - - - - - -0.5
Source: MEDaC (1999) and NBE (2003)
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The largest fall in prices was in medical care where deflations of -17.3 per cent 
and -15.5 per cent were recorded in the years 1996 and 1997, respectively. Deflations of 
-1.0 per cent and -5.8 per cent were registered for the General CPI in the years 1996 and 
1997, respectively. Deflation remained the feature of prices developments where the 
average General CPI for 1998-2002 was -0.5 per cent. Azeze’s (1996) non-parametric 
assessments show that total domestic credit flow on the three years average fell from 15.2 
per cent before the programme to 13.6 per cent. This raises the question why deflationary 
policies are advocated in Ethiopia.
5.3.3 Test Results for Current Account Balance and International Reserves
As Tables 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate, the results under the short-term tests for the 
current account balance were insignificant for the first SAF programmes for both 
countries. Successive ESAF and PGRF programmes essentially resulted in deterioration 
of the current account and the results are significant. The results for the accumulation of 
international reserves in Ethiopia, measured in months of impoit coverage, imply that 
there have been statistically significant improvements in the first SAF but deterioration in 
the second ESAF, For Uganda the changes in international reserves were insignificant for 
the entire programme period.
Comparing ten years under IMF programmes with those eight years without 
programmes (or the before period in the before-after), show that the current account 
deficit for Ethiopia improved from 1.9 per cent to 1.8 per cent of GDP. For Uganda the 
improvement was from 9.2 per cent to 7.3 per cent of GDP comparing the fifteen years 
with IMF programmes with the seven years without IMF programmes. However, as 
shown in Table 5.10 and 5.11 these changes in the current account balances were 
statistically insignificant for both countries.
For the same period the long-term tests show that there have been statistically 
significant and positive changes in the reserve holdings of both countries. International 
reserve holdings for Ethiopia improved from 1.6 months before to 4.4 months impoit
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coverage after IMF programmes. For Uganda the improvement was from 1.2 months to
3.4 months. Tests on individual programmes indicate that both the SAF and ESAF 
contributed to improvements in reserve holdings for Ethiopia. Only the ESAF programme 
contributed to reserve holdings in Uganda (see Tables 5.12 and 5.13).
One-to-one with-without comparisons, as shown in Tables 5.14 and 5.15, confirm 
that there are significant differences in the current account deficits of Ethiopia and 
Uganda, which deteriorated under IMF programmes from -4.5 to -6.3 per cent of GDP 
compared to the current account balance for Botswana, which increased its surplus from
5.3 per cent to 8.5 per cent of GDP. Botswana also increased its reserve holdings from
12.3 to 23.4 months of import coverage compared to an increase from 1 to 3.7 months of 
imports for Ethiopia and Uganda under the ten years before and ten years after 
programme calculations. No significant difference is observed in the current account 
balance for Ethiopia compared to the four countries without IMF programmes. For 
Uganda lower and statistically significant difference in the current account deficit is 
found compared to the average for countries without IMF programmes. The deficit for 
the four countries averaged 4 per cent of GDP compared to 7 per cent for Uganda. 
International reserve holdings for both Ethiopia and Uganda are significant and lower 
compared to the average for countries without IMF programmes. Reserves could cover 7 
months of imports for the countries without IMF programmes compared to 4 months for 
Ethiopia and 5 months for Uganda.
Despite successive ESAF and PGRF programmes the results overall indicate that 
Ethiopia and Uganda did not significantly improve the deterioration in their current 
account deficits. Both the short-term and long-term tests imply that no statistically 
significant difference was observed before and after IMF programmes. IMF programmes 
had positive and significant impact on the reserve holdings of both countries, but these 
improvements are not unique. Botswana and the countries without IMF programmes 
fared much better both in having lower current account deficits and larger import 
coverage out of their reserve holdings.
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The above results are not surprising given the growth of imports following trade 
liberalisation. The new government in Ethiopia acknowledged that its first step was to 
replace “existing quantitative restrictions with tariffs and encouraging investment in 
export-oriented undertakings” (TGE, 1991, pp. 32-33). And when the SAF agreement 
with the IMF was concluded in 1992, the tariff regime has been overhauled, which began 
with reducing the negative imports list from 102 to 43 items on 1 March 1994 (Hansson, 
1995; Abraha, 1996). As Table 5.2 presents, the maximum tariff rate was reduced from 
209 to 30 per cent and the numbers of tax exemptions were reduced from 327 to 138 per 
cent, while the trade weighted average rate was reduced from 21.5 per cent to 14.9 per 
cent and the number of tariff bands declined from 15 in 1993 to 7 in 2000. The average 
unweighted and the item-weighted tariff rates were reduced from 31 per cent and 29 per 
cent in 1994 to 17.1 per cent and 19.5 per cent in 2000, respectively.
The test results for the current account balance are consistent with the argument 
that the demand for imports, particularly for intermediate goods, is highly inelastic for 
import-dependent economies such as Ethiopia and Uganda.8 In Uganda, the increase in 
imports is linked to increased programme aid, particularly import-support. The 
composition of imports is about 54 per cent investment goods such as machinery and 
transport equipment and 26 per cent intermediate goods including fuels and chemicals 
(Ddumba-Ssentamu, et a l, 1999). Ddumba-Ssentamu, et al (1999) note: “it is not easy to 
conclude on whether aid financed the trade or current account deficit, or created it. In the 
absence of aid, imports would have been at lower levels and economic growth would also 
have been lower” (p. 40).9
Table 5.2 -  Structure of Import Duties, 1993-2000 (number and per cent)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Tariff B ands 15 10 10 9 8 8 7 7
Maximum Tariff Rate 209 80 80 60 50 50 40 30
Average Unweighted Tariff Rate — 31.0 31.0 25.6 21.3 21.3 17.1 17.1
Item-Weighted Tariff Rate — 29.0 — — - 21.5 19.5 19.5
Trade-Weighted Average Tariff Rate - 21.5 - - - 15.9 14.9 14.9
Source: IMF (1999a and 2002a)
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In Ethiopia, trade liberalisation has led to an increase in import intensity of the 
industrial sector, which is in conflict with the expenditure-switching objectives of the 
adjustment package as discussed in Chapter 3. Imports make up the inputs as follows: 96 
per cent for food and beverage; 78 per cent for machinery and engineering workshops; 37 
per cent for textiles; 30 per cent for leather processing; 69 per cent for chemicals and 98 
per cent for medicine and medical equipment (Wole, 1996). In 1992, import intensity, 
measured by the ratio of the value of imported input to total value of domestic inputs, has 
been 0.33, which increased to 0.44 in 1997 (MEDaC, 1999). As Table 5.3 illustrates 
capital goods make up a higher proportion of imports at 31.8 per cent followed by 
consumer goods 27.6 per cent, fuel 17.1 per cent, and semi-fmished goods 9.5. Transport 
and industrial goods take a large proportion of capital goods, while non-durable goods 
such as food (14.2 per cent) hold the lion’s share of consumer goods.10 Raw materials and 
medical goods make up less than 3 per cent in total value of imports.
Table 5.3 -  Ethiopia; Percentage Share in Total Value of Imports, 1992-1998
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average
Raw Materials 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0
Semi Finished G. 6.8 4.8 6.2 9.2 12.5 13.9 13.3 9.5
• Chemicals 0.9 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 4.2 3.9 3.3
• Fertilizers 4.9 0.4 1.3 4.2 7.2 7.8 7.6 4.8
• Textile 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.5
Fuel 13.8 18.8 24.3 15.9 15.2 16.5 15.5 17.1
Capital Goods 25.8 36.3 26.1 31.4 32.6 36.7 33.5 31.8
• Transport 18.6 23.9 12.0 13.2 13.6 16.7 13.9 16.0
• Agricultural 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 1.4
• Industrial 7.1 12.1 13.5 16.3 17.0 17.7 17.2 14.4
Consumer Goods 28.4 29.3 28.8 30.8 27.9 21.1 26.9 27.6
• Durables 7.6 7.8 8.7 8.6 8.0 8.5 7.9 8.2
• Non Durables 20.8 21.5 20.1 22.2 19.9 12.6 19.0 19.4
Food 15.0 15.9 13.8 17.0 15.2 7.8 14.4 14.2
Medical Goods 1.9 3.6 4.1 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.1
Source: Calculated from MEDaC (1999)
5.3.4 Test Results for Policy Variables
The short-term comparisons in Table 5.8 and 5.9 show that for both Ethiopia and 
Uganda, no significant difference was observed in the flow of domestic credit to
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government before and after IMF programmes. No significant change was registered in 
the fiscal deficit for Ethiopia compared to the pre-programme period. According to Azeze 
(1996) M2 slightly rose from 16.4 per cent to 16.9 per cent. The results for the changes 
from 1994 to 1995 are of particular interest: M2 rose from 10.3 per cent to 23,5 per cent; 
Ml rose from 8.6 per cent to 21.3 per cent; and total domestic credit increased from 7.3 
per cent to 14.5 per cent. In Uganda domestic credit as a share of total domestic credit 
began to fall only after six years of IMF programme.
A statistically significant increase in the fiscal deficit was observed in Uganda.11 
The test here shows that real effective exchange rate significantly depreciated under the 
SAF programmes in Ethiopia compared to the three years period without IMF 
programmes. The real effective exchange rate significantly depreciated under the SAF 
programmes in Ethiopia compared to the three years period without IMF programmes. In 
contrast, the first SAF in Uganda did not impact on the exchange rate but only a 
significant depreciation was achieved under the second ESAF programme. Interest rates 
in both countries were liberalised in 1994 and comparing the three years before 
programmes with those after reveals that the change in real interest rates was insignificant 
in Ethiopia but positive and significant in Uganda.
Table 5.10 and 5.11 show that under the long-term tests, no significant changes 
were found in the flow of domestic credit to the governments for both Ethiopia and 
Uganda. The same result is found for the fiscal deficit. A significant deterioration in the 
overall fiscal deficit as a share of GDP was found under the SAF and ESAF programmes 
for Uganda from 3.8 per cent to 7.9 per cent. The tests for Ethiopia are insignificant but 
show that the fiscal deficit has remained the same at 9.5 per cent of GDP for both the ten 
years with and without IMF programmes. It was not possible to control the fiscal deficit 
as the government also adopted the World Bank supported Sectoral Investment 
Programmes (SIPs) and Sector Development Programmes (SDPs), which committed the 
government for up to ten years spending. Notable sectors are roads, energy, education, 
and health (Abegaz, 1999). The fiscal balance in the first years of adjustment remained 
high because rehabilitation and reconstruction necessitated increased spending. Later, the
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conflict with Eritrea in 1998 increased government spending, which implied that the 
liberalisation process and macroeconomic stability were not free from political 
developments (Addison and Ndikumana, 2003). The long-term before-after comparisons 
- ten years with IMF programmes versus seven years without programmes for Ethiopia 
and fifteen years with and seven years without for Uganda - show significant 
depreciations in the exchange rates for both countries.
Tests based on individual programmes depict no significant difference was found 
between the flow of domestic credit to the governments under the SAF and ESAF 
programmes compared to the period without IMF programme. This applies to both 
Ethiopia and Uganda. For Ethiopia none of the programmes brought about significant 
changes in the fiscal deficit, while for Uganda the deficit deteriorated under the ESAF 
programmes. Both the SAF and ESAF led to real exchange rate depreciations for 
Ethiopia. For Uganda the first programme did not impact upon the exchange rate, but 
successive ESAF programmes were associated with depreciation (see Tables 5.12 and 
5.13).
Overall the tests for the policy variables lead to the conclusion that: 1) no 
significant difference was observed in the flow of domestic credit to government 
throughout the programme period; 2) no significant change was registered for Ethiopia 
and a deterioration was found in the fiscal deficit for Uganda; 3) IMF programmes were 
associated with significant real exchange rate depreciations for both Ethiopia and 
Uganda; and 4) liberalisation of the financial sector in Uganda led to significant real 
positive interest rates, but not for Ethiopia. Therefore, IMF programmes were not fully 
implemented in Ethiopia and Uganda.
5.3.5 Discussion on Policy Variables
Monetary Policy: The Ethiopian government announced that “the state should take 
urgent measures for achieving fiscal balance” and “monetary policy should be such as to 
ward off inflationary trends resulting from the circulation of money in volumes beyond
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the economy’s capacity” (TGE, 1991, pp. 36-37).12 However, reductions in the level of 
domestic credit to the government fell short of achieving set targets under the IMF 
programme. This was mainly due to the “downward fiscal-inflexibility”, which arises 
from the need for rehabilitation and reconstruction of a war-torn infrastructure (Addison 
and Ndikumana, 2003). According to Azeze (1996), in the first year of credit squeeze 
(1993), the deviation from the target was 75 per cent and in 1994 the deviation was 94 
per cent. In the third year of stabilisation (1995-1996) the flow of domestic credit to 
government deviated by minus 145 per cent. For the growth of total domestic credit and 
broad money, the evidence shows that targets have been met only for 1993 and 1994. 
While in 1995 the deviation from target on the growth of total domestic credit was 45 per 
cent and 86.5 per cent for broad money.
In Uganda domestic credit as a share of total domestic credit began to fall only 
after the monthly cash flow mechanism was introduced in 1992, which meant that 
government expenditures could not exceed the sum of revenues plus foreign grants and 
loans (Henstridge and Kasekende, 2001). A cash flow system involves monthly 
monitoring of cash disbursements to line ministries, which allows flexibility to adjust in 
response to revenue and donor finance changes. Most importantly the system restrained 
deficit financing (Stasavage and Moyo, 2000). The system was introduced in response to 
repeated shortfalls in the financing requirement of various ministries and government 
institutions and seems to have had two effects: a reduction of the deficit before grants, 
and a reduction of the deficit after grants to such an amount that it can be fully financed 
by external loans (Dijkstra and van Donge, 2001).
Exchange Rate Policy: In 1974, the Dergue regime had decided to keep the value of the 
bin* but brought to halt transactions in foreign exchange outside of the National Bank of 
Ethiopia (NBE). The foreign exchange restriction imposed on the private sector in the 
face of a fixed exchange rate regime caused a parallel market to merge and illegal trade 
flourished (Kidane, 1994; Kibret, 1994). In the aftermath of the Dergue, devaluation and 
price liberalisation became the central blocks of the stabilisation and adjustment package 
(Hansson, 2001). The new government’s November 1991 official line stated that:
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The exchange of the birr compared to the US dollar is unrealistically overvalued.
This clearly has its own negative impact on the country’s foreign trade. While 
there is, in principle, a basic understanding that corrective measures should be 
taken, it should also be understood that an adjustment of the exchange rate would 
have to be backed by a dependable supply base. In the short run, the impact of 
exchange rate adjustment on the country’s foreign trade would be minimal. On 
the other hand, any major change in the exchange rate of the birr without 
economic recovery and growth is likely to exacerbate problems of inflation, 
unemployment and economic decline, thereby seriously endangering the process 
of consolidating peace, stability and democracy. Therefore, exchange rate 
adjustment should be a gradual process to be undertaken in tandem with 
improvements in the performance of the economy on the basis of appropriate 
studies. There could also be other alternatives, which may have to be explored 
(TGE, 1991, pp. 35-36).
A few months after stating the above the government, under the SAF 
arrangement, devalued the official value of birr by 142 per cent on 30 September 1992 
(from biiT 2.07 to 5.01 per US$). On May 1993 the exchange rate was allowed further to 
adjust on a bi-weekly auction market, which started with allocation of foreign exchange 
for imports of goods worth more than US$5,000 (Warner, 1996).13 However, it has also 
been found that even though the government pegs the official rate to the parallel market 
rate, dissatisfied demand caused a persistent parallel market premium. This is due to the 
fact that unsuccessful bidders at the auction market increased the demand for the parallel 
market rate (Patterson, 2001).14
Table 5.4 - Sectoral Percentage Share of Total Export Earning, 1990-1998
Years Private Sector Government
1990 16.2 83.8
1991 15.6 84.4
1992 18.9 81.1
1993 28.8 71.2
1994 41.9 58.1
1995 48.2 51.8
1996 53.9 46.1
1997 63.0 37.0
1998 (first live months) 78.5 21.5
Source: Calculated from MEDaC (1999)
Despite a large devaluation demand for import of intermediate and capital goods 
proved to be highly inelastic (Kibret, 1994).15 From the liberalisers point of view perhaps
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the good news is that the share of the private sector in the export sector has been 
significantly rising. As shown in Table 5.4 the share of the private sector grew from 16.2 
per cent in 1990 to 78.5 per cent in 1998, while the share of government export earnings 
fell from 83.8 per cent to 21.5 per cent in the same period.16
Information on exchange rate policy in Uganda is relatively widely available as 
open public debate took place on the merits and de-merits of devaluation (see Mamdani, 
1990, 1991; Tumusiime-Mutebile, 1991). In 1990 retention of all foreign exchange 
receipts other than coffee was allowed. At the same time exchange bureaux were 
permitted to hold transactions in foreign exchange at a market rate, and there was extreme 
tolerance of the parallel market until its legalisation in July 1990. In effect the parallel 
market rate became the official rate. At the same time the authorities chose a crawling 
peg system introduced to maintain the real effective exchange rate constant and 
introduced an auction system in December 1991 (Kasekende and Ssemogerere, 1994; 
Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 1999a). In the pre-reform period, domestic prices were 
largely determined by the parallel or kibanda rate, as imports were obtained through 
foreign exchange obtained in this same market (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 1991, p. 340). 
Changes in the official exchange rate, therefore, did not affect the supply and demand for 
dollars significantly. This meant an official devaluation had little effect on the supply and 
demand for foreign exchange and hence the trade balance. Businesses could obtain 
foreign exchange on the parallel market, but the devaluation affected them as far as the 
increases in transport costs, particularly increases in imported fuel (ibid.).
If the official exchange rate did not affect the trade balance and prices, what was 
the devaluation meant to achieve in the post-reform period? The argument in favour of 
devaluation was because it transferred resources from urban users of official foreign 
exchange to earners of official foreign exchange, usually the rural fanners (Ddumba- 
Ssentamu, et al, 1999).17 Most important, devaluation was sought for its impact on the 
fiscal balance. As Mamdani (1991) notes:
“The pre-IMF dictum “print and spend” has simply been replaced by a new
guideline: “borrow and spend!” Devaluation has become a budgetary substitute
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for monetary financing of the deficit” (p. 352)....’’For those who have argued that 
devaluation is the single most important instrument “to get prices right”, it indeed 
seems strange to then turn around and argue just as vigorously that devaluation 
has little effect on the general level of prices under conditions of a large parallel 
market, the existence of which was given as reason in the first place to set “the 
prices right” through devaluation! But perhaps one can have one’s proverbial 
cake and eat it too” (p. 356).
Financial Liberalisation: In the mainstream sense, the financial sector in Ethiopia has 
been repressed for most of the 1970s and 1980s. “Political lending” has been a common 
practice and the state used the monopoly over state banks to finance its own spending 
plans. Between 1970 and 1991 deposits in the saving accounts only yielded between 1-2 
per cent nominal interest rates (Ayana, 1994; Mohamed, 1996).18 As shown in Table 5.5, 
real interest rates remained negative until 1996, but showed improvement thereafter, only 
to reverse back to negative rates in 2000 and 2001.
Table 5.5 -  Real Interest on Time Deposit, 1985-2001
Years Ethiopia Uganda
1985 -2.7 -33.5
1986 3.7 -48.7
1987 -5.0 -58.9
1988 -13.5 -50.5
1989 14.2 -38.4
1990 5.6 -3.1
1991 -3.8 7.7
1992 -6.1 -
1993 -2.1 -5.5
1994 -14.8 5.6
1995 -13.0 2.5
1996 1.8 3.9
1997 10.7 2.6
1998 -1.2 1.8
1999 6.2 7.6
2000 11.1 -
2001 -0.1 -
2002 -0.2 —
Source: IMF Financial Statistics Electronic Database, 2002.
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Ethiopia’s reforms in the financial sector in general are “evolutionary” and not 
“revolutionary”: the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) still holds over 75 
per cent of the market share (see Peterson, 2001). The IMF constantly argues that the 
financial sector should be liberalised, particularly the elimination of the monopoly by the 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia to enhance competition. In its reports the IMF insists that 
further liberalisation in the financial sector should be “pushed” and the government needs 
to take “genuine” actions and it continues to “urge” the government to open up the sector 
(IMF, 2002a and 2002b). However, the Ethiopian government insists that the financial 
sector remains closed from outside competition until domestic banking capacity is built 
(Stiglitz, 2002). The fear is the dominance of foreign banks and the likely effect on 
interest rates and exchange rates. What the government conceded was (a) to restructure 
the management of the CBE; (b) to observe strictly the reserve requirements; (c) to 
reduce excess liquidity and nonperforming loans; and (d) to allow auditing by an 
international firm (IMF, 2002a and 2002b).19
In Uganda, financial liberalisation started when interest rate controls were 
removed in 1993 and was completed in July 1994 (see Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 
1999a). As shown in Table 5.5, real interest rates on time deposits improved from -5.5 
per cent in 1993 to 5.6 per cent in 1994. Intensive liberalisation and decline in inflation 
rates meant positive real interest rates from 1994 onwards. After the liberalisation of the 
sector, there has been rapid expansion with new banks entering the market (Harvey and 
Robinson, 1995; Ddumba-Ssentamu et al., 1999; Henstridge, 1999; Nachega, 2001, p. 16; 
UN, 2001).20
5.3.6 Performance and Programme Completion
Section 4.8 in the previous chapter tackled the question “are IMF programmes 
implemented as agreed?” Answers to this question are relevant as the failure of IMF 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes is often explained by lack of implementation. 
Recent studies argued that failure to comply with IMF conditionality or implementing 
agreed policies results in worse performance. The notion is that commitment to reform
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will result in proper follow-up of conditionality set by the IMF which in turn results in 
improved macroeconomic performance (see Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya, 2000). 
Many researchers found that compliance with IMF conditionality has been problematic 
and numerous programmes have not been completed as agreed (Beveridge and Kelly, 
1980; Edward, 1989, 2001; Polak, 1991; Conway, 1994; Killick, 1995a; Mussa and 
Savastano, 1999; Mecagni, 1999). The consensus is that high rate of non-adoption is 
widespread and waivers and modifications may lead to overestimation or underestimation 
of programme effects (Goldstein, 2000, 2003; Kapur, 2001; IMF, 2001b).
According to Killick (1995a) incomplete programmes are those in which 20 per 
cent or more of the total credit agreed between the IMF and a country is undrawn. 
Mecagni’s (1999) definition is that incomplete programmes are those with 6 months 
delay in programme reviews. As Tables 5.7 show both Ethiopia and Uganda had 
programmes, which were delayed by six months or more and where more than 20 per 
cent of the agreed amount was undrawn. Here, we set new criteria and test whether 
programme completion affects outcome of IMF programmes or not. Programmes are 
assumed incomplete when 25 per cent or more of the agreed balance is undrawn and 
when end of programme or expiry date is extended by ten months or more.
The first SAF in Ethiopia was completed as the entire agreed amount was 
withdrawn on time: no undrawn balance and no extension. Under this programme there 
were positive and significant changes in real per capita GDP and real GDP growth rates 
as well as international reserves. But no significant changes were found for inflation and 
the current account deficit. The ESAF programme is incomplete as 67 per cent of the 
agreed balance was undrawn and a 12-month extension was agreed. The results show that 
insignificant changes in real per capita and real GDP growth rates as well as inflation; a 
significant deterioration in the current account balance and international reserves. These 
results are consistent with the tests conducted above and demonstrate that - where 
programmes are not completed as agreed - the macroeconomic outcomes show no 
significant changes or exhibit deterioration. Where programmes are completed only the 
growth rates and international reserves showed positive and significant changes.
2 2 2
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The results for Uganda show that the first SAF programme was not completed as 
agreed because 29 per cent of the amount was undrawn. Under this programme there 
were positive and significant changes in real growth of GDP per capita and real GDP 
growth rates, but insignificant changes were observed in inflation, current account 
deficits and international reserves. The second programme or the ESAF was also not 
completed as the programme was extended by twenty-seven months. The results show 
that no significant changes were observed in real growth rate of GDP per capita, real 
GDP growth rate, and international reserve holdings. Only the improvement in the 
inflation rate is statistically significant. The most recent ESAF/PGRF programme passes 
the completion test as the entire agreed amount has been withdrawn, albeit with two 
months extension of the expiry date. However, no significant changes were observed in 
real GDP per capita growth; real GDP growth rate; inflation and international reserves. 
Only a significant and positive improvement was observed in the current account deficit.
The above findings imply that even if we take account of programme completion, 
we only find a few statistically significant differences between completed and incomplete 
programmes in terms of impact on key macroeconomic variables. In Ethiopia a 
completed programme was associated with partial success, mainly improvement in 
growth rates. The incomplete ESAF had no impact on growth rates and the programme 
was associated with worsening external sector. For Uganda growth rates improved even 
though the SAF programme was not completed. The ESAF programme took three full 
programme years and two additional years to bring about reductions in the inflation rate. 
When the ESAF/PGRF was completed it only resulted in an improved external sector, but 
no changes were observed in the other variables.
5.4 Absence of Structural Transformation
Statistical significances (or otherwise) based on t-statistics do not tell us much 
about economic significance. The right direction in assessing economic reform 
programmes would be to examine how improvements in key target variables translate 
into tangible development outcomes. One of these outcomes is an increase in the output
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share of manufacturing in national income or structural transformation. The results 
reported as well as those surveyed in the previous chapter fail to answer the question - 
are improvements in per capita income or the rate o f growth associated with structural 
transformation? Impact assessments based on merely measuring the counterfactual by 
traditional macroeconomic performance fail to tackle the fundamental problem of 
development, particularly in economies heavily dependent on imports where domestic 
manufacturing may possibly substitute.
By “structural” then is meant a contribution to development beyond 
macroeconomic performance as such. It is not the intention of this chapter to examine 
such a notion in depth, either conceptually or empirically. This section seeks an impact 
evaluation that goes beyond testing statistical significance of changes in macroeconomic 
target and policy variables to measuring the fundamental causes of economic decline and 
how these have been resolved. This is done by assessing changes in the share of 
manufacturing in national income for both Ethiopia and Uganda. Both before-after and 
with-without tests are applied. The former observes changes in the share of 
manufacturing before and after IMF programmes and the latter evaluates changes in the 
share of manufacturing in both countries compared to that observed in the four countries 
without IMF programmes.
The results in Table 5.16 indicate that structural transformation did not take place 
in Ethiopia and positive but modest change was observed for Uganda. The results for 
Uganda indicate that the share of manufacturing in GDP increased from an average of 6.6 
per cent for the period 1965-1986 to 6.8 for the period 1987-2001. However, even this 
meagre increment is statistically insignificant on long-term comparisons implying no 
difference in the structure of the Ugandan economy between the years with IMF 
programmes and those without. If we take out the period 1965 to 1971, the result 
becomes significant as the share of manufacturing in GDP increased from an average of
5.5 per cent for the period 1972-1986 to 6.8 for the period 1987-2001. The bulk of the 
increase in the share of manufacturing took place post 1995 when it reached 6.2 per cent - 
the same value that was achieved in 1982. The favourable trend is that export-oriented
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manufacturing firms performed better than non-exporting firms, with an increase of 40 
per cent, compared to 15 per cent for non-exporters, but not for import substituting 
manufacturing (Gauthier, 2001).
For Ethiopia the share of manufacturing in GDP declined from an average of 7.2 
per cent for the period 1981-1991 to 6.2 for the period 1992-2001. Most importantly this 
change is statistically significant. The Ethiopian economy under IMF programmes de­
industrialised and remains fundamentally an agrarian economy. Coffee still makes up 73 
per cent of the total values of exports. The contribution of the five major export 
commodities, which are all agricultural (coffee, khat, hide/skins and spices), has been 
increasing from 74 per cent in 1991 to 95 per cent in 1998 (MEDaC, 1999).
With-without comparisons also show significant differences between Ethiopia and 
Uganda, on the one hand, and countries without IMF Programmes, on the other. As 
shown in Figure 5.1, the share of manufacturing in GDP averaged 8.8 per cent for the 
four countries without IMF programmes for the period 1981-2001 compared to 6.2 per 
cent and 6.3 per cent for Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively. Tests for the programme 
period, from 1992-2001, indicate that the share of manufacturing averaged 9.2 per cent 
for countries without IMF programmes compared to 6.3 per cent and 7.4 per cent for 
Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively. These findings illustrate that behind superficially 
alluring growth rate figures both Ethiopia and Uganda experienced no major structural 
transformation under IMF programmes compared to the years without programmes or 
compared to countries without programmes. The rationale of IMF programmes and their 
objectives must be questioned if they only achieve higher growth rates, reserve holdings 
and in some cases low inflation but not fundamental economic development.
All in all the evidence indicates that there is no sign of expansion in 
manufacturing activities. These findings substantiate the reservation against liberalisation 
in the absence of selective credit disbursement, subsidies, protection and technological 
transfers. If we just take one of these incentives, disbursement of bank credit, we find that 
little attention has been paid to its contribution to the manufacturing sector. In Ethiopia,
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as Table 5.6 shows, the share of bank credit to finance imports went up from 2 per cent in 
1992 to 16.3 per cent in 1998. Surprisingly, in the same period, bank credit to the export 
sector fell from 8.6 per cent in 1993 to 3.7 per cent in 1998, but picked up significantly 
for the period 1999-2002 to reach 30.5 per cent in line with the increase for international 
hade which went up from 7 per cent in 19992 to 38.4 per cent over 1999-2002. Credit 
flow to agriculture fell from 21.7 per cent in 1992 to 5.9 per cent over 1999-2002. A 
significant share of credit, 28 per cent, went to the domestic retail-trading sector over 
1999-2002. Credit disbursements to manufacturing, however, declined from 28.9 per cent 
in 1993 to 9.8 per cent in 1998.
Figure 5.1 Manufacturing Output as a share of GDP (Percentages - 1965-2001)
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Source: Calculated from World Bank Africa Database CD Rome, 2003.
In Uganda, as shown in Table 5.6, a large proportion of bank credit went to the 
trade sector, which averaged 45.7 per cent between 1992 and 1998. The data show that 
credit advanced to the agricultural sector was falling throughout the 1990s. Credit to the 
manufacturing sector doubled from 14.4 per cent in 1992 to 27.6 in 1998, but fell back to
21.3 percent for the years 1999-2002. The increase in credit going to the manufacturing 
sector is mainly linked to the return of Asian businesses, which are traditionally the 
pioneers of industrial capital in East Africa (Himbara, 1993). However, as the statistical
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test illustrates the share of manufacturing in national income has not improved 
significantly. As the findings in the previous section confirm, the share of credit advanced 
to the export sector has been falling since 1994 from 1.6 per cent to 0.9 per cent in 1998. 
This is a startling statistics given the emphasis on export-led growth within the 
liberalisation agenda. Increasing loan disbursement to finance imports and retail trade 
implies that: 1) business activity focuses on quick entry and exit and not long-term 
commitment in manufacturing; and 2) lending is predominantly for short-term financing 
working capital rather than for long-term financing of investment or fixed capital 
formation.21
Table 5.6 -  Percentage Share of Credit by Sector in Total Bank Credit, 1992-2002
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999-2002
Ethiopia
Agriculture 21.7 8.5 5.3 13.8 16.2 16.9 16.7 5.9
Manufacturing 20.4 28.9 18.6 8.1 11.8 9.6 13.1 9.8
Retail Trade 27.0 25.9 42.4 37.4 36.4 31.7 23.7 28.2
International Trade 7.0 18.5 6.4 7.7 15.0 16.8 20.0 38.4
• Export 5.0 8.6 2.8 3.3 6.2 7.9 3.7 30.5
• Import 2.0 9.9 3.6 4.3 6.3 8.9 16.3 7.9
Uganda
Agriculture 25.4 26.2 23.8 22.1 19.5 19.2 17.1 7,5
Manufacturing 14.4 16.8 20.9 21.8 26.7 21.7 27.6 21.3
Retail Trade 10.5 14.1 13.1 13.7 16.3 10.6 9.7 —
Trade 45.8 43.8 42.6 46.4 45.5 50.5 45.1 ___
• Imports - - 14.3 19.1 13.3 20.7 16.7
• Exports - - 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9
Source: For Uganda IMF (1998; 1999d) and Bank o f Uganda (2003). For Ethiopia 
Calculated from MEDaC (1999)
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter asked the question “does the IMF achieve its stated objectives? 
Survey of the empirical literature in the previous chapter concluded that the results are 
mixed. IMF programmes are associated with positive outcome in some variables but not 
all the time. This chapter answers the above question by assessing the impact of IMF 
programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda - two of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which
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adopted eight IMF programmes between 1987 and 2004. The programmes prescribed 
various short-term stabilisation and medium-term structural reforms.
Using a mix of case study and formal statistical methods, this chapter concludes 
that IMF programmes did not meet their stated objectives nor are these objectives 
necessarily appropriate for economic development. The target variable tested included 
real growth of GDP per capita; real growth of GDP; the rate of inflation; current account 
balances; international reserve holdings as well as policy variables. The before and after 
method compared outcomes in target variables on both short-term and long-term basis, 
while the with-without approach compared Ethiopian and Uganda to countries, which did 
not implement IMF SAF and ESAF programmes. Tests were also carried out to examine 
individual effects of programmes -  whether the SAF or ESAF led to better performance.
The statistical tests for the most part demonstrate that the effect of IMF 
programmes on real GDP per capita and real GDP growth rates is only significant in the 
initial three years under SAF programmes compared to the previous three years. Uganda 
performed better than Ethiopia under IMF programmes, particularly on longer-term 
comparisons. However, growth rates for both countries were no better than for countries 
that did not adopt IMF programmes. While Uganda reduced its high rate of inflation in 
the second ESAF programme after six years under IMF programme, Ethiopia shows a 
significant difference compared to the average for countries without IMF programmes, 
but Ethiopia always had historically low inflation rates.
The current account for Ethiopia and Uganda did not significantly improve under 
IMF programmes and in some years experienced deterioration in their deficits. In contrast 
IMF programmes had positive and significant impact on the reserve holdings of both 
countries, but these improvements are not statistically different from those observed in 
Botswana and the countries without IMF programmes. Countries that did not implement 
IMF programmes actually performed better and improved their external sectors.
228
Chapter 5 IMF Programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda
Two-thirds of IMF programmes were not fully completed and the policy variables 
did not move in the predicted direction. The results show that no significant difference 
was observed in the flow of domestic credit to government or in fiscal deficits before and 
after programmes. IMF programmes were associated with significant real exchange rate 
depreciations for both Ethiopia and Uganda, while liberalisation of the financial sector in 
Uganda led to real positive interest rates, but not in Ethiopia. These results indicate that 
IMF programmes are not always fully implemented. Moreover, programme completion is 
not correlated with performance. We find cases where target variables improve even 
though programmes are not completed and vice-versa.
For the most part “recidivism”, a la Bird (2001), is practised in both Ethiopia and 
Uganda, but there is no discernible evidence to celebrate sustained success in the target 
variables. The findings conform to those in the literature that recidivism has been the 
standard practice in countries facing internal and external imbalances (Edwards and 
Santaella, 1993; Conway, 1994; Knight and Santaella, 1997; Conway, 2000; Bird, 2001; 
Bird et a l, 2002; Joyce, 2002). The rate of repetitive lending is found to be high where 
new programmes had to be agreed in response to failed ones. However, it has also been 
found elsewhere that repetitive lending does not lead to improved performance (Easterly, 
2002).
The results are largely consistent with the survey of the empirical evidence in the 
previous chapter. There is limited and partial evidence to imply that Ethiopia and Uganda 
fared differently from their pre-reform economic state or performed as or better than 
Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, and Sudan, which never implemented IMF SAF, ESAF 
and PGRF programmes. The results mean that not only IMF programmes do not work as 
envisaged but also their rationale must be questioned. A test of structural transformation 
shows that despite extensive reforms the Ethiopian economy de-industrialised while the 
Ugandan industrial sector stagnated. These conclusions are supported by results, which 
illustrate that the share of manufacturing in GDP declined by 1 per cent for Ethiopia, 
comparing the years with IMF programmes to those without. The 1 per cent increment for 
Uganda is significant only when compared to 1981, when the share of manufacturing was
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1.9 per cent. At 9 per cent of GDP the share of manufacturing in 1970 is equal to that for 
2001 .
This chapter’s contribution is both in assessing the impact of IMF programmes in 
Ethiopia and Uganda as well as in testing whether the positive effects are meaningful or 
not. The conclusion is that IMF programmes were associated with immediate 
improvements in real GDP; per capita GDP growth rates; and reserve holdings, but there 
is little evidence to advocate that IMF programmes meet all their objectives. Ethiopia and 
Uganda implemented IMF programmes at a particular point in time where both emerged 
out of civil wars and low level of growth rates. It would be difficult to ascribe 
improvements in these variables to IMF programmes. But this is a moot point. One could 
argue that economic reforms, that may well improve growth rates, would have been 
adopted in some form or another.
More to the point both countries failed to transform their economies structurally, 
mainly because the theoretical foundation of IMF programmes has set aside the 
developmental role of the state. Structural transformations occurred in other parts of the 
world, particularly East Asia as a direct result of state intervention to guide structural 
transformation. The next chapter argues the missing link in countries such as Ethiopia 
and Uganda is the developmental state, which would mobilise finances, and create state- 
society relations that allowed for selective credit, subsidies, protection, and other 
industrial policies.
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Chapter 5 IMF Programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda
Notes
1 Uganda’s economic programme under the NRM is a post-conflict recovery from a civil 
war in the first half of the 1980s, which destroyed assets; disrupted transaction and contract 
enforcements; and diverted government expenditure to unproductive sectors (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2000; Collier and Reinikka, 2001a).
2 In Uganda poor macroeconomic performance was tolerated due to political 
considerations, mainly related to regional stability (Dijkstra and Donge, 2001; Adam and 
Gunning, 2002).
3 The Dergue's (1974-1991) radical reforms began with nationalisation of rural land, 
privately owned industrial establishments, financial institutions, urban land and houses (see IDS, 
1994 and Minas, 1994). In 1984 and 1985, Ethiopia suffered from a severe drought and the forced 
conscription of many young Ethiopians into the armed forces significantly affected the rural 
labour force (see Wolde Giorgis, 1989; Tiruneh, 1993; Hansson, 1995). The Dergue’s “dirigiste” 
strategy favoured control of prices through marketing boards, overvalued the exchange rate, price 
controls, repressed interest rates, and import-substitution (see Abegaz, 1994c, 1999).
4 The 1981 IMF Stand-by programme in Ethiopia was abandoned with 35 per cent of the 
approved amount undrawn (see Table 5.7). In 1990, the Dergue, by its own volition, attempted to 
reverse the decline in the economy by announcing a series of new measures (Hansson, 1995). The 
reforms began when the Dergue acknowledged its weaknesses and announced a “mixed 
economy”. The new measures, though short-lived, focused on private sector participation and 
abolition of producer cooperatives and marketing parastatals, but fell short of trade liberalisation, 
devaluation, financial liberalisation and privatisation (Hansson, 2001).
5 See the papers by Goldstein and Montiel (1986) and Khan and U1 Haque (1998) for 
alternative versions of impact assessment models.
6 The international coffee boom in the mid 1990s helped Uganda achieve the biggest 
reduction in poverty, particularly in the coffee-growing regions (Henstridge and Kasekende, 
2001). The average life expectancy has fallen because of HIV/AIDS, while there is now 
improvement in the prevalence rate (MFPED, 2000). A large proportion of the population 
consumes less than is required to meet basic needs of life (MFPED, 2001a). Uganda's Human 
Development Index (HDI) at 0.435 is also categorized as one of the 24 low cases. According to 
the 2001 Poverty Status Report (MFPED, 2001a) real per capita consumption for the top deciles 
increased by 20 per cent while for the poorest deciles it only rose by 8 per cent.
7 The maximum inflation rate, since the Consumer Price Index statistics began, was 28.5 
per cent in 1976.
8 The maximum tariff rate in Uganda currently is 15 per cent on consumer goods, and 
there are only two other tariff bands: zero for capital goods and 7 per cent for intermediate 
imports (Collier and Reinikka, 2001a). As Collier and Reinikka (p. 33) argue “taxing imports had 
an offsetting effect on the value of the foreign exchange. As a result, the government ended up 
paying the import tax itself by getting less for its sale of foreign currency.”
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9 The government benefited through increased taxes from import duties as well as from 
sectors that use imported inputs (see Tanzi, 1989b). However, the dependence of public finances 
on import taxes driven by increased import-support and the fluctuations in donor finance meant 
the government resorts to deficit financing in cases of reduced support (Kasekende and 
Ssemogerere, 1994). See WTO (1995) for early trade policy in Uganda.
10 The increase in imports since 1996 is a result of increases in franco valuta imports of 
cars; spare parts; garments and other consumer goods: the share of franco valuta imports 
increased from 32.1 per cent in 1988/89 to 53.6 per cent in 1991/92 and to 42.7 per cent in 
1993/94 (Abraha, 1996).
n It is only in 1999 that the government was able to use monetary instruments to control 
inflation. By this time conditions exhibited improved excess liquidity position; improved 
financial depth; and emergence of a secondary market for Treasury Bills in 1997 (Henstridge, 
1999; Henstridge and Kasekende, 2001).
12 The Dergue relied very much not on explicit tax revenues, but various forms of non-tax 
revenues, which included employee contributions for the war and famine; implicit taxation of 
agriculture through price regulation and exchange rate overvaluation; and profit from public 
enterprises (Bevan and Pradhan, 1994; Bevan, 2003). Deficit financing has taken the form of 
borrowing from the domestic banking system, effectively from the state-owned commercial bank 
in the form of Treasury Bills and bonds as well and from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) in 
the form of direct advances (Ghebre, 1994; Mulat, 1994).
13 The auction market has improved the allocation of foreign exchange by increasing 
supply of foreign exchange to the private sector narrowing of the spread between the highest and 
lowest bids; reducing in the negative imports list; and diminishing margin between the parallel 
(Warner, 1996).
14 Towards the end of the Dergue rule and in the first year of EPRDF, unofficial 
transactions, particularly smuggling had been rife and much of the economy was operating 
underground (Dercon and Ayalew, 1995; Abraha, 1996). Prices already reflected what went on in 
the illegal trade and when official devaluation was announced little changed (Hansson, 1995). 
The fear was that devaluation would be inflationary because of high import prices and indirectly 
through increased demand by the tradable sector as well as due to output contraction (Degefe and 
Moges, 1994).
15 As noted by Kibret (1994, p. 112);
“the difference in elasticities between the demand for imports and exports; 
quantity imported is elastic with respect to income and the real exchange rate but 
inelastic with respect to import prices; quantity exported, on the other hand, is 
inelastic with respect to world income and real exchange rates but close to unity 
with respect to price in all the estimated equations; therefore, devaluation affects 
imports more than exports”
16 The private sector invests mainly in the agricultural sector and faces fluctuations in the 
terms of trade. For instance, the number of coffee washing stations increased from 165 in 1992 to 
480 in 1998 (IMF, 1999a).
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17 Jamal (1991, p. 329) notes “[I]n such a context the conventional ratios of border prices 
to producer prices or actual figures o f export taxes fail to reflect the true state o f taxation. What 
the government was doing was to squeeze the farmers by letting Uganda inflation diverge from 
imported inflation while defending the exchange rate.”
18 The financial sector is not yet competitive and the legal as well as the institutional 
framework is still underdeveloped. Banks still prefer to hedge risk not by varying interest rates 
but by seeking valuable collateral such as businesses, real estate and residential houses (Ayana, 
1994).
19 hi April 2002 the IMF went further in organising a workshop on “The Development of 
the Financial Sector in Ethiopia: the Issue of Competition”. Representatives made presentations 
from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (its star pupil) who emphasised that liberalisation of the 
financial sector brought competition, stronger capitalisation o f  the banking sector, more 
diversified lending, and more efficient financial intermediation.
20 Between 1990 and 1995 10 commercial banks were established. However, most banks 
failed to sustain their operation and four banks were closed in 1999. The share o f assets and 
deposits changed and by 1999 private domestic owned banks accounted for 25 per cent o f the 
market share followed by 52 per cent foreign banks and 23 per cent state owned banks. Currently 
the foreign banks account for 75 per cent of the market share (IMF, 1999; Henstridge, 1999).
21 As Mosley (1999) notes:
“The assumption of unitary economy, which required to sustain the stock 
arguments for financial de-repression, is particularly dangerous in Africa. The 
removal o f controls on interest rates and the increase o f financial depth do not, on 
the available evidence, increase the volume o f savings or access to credit in rural 
areas, except by those who already have collateral. This can be readily explained 
in terms o f reluctance o f commercial banks to lend to those who lack this 
attribute, which distorts the market” (p. 381).
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Chapter 6 
From Stabilisation to Adjustment:
Is the Developmental State the Missing Link?
6.1 Introduction
The central argument in this chapter is that the rationale underpinning IMF 
programmes has set aside the developmental role of the state, despite conclusive 
evidence that it has contributed to industrialisation in other parts of the world, not 
least East Asia. Indeed there is a theoretical, historical and empirical case for state 
intervention to guide structural transformation. The East Asian developmental states 
were successful in achieving rapid growth, not least the state mobilising finance and 
because of state-society relations that allowed for selective credit, subsidies, 
protection, and other industrial policies. Despite such conclusive evidence, there is no 
clear strategy on how to go beyong the minimalist state approach. IMF programmes 
still set aside the developmental role of the state.
Four elements marked the emergence of the neo-liberal ascendancy from the 
early 1970s. First, it combined ideological supremacy and the financial backing to 
push through anti-state-led strategies. Second, denial of the East Asian state-driven 
industrialisation serves as a platform to argue for dis-engaging the state. Third, based 
on the impossibility for the emergence of the developmental state in SSA, the 
Washington consensus concocts a case for a minimalist state vis-a-vis stabilisation 
and adjustment programmes. Fourth, treating state-society relations as an impediment 
to implementation of IMF programmes and causes for failure, provides a further 
justification for de-linking the state from active intervention. The first three elements 
are explicit and abound in the literature. The last one, however, is subtler and is 
closely related to the impact of IMF programmes. It is through this last point that this 
thesis contributes by bringing together the other issues that are often addressed 
separately. The previous chapters showed that IMF stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes are theoretically challenged and, empirically, their outcome is at best
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inconclusive, and at worst skewed to the negative. This chapter argues that the IMF’s 
use of state-society relations as explanation for failure and non-adoption of IMF 
programmes has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it is used to vindicate failure of 
IMF programmes. On the other, it adds to the anti-state stance, which began three 
decades ago.
The concept of the developmental state centres on the role of public 
institutions in aiding the market to bring about societal progress, mainly industrial 
transformation (Johnson, 1982). The idea emerged from the experience of Japan, 
where intervention led to high growth and industrial development. The intervention 
was possible through a capable, independent and committed bureaucracy that forged 
productive relationships with especially favoured capitalists. Through such 
relationships the state was able to grant selective credit, tax incentives, public-private 
investment partnerships, high government funded research and development, conflict 
resolution between capital and labour, and simple and quick administrative decisions 
(Johnson, 1999). Whilst it is important not to over-generalise, the notion of the 
developmental state has usefully been exported to other East Asian countries, 
particularly South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Nationalism 
and ideology have been seen as the driving forces behind these developmental states 
and the catching-up project was executed through systematic mobilisation of 
industrial finance. Another key factor to the success of these developmental states has 
been the prevailing international political economy. South Korea and Taiwan were 
satellite nations of the U.S. and Japan a significant ally during the cold war. East 
Asian countries transformed into a capitalist economy through a mix of state-led and 
market-led policies, as the prevailing political exigency and U.S. tolerance allowed 
them to improvise (Evans, 1987; Amsden, 1989; Woo, 1991; Kim, 1995; Lukauskas, 
2002).
The success and even the existence of the developmental states have been 
questioned by the ascendancy of anti-state development strategies inspired by neo­
classical theories in the 1970s (Lai, 1983, 1987a; Srinivasan, 1985; Krueger, 1990). 
Much later, a comprehensive revision of economic history presented the success of the 
East Asian economies as a result of market-friendly, neo-liberal policies (World Bank,
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1993). The laissez-faire paradigm was presented both as an alternative to state-led 
strategies and as an explanation of previous successes (Krueger, 1974; Balassa, 1981, 
1987). Faced with the fact that the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) actually had 
significant state intervention, the neo-liberal explanation resorted to the notion of the 
authoritarian state as a driving force behind East Asian industrialisation (Lai, 1983, 
1993a; Bhagwati, 1986). The message of the laissez faire-authoritarian account of 
East Asian industrialisation is a rejection of the possibility that the state can actually 
stimulate capital formation and accelerate structural change under a state-corporatist 
system of “governing the market” (Wade, 1990), complemented by acquisition of 
technology and infant industry protection (Chang, 1993, 1994; White, 1988; 
Hoogvelt, 1990).
In relation to SSA, the discourse focused on the possibility of reproducing the 
developmental states of Asia (Stein, 1995b). The pessimists, referring to poor record 
of past economic performance, rallied to show what Mkandawire (1998) terms the 
“impossibility thesis”. According to this, SSA states cannot be developmental because 
they lack ideology or a national project (Callaghy, 1990), the bureaucracy is weak 
(World Bank, 1994), state-business relations are based on patrimony and rent-seeking 
(Bates, 1981, 1988; Pletcher, 1986; Sangmpam, 1992; 1993). The SSA state is seen as 
personalistic, dictatorial and kleptomaniac (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Gray and 
McPherson, 1999). The impossibility case argues much of the post-colonial strategy 
focused on anti-capitalist strategies and poor coordination of economy wide 
institutions and markets (World Bank, 1981; Ndulu and O’Connel, 1999). It is argued 
that industrialisation strategies over-extended public ownership, over-expanded 
industry, and over-invested in import-substitution. As a result the private, the 
agricultural, and the export sectors turned out to be underdeveloped (Meier and Steel, 
1987).
By arguing that the developmental state cannot emerge in SSA and attempts to 
create it are anti-productive, a case is made for stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes. A further impetus to de-linking the state came from the view that state- 
society relations are obstructions to successful implementation of IMF programmes. 
The state’s ideology, weak capacity and interest group pressures are presented as
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obstacles to adoption of IMF policies (Callaghy, 1990; Bienen, 1990; Wolgit, 1997). 
The theoretical and empirical foundations of public choice theories, on which the 
state-society relations are based, however, fail to explain the possibility that rents can 
actually be constructive for positive development outcomes (Khan and Jomo, 2000). 
Indeed, non-adoption, interruption and failure of stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes are blamed on internal political pressures that delay reforms and 
exacerbate crisis (Nelson, 1988; 1989b). The case for continuance of policy advice is 
made on the grounds that policies can be tailored to suit state-society relations through 
systematic timing and sequencing of stabilisation and adjustment policies (McKinnon, 
1973, 1991; Choksi and Papageorgiou, 1986; Edwards, 1992; Haggard and Webb; 
1993).
The Washington consensus sets in motion stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes under a strict conditional regime, justified on the grounds that the IMF is 
the lender of last resort, and it has to make sure that it will be repaid (IMF, 2001a, 
2001b; Khan and Sharma, 2001). Furthermore, conditionalities are justified on the 
grounds that they are the same as collateral, analogous to commercial bank lending 
practices (Sachs, 1989a; Mosley, 1991b; 1992b). Most importantly conditionalities 
signal commitment and credibility to reforms (Rodrik, 1989; Casella and Eichengreen, 
1996). The number of IMF conditionalities has been steadily rising in line with 
increasing involvements of the IMF from its traditional stabilisation area into more 
elaborate and comprehensive adjustment and structural reforms (Polak, 1991; IMF, 
2001b). No matter how many other functions are ascribed, however, IMF 
conditionalities are designed to alter the behaviour of governments with regard to 
political structures, social practice, and economic strategy. These conditionalities to 
the highest degree compromise domestic ownership of policies, because a relationship 
of financial dependency is established through IMF programmes. The IMF enjoys a 
bargaining power over the recipient government, mainly through tranching of credit. 
Therefore, conditionalities, through behavioural modification of the recipient country, 
establish asymmetrical power relationship based on donorship (Stokke, 1995). 
Donorship presides over ownership as recipient governments often retract from agreed 
conditions. By and large, the IMF suspends its programmes as the ultimate 
manifestation of the asymmetrical power relationship.
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Behavioural alteration through conditionalities is driven by the shareholders of 
the IMF, which are led by the United States (Taylor, 1997). The evidence shows that 
the nearest members’ proximity to the U.S.-led political view, the higher the 
probability of IMF lending (Barro and Lee, 2001). The adjusting country, on the other 
hand, possesses specific historical and political institutional conditions in which 
various interests are represented. The IMF will be paid back the loan it advances 
whatever the outcome of its policy advice. However, the adjusting countries often face 
upheaval during implementation of austere policies. IMF programmes, therefore, 
require a process of galvanising popular support and broad consensus becomes 
necessary (Drazen, 2001). Conditionalities, therefore, reflect the conflict between the 
recipient country’s objectives and the influence of powerful nations (Killick, 1997). 
The outcome usually is in favour of the IMF, whose catalytic function and seal of 
approval give it powerful leverage. For this reason alone, conditional lending erodes 
ownership of programmes and encumbers their implementation, which is the cause of 
non-adoption and failure, and not state-society relations, as the Washington consensus 
would have us believe.
The incompatibility of conditionality and ownership implies that the public 
usually reacts negatively to IMF programmes and continuance of these in the face of 
resistance results in transforming the state into a repressive mode. Various studies 
show that stabilisation and adjustment programmes cause riots, disobedience, and 
public discontent, which are often followed by imprisonment of journalists, banning 
of political parties, and detaining of opposition leaders (Franklin, 1997; Ibhawoh, 
1999; Stiglitz, 2002). IMF programmes nurture a new form of dependency, one based 
on neo-liberal policies pushed through by a powerful political hegemony. The 
dependency is exacerbated by conditionalities; we can call the power structure that 
merges from conditional finance as a repressive pseudo-developmental state.
Such a state consistently set asides the role of the developmental state, forcing 
a reform agenda, which is often unacceptable and difficult to implement, and forming 
a state, which has to use repression to implement unpopular policies. In contrast, East 
Asian developmental states transformed into successful capitalist economies through a
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mix of state-led and market-led policies. They achieved this as the prevailing ideology 
and U.S. tolerance allowed them to introduce “dirigiste” measures. Most of all 
unconditional lending allowed them to develop home-grown policies and promote key 
sectors of the economy. The SSA case is not the same since conditional finance has 
been imposed in the face of scarce external finance and meagre private lending.
There is a clear anti-developmental driving force to the Washington consensus, 
mainly because obsession with stability of monetaiy aggregates and removal of 
market distortions does not address fundamental structural questions (Stein, 1992, 
1994; 1995a). Although stabilisation and adjustment programmes include supply-side 
measures in the form of market liberalisations, they unduly rely on removing 
distortions in the exchange side. Exchange rate and financial liberalisation may 
increase availability of foreign exchange and investable finance. However, production 
requires precisely the introduction of new “distortions” such as research and 
development, firm-specific knowledge, product differentiation, scale economies, and 
externalities, based on some form of state intervention (Amsden, 1994, 1997; Chang, 
1999). Given the limitations of primary commodity exports, SSA requires some 
success in industrialisation to augment living standards. It is not sufficient to improve 
macroeconomic indicators as long as weaknesses in institutions, infrastructure, and 
available human resources constrain export performance, particularly manufacturing 
exports.
The impact of neo-liberal policies has been to build the capacity of the state in 
a paradoxical way. Its strength was needed to carry out the unpopular stabilisation and 
adjustment policies through capacity building and good governance. But its ability to 
emulate the developmental states of Asia through mobilising finance, providing 
incentives and protection has been curtailed. The logical step of moving from nation 
building to economic development has been cut short. Macroeconomic stability may 
be achieved through stabilisation and adjustment policies, but developing into a 
competitive and technologically advanced economy as well as successful 
transformation of society requires a developmental state. Unfortunately, IMF- 
sponsored stabilisation and adjustment programmes, constantly impedes the 
emergence of such a state as the case of Ethiopia and Uganda demonstrate.
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The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the theory 
and experience behind the developmental states of Asia and shows the modalities, 
which brought about successful industrialisation. Section 6.3 examines the debate 
over the identification and reproducibility of the Asian developmental states and the 
neo-liberal explanation for Asian industrialisation that questioned the autonomy, the 
capacity, and the desirability of the state to alter incentives from the market. This 
section also outlines the arguments for reasserting the developmental state through 
various channels, mainly its assistance in acquisition of technology and protection of 
property rights. Section 6.4 extends the discussion to show how doubting the 
feasibility of the developmental state in SSA was presented as justification for, and 
vindication of, the Washington consensus. Section 6.5 will turn to argue that state- 
society relations, which formed the basis for the “impossibility thesis”, have been 
used to explain non-adoption and programme interruption, further pronouncing the 
demise of state-led strategies. Section 6.6, drawing on examples from Ethiopia and 
Uganda, demonstrates how the state, under IMF programmes, has failed to tackle 
major structural issues and has not imported the role to be played by the 
developmental state. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.7
6.2 The Developmental State
The literature on the developmental state refers to the industrialisation 
experience of East Asian economies and entails the political and bureaucratic 
influences of the state in organising capital accumulation and honing international 
competitiveness. The notion of the developmental state emerged from the experience 
of Japan, studied by Johnson (1982), who argued that the state through its Ministry of 
International and Trade and Industry (MITI), has coordinated and brought about rapid 
economic growth between 1925 and 1975. Johnson argued that the Japanese economic 
system was neither based on central planning as in the socialist sense nor on free 
market where private ownership and control dominate. Instead, the Japanese system 
was led by a “plan rational” state whose interventions run alongside private 
ownership. Johnson declared that his intention for drawing attention to the
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developmental state is to challenge the conventional divide between U.S. style market 
capitalism and Soviet style central planning, to point that there is another form of 
capitalist system: the “capitalist developmental state”. The purpose was to expound on 
the Japanese developmental state that withstood economic down turns and managed to 
maintain stable growth while most developed countries fell into recession and 
stagflation (Johnson, 1999).
The notion of the developmental state is not strictly about whether the state 
should intervene in the economy or not, but interest is on what kind of intervention 
leads to high growth and industrialisation. The developmental state, as understood in 
the literature, is a state that intervenes with the unambiguous objective to industrialise. 
This contrasts with intervention aimed at shaping procedures and rules to achieve a 
competitive market-oriented economy, invariably propagated by the Washington 
consensus. The interventions of the developmental state take various forms. First, 
there must be a small and capable bureaucracy that identifies the industries to be 
developed, selecting the method by which such industries develop and creating an 
environment where firms obey the rules for competition. Second, the bureaucracy is 
given a political space to operate independently and effectively. Third is use of 
government institutions to plan and guide production and exchange. These include 
government financial institutions to grant selective credit, tax incentives, public- 
private investment partnerships, high government funded research and development, 
conflict resolution between capital and labour, and simple and quick administrative 
decisions. Fourth are organisations such as MITI: a democratic and driven institution 
to design industrial and other subsidiary polices (Johnson, 1982)
Analysis of the Japanese experience has been interpreted as a Weberian 
historical analysis, which attempted to uncover the motives of Japanese policy makers 
to adopt the “plan rational” system of production and exchange. The conclusion was 
that Japan responded to the economic dominance of North America and Europe. The 
reaction was nationalism and social mobilisation that aspired to elevate Japan to 
higher economic status. The actions of the developmental state were also spurred by 
the desire to counter economic depression, prepare for war, invest in post-war 
reconstruction and graduate from post-war foreign, especially U.S., assistance.
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Therefore, the developmental state required a clear “ideology” or a “national project”, 
which guided social transformation (Johnson, 1982; 1999).
Although the developmental state appeared in a particular time and in a 
particular setting, according to Johnson (1999) “it is both particular and 
generalisable.” The interesting aspect of the developmental state idea, therefore, is its 
export to other countries, particularly South Korea, Thailand Singapore and Hong 
Kong. Later additions to the developmental state included Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand. Chile and Turkey are also considered non-Asian developmental 
states. For South Korea, the Japanese colonial legacy put down certain initial 
conditions indispensable for capital accumulation, particularly a well-developed 
agricultural sector. The South Korea state actively embraced the developmental state 
and its objectives to funnel industrialisation through allocating and mobilizing 
financial resources (Kohli, 1999). Ideology was not a sufficient condition but required 
committed policy makers and political leaders. The Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese 
leaders and policy makers had experienced wars and came out determined to execute 
the nationalist agenda: economic nationalism (Johnson, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1999a). 
A dedicated developmental state as in “Singapore Inc.” has delivered employment, 
income, homes, education, security and welfare (Huff, 1995; Low, 2001). State 
interventions in Chile at the sectoral level identified and supported comparative 
advantage quicker and at lower cost than the market could. Intervention in information 
provision, credit and input supply as well as insurance against risk worked 
successfully. The case studies in the Chilean fruit, fish, and forestry sectors, suggests 
that public interventions were “crucial catalysts in shaping a sustained export 
response” (Kurtz, 2001, p. 1).
However, nationalism, ideology and other initial conditions can only be 
executed if the state is also capable of mobilising the finances needed to achieve 
industrial development. The developmental state was successful in directing finance 
to industrialisation, as advocated, for instance, by Gerschenkron (1962). State 
allocation of finance in the Asian case was also similar to those observed elsewhere. 
France has followed the same bank-based credit allocation, as opposed to equity-based 
system (Loriaux, 1999). The state in Finland also successfully financed
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industrialisation through control of interest rates and bank-based credit allocation 
(Vartiainen, 1999). The developmental state allocated finances through credit-based 
financial structures and influenced investment patterns and sectoral mobility through 
control of interest rates. The credit-based financial allocation also allowed firms to 
obtain funds from the banking sector well above retained earnings (Zysman, 1983). In 
the case of South Korea the developmental state was able to channel subsidised 
finance to the Chaebol and in the process created a coalition of capitalist interests that 
rallied behind the ideology of nationalism (Amsden, 1989; Woo, 1991). Interest rates 
on loans advanced to exporters were subsidised by as much as 75 per cent and direct 
allocation of credit to priority sectors was normal practice (Kim, 1995). Statistical 
evidence for Brazil confirms that state coordinated savings substantially influenced 
economic growth rates (Krieckhaus, 2002).
An important aspect of the developmental state that enables it to synchronise 
development finance is the structure o f  the bureaucracy. Developmental states need 
a high degree of internal cohesiveness, supported by a competent bureaucratic entity. 
The East Asian economies are characterised as developmental states because they 
possess strong and autonomous bureaucratic leadership that directs the economy 
toward achieving the national project. The bureaucracy in Japan, despite the country’s 
defeat in WWIE, firmly remained in control to guide post-war development 
(Nakamura, 1981). Comparison of the East Asian and Latin American 
industrialisation process revealed that the critical variable is the constitution of the 
bureaucracy. The Desarrollista states in Latin America entailed a bureaucracy that is 
politically tied and appointed, which is also dispensable during regime change. The 
Desarrollista’s system of political capitalism allowed the state to determine profits 
and investment through ideology of exclusion, military control and banning of 
opposition. Latin America created a bureaucracy that was slower to guide 
industrialisation (Schneider, 1999). Such “appointive bureaucracy” with a tenuous 
power base contrasts to the Asian professional and competent bureaucracy that is 
embedded in the state’s national creed. However, a competent and long-standing 
bureaucracy is not a sufficient condition for the developmental state’s success and 
cross regional comparisons are sometimes misleading.1 In the case of India’s 
developmental state it has been shown that the bureaucracy, although capable, was not
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embedded in the ideology of development. The Indian developmental state failed to 
unite the fragmented private sector. Instead the state favoured individual capitalists 
through patronage such as ethnicity, loyalty, birth, and family relations (Herring, 
1999). Interagency relations had different outcomes in India and South Korea. While, 
both countries had vigorous bureaucracies, the Indian bureaucracy was not cohesive 
compared to its South Korean counterpart (Chibber, 2002).2
The developmental state aided by a competent bureaucracy forges a unique 
relationship with businesses to steer the forces of social transformation. For 
successful financing of industry the relationship must be mutually beneficial. The state 
identifies and rewards successful businesses. Private capitalists, in turn, respond to 
the incentives the state institutes. Specifically, the state in Japan’s development has 
been instrumental in cartelising each industry and restricting entry. Such protection of 
industrial groups (keiretsu) took the form of financial and legal assistance to fend off 
foreign competition (Nakamura, 1983). South Korea used protection to reward 
exporters and threatened non-exporters with removal. Since protection is granted on 
the basis of previous success, a snowballing effect was built in the system of 
incentives leading to the development of the chaebols. These big businesses were 
promoted to a level where they could compete internationally and reap economies of 
scale as a result of their large production capacity. Other mechanisms included 
allowing a two tier pricing system which enabled producers to charge a higher price 
domestically and a lower price in the international market, by providing subsidised 
interest rate, foreign currency loans and special insurance. At the same time consumer 
goods imports were restricted under extensive negative list and effective protection 
rates increased to shield infant industries (Kim, 1995). By 1990 subsidy in Malaysia 
from protection and non-protection incentives reached 3.7 per cent of gross national 
income (Edwards, 1995).
Initial conceptions of the developmental state treated it as isolated from 
international political economy and presented the state as an agent that mediates 
among local interests to purse a certain national goal. However, the developmental 
state is dependent on, and sometimes the result of, international interests transmitted 
through international political influences, foreign capital and overseas export markets.
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The international community, most importantly the U.S., tolerated Japanese protection 
as a source of political gain through post-war alliance and cooperation (Johnson, 
1999). South Korea and Taiwan also became satellite nations of the U.S. As a result, 
these countries were able to advance their own version of capitalism as the Cold War 
increased the tolerance of the U.S. to alterative capitalist developments, which were 
based on credit rationing, price controls, investment subsidies and repression of 
interest rates (Pempel, 1999; Vartiainen, 1999). U.S. aid to South Korea averaged 80 
per cent of gross domestic investment between 1953 and 1962 (Evans, 1987; Amsden, 
1989). U.S. aid to South Koreas in the 1950s and 1960s has also been accompanied by 
easy access to the U.S market (Edwards, 1992; Pempel, 1999).3 The East Asian 
developmental states used financial controls to mobilise resources for industry, while 
political and security imperatives put up with the degree of inefficiency introduced 
into the financial sector (Lukauskas, 2002). Similarly, Austria, Finland and Taiwan 
have all experienced a drive to development, mainly as a result of security fears and 
the urge to catch up with the developed economies. Thailand’s well-developed 
network of rural roads was the result of U.S. finance, which was mainly triggered by 
security concerns. The “political underpinnings” or a nation’s political status in 
international alliances and the global security environment is one of the most 
important conditions for the success of the developmental state (Mackie, 1988).
In sum, from this wide-ranging and selective account, it can be concluded that 
the developmental state is far from the central planning and market-fundamentalism 
models, but close to a systematic contextual intervention to create a competitive 
industrial base. The importance of industrialisation, particularly the emergence of a 
dynamic manufacturing export sector is the most crucial in the progress from low to 
higher income levels, both from historical and structuralist theoretical points of view 
(Singh, 1982; Hawkins 1986; Chenery et al., 1986; Kitching, 1989).
6.3 The Developmental State Contested
The idea of the interventionist later moderated as developmental state ran into 
opposition in the 1970’s, as anti-state development strategies based on the neo­
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classical theory rose to ascendancy. State-led strategies have been attacked for being 
“optimistic” and “completely out of touch with the realities” (Srinivasan, 1985, p. 45). 
The neo-liberal thinking argued that “market failures” are more tolerable than 
“government failures” (Krueger, 1990). Government intervention under the 
Washington consensus has been demonised and liberalisation of markets have been 
favoured, despite second best theory implied that liberalising more markets, but not 
all, does not lead to allocative efficiency (Chang, 1993) and imperfect information and 
concentration of market structure may generate dynamic gains and comparative 
advantage through reducing uncertainty, innovation and economies of scale (Amsden, 
1989, 1997; Chandler, e ta l ,  1997).
The “new political economy” (NPE) gave the neo-liberal camp the 
justification to depoliticise the economy further, as state involvement and politics are 
considered corrupting and wasteful as well as distorting. The breakthrough by the 
NPE was to show that although the quest for self-fulfilment in the competitive market 
leads to efficient outcomes such self-interest in politics is damaging. The NPE views 
political groups or agents as rational, forward looking and optimising and presented an 
“economic theory of politics”. The NPE came up with three critical features - 
suspicion of the state’s motive in policy making, the prediction that necessary reforms 
will not, in the presence of interest groups, ever be carried out and the assumption that 
the actions of national states are independent of global political economy (Lai, 1983).4 
Lai (1987b, pp. 276-277) also states:5
“[M]ost of the existing literature on the order of liberalisation is based on the 
economist’s traditional picture of disembodied, altruistic policy makers 
maximising some social utility function subject to the usual resource and 
technological constraints. This view of the state is highly misleading, 
particularly when one considers the heterogeneous group of countries that 
comprise the developing world. By contrast, it is more useful to follow the 
“new political economy” [NPE] and view the State as composed of a group 
of self-regarding individuals and groups interacting strategically with private 
agents. The State is then seen as seeking to maximise its own utility 
(including incomes, perquisites, and power) and not necessarily the welfare 
of its citizens.”
The advent of the NPE separated the discourse on the developmental state into 
the “economic school”, which is based on the need for the state in aiding the market to
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bring about specific objectives, and the contending “political school”, which questions 
the autonomy of the state and its capacity to insulate itself from special interests for a 
broader societal objective (Fine and Stoneman, 1996; Fine and Rustomjee, 1997). At 
the same time, in a complete re-reading of economic history, the success of the East 
Asian economies was attributed to market-friendly neo-liberal policies. The World 
Bank refers to the “Asian Miracle” as “market friendly” approach, where governments 
ensured increased investment in developing human capital, provided a competitive 
climate for private enterprises, opened the economy to international trade and 
maintained a stable macroeconomy (World Bank, 1993). The implication for other 
countries is, therefore, the reconfirmation of the earlier laissez-faire policies and a 
further retracting from assigning a vital role for the state (Balassa, 1981; Bhagwati 
1986; Balassa and Williamson, 1987; Krueger, 1990).
A number of studies, however, showed that neo-classical, neo-liberal readings 
of the East Asian success are misleading (Wade, 1996; Amsden, 1994; Clark and 
Kim, 1995b). The World Bank’s export orientation versus import substitutions is a 
false dichotomy, and states intervened in lowering real wages for labour-intensive 
industrialisation strategy (Stein, 1994). There was a growing recognition of the 
importance of externalities in the area of information processing, learning and 
acquisition of technological capability. In developing countries some of these 
externalities are internalised in non-market institutions like large corporations. The 
state in East Asia played a role in promoting the crucial learning processes and 
offsetting externalities, in addition to its role as substitute for missing capital markets 
(Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990; Westphal, 1990). The existence of market failures in the 
form of human capital; information asymmetry; crowding in private investment; 
industrial policy, are given high status by confirming that non-market institutions are 
effective in organising economic systems (Chang, 1994). Therefore, as far as the 
Asian success is concerned there was room for intervention to correct market failures: 
what is named the “counter-counter revolution” (Krugman, 1992; 1994).
The developmental state model also focused on guiding market economies in 
which intervention focused on “strategic industries” based on criteria such as global 
demand elasticity and the potential for technological progress (Chang, 1993). The
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Asian success is based on strong state intervention, infant industry protection and 
temporary shielding of domestic firms from international competition, which 
emphasises that comparative advantage benefits the dominant economic powers, and 
late industrialisers will not benefit from unfettered trade (White and Wade, 1988; 
Hoogvelt, 1990; 2001).6 There is strong empirical evidence that confirms the South 
Korean state was instrumental in facilitating the transfer of technology (Amsden, 
1989) and the mobilisation and control of finance for industrial policy (Woo, 1991). 
The evidence also shows Taiwan’s distinct non-market and non-plan developmental 
state took measures including import-substitution, protection of domestic markets and 
overvalued exchange rates (Wade, 1990; Wu, 1994). Only later did Taiwan adopt an 
export-oriented strategy after a gradual and cautious liberalisation of key markets. 
Taiwan’s trade until the early 1970s was characterised by a variety of tariff, non-tariff 
barriers and quantitative restrictions and the nominal exchange rate was tightly 
controlled (Brautigam, 1995). Hong Kong and Singapore, although perceived as 
models of market capitalism, have had mixed economies and used protective 
measures, possibly less so than Latin America (Hirschman, 1968; Ranis, 1990). The 
NICs became the epitomes of rapid development because they had a particular 
geographic position and historical experiences as well as the state’s unique mix of 
inward- and outward-looking policies (Brohman, 1996) and not necessarily because 
they were authoritarian.
The developmental state has a role to support sustained industrialisation 
through providing vision, moderating conflicts and establishing the foundation for 
growth such as education and infrastructure. The critique of the neo-liberal 
programme highlighted the confusion in neo-classical economists between allocative 
and dynamic efficiency. The former does not automatically lead to the latter, and there 
is neither a theoretical rationale nor empirical proof to suggest otherwise (Taylor, 
1993a). A free market also depends on time and place. What is regarded a free market 
today may not have been few years back, or what is regarded a free market in a 
developed country may not be a free one in a developing country. A free market 
depends on a society’s definition of a system of rights considered legitimate (Chang, 
1999). The neo-liberal doctrine also underestimates the possibility that bureaucrats as
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well as other interest groups can actually serve the public interest. Lipton (1992, p. 
649 emphasis added) notes,
tc[I]ndeed, one strand of NPE asserts that there is a strong presumption that 
State action, ostensibly to improve global outcomes or correct income 
distributions, will make matters worse, and that State economic action should 
be largely confined to the provision of clearly public goods. On this view, the 
state itself is endogenous. Its members and clients, use State power to seek 
rents... The use o f NPE theorising to justify state compression, and to reject 
Keynesian and structuralist interventions as incentive incompatible for want 
o f "micro foundations, " is questionable. ”
Faced with the fact that the NICs actually had significant state intervention the 
neo-liberal explanation resorted to three explanations. First, the theory of “virtual free- 
trade regime” argued that various measures of state interventions cancelled out one 
another and produced a neutral market-based incentive structure (Lai, 1983). Second, 
the theory of “prescriptive state intervention” was advanced, which argued that 
intervention did not impede growth because it left room for private initiative 
(Bhagwati, 1988; World Bank, 1993). The third, and more elaborate explanation, 
argued that the developmental state could only bring about industrialisation and 
development, when the populace, particularly labour, accepts its ideology, its 
financing arrangement, its bureaucracy as well as its relations with big businesses. The 
existence and possibility of galvanising mass support to the national project has been 
questioned, with forced similarities offered between authoritarianism  and the 
developmental state. For Lai (1983, p. 33): “a courageous, ruthless and perhaps 
undemocratic government is required to ride roughshod over these newly-created 
special interest groups.” Bhagwati (1986, pp. 100-101) states the “gang of four 
countries [Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan] appear to have used 
authoritarian methods to keep trade union wage demands under control and build on 
this bases a successful macro policy of low inflation”. By contrast, “pluralistic 
democracies may find it much harder to dismantle the controls, protection, etc., that 
inevitably accompany the IS [Import Substituting] strategy. These policy instruments 
carry patronage and confer on the politicians the power to collect funds for their re- 
election, so that the economic regime under the IS [Import Substitution] strategy tends 
to become a critical source of political power” (ibid.).
261
Chapter 6 The Developmental State is the Missing Link
On a theoretical level the argument for authoritarianism is Olsonian: struggle 
between “distributional coalitions” results in sub-optimal welfare. Self-interested 
groups struggle for obtaining a larger share of the national pie rather than enlarge the 
pie and obtain a larger amount. An individual or group that attempts to benefit society 
as a whole is providing a public good while bearing the costs of his/its action. A 
“rational” individual or organisation, therefore, refrains from engaging in activities 
where the costs are borne individually while the benefits are reaped collectively 
(Olson, 1965; 1982). Reforms such as subsidy reductions and price decontrols harm 
urban hade unions and the civil service whose opposition can only be suppressed by 
an authoritarian government. In a democracy the government is influenced by rent- 
seeking groups and entertains the wishes of powerful interests rather than carry out 
radical reforms because it relies on these same groups for political support, votes and 
finance. “Authoritarian leaders, by contrast, can override interest-group demands by 
fiat” (Haggard and Webb, 1993, p. 145). Authoritarian and anti-communist states in 
South Korea and Taiwan insulated themselves from the rural elite and as a result were 
able to squeeze agriculture to finance industrialisation (Evans, 1987). Authoritarian 
governments are also able to widen the gap between current production and current 
consumption (Nehru, 1979).7 The developmental state must demonstrate its 
commitment to development through a “process of reputation building”. Credibility 
and reputation are found to be key determinates to elicit private investment. The 
“process of reputation building” requires a state free of special interests and 
authoritarian enough to implement unpopular policies (Dewit et a l 2001).
The laissez faire-authoritarian explanation of the “Asian miracle” ignores the 
systematic role the state played in “supply-push” models for late industrialising 
economies in the Pacific Rim where state promoted capital formation and accelerated 
structural change (Appelbaum and Henderson, 1992). Johnson (1999, p. 52) 
comments:
“My position on this controversy is to deny any necessary connection between 
authoritarianism and the developmental state but to acknowledge that 
authoritarianism can sometimes inadvertently solve the main political problem of 
economic development using market forces - namely, how to mobilise the 
overwhelming majority of the population to work and sacrifice for developmental 
projects. An authoritarian government can achieve this mobilisation artificially and
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temporarily, but it is also likely to misuse such mobilisation, thereby making it harder 
to achieve in the future. In the true developmental state, on the other hand, the 
bureaucratic rulers possess a particular kind of legitimacy that allows them to be 
much more experimental and undoctrinaire than in the typical authoritarian regime.”
By equating the developmental state with authoritarianism, the laissez faire- 
authoritarian school sends a clear message: even if the Asian success is attributed to 
state-intervention the trade-offs are democratic values. This position is untenable. In 
the first instance, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that both democratic 
forms of government and authoritarian regimes advance economic development and 
improve welfare. Although some evidence shows that authoritarian regimes exhibit a 
larger variance in economic performance than democracies (Sah, 1991), there is no 
simple distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes. The distinction is 
also too stark and rigid (Sorensen, 1991).8 The NICs neither have been democratic in 
the sense of meaningful political participation nor were they authoritarian in its brutal 
sense. Democracies versus authoritarianism discourses are too simplistic and the 
hypothesis does not also distinguish among successful reformers and not so successful 
reformers. Although India as a democracy has avoided famine, China had a severe one 
over 1959-1961. But China also achieved increases in social services in terms of high 
literacy rates and better health to the poor than India (Sen, 1983). Opposition to 
reforms may also come from the military and not necessarily from the usual suspects: 
labour and the urban middle classes (Haggard and Webb, 1993; Bienen, 1990). Gray 
and McPherson (1999) rightly ask: if we go by the authoritarian state hypothesis, why 
there has not been economic development in Africa given that 22 leaders have been in 
power since 1979 and 26 since 1989. According to Rodrik (1996a, p. 19): “there are 
too many mismanaged dictatorships around the world to take the hypothesis 
seriously.” Alesina and Perotti (1994) also note that inconclusiveness of the literature 
is due to the heterogeneity of authoritarian regimes: What are we referring to: 
“kleptocracy”? “authoritarian-corporatist”? or “benevolent dictators”?
Overall the link between authoritarianism and industrial strategy is thin, but a 
high degree of authority and efficient administration can reform the economy 
successfully (Toye, 1992). In the Asian cases wage demands have been weakened to 
compete through labour-intensive exports in the international market. Intervention in 
agriculture also focused on surplus extraction. The strategy was to increases food
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production through investment in agriculture and at the same time to keep rural 
incomes low, to encourage migration of labour out of rural farming and into urban 
industries. Investment was in the form of provision of inputs, procurement and 
pricing, land reform, high levels of public investment in research, and provision of 
seed variety. In the case of Japan the state was able to use land tax as a form of capital 
extraction out of agriculture without opposition from the landed class (Nafziger, 
1995).
Taiwan’s reform, which distributed land to poor farmers dismantled interests 
working against outflows of capital from agriculture. At the same time rice prices 
were kept artificially low to keep urban real wages at a minimum. Implicit and explicit 
taxes have also been used as a form of capital extraction (Brautigam, 1995). The 
South Korean state, in addition to its direct support to agriculture, as was the case in 
Japan, deliberately kept grain prices below market levels to encourage the flow of 
labour into import-intensive manufacturing sector. The migration of labour out of 
agriculture also kept real wages down. The key to success was a conscious effort to 
support the farmers without increasing food prices to urban consumers and industrial 
workers (Kim, 1995). In Singapore real wages were kept low and below productivity 
through restraining labour union bargaining, directly interfering in settling pay 
disputes, and most importantly through provision of social goods to obtain the consent 
of labour (Lim, 1995). These strategies contradict the standard 
authoritarian/democracy dichotomy of regime types.
The experience of successful industrialisations clearly demonstrates that the 
developmental state is effective when its leadership resolves collective action 
problems. What also matters is more egalitarian income distribution, institutionalised 
networks between public officials, and private capitalists as in Japan and South Korea, 
and closely tied party alliances as in Taiwan (Bardhan, 1993). The NICs achieved high 
levels of capital accumulation under a state-corporatist system of political governance, 
what is dubbed “governing the market”. The state created interests with “monopoly of 
representation” and simultaneously monitored their activities so that there was no 
“narrow, conflictual demands” (Wade, 1990). What is crucial is also continuity or 
discontinuity of the regime, rather than its democratic and authoritarian attributes
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(Waterbnry, 1989, p. 50). The advent of the “post-Washington Consensus” also 
heralded the death of the need for an authoritarian state. This was evident from a 
series of papers, which came out in the late 1990s from the World Bank, to 
demonstrate the possibility of a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), 
which is based on a holistic approach and participatory processes in advancing 
economic development (Stiglitz, 1999b; 2000a). According to Stiglitz (1999b, p. 2):
“participatory processes (such as “voice”, openness, and transparency) 
promote truly successful long-term development. This is not to suggest that 
those that are highly participatory, at least in formal structure, have failed to 
achieve development success. But it does mean that an understanding of 
centrality of open, transparent, participatory processes in sustainable 
development helps us to design policies-strategies and processes-that are 
more likely to lead to long-term economic growth that reinforce the strengths 
of the processes themselves”
The evidence shows that the NICs gradually embraced democratic values. This 
is consistent with the premise that regime types are endogenous to the development 
process itself. Capitalist development can foster democracy as it transforms the class 
structure, increases the number of working and middle classes and their organisational 
capacity, making it difficult to exclude them in the governance structure. In addition, 
capitalist development dismantles the land owning elite or the feudal system that 
clings to the non-capitalist mode of production (Rueschemeyer, et al., 1992). It is the 
emergence of a vocal working class that facilitates the advent o f democratic traditions 
(Haggard, 1990) -  a testimony to Marxist view of the role of the bourgeoisie in 
democratic developments and Moore’s (1966, p. 418) “[N]o bourgeois, no 
democracy” assertion. More recently, a study of 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 
showed that democracy measured by electoral rights is positively associated with 
improved standards of living (Barro, 1999).9
“Inspection of the cross-country data suggests that countries at low levels of 
economic development typically do not sustain democracy. For example, the 
political freedoms installed in most of the newly independent African states 
in the early 1960s did not tend to last.. .Thus a casual view of the data seems 
to support the Lipset/Arstotle hypothesis” (ibid. p. 163).
Yet, just as the idea of the developmental state was gaining in prestige the 1997 
Asian financial crisis set it back again. Some have even suggested that financial
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globalisation in the 1990s “effectively dismantled the Asian developmental state and 
forced East Asia to search for a new political economy model” (Pang, 2000, p. 570). 
Financial liberalisation and the consequent capital movements in and out of Asia 
reduced the dependence of businesses on state directed finance. The expanding 
financial portfolio of Asian corporations questioned the traditional role of the state, 
particularly because the crisis was not be prevented by state action (Chan et al., 1998). 
As Fine (2001c) summarises, the discourse on the death or otherwise of the 
developmental state, centres around three themes.
First, the developmental state is a temporary configuration o f state-society 
relations solely designed for catching up by late industrialisers (Moon, 1999). Second, 
the developmental state has been superseded by gigantic businesses, which disabled it 
from correcting institutional weaknesses in the financial sector (Lee, 1997; Kim, 
1999). Most notable is state-businesses relationships led to the formational of corrupt 
state officials and powerful big family-run industries forming an oligopolistic 
structure, what is called “crony capitalism” (Cummings, 1999). Third, and more 
convincing, the developmental state is not to blame for the financial crisis as opposed 
to neo-liberal-inspired rapid financial and capital market liberalisations (Krugman, 
1999; Wade, 1998; Chang, 1998, 2000). Financial liberalisation made emerging 
economies more vulnerable to both currency and banking crises by allowing more 
liquidity to inflow, which finds its way into speculative projects increasing the chance 
for borrower default (Weller, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002). In South Korea premature 
liberalisation that did not take account of weaknesses in institutions, resulting in 
crisis. Financial liberalisation, where excess liquidity exists and when the real sector 
cannot absorb it, leads to speculative investment (Demetriades and Fattouh, 1999). 
The crisis in Thailand was also the result of financial liberalisation in the face of weak 
institutions (Alba, et al., 1999). Often liberalisation of both the external and internal 
markets results in financial flows both to the productive and speculative sectors. 
However, the mismatch between the slow growths of the real sector compared to the 
financial sector diverts capital to the speculative sector, which in turn results in 
banking and currency crisis (Weller, 2001).
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The Asian financial crisis offers lessons to be learned by the developmental 
state and not a harbinger for its demise. The presumed death of the developmental 
state should not detract the role it played in history, especially given the weakness of 
the market-led alternative strategy. The point is that the successful Asian 
developmental states created an industrial base, which transformed them into export- 
oriented, competitive and high-income economies. As Stiglitz (2002, pp. 91-92, 
emphasis added) put it:
“Whether one calls it a miracle or not is beside the point: the increases in 
incomes and the reductions in poverty in East Asia over the last three 
decades have been unprecedented. No one visiting these countries can fail to 
marvel at the developmental transfonnation, the changes not only in the 
economy but also in society, reflected in eveiy statistics imaginable. Thirty 
years ago, thousands of backbreaking rickshaws were pulled for a pittance; 
today, they are only a tourist attraction, a photo opportunity for the camera- 
snapping tourists flocking to the region. The combination of high savings 
rates, government investment in education, and state-directed industrial 
policy all served to make the region an economic powerhouse.”
A role for the state has been given theoretical backing from various quarters. 
Markets are considered as transactions by institutions faced by imperfect and costly 
information, which increase transaction costs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Stiglitz, 1989). 
Under these conditions Pareto-efficiency may not be achieved (Akerlof, 1984). 
Therefore, institutions are important for markets to function, and institutional structures 
must be developed to counter the agency problems associated with moral hazard and 
adverse selection, particularly in the financial sector. Based on this approach, the “post- 
Washington Consensus”, which emerged towards the end of the 1990s, resurrected 
market failures and argues that we are living in a world where there exists imperfect 
information, hence government intervention, “while itself bound by some 
informational limitations, can make at least some people better off while not making 
anyone worse o ff’ (Stiglitz, 1998c, p. I).10
The continuous search for new roles for the state is commendable. 
Nonetheless, inclusion of market imperfections presumes a logical progression from 
microeconomic equilibrium to better developmental outcomes. The debate needs to 
move away from the state’s complete absence or full play to its developmental role. 
All states intervene and the focus should be on the quality as well as the quantity of
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intervention. Failure of the state can be explained by rent-seeking just as success in 
industrialisation can be explained by state intervention. As prominent writers in this 
field argue there is a need for “reconstruction of the developmental state” (Chang, 
1999). Such reconstructions need to focus on: 1) the role of the state in coordination 
for change, provision of vision, institution building and conflict management (Chang, 
1999); and 2) the production side of the economy, moving away from the exchange 
rate, and trade and financial liberalisation as the sole determinants of development 
(Amsden, 1997).
First, the role of coordination fo r  change is needed to assure the extension of 
complementary investments and reduce the cost of adopting new technology by firms. 
As technology is embedded in the capital stock, under fragmented ownership, the 
transaction costs of formulating and monitoring contracts among a large number of 
agents is likely to be high. Second, the developmental state can provide the vision for 
moving from low- to high-equilibrium or from moving to a given choice set to 
creating additional choice sets. In a world of static efficiency the state can change 
relative prices and achieve a movement from one equilibrium state to another. 
However, static efficiency does not necessarily imply institutional and structural 
transformation (Nissanke and Stein, 1999; Stein, 2000). Thus the state, like an 
entrepreneur, sets goals and provides vision to achieve them. Third, the institutional 
building role of the state is necessary to guarantee the realisation of the developmental 
“vision”. Such functions come from the need for minimising transaction costs, 
guarantee property rights, invest in research and development, and resolve the 
uncertainties in the market economy along the lines advocated by Coase (1992) and 
Williamson (1995). Fourth, conflict management is a key role that the developmental 
state can play. The conflict arises when the economy moves from low- to high- 
productivity production, specifically form agriculture to manufacturing. The shift, 
under imperfect factor mobility, creates losers in terms of lost income and 
employment. This manifests itself when agents find it difficult and resist shifting 
assets, skills, contracts and even patronage from one sector to another. The state 
supports losers and winners through increased investment and socialisation of risk 
(Chang, 1999).11
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Theoretically, IMF stabilisation and adjustment programmes focus too much 
on the exchange side of the economy. Exchange rate liberalisation may remove major 
bottlenecks, trade liberalisation may open up new markets, financial liberalisation may 
increase availability of finance, and privatisation and FDI may introduce new 
technology. However, these are all based on the assumption that there exist production 
sectors waiting to reap the benefits of liberalisation. This is a spurious position and 
concocted to disengage the state further. Liberalisation attempts have generally not 
been adequately tailored to address the specific problem of product development in 
the context of industrialisation. The least developed countries, do not have 
manufacturing or agricultural sectors with brand-name, technology, and know-how to 
benefit from liberalisation without state guidance in diffusing technology and 
providing the necessary incentives. As Amsden (1997) puts it:
“...despite the craze for liberalism in the 1990s, the elite of development 
economists at present neglects production almost entirely in analysing the state’s 
role in industrial development. Microeconomic questions about how firms are 
formed, how technologies are acquired, how industries emerge, develop or die, and 
what role governments play in the process occupy an infinitesimally small place 
compared with macroeconomic questions about fiscal prudence and foreign trade”
(p. 469),
The chasm between the developmental state and the IMF’s view of development 
is mainly that the latter’s thinking lectures the merits of unfettered markets and 
recommends de-regulation, liberalisation, and privatisation. In other words it is anti­
interventionist. The argument for a minimal, pro-business state has been further 
strengthened with both the increase in the involvement of the IMF in developing 
countries and the rise of neo-liberalism and globalisation.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the IMF, fundamentally believes in the neo­
liberal resurgence that changed the terms of debate on the role of the state. Contrary to 
its developmental role, the state is no more assumed to be a neutral guardian of public 
interest. The IMF prescribes to the notion that the state is a “predator” or a vehicle for 
politically powerful groups and their interest, for instance as in the case of rent- 
seeking discussed in Chapter 3. The IMF’s policy advocacy is based on the 
assumption that the state has no other motive other than maximisation of material
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self-interests. This position, unlike the developmental state, effectively cuts out the 
role of politics as a valid way to correct the market outcomes according to the 
“collective will” (see Chang, 2003).
Although the IMF’s view of development is anti-technocratic, in the sense that it 
opposes the idea that the state can correct market failure, it accepts rectification of 
such failures in “politically acceptable” areas, for example in infrastructure 
development and policy design. This contrasts with the rejection of successful 
industrial policy of the kind seen in East Asia (Evans, 1995a). This dilemma arises 
from the theoretical underpinnings of the IMF’s view. First, mistrust of the state is 
entrenched in the view of development to which the IMF subscribes. State 
involvement and its bureaucracy are in effect considered corrupting and wasteful 
because they always work for their own interest. This view places trust in the rational 
and forward looking individual entrepreneur. However, this is a contradictory 
position. On the one hand, the state is trusted in certain areas including setting rules 
and regulations, enforcing contracts, infrastructure development, and maintaining 
security. In these areas the autonomy of the state and its ability to protect itself from 
special interests for a broader common objective is accepted, while not in promoting 
industrial policy. In addition, trust of the individual entrepreneur assumes 
development and entrepreneurial activity as solely individual efforts. This view 
neglects the fact that knowledge is dispersed and entrepreneurial activities essentially 
result from collective effort, not least state interventions that generate incentives 
(Burlamaqui, et al., 1997).
Second, the IMF subscribe to the view that focuses on the principal-agent 
framework. This framework highlights the difficulties associated with monitoring by 
the principal. This is related to the difficulty of designing incentives for agents who 
are condemned to pursue their own self-interest. One example is the problem linked to 
designing industrial subsidy schemes and the difficulty of pinpointing where and how 
problems arise. These could be external shocks or bad management, but may not be 
obvious to the principal or in this case the state. However, state intervention should 
not be rejected on the grounds of a principal-agent framework, where identifying the 
principal and the agent is problematic. As Chang (2003, p. 32-33) put it:
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The political process in a modem society involves collective action and 
bargaining problems at different levels (local, industry, or national levels), 
whose solutions are strongly influenced by social norms (working class 
solidarity, work ethic, abstinence) political institutions (dictatorial, 
corporatist, nationalism, welfare statism, free enterprise). The principal-agent 
model, given its sole emphasis on wealth-maximising behaviour or selfish 
individuals, cannot take such complexity of political-economic process into 
account. Thus seen, there are serious dangers in accepting the radical 
proposals for rolling back the state derived from such models.
The IMF’s view of development, based on the neo-liberal schema, exposes its 
own inconsistencies. It fails to provide clear-cut criterion to draw the boundary 
between positive and negative state interventions. One conclusion that can be made 
from this observation is that despite its facade of logical consistency and 
straightforward divisions between various interventions, the IMF’s view of 
development is based on a fundamentally contradictory intellectual dogma.
As discussed earlier, the state in East Asian economies assisted the private 
sector in building a modem and competitive production base and its progression from 
labour-intensive to large capital-intensive stage. The IMF’s view of development 
equates correcting market failures in exchange with correcting market failures in 
production. Production requires “getting prices wrong” and a deliberate formation of 
“distortions” to expand investment in productive capacity in the realm of firm-specific 
knowledge, differentiated products, patents, scale economies, externalities, research 
and development (Amsden, 1997). The same is true for agriculture. For the least 
developed countries of SSA, new agricultural technology spurred by research and 
development is found to be one of the significant inputs (Sanders et al, 1990). 
Agriculture can also be the “leading sector”, and policy can induce mral household 
demand and facilitate backward linkages through agricultural development (Vogel,
1994). Increased agricultural productivity via technological diffusion and higher mral 
income produces additional mral household consumer demand and increased food 
supply for fostering industrialisation, which goes “beyond export-led 
industrialisation” (Adelman, 1984).12
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The “take-home message” for the possibility of replicating the Asian 
developmental state is clear. The issue is not exact cloning of the East Asian 
experiences but learning, as other countries did, the role the state can play in 
organising capitalist development.13 Johnson (1999, p. 40) noted that the Japanese 
developmental state “would be hard to emulate. If nothing more, it depended to a 
large extent on losing a big war to the right people at the right time”. The bureaucracy 
has been built through arduous processes that consumed time and money. However, 
the East Asian experiences show that the developmental state is not only a result of 
“economic culture”, such as Confucianism which promotes familial obligations and 
trust for establishing trading networks (Clegg et al., 1990 and Redding and Tam,
1995), but it is borne out of specific institutional arrangements among states, domestic 
classes and international interests. Numerous countries adopted the developmental 
state and improvised to suit their needs. To conclude: the developmental state is 
possible and its harmful effects can be lessened. However, SSA countries have been 
singled out as economies where the developmental state could not emerge, which the 
rational for de-linking the sate and was taken up by the IMF (and the World Bank) as 
the main strategy for SSA development under stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes.
6.4 Can the African State be Developmental?
The major challenges in application of the developmental state of Asia to 
Africa have been the problems of identification and reproducibility (Stein, 1995b). 
Identification focuses on pinpointing the factors responsible for industrial 
development in Asia. Reproducibility refers to the feasibility of replicating the Asian 
model, with debate focusing on what Mkandawire (1998) calls the “impossibility 
thesis”. This argues that SSA states cannot be developmental because they lack 
ideology (a national project), the bureaucracy is weak, and state-business relations 
mean interest groups easily capture governments (Callaghy, 1993). These factors, 
combined with poor record of past economic performance in the 1970s and 1980s, call
272
Chapter 6 The Developmental State is the Missing Link
for a further disengagement of the state and provides an entry-strategy for the 
Washington consensus.
State-led strategies were abrogated as the economic crisis manifested itself in 
low per capita income, large resource gaps, internal and external imbalances, low 
level of investment, price instability, and large curb markets (Ndulu, 1993). The 
African state is blamed for economic crisis, backwardness, weaknesses and largesse as 
well as its inefficient intervention where much of the post-colonial strategy focused on 
anti-capitalist and poor coordination of economy wide institutions and markets (World 
Bank, 1981). According to the narrative, governments in SSA, by abandoning outward 
looking strategies as colonial, became obstacles to the proper functioning of markets 
and impediment to social development (Chazan, 1988; Rothchild, 1994). Post­
independence governments used fiscal policies and foreign aid to pursue state-led 
industrialisation, which relegated peasant agriculture to the technologically backward 
state and crowded-out the private sector (Ndulu and O’Connel, 1999). The most 
prominent criticism came from a World Bank sponsored publication, Meier and Steel 
(1987), which pointed out that industrialisation strategies in SSA were based on over­
extension of public ownership, over-expansion of industry and over-investment in 
import-substitution at the expense of private ownership, development of agriculture, 
and export orientation.
Vilification of the state in SSA is backed up by the ideological ascendancy of 
neo-liberalism in the major developed countries. Neo-liberalism, both as a result of 
intellectual developments in the early 1970s and the political victory of the 
republican-conservative parties in the U.S. and the U.K. towards the end of the 
decade, was provided as an alterative to interventionist measures, mainly 
Keynesianism and modernisation. Although, the poor economic performance of the 
SSA in the 1980s prompted the World Bank to rethink its anti-statist stance, its 
reports published a decade later, instead of assigning the state a role for mobilisation 
of resources and financing structural transformation, emphasised “capacity building 
and good governance” in the form of reforming the judicial system and improving 
public accountability and transparency (World Bank, 1989a; 1992). The case for the 
developmental state, particularly for industrial policy was reduced to institutional
273
Chapter 6 The Developmental State is the Missing Link
reform and regulation of markets. Another report released in 1994 reiterated the need 
for market-oriented development strategy (World Bank, 1994). As Mkandawire
(1998), succinctly put it, the Washington consensus declared:
“African states cannot correct them [market failures] in ways that do not 
make things worse. What emerges in the literature on Africa is that what has 
obviously worked in other “late industrialisers” is simply a non-starter in 
Africa...While it is now admitted that the state has played a central role in 
the development of Asian countries, it is suggested that replication of the 
Asian experience is somehow impossible for Africa.”
The economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, by implying the impossibility of 
the developmental state emerging in SSA, killed the rationale for state intervention 
and led to the pessimism, which was to dominate the subsequent years. The absence 
of a state with a developmental vision as well as powerful interests and rent-seeking 
were given as reasons why the developmental state is infeasible in SSA. Combined 
with the misreading of the Asian success, the ascendancy of neo-liberal thinking 
meant that the state in SSA was further disengaged.
6.4.1 Is a State with a Developmental Vision Absent in SSA?
At the heart of the “impossibility thesis” is that the state as well as the 
domestic bourgeoisie in SSA lack ideology that guides them towards the goal of 
achieving high rates of accumulation, industrialisation and structural change. As 
Mkandawire (1998) put it, advocates of the thesis argue that states in SSA lacked the 
“ideological hegemony in Gramscian sense”, as in Fanon’s (1966; 1967) portrayal of 
the African ruling classes’ weakness in adopting a developmental ideology. SSA 
countries adopted an ideology, which is not motivated by religious, socialist, or 
nationalist attributes to accumulate capital and extract surplus as was the case in 
Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan and the NICs during their period of industrialisation.
The “Great Man Theory” takes the view that Africa’s predicament is the result 
of having no “visionary” leaders”. Accordingly, “it is when a leader draws rents 
exceeding a reasonable estimate of the opportunity cost of his/her time and effort that
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the title “visionary” becomes inappropriate” (Gray and McPherson, 1999, p. 21). 
Reputation of a leader as honest and trustworthy does not necessarily guarantee a 
corruption free administration. Nyerere, for instance, is portrayed as a leader who 
disguised rent-seeking under a statist ideology. A visionary leader is one that 
identifies constraints and designs an appropriate policy to promote agricultural 
development and manufacturing for exports. According to Gray and McPherson
(1999) strong leaders with “vision” hardly:
“merge like Venus from the sea... All leaders, from “visionary” types down 
to the most venal kleptocrats, are products of social structures, i.e. 
organisations and networks...as economists we challenge our social science 
colleagues-sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists-to help answer 
this question, where Africa can get its leaders? (p. 23)...a case can be made 
for awarding the title of “most visionary leader of all” to one who believes 
traditional public foreign aid has impeded his/her country’s development by 
creating a dependency relationship detrimental to adoption of pro-growth 
policies, as well as a mobilisation of domestic talent and resources. Such 
leader will be more inclined to devise an aid/debt “exit” strategy than to 
persuade donors to augment the aid flow. He/she will be more interested in 
foreign direct investment than official development assistance” (p. 26).
Equally, the domestic bourgeoisie is accused of being self-interested and 
domestic debates on development policy are often confined to a small group where 
mass illiteracy is the norm (Onimode, 1988; 1991). For instance, the bourgeoisie in 
Sierra Leone instead of transforming itself into a “hegemonic class of capital” was 
involved in the “construction of kleptocracy, fuelled by patron-clientism”, an 
“oligarchy, with specific project of creating a unity between the governing and the 
ruling classes” (Zack-Williams, 1990, p. 22).14 The ideology that existed was used for 
regime survival under the guise of post-colonial nation building and the recent 
democratisation process modernises impoverishment rather than bringing about 
development based on structural change (Ake, 1996). Ideology has also masked the 
individual character of dictatorial regimes, which is dominated by rent-seeking groups 
and lacks the institutional capacity to provoke methodical accumulation (Sandbrook, 
1986). The post-independence government of Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal and 
Zimbabwe turned into one party, authoritarian, and personal regimes. The colonial 
legacy left an example of authoritarian and statist culture, ethnic divisions led to 
rivalries, there is lack of political culture, and civil society tolerates illegitimate
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regimes and authoritarianism (Diamond et a l , 1988). Personal Rule typifies the 
African states, which is “inherently authoritarian” (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982).
“an arbitrary and usually a personal government that uses law and the 
coercive instruments of the state to expedite its own purposes of 
monopolising power and denies the political rights and opportunities of all 
other groups to compete for that power.... Modem African authoritarianism 
is characterised by the removal of constitutional rights and protections from 
political opponents, the elimination of institutional checks and balances, and 
the centralisation and concentration of state power in presidential offices, as 
well as the termination of open party politics and the regulation and 
confinement of political participation-usually within the framework of a 
single mling party” (ibid. p. 23-24).
The literature is rife with commentary that states although governments in 
SSA professed rapid socio-economic development strategies as their main goal, 
economic policy was designed for regime survival through buying political support. 
The policy choice process is explained under the “autocrat” who is the sole policy 
maker, the “prince” who has the power to overrule, the “prophet” who empowers the 
bureaucracy, and in the case of the “tyrant” policy is at best unstable and at worst 
unpredictable. In contrast, in the constitutional multiparty democracy that is said to 
prevail in Botswana, policy decision is the outcome of harmonious relationships 
between legitimate politicians and independent bureaucracy (Gulhati, 1990, p. 
1152).15 Post-independence African states have emerged as large and clientelist 
networks through management of parastatals, taxes and subsidies and transformed 
into “highly personalistic authoritarian, but weak, administrative states-lame 
Leviathans—in which crony statism and subordinate crony capitalism prevailed” 
(Callaghy, 1990, p. 258). This “syndrome” among other things led to surplus 
extraction from agriculture and inefficient investment decisions based on political 
rather than economic analysis. Callaghy (1990, p. 318 emphasis added) concludes:
“[M]ost of Africa is neither effectively capitalist, nor even statist. Socialist 
and statist efforts have come to very little; modern capitalism hardly exists.... 
for Africa both sides are right: as the structuralists maintain, economic and 
social structure obstacles to development, internal and external, are 
enomious; and, as the adherents of neoorthodoxy maintain, the state is also 
an obstacle.”
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To begin with the argument that nationalism, state patrimony and rent-seeking 
are motives for state intervention and specifically for management of public 
enterprises is a gross exaggeration in the context of SSA. Governments in Africa 
became managers of public enterprises mainly due to the absence of local bourgeoisie 
(Mkandawire, 1994b). The post-colonial states were developmentalist and their 
ideology was nation building, which focused on planning and commitment to 
eradicate poverty, ignorance, disease as well as provision of social services, 
infrastructure, and industrial development. The evidence shows that the post-colonial 
interventions were characterised by high levels of growth, savings and investment 
rates (Mkandawire, 1999). The developmental state existed and brought about 
industrialisation financed by domestic savings and high growth successes. In the early 
1960s to the early 1970s, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania, pursued 
developmental policies and achieved accumulation of human capital, extension of 
infrastructure, and some industrialisation (Stein, 1995c). Both the case studies in this 
thesis show that rapid growth and high savings were characteristics of the post­
colonial period in Uganda and modernisation in Ethiopia in the 1960s.
African states were committed to inward-looking development strategies not 
because they were against outward-looking strategies. Similarly, earlier strategies 
focused on land-intensive production not because the state was against labour- 
intensive policies. Rather, the development strategy focused on earning foreign 
exchange for industrialisation through export of primary products, and aimed at a 
gradual diversification of exports.16 It is precisely the instability of primary 
commodity exports that locked the strategy and perpetuated the concentration of 
exports (Sarkar, 1992). The debt burden is also one of the key causes of economic 
crisis in the region (UNECA, 1989). The findings indicate that external factors 
contributed to economic decline in SSA, without excluding some important internal 
factors (see Parfitt, 1990; Mosley and Weeks, 1993). Similarly, states in Africa invited 
foreign investors as part of the “industrialisation-by-invitation” strategy. The 
conditions demanded by investors were that the state should introduce protection such 
as tariffs and quotas. International capital has often demanded and received measures 
that have “distorted” the market, removing them would hardly have been an attraction
277
Chapter 6 The Developmental State is the Missing Link
(Stein, 1992). Therefore, the state entered into joint ventures and developed its own 
enterprises under protection (UNECA, 1989; Mkandawire, 1998).
Individual country experiences also point to the developmental features of 
African states. The state in Botswana played a significant role in the country’s capital 
accumulation. The state provided direct credit and extension services to local 
businessmen and farmers as well as subsidies to small-, medium- and large-scale 
manufacturing (Tsie, 1996b). The state has been effective in guiding industrial policy 
through a system of financial disbursements to the private sector including support to 
private manufacturing enterprises, agriculture and mineral processing. The objective 
was to increase employment, particularly of unskilled labour, increase production both 
for exports and import-substitutes, and correct income distribution through regional 
policy. Owusu and Samatar (1997, p. 23) note that:17
“Botswana defied the thrust of the prevailing development orthodoxy, which 
claims that African states cannot enhance industrial development through 
interventionist strategy. Botswana’s state-governed industrial strategy 
supports recent research on the East Asian miracle, which underscores the 
fundamental importance of state intervention in industrial transformation.”
The success of Zimbabwe in the 1970s is attributed to direct state protection of 
non-traditional manufacturing (Riddell, 1994). Cross-ethnic and class coalitions, an 
independent and capable bureaucracy favoured local capital accumulation through 
public-private partnership, which dominated the post-independence state in Mauritius. 
The main strategy was to expand sugar production and export to fund public-work 
programmes through taxation and foreign exchange earnings. A bureaucracy that was 
capable of identifying market opportunities carried out this strategy successfully up to 
the end of the 1970s (Meisenhelder, 1997). Drawing from experiences of Ethiopia, 
and Togo, Manor (1991) showed that the state can engage in various roles 
simultaneously, beyond maintaining its own interest; the state can be neutral, arbiter, 
guardian, and developmental.
Another attack on the African state pointed at the lack of institutional, 
technical, and administrative capacity to correct market failures as well as the 
bureaucracy’s motivation.18 The rational actor model is ascribed to African
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bureaucracies. Due to the intricacy of perfectly rational choice and its costs in terms of 
time and attention, bureaucrats do not always try to attain optimal solutions to 
problems. They opt to find ones that fulfil their basic criteria or ones that meet 
satisfactory standards (Grindle and Thomas, 1991), One example is that self-interested 
and “foreign exchange maximising bureaucrats” choose capital-intensive technology 
led by their “expansionist drive” in the public sector (James, 1996). The bureaucracy is 
weakened as the most competent and experienced personnel left their public posts, 
mainly as a result of retrenchments, retirement and moving into the better paying private 
sector (Dia, 1993). The proliferation of capacity building and technical assistance 
projects in the 1990s is a direct result of the view that institutions of governance are 
weak, particularly the capacity of its personnel and lack of transparency and 
accountability (World Bank, 1994 and 2000b). These projects are part of donor 
conditionalities imposed specifically to carry out neo-liberal policies (Tsie, 1996a). 
Once again a case is made for rooting out the state and replacing it with market-led 
strategies at the same time strengthening its capacity precisely for implementing the 
same strategy. The obvious conclusion is to advocate a minimalist state and open the 
door for the Washington consensus.
6.4.2 Do Powerful Interests Get in the Way of the Developmental State?
The weakness of the state in the sense that interest groups influence its 
decisions is put forward as one of the reasons why the state in Africa cannot be 
developmental. The policy choice approach is used as a starting point to illustrate state 
sponsored policy reform processes under the presence of interest groups. The public 
choice approach draws on the work of Olson (1965 and 1982), Buchanan, Tollison 
and Tullock (1980), Colander (1984), and Grindle and Thomas (1991). The argument 
in this approach is the analysis of “distributional coalitions”. Society, in this view, is 
composed of interest groups each concerned with maximising its own benefit in terms 
mainly of income and power.19 The underlying assumption of the public choice model 
is the division of society into losers and gainers from a particular policy change. 
Common divisions are between consumers and producers, tradable and nontradable 
sectors, urban and rural sectors, state and market, and government and civil society.
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For instance, business groups favour protection of trade and cuts in taxes, the urban 
sector presses for subsidised food, the rural sector for increased earnings, the civil 
service for public sector expansion etc. Therefore, policy change is an outcome of the 
most powerful group influencing or bargaining with government decisions. 
Governments in turn are concerned about losing or gaining votes and political 
support. Once a government is firmly clinging to power and serving its own or the 
interests of other groups, policy changes are hard to come by. Working against its own 
and other interest groups are considered irrational. In Olson’s line of thinking policy 
change can only come about if the existing structure of “distributional coalitions” is 
dismantled due to war, revolution or coup d’etat. If not, an economy continues to 
deteriorate until its demise.
At the centre of public choice theory is the assumption of a dependent or 
fettered state: a state that is incapable of independent policy making. The theoretical 
tool is supplied by Olson (1982) who infers “[0]n balance, special interest 
organisations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in 
which they operate and make political life more divisive” (p. 47). To Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (1991, p. 1146):
“The answer usually relies on what may be called a “nonneutrality” in the 
way that the gains and losses from the reform are distributed within society: 
the gainers from the status quo are taken to be politically “strong” and the 
losers to be politically “weak”, thereby preventing the adoption of reform. 
(Nondistorting transfers would of course short-circuit this problem, but they 
are usually ruled out as unavailable). In pressure-group models, this 
nonneutrality typically expresses itself in the form of differential 
organizational ability: for example, the gains from the status quo may be 
concentrated on a small number of individuals while the losses are diffused, 
such that free riding hampers the lobbying effort of the second group to a 
much greater extent. In voting models, the nonneutrality operates through 
distributional consequences across individuals, so that the median voter may 
prefer the status quo to a reform that would increase aggregate real income.”
One example of interest groups, particularly in SSA, is that which identifies 
them in the urban setting. Early analyses of interest groups focused on the rural-urban 
resource flows: urban bias in developing countries (Lipton, 1976) and anti-rural 
agricultural policies (Bates, 1981; 1993).20 The urban coalitions are said to consist of 
intertwined urban elites consisting mainly businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats,
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trade-union leaders, professionals, academics and intellectuals (Lipton, 1982). The 
central tenet of the argument on “pro-urban” and “anti-rural” is based on the logic of 
numbers. Since the majority in a typical agrarian economy are farmers, policies that 
disadvantage the rural sector must be wrong. This line of reasoning is well captured 
by the following quotes.
“There is nothing wicked or conspiratorial about this. It is the natural play of 
self-interest and power, only obfuscated by moralising from outside-cori fan 
tutti, moralisers as well. And it is only one of many ways in which the city 
(where most government is) screws the village (where most people are) in 
poor countries. In tax incidence, in investment allocation, in the provision of 
incentive, in education and research: everywhere it is government by the city, 
from the city, for the city” (Lipton, 1976, p. 68).
“ [Governments face a dilemma: urban unrest, which they cannot 
successfully eradicate through co-optation or repression, poses a serious 
challenge to their interests as employers and sponsors of industry. Their 
response has been to try to appease urban interests not by offering higher 
wages but by advocating policies aimed at reducing the cost of living, and in 
particular the cost of food. Agricultural policy thus becomes a by-product of 
political relations between governments and their urban constituents” (Bates,
1981, p. 33).
The urban bias hypothesis is still alive, the clear water between urban and rural 
passionately idealised. The standard coalition structure in SSA promotes import- 
substituting industrialisation while redistributing income from rural to urban 
populations and from poorer to richer income strata. Such a coalition also benefits 
from the support of intelligentsia due to its populist and nationalist rhetoric 
(Waterbury, 1989). Frequently cited examples of the above phenomena are 
agricultural pricing policies. Repression of agricultural prices below market prices is a 
policy designed to benefit urban coalitions who are more articulate and mobilised. The 
consequence of this type of policy is to lead the rural sector into subsistence farming, 
smuggling and “withdrawal” from production of the output whose price is controlled 
(see Bates, 1981, 1988 and Pletcher, 1986). The state cultivates local support through 
favoured tax and subsidy systems. The conflict between the objectives of marketing 
boards and political pressures coming from “labour, industry, and government” works 
to the disadvantage of farmers (Bates, 1988, p. 357).
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The state breeds inefficiencies, distortions and spreads non-Pareto outcomes in 
return for rents. Anti-rural policies lead to chronic budget deficits that can only be 
financed by domestic or external borrowing and inflation tax. If further attempt is 
made to control prices the crisis deepens as the tax base falls, transfers decline and the 
regimes political base diminishes. Unless reforms that alter the existing system of 
transfer and entitlement are in place, liberalisation and foreign capital are not much of 
a solution. The more the government intervenes in the economy the less control it has. 
Government intervention can be represented by some version of a “Laffer curve” (Lai, 
1987b). Government policy that favours a particular interest group does so at the 
expense of another, diminishing its key developmental objectives. The argument 
follows that import-substituting policies and food subsidies, for instance, by creating 
special interests, lead to a “vicious circle” o f crisis, whereas export-promoting 
strategies shift the political equilibrium towards new market-friendly interests 
resulting in a “virtuous circle” of economic progress (Krueger, 1993b).
The public choice view purports that economic development is sacrificed for 
short-term political gains. The primordial, patrimonial and paternalistic features of the 
African state have weakened its developmental capability (Adam and O'Connell,
1999). Similarly, the non-autonomous and clientelist states are unable to establish the 
state-corporate relationships witnessed in East Asia. Entrepreneurs are not sure of 
returns, as risk is not socialised and the state is interested in the “politics of the belly” 
(Bayart, 1993). A developmental state that is capable of being autonomous from 
interests and strong enough to push forward its mission, as seen in East Asia, is 
compared to the states of SSA that are deficient in the ideology and freedom to pursue 
their own developmental project. The notion of the “soft state”, applied in the context 
of Asia now forms a standard analysis for SSA states (Myrdal, 1968). A critique of the 
statist models in African argued the state is “neither soft nor dead”, but “alive and 
well” and anti-developmental (Sangmpam 1993).
However, rent and interest coalitions are not necessarily anti-developmental. 
There is now evidence for a “benign view” of interest groups as not divisive and 
obstructive, but beneficial (Brautigam, 2000). The new view of interest groups draws 
its conceptualisation from theories of pluralism and shows that interest groups can
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promote industrialisation. The framework, which mostly alludes to the experience of 
East Asia, is based on two premises: 1) even though a government is not willing to 
introduce policy refonns, organised interest groups, which face unfavourable 
economic environment can demand policy change; and 2) if a reform is already 
underway, interest groups can also shape and negotiate change.21 The public and 
rational choice schools, on the other hand, fall short of explaining whether the 
predatory and rent-seeking state is a temporary or permanent phenomenon. Killick 
(1976), in discussing development planning, pointed out the limitations of the rational 
actor approach: “the use of development planning models-and the elegance and 
internal consistency they offer-has surely harmed the cause of planning by 
contributing to a neglect of political realities and the mundane specifics of every day 
policy” (p. 79). The rent-seeking behaviour - a very important critical tool for the NPE 
advocates - does not necessarily hinder autonomous state action and impede efficiency 
of public policy (Skocpol, 1985; Lewis, 1994).22 In the case of East Asia, state 
autonomy and its ability in promoting import-substituting industrialisation have been 
successful (Grabowski, 1994; Leftwich, 1995). Labelling state actions as merely rent- 
seeking, corrupt and promotion of self-interest does not explain the success of 
industrial countries that pioneered the system of taxation, minimum wage legislation, 
and the welfare state (Toye, 1991; 1993).23
Weak state-society relations in Africa are exactly reflections o f the stage of 
development, which may disappear with progress over time. As discussed earlier, this 
point has been used to explain the 1997 Asian financial crisis, that the developmental 
states had to mature before interests were able to capture them. To argue African 
societies are inherently patrimonial and clientelist, at their early strategies of 
development, is at best prejudiced (Mkandawire, 1994a; 1998). Often, rents are 
accepted if they are meant for export-promotion. However, rents created for import- 
substitution are vilified. This implies inconsistency in the treatment of rents and rent- 
seeking. The African state-business relations are considered detrimental, but the same 
relations in Asia are known as developmental states. Moreover, rent-seeking and 
patrimony are not altogether harmful, as “embedded” state-private sector relations are 
possible (Evans, 1995a). Similarly, the Asian experience shows that the state reduced 
rent-seeking costs and rents were provided on a selective and temporary basis and
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withdrawn once industries matured sufficiently to compete internationally and rent 
realisation was linked to explicit performance standards (Akyuz, 1996).
The key argument forwarded by the authors in the Khan and Jomo (2000b) 
collection is that rents could be “value-enhancing”. This is related to rents created to 
tackle market failures and externalities such as asymmetric information, innovations 
and natural resource conservation. The finding is that conventional thinking focused 
on input costs rather than rent-outcomes.
“The net effect of the rent-seeking process will depend not only on the rent- 
seeking costs but also on the efficiency and growth implications of the rents 
which are created and maintained through this process” (Kahn and Jomo,
2000a, p. 13).
Comparing successful Asian economies with other developing countries, 
which are not that successful, although both had rent-seeking entrenched in the 
system, they found that rent-seeking depends on institutional and political variables. 
Institutional changes, which are key to the development process, involve creating or 
destroying rents and the outcome may not be unfavourable (Khan and Jomo, 2000a). 
For instance, rent-seeking costs in Thailand were found to be high and outweighed by 
benefits. The clientelist structure itself is competitive, which meant that patrons within 
the state could not protect rents for their clients. Other patrons could create their own 
clients and facilitate entry in the market (Donor and Ramsay, 2000). In the Thai textile 
industry powerful capitalists used their client status to acquire technology (Rock,
2000).24 In Senegal rents obtained by diverse groups, from farmers to urban 
capitalists, have been used for productive purposes and accumulation (Boone, 1994).
The urban-rural divide itself is problematic. It may be difficult to distinguish 
geographically urban from rural areas, two sectors are too few, and the dichotomy may 
be between the capital city and the rest of the country and not strictly between urban 
and rural. The biases may be between agriculture and industry, consumer goods and 
investment goods, or between poor and rich, rather than between country and town 
(Lipton, 1976). In a “typical” African economy there is integration of the wage and 
non-wage economies through the household, the extended family, and the community.
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Dividing the state from civil society, wage from non-wage and urban from rural is 
problematic. Seeing interest groups as emerging from, privileged urban groups, solely 
concerned with their own self-interests regardless of the implication on the many - the 
poor, the underprivileged, the underorganised, the “silent majority” - is problematic 
(Beckman, 1992, p. 91). Although interest groups appear to be self-seeking, the 
postcolonial civil-society and state was constructed with this same group's endeavour. 
Public choice theories are reductionist and ignore the composition and interaction of 
African societies. As Bangura and Gibbon (1992, p. 24) note;
“The first-and overriding-problem of conventional political science-based 
approaches to politics of adjustment has been their fidelity to transposing 
certain of the key categories of neo-classical economics to the political arena, 
and their use of these categories to designate watertight social institutions 
and groups of actors.... The systematic interpenetration of the relations 
designated by these categories, perhaps one of the defining features of 
African social and economic formations, is overlooked, and in the process 
the economic and political effects of adjustment are systematically 
misunderstood.”
The conventional thinking of interest group pressure in SSA based on urban 
coalition theory does not provide a definitive answer on how urban groups become 
organised under common interests to undermine the developmental state. The 
assumption is that urban coalitions are “divisive and parasitic”, cause “social 
rigidities”, and are “socially destructive”. Contrary to established belief that interest 
groups come from the urban sector most vested interests were found in the agriculture 
rather than the industrial sector (Toye, 1992, p. 118),25 Interests may also have non- 
sectoral characteristics. Agricultural interests in Kenya, rural political activity in 
Gambia in the 1980s, and the ethnic tensions in Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Somalia and Zaire are a few examples. Ethiopia, where federalism has created 
interests demarcated along ethnic lines, is also a classic case in point.
Moreover, analysis derived from microeconomics and rational-cum-public 
choice theories -  has serious limitations in understanding the politics of developing 
countries.26 van de Walle (2001) has shown that interest group models “conflated 
interests and interest groups”, presumptuously linking economic interests with 
effective representation in the political system. Interests may exit but their
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transformation into effective lobby is not automatic and requires a certain level of 
organisation, which is often taken for granted. Interests remain unexpressed due to 
lack of recourses and leadership contrary to interest group models, which assume 
“economic power translates automatically into political power and organisation is 
irrelevant” (p. 27). For instance, very low population densities constrain the 
emergence of landed interests and the limitation of the private sector as well as the 
small size of the industrial sector halt the emergence of labour organisations. Besides 
a large proportion of household income is derived from the informal sector, which, by 
its nature, is out side of formal representations.
Since it is found that interest groups in SSA are not well-organised, the idea 
that rent-seeking impedes the developmental state does not hold (Mosley et al., 1991). 
The rent-seeking argument mistakenly believes that when a group benefits from a 
particular set of policies, this same group must have lobbied for those policies. As 
Mkandawire (1998, p. 17-18) put it:
“In the African case, key groups benefiting from putatively “captured” 
policies (such as the vaunted “labour aristocracy”) have been dropped from 
the coalition with surprising ease. Conceptually, state policies were never a 
“class project” in Africa. Import substitution was neither the result of 
successful lobbying by rent-seeking groups nor a consciously devised 
strategy to support the emergence of a national bourgeoisie.”
The capitalist class in SSA was weak to influence policy making in the post­
independence period. The weakness has mainly been due to its complete absence or 
little financial and organisational capital and the inconsequential role it played during 
the struggle for independence. The neo-liberal agenda discounts the ideology of nation 
building in SSA as a mask used for interests. According to Bangura and Gibbon 
(1992, pp. 25-26), the “obvious parallel is the Enlightenment conception of religion as 
a conspiracy of priests and despots.” Direct control of the economy by governments, 
however, is the preferred option not because the state is expansionist but where 
administrative capacity is limited to carry out effective regulation of the private sector, 
it may be the only alternative for revenue generation. To see state-society relations as 
an obstruction to the developmental state, remains unfounded, but provides a further 
case for de-linking the state and serves as way in for the Washington consensus.
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6.5 Programme Failure: Vindication and Entry-Strategy
While the “impossibility thesis” presents the case for stabilisation and 
adjustment, the same thesis is used for explaining failure and non-adoption of IMF 
programmes. By making an added case to disengage the state, the mission is to root 
out state-led strategies based on the argument that stabilisation and adjustment 
policies fail because government officials are self interested, interest groups block 
reforms, the state is clientelist, and in any case there is lack of capacity to implement 
reforms. The public choice approach is used to describe the degree to which 
governments can insulate themselves from domestic interests: the “syndrome”. This in 
turn depends on technocratic state capacity, the system of government, external 
finance, and the nature of support coalitions, and “shredding” (i.e. the degree of 
syndrome break-up due to regime change) (Callaghy, 1990).
As summarised by Wolgit (1997), IMF-induced stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes could not work because: 1) the prevalent ideology distrusted foreign 
intervention and the notion o f a minimalist state was an alien concept; 2) interest 
groups were obstacles to implementation; 3) incumbent governments do not wish to 
risk their political power by introducing policies that entail significant losses to strong 
interests that benefit from the status quo; and 4) implementation is difficult and time- 
consuming in which the bureaucracy has neither the capacity nor the will to carry out 
reforms. Thus, the implication is that policies work but it is the difficulty in 
implementing programmes the leads to failure. For instance, major sectors in mining 
or commercial farming create interests to protect their traditional market. Heightened 
demand for protective policies such as import substitution, overvalued exchange rates 
and repressed interest rates come from civil servants, politicians, and the military who 
benefit from cheap imports and corrupt practices (Bienen, 1990, p. 715).
The most common of all the reasons given for failure of stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes are internal political pressures, which lead governments to 
“postpone corrective action until the economic crisis is acute and/or to dilute or 
abandon programmes before the necessary economic adjustment are accomplished”
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(Nelson, 1988, p. 82). Even if the design of stabilisation and adjustment programmes 
takes political sustainability into account, there will be requirements for reducing the 
losses to the most politically pertinent groups, which means increasing the cost to 
another group.27 The notion of “pro-poor adjustment” also points out that because the 
poor are less “articulate”, less organised, less connected and geographically dispersed 
mainly in rural areas, they do not make up part of “distributional coalitions” unless 
they are ethnically or ideologically important. The political costs of stabilisation and 
adjustment policies would be reduced if employment, real incomes, and public 
services were improved for the “middle deciles regardless of what happened to the 
bottom third” by focusing on primary education and health, land reform and targeted 
subsidies (Nelson, 1989b, p. 111). If business interests and governments share similar 
ethnic values and languages, introducing and sustaining adjustment programmes may 
be easier (Brautigam, 2000).28
Numerous country case studies are presented to support the argument that 
political configurations determine the outcome of stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes. The obvious example is Ghana, which experienced deep economic crisis 
in the early 1980s but has managed to implement reforms as a result of able 
technocrats, political commitment and substantial external resource flows. In the case 
of Nigeria there has been little “shredding”, the government depended on coalitions 
and there has been modest external resource flows. As a result the stabilisation and 
adjustment efforts were unsatisfactory. Weak technocratic capacity, strong opposition, 
and limited resource flows failed the reform process (ibid). Zambia with a highly 
urbanised population, powerful trade unions (in copper mining), the civil service, the 
bourgeoisie, and the informal sector who benefited out of food subsidies contributed 
to the “alienation of the peasants” (Pletcher, 1986, p. 607). The collapse of IMF 
programmes (1985-1987) was due to the government’s bias against producers and 
toward consumers (Bates and Collier, 1995). In Guinea-Bissau, IMF policies were 
unsuccessful because credit from the international financial institutions fell in the 
hands of “ponteiros” and state officials who failed to use them for productive 
investment (Galli, 1990).29 Privatisation strengthened the bourgeoisie under a patron- 
client state and harmed worker rights (Ihonvbere, 1993).30 Empirical results for 170 
IMF programmes indicate that members of the nomenklatura impede reforms through
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tax evasion, corruption, trade protection for instance Zimbabwe, which has an 
interest-ridden state (Anayiotos et a l , 2001).
The reasons for the collapse of IMF programmes under EFF have also been 
applied to other reforming countries: weak authoritarian, patrimonial, familial and 
bureaucratic regimes, but with strategic significance to important donors (Zaire and 
Haiti); hijacking of reforms by social, ethnic and professional groups (Guyana and 
Sudan); democratic stalemate and electoral promises (Jamaica and Sri Lanca); 
stalemate under corporatism or bargaining between influential groups (Mexico); and 
technocratic and administrative weakness (Haggard, 1986). hi transition countries the 
nomenklatura create obstacles to transition as they gain from uncertainties associated 
with new reforms. Vested interests oppose reform because they get favoured access to 
credit, trade license, insider information, special subsidies, and tax breaks. Some 
vested interests oppose liberalised and competitive markets as they may enjoy 
monopolistic position. Others oppose as new property rights mean reduction in the 
privileges and special dispensations. Interest groups can accept policy reforms if they 
recognise that long-term growth is better than short-term gains and if strong leaders or
31international organisations pressure them (Havrylyshyn and Odling-Smee, 2000). In 
general, based on cross-country evidence, gradual reform is superior to abrupt 
liberalisation (Jones and Kumssa, 1999).
Reform succeeds when distributional conflicts are resolved among competing 
interest groups.32 Groups with little political power often bear the cost of adjustment; 
and policies with prior record of success tend to be repeated (Alesina and Drazen, 
1991 and Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). Societies that are ethnically diverse have 
higher political patronage and less trust among members of society, which in turn may 
result in undemocratic decision-making, conflict and war. In this theme, ethnic and 
linguistic factionalism increases transaction costs and impede policy implementation 
(Collier, 1998b). If IMF-supported programmes fail it is due to domestic political 
conditions that include ethnic and linguistic divisions, strong vested interests, and lack 
of political cohesion. Hence, non-adoption of stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes are results of conflict between economic interests fighting over 
“conflicting distributional objectives”. By implication, these programmes work,
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despite, as shown in the previous chapters, the theoretical underpinnings being wobbly 
and the empirical evidence scant.
The implication of this argument is two fold: first, for the IMF to consider 
interest group actions ex ante programme implementation. This allows a selection 
process based on political criteria making countries vie for its resources. Second, to 
devise right timing and sequencing of reforms for consistency as well as 
sustainability. Noticeably, the line of reasoning is that stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes work, but what is required is pre-selection of economies that could 
introduce them without opposition through suitable timing and sequencing (Collier, 
1998b). These approaches are labled “reform mongering approaches”, which focus on 
strategies, deceptions, and resources that policy makers make use of to neutralize 
opposition to policy reforms (van de Walle, 2001). For instance, one of the 
explanations for the absence of protest to the 1986 adjustment programmes in Gambia 
is the systematic incorporation of oppositions and interest groups into the power 
structure. Gambia’s successful implementation of liberal “reform without revolt” is, 
firstly, due to the large political domain of the ruling People’s Progressive Party (PPP) 
in the rural sector, secondly, the timing and sequencing of policies to absorb 
remaining interests (Radelet, 1992).33 Thus, timing of adjustment is not an outcome of 
a social welfare maximising policy maker attempting to take his/her country to a 
growth path. Rather timing is a function of heterogeneity of a population.
Through systematic timing and sequencing of stabilisation and adjustment, 
gainers and losers of reform can be identified (Bienen, 1990). Much of the discussion 
has focused on: “tortoise or hare” and “phased or bundled” forms of timing and 
sequencing of reforms.34 Others use phrases such as “big-bang” and “death by a 
thousand cuts” to refer timing for policy change.35 Gradual reform may not be 
preferred as opposition can coalesce, which increases the “cost and risks of relying on 
coercive suppression of opposition”, but it may be preferred as there is opportunity for 
prioritising and “respond to political signals” (Nelson, 1988, p. 84). Shock treatment 
might be appropriate where public tolerance and government capacity is limited and 
where interest groups are organised. Shock treatment quickly mobilises new interest 
groups and eliminates old ones (Haggard and Webb, 1993). Specifically, liberalising
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capital markets first centres on the costs of adjustment programmes and the role of 
capital inflow in alleviating them as well as avoiding real exchange appreciations (see 
McKinnon, 1973, 1991; Choksi and Papageorgiou, 1986, Edwards, 1992). There is a 
view, which argues against reforming the capital market last based on the “dependent 
economy5’ two-sector model. Where capital is fixed in the short-term, devaluation 
leads to a fall in real wages. Removing distortions in the capital-intensive traded 
sector increases real output via exports and real wages. Hence, sequencing of reforms 
starting with capital market liberalisation protects real wages affected by exchange 
rate policies (Lai, 1987b).
In SSA policies need to be changed urgently but because of administrative 
constraints or political will, efficient sequencing raises complex problems (Collier and 
Gunning, 1999a and 1999b). Two phases are identified where this might be possible. 
The first phase consists of devaluation, reduction of the budget deficit and de­
indexation of wages. The components of phase two are cuts in consumer subsidies, 
liberalisation of producer prices in agriculture, cuts in interest rates, reduction in 
tariffs, and adjustment of the exchange rate.36 The first phase is said to reward 
exporters of agricultural produce and manufactured goods, the tourist sector and 
migrant workers. The main beneficiaries of the second phase are the agricultural 
sector and public sector enterprises, among others (Waterbury, 19 89).37 Similarly, 
bundling of reforms could result in compensation. For example, if two policies are 
introduced at the same time and one reduces, while another increases income, the two 
will cancel out each other lessening the negative impact of adjustment programmes 
(Haggard and Webb, 1993). According to Krueger (2000, pp. 11-13):
“There is increasing, but by no means conclusive, evidence that changes in 
the key macroeconomic variables that are carried out quickly have smaller 
costs than those that are phased in over a longer time period, for a variety of 
reasons. First, a rapid change in macroeconomic signals sends a message that 
policy makers are serious in their determination to restore macroeconomic 
equilibrium. Second, those sectors of the economy (exportables, in 
particular) which benefit from reforms are likely to respond more rapidly 
when the adjustment is made at once than when it is phased in over time.
Third, the political opposition faces a higher hurdle in its efforts to oppose 
and overturn reforms that have already been achieved that it does for those 
which are merely announced as intended at a future date.”
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Non-adoption and interruption o f IMF programmes also prompted discussion 
on the perfect conditions under which policies could be carried through and type of 
policies that are least opposed. Pre-reform crisis has been identified as stimulant to 
successful policy reform due to “social learning experience”. The severity of the initial 
crisis provides new governments the “something must be done” approval from the 
public and powerful interest groups (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Empirical 
evidence is provided to support the claim that that crisis and reform initiatives are 
significantly correlated and non-crisis situations provide little impetus for reform 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991, p. 83-84). “Price based” policies are often preferred 
because they lead to minimum opposition due to uniformity in impact, “project based” 
policies on the other hand may lead to fierce protest due to their specificity and target 
on a particular group (van de Walle, 1994). Political authority and programme 
management are necessary aspects for avoiding adjustment costs, because lack of the 
former requires “coercion”, “ad hoc compromises”, and “proxy” policies and raise 
cost of implementation. Protection o f consumers, distributional and nationalist issues 
need to be taken into consideration in deciding on allowing foreign investment 
(Johnson, 1994).38 Reform “tactics” in camouflaging policies, for instance, phasing 
out subsidies and persistence in policy decisions add to credibility (Waterbury,
1989).39 Uncertainty on the part of private investors may be caused by the newness of 
policies and the government that introduces them as well as doubt about external 
involvement. Therefore, policies that cannot be maintained must be avoided, and 
despite resource costs sustainable policies must be adhered to (Rodrik, 1990).
Other observers, for instance van de Walle (2001), accuse reform mongering 
approaches for idealistically assuming that the state is committed to reform and 
programme failures result from triumphant opposition of interest groups. For van de 
Walle (2001), however, reforms are often undertaken without ideological 
commitment, mainly to satisfy donor demands. Most reforms have not been carried 
through or, states have failed to undertake reforms despite the absence of popular 
opposition. Reform reluctance or partial reform is supported by the fact that 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa do not always pioneer reforms in response to 
crisis, van de Walle (2001) argues that elites shield themselves “not only to the 
vagaries of the business cycle, even to unmitigated economic disaster. Leaders who
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are not politically threatened by economic failure may not feel any need to upset the 
status quo” (p. 44).
On the other hand, those who focus on timing and sequencing of reforms also 
conflated state capacity with state autonomy. The latter is defined as the capacity of 
state actors to take action according to their own institutional interests, particularly 
when opposed by non-state actors. State autonomy is needed to design policy reforms, 
state capacity is needed to implement and sustain them, as the combination of the two 
led to successful reform in East Asia. According to van de Walle (2001) timing and 
sequencing of reforms are irrelevant where states lack capacity to gather and analyse 
data. For instance, in most least-developed economies tax and tariff collection is 
weak. Weak state capacity is also paralleled by lack of capacity throughout the 
economy including civic associations and other non-state actors.
van de Walle’s thesis, however, introduces another reason for “permanent 
crisis” in countries in sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1970s. The gist of the 
argument is that the state in the region failed to achieve economic success due to its 
neo-patrimonial character. More specifically, the state was based on clientelism, never 
believed in stabilisation and adjustment programmes and lacked capacity. The 
institutions of state gave rise to private wealth accumulation through public office. At 
best development assistance strengthened the anti-developmental nature o f the neo- 
patrimonial state. The argument asserts that the “political authority in Africa is based 
on the giving and granting of favours, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go 
from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state” (p. 51). After 
independence state elites quickly came to rely on patronage and the distribution of 
economic rents in order to ensure political stability. According to van de Walle (2001, 
pp. 16-17);
“African political systems became neo-patrimonial, combining the external facade 
of modem rational-legal administration with an internal patrimonial logic of dyadic 
exchange, prebendalism, and the private appropriation of public resources by state 
elites. Neo-patrimonial systems tend to favour consumption over investment, they 
produce unsustainable economic policies, and they systematically under-invest in 
the institutional capacity, which threatens power holders. Neo-patrimonialism 
combined in Africa with a weak civil society and few participatory traditions, a 
colonial legacy most of the first generation of rulers found useful to maintain.
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Therefore, political institutions hold the explanatory key to the African’s crisis and 
that there will not be successful economic reform without a prior reform of the 
region’s politics.”
Interest groups did not constrain the state as it remained durable throughout the 
crisis; even those countries which experienced regime change were due to “personal 
ambitions, rivalries within the military and ethnic conflict”. The state in sub-Saharan 
Africa is autonomous but suffers from lack of capacity. Van de Walle treats state 
capacity not as a process imposed externally through capacity building and 
institutional building projects, but an endogenous outcome of the neo-patrimonial 
political system. Some state sectors found low capacity beneficial and did not see 
building it as a priority. Enhanced capacity is at odds with the neo-patrimonial system 
because: 1) clientelism requires interventionism or command over public resources. 
Hence, liberalisation is anathema to the neo-patrimonial system; 2) neo- 
patrimonialism is associated with fiscal crisis, particularly on the revenue side: 
“cronyism and rent-seeking siphoned off potential state revenues, taxes are not 
collected, exemptions granted, tariffs averted, licences bribed away, parking fines 
pocketed” (p. 53); 3) the neo-patrimonial state encourages public consumption over 
public investment. The political system draws no boundary between state and private 
property. Stabilisation and adjustment programmes have been manipulated to increase 
personal enrichment as these programmes have rarely been fully implemented -  what 
is called the “partial reform syndrome”.
The crisis in the sub-Saharan region is, therefore, mainly a result o f reform non­
adoption, which arises from interaction among the clientelist needs of neo-patrimonial 
states, its limited capacity, and its scepticism of stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes. The scepticism was extended to subverting the reform process to derive 
political benefits. Just enough reforms were implemented to preserve donor support. 
State elites used conditionalities to centralise power and readjust patrimonial practices 
to the lower level of resource available because external finance provided the 
resources and technical capacity, which the state would not have been able to mobilise 
on its own. For van de Walle (2001) external development finance substituted private 
capital and supported governments to establish mostly inept projects with “excludable 
benefits” controlled and managed by the state. External finance decreased the need to
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embark on adjustment policies, while it has increased the liability of the state. In fact, 
donor resources arrested “policy learning” among African elites. In his words:
“African rulers have wholeheartedly resisted implementing the adjustment 
reforms that would have undermined them, and have instead sought to delay, 
shape, and redesign reform policies in such a way as to make them less 
threatening and, in some cases at least, even profitable (page, 21)... The 
initial, emergency response of the donors to the African economic crisis in 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s had progressively transformed itself into a 
stable international regime, with its norms, institutions, and myths. Though 
conditionality has been weak at best, external public funding has resulted in 
a growing role for the donor agencies in day-to-day decision-making and the 
increasing marginalisation of central state decision-making bodies to the 
benefit of ad hoc, donor-funded, parallel institutions. The intrusive donor 
presence continues because the non-implementation of reform, notably to 
restore fiscal balance, necessitates annual donor-funded bailouts” (p. 61)
The 1990s were different: the decade begun with democratisation and regime 
change. Stabilisation and adjustment programmes were not working and aid flows to 
the region began to decline in the early 1990s. At the same time civil society 
organisations started to participate in public life. However, by comparing the 
performance of African economies before and after regime changes in the early 1990s, 
van de Walle argues that democratisation has had little impact on economic decision 
making, because the new democratic regimes remain neo-patrimonial by structure. 
Conditionalities reinforced the central tendencies of the state, which in turn 
demoralised the private sector and sustained state capacity at low level. Partial reform 
successes kept donors at bay, who, in any case, possess little knowledge of local 
politics, have extremely short institutional memory, and too much optimism about 
success of their own polices.
In sum, non-adoption and failure of IMF programmes are blamed on the same 
political economy arguments, which constituted the “impossibility thesis”. Entrenched 
interests, patrimonial structures, feeble states and incompetent bureaucracy not only 
impede the emergence of the developmental state, but also hamper the success of 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes. While failure and non-adoption call for a 
systematic intervention by the state, based on the historical experience of 
developmental states, what we have, instead, is an aberration in the form of timing
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and sequencing of the same failed polices. This provides a further ostensible 
justification for de-linking the state and paves the way for an additional entry-strategy 
for stabilisation and adjustment policies. Such anti-developmental agenda must be 
challenged on three fronts: 1) the developmental state is feasible in SSA and most 
states had a strategy and ideology for development and industrialisation; 2) the 
traditional public choice based arguments, which demonise state-society relations are 
neither justified theoretically nor proven empirically; and 3) IMF-programmes have 
not worked and their failure is related to the nature of conditionalities and austerity 
that eroded domestic ownership of development policies, ft is this last point now we 
turn to.
6.5.1 Conditionalities Erode Ownership
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, few industrial countries, have 
control and influence over the IMF. Recent studies have found that IMF decision­
making creates an opportunity for American policy makers to influence IMF lending. 
These are based on both interest group politics and foreign policy objectives. Loan 
disbursements between 1985 and 1998 were responsive to American pressure and 
larger loans went to countries in which “American banks were highly exposed and to 
governments closely allied with the U.S.” (Oatley and Yackee, 2000). Empirical 
evidence shows that a member country’s political stance that conforms with that of the 
IMF determines the probability of loan approval: the nearest members’ proximity to 
the US-led political view, the higher the probability of lending, what is called the 
“political proximity hypothesis” (Barro and Lee, 2001).
The IMF reflects the economic and political interests of its creators. The 
withdrawal of the former Soviet Union-after the initial negotiations fifty years ago 
and later by other Eastern European countries-attest to the capitalist ideology the IMF 
held from the outset (Ferguson, 1988). Some examples are that France influenced the 
IMF not to push for devaluation of the CFA; Egypt was favoured in IMF loan 
disbursements under pressure from the U.S., Belgium, France, and Germany. The U.S. 
also used the IMF to support Zaire despite a fraudulent regime (Kapur, 1998).40
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Stanley Fischer, the former Deputy Managing Director, mentioned that to assume that 
the IMF is free of political influence is “uncharacteristically naive” .41 Access to IMF 
credit is very much politically influenced. As stated by Polak (1991, p. 31) “some 
countries may be barred from access for political reasons even if  they have technically 
adequate programmes” and “some other countries may be granted access for political 
reasons, despite staff judgement that their programmes do not meet minimum 
standards.”
A notable example is the 1998 financial crisis in which the IMF put together 
US$47 billion line of credit for South Korea in just two weeks (Boughton, 2000). 
Such moves sharply contrast with the exigency of solving the financial crisis than the 
urgency of cancelling debt and eradicating poverty in the least-developed countries. 
The IMF focuses on lending to countries with global economic and political 
significance. Of the total IMF lending of SDR 49 billion thus far, Korea’s share was 
SDR 15.5 billion, Russia’s SDR 13.2 billion and Indonesia’s SDR 4.7 billion. These 
make up two-third o f the total disbursement compared to only 10 per cent of the 
disbursement going to low-income countries. On the lending scale, Korea comes at 
the top while Rwanda is at the bottom (Bird, 1999). The institutional set up and the 
staffing policy of the IMF also precipitates a uniform outlook. As Woods (2000, p. 
834) notes:
“critique of the Fund and the Bank is that both are overwhelmingly Anglo- 
Saxon in their approach to economics. This bias stems from early on when 
unlike in other international organisations, the United States was able to 
resist pressures for national quotas for hiring, and furthermore, from the very 
start to establish a commitment to nothing but English as a working 
language... this skewed employment in the Fund and Bank significantly, not 
just geographically (favouring South Asia over East Asia and Britain over 
other European countries), but also overwhelmingly toward graduates of 
institutions that taught in English (i.e. predominantly U.S. and U.K. 
schools).”
There are ample reasons to believe that the decision of the IMF is influenced 
by politics. The U.S. influences the decision to which countries to lend or otherwise. 
The strategy, from the U.S point of view is to use IMF resources for “attracting new 
allies”, “rewarding loyal friends”, and “punishing defectors” (Thacker, 1999, pp. 68- 
70). What is clear is that strong states, through conditional finance, influence the weak
297
Chapter 6 The Developmental State is the Missing Link
ones in terms of establishing norms and new consensus. Their actions could be a 
result of genuine advancement of development, concern for international security, or 
sheer self-interest. However, international organisations become the mechanism 
through which influences are made, and the IMF is no exception. As noted by Pauly 
(1999, p. 403):
“Now, the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ seems necessarily to entail not 
only universal aspirations but also an intricate overlapping of the once 
separate areas of financial policy, competition policy and industrial 
policy...proponents of such a project are overreaching, and that the new 
mandate of the international organisations charged with its promotion rests 
on a foundation of sand. Institutional adaptation is a perennial theme in the 
study of international political economy. The case of the IMF’s foray from 
its traditional monetary terrain into the field of govemment-industry relations 
is part of a larger process of organisational transformation in the post-Cold 
War era, a process commonly depicted as a groping toward some form of 
global governance.”
The adjusting countries, on the other hand, possess specific historical and 
political institutional set up in which various interests are represented. The IMF will 
be paid back whatever the outcome of the policies. However, the adjusting countries 
face the rebellion and loss of support. Conditionality, therefore, must be analysed in 
terms of the tensions that result from divergent views of the costs and benefits of 
stabilisation and adjustment to the recipient country and the influence of powerful 
nations (Killick, 1997). Adjustment policies such as trade liberalisation and 
privatisation affect a wide range of groups. Therefore, IMF programmes require a 
process of galvanising popular support for policies. If the main policy reform is 
stabilisation such as fiscal restraint and reduction in domestic credit, the support 
needed may not be that extensive outside of the key ministries. However, as the IMF 
broadens its objectives from stabilisation to adjustment, broad consensus, “shared 
values” must be translated into ownership.
The divergent views on policy are eliminated when the adjusting country 
designs its own programme and the IMF accepts it as such. Home-grown programmes 
reflect domestic constraints and minimise the costs associated with reform. They 
require domestic political leadership, consensus building and intellectual conviction, 
which are all the ingredients of ownership of programmes and subsequent success
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(Helleiner, 2000). For the IMF both conditionality and ownership can coexist. In this 
view, conditionalities are not intended to infringe on national sovereignty and it is in a 
country’s own interest to pursue policies that will achieve a sustainable external 
position and high rate o f economic growth (IMF, 2001c). The idea is programmes 
must be fundamentally the authorities’ own, whereas conditionality is introduced to 
ensure that the IMF resources are used for their intended purpose. Accordingly, 
ownership at varying degrees is possible, though full ownership is impossible (Khan 
and Sharma (2001). The IMF argues ownership is an essential foundation for 
conditionality: it is the authorities who decide what policies to adopt, including 
whether to seek the financial support of the Fund, and it is the authorities that are 
responsible for implementing the programme. Having this as a background the IMF 
defines ownership as:
“Ownership is a willing assumption of the responsibility for an agreed 
programme of policies, by officials in a borrowing country who have the 
responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an 
understanding that the programme is achievable and is in the country’s own 
interest” IMF (2001c, p. 6).
In a complete denial of political influences discussed in the previous section, 
the concept of ownership is linked to a counterfactual analysis: the country would 
have adopted a programme similar to that of the IMF, say FP, had there not been an 
IMF programme in place. Therefore, the programme will not be at odds with the 
country’s objectives and policies. In other words the country would have implemented 
the programme had it not been for its inability to finance it. The IMF provides the 
finances, while the country owns the programme any way (Khan and Sharma, 2001).42 
This analysis ignores alternative development strategies such as those pursued by 
developmental states. If countries have alternative access to capital, or if there were 
political exigencies such as the cold war, which tolerate dirigiste policies, they may 
chose to pursue protective trade and industrial policies. The developmental states of 
East Asia have precisely done that, mainly because U.S. aid was not conditional as is 
the case today in SSA. As Diaz-Alejandro (1984) put it:
“Only when a small country asks for concessional external credit, such as 
that provided by the IMF or by bilateral aid programmes, is there a case for
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international discussion of that country’s stabilisation plans. This is the key 
justification for “conditionality”, if you ask for a gift, you must listen to your 
patron.”43
Ownership is a complex issue that results from a conflict of interest between 
the donor and the country and the government of the county and interests within it: “it 
is impossible to justify conditionality in the absence of a conflict of interests of some 
sort” (Drazen, 2001, p. 6). In his theory of “domestic heterogeneity of interests”, 
Drazen explains that since there are always conflicts over policy choice among 
domestic interest groups, the purpose of conditionality is to strengthen the government 
that chooses to implement IMF programmes. Conditionality, which follows pre­
arranged and pre-planned policies, however, has the exact opposite effect: it erodes 
domestic ownership of programmes. In the absence of home-grown policies 
governments implement the “inescapable minimum” of policies (Killick, 1996 and 
1997).
In countries where there was high rate of programme interruption, IMF’s and 
other donors’ financial assistance has been low.44 At the same time, SSA countries 
with limited access to alterative capital received relatively large IMF credit, which 
means that conditionality in these countries is the highest (Killick, 1995a). It has also 
been found that IMF involvement has not been followed by increased private capital 
flows questioning the catalytic effects of IMF credits as well as the incentive for 
policy change under the principal-agent framework (Hajivassiliou, 1987 and Faini et 
a l, 1991). Investors assess risks of policy reversal based on their own information on 
the domestic political configuration (Killick, 1997). The only workable areas of IMF 
conditionalities are where donors are able to monitor and track their finances as well 
as where support to reforms is relatively non-controversial (White and Morrissey, 
1997).
As shown in Chapter 4 many studies found no relationship between reductions 
in inflation rates, improvement in current accounts, as well as increase in growth rates 
and IMF programmes (IMF, 2001c). Lack of ownership and the hesitancy to 
implement IMF programmes wholeheartedly are the causes of failure, interruptions 
and non-adoption. IMF programmes can have positive impacts, say, on inflation as a
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result of excessive deflation. The absence of a relationship between programmes and 
policy outcomes, even where they can work, however, is explained by “over-reliance 
on conditionality” that leads to programme interruptions (Killick, 1996 and 1997).45 
Ex ante conditionality has been shown to be not only ineffective in improving policy 
outcomes, but also undermines the IFI’s who appear to condone slippages in 
programme implementation (White and Morrissey, 1997). The very existence of 
conditional finance shows that recipient countries are not willing to implement the 
recommended policies leading to a bargaining process between the provider and the 
recipient as well as the implementing government and local interest groups (Bacha, 
1987).46
Stiglitz (2000b) notes “[cjonditionality -  including the manner in which 
conditions have been imposed -  has become to be seen by many, especially within the 
developing world, as part of the new economic colonialism which has succeeded the 
old” (p. 40). Failures and interruptions of IMF programmes are the result o f harsh 
conditionalities, particularly in SSA where conditionality is the highest and 
programme non-compliance and ownership problems exist (Killick, 1995a). An IMF- 
sponsored evaluation, Botchwey et a l, (1998), also found that lack of ownership of 
programmes resulted in poor implementation of reforms in Zambia (1976-1991), 
Uganda (1987-1990), and Malawi (1994).47 Botchwey et a l, (1998, p. 21) state that 
the dilemma is:
“how to foster strong country ownership and at the same time provide 
adequate assurances to both multilateral and bilateral sources of financial 
assistance that their resources will not be wasted. The solution, in our view, 
lies not in reducing ownership to simply persuading the country to adopt 
what others want, but in finding a middle ground that enables the country to 
express its will and build consensus behind a programme capable of 
achieving sustainable growth. This requires actions both at a country level to 
improve the decision-making and consensus-building processes, and by the 
Fund to make the negotiations process and conditionality regime more 
supportive of country ownership.”
Despite a number of studies, including those sponsored by the IMF, find that 
conditionalities constrain implementation (Kapur, 2001 and Goldstein, 2000 and 
2003), the IMF reports that there is no evidence that “more conditionality impairs 
implementation” (IMF, 2001a, p. 21). Moreover, non-adoption is a result of
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“political upheavals and flagging commitment” (IMF, 2001a, p. 56). We are back 
where political economy arguments are used to explain non-adoption. In response to 
failure and non-adoption, proper timing and sequencing of programmes are advocated 
to reduce opposition and upheavals. When lack of ownership is found to be the real 
cause of non-adoption, selective assistance, where aid can be “effective and owned”, 
has been presented as a solution. A series of research highlighted that under the 
previous aid regime much of the assistance went to weak policy environment and 
much of the aid went to consumption rather than investment (Boone, 1994 and 1995; 
Collier and Gunning, 1996 and 1999,, Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Collier and Dollar, 
2000). The “aid effectiveness” literature highlighted that aid only positively 
contributes where there are quality policies or aid is more likely to be successful with 
relatively new and democratically elected governments. This implies that the IFIs 
develop good policy indicators, such as the possibility of ownership, the domestic 
political configuration, commitment by the leadership, and local implementing 
capacity (Drazen, 1999; Vreeland, 1999; and Dollar and Svensson, 2000).
Ownership, in its true sense, however, means the country introduces its own 
policy (Helleiner, 1995). No matter how rigorous pre-selection is it is difficult to have 
full ownership under conditional finance (Khor, 2001). The trade-off between 
conditionality and implementation is the same as the Laffer curve: increased 
conditionality is associated with decreased ownership and implementation (Bird, 
2000). Helleiner (2000, p. 85) quotes an official of a donor agency saying, “ownership 
exists when they do what we want them to do but they do so voluntarily.”48 But, IMF 
programmes are seen as “doctrinaire”, “prejudged”, “dogmatic” and imposed from 
outside and adjusting governments often resent them, which means they are forced 
upon weak economies with no access to alterative finance (Helleiner, 1983b). As 
Kapur (1998, p. 126) notes;
“The increasing scope of loan conditions implies that during a financial 
crisis, the IMF should take over more and more of a country’s decision­
making process, without any commensurate increase in accountability. Put in 
a different way, the absence of risk sharing means that these conditions 
amount to a fomi of political taxation without representation.”
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It is an open secret that IMF conditionalities are designed to alter the 
behaviour of governments with regard to political structures, social practice, and 
economic strategy. These conditionalities greatly compromise ownership of 
development activities. Once IMF programmes are in place, a relationship of 
dependency has been established, giving the IMF bargaining power over the recipient 
government, mainly through tranching of credit. Conditionalities, through behavioural 
modification of the recipient country, establish asymmetrical power relationship based 
on donorship rather than ownership (Stokke, 1995).49 Donorship presides over the 
relationship as recipient governments often take a course of action, which is anathema 
to IMF conditions. More often than not, the IMF suspends its programmes as a 
definitive manifestation of the asymmetrical power relationship.
The suspension of IMF programmes in Ethiopian is a case in point. The IMF 
simply describes the termination as: “on October 11, 1996, the IMF approved a three- 
year ESAF arrangement for Ethiopia. However, the mid-term review under that 
arrangement could not be completed, and the first annual ESAF arrangement was 
allowed to expire on October 10, 1997” (IMF, 1998, p. 1). The real story is related to 
rigid conditionalities and Ethiopia’s sovereign right to use its resources (Stiglitz, 
2001, 2002 and Wade, 2001). First, the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines used four of its 
aircrafts as a collateral and borrowed money from a U.S. based bank. The interest it 
was paying was much higher than the interest it was earning from depositing its 
reserves in the U.S. bond market. This was mainly because the country had a bad 
credit rating. So the government used its foreign exchange reserves to pay off the loan 
and close the transaction with the commercial bank. The IMF was unhappy because 
the government used its reserves without the Funds permission. The IMF argued that 
Ethiopia failed to meet its target for international reserves. What actually happened 
was a change in the asset and liability of the nations finances (Wade, 2001).
Second, the government of Ethiopia refused to open up the domestic financial 
sector to foreign competition and decided to maintain the monopoly of the state- 
owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE). The government argued that it has to 
build local regulatory capacity and competency of indigenous banks before allowing 
entry by foreign banks. The IMF was disappointed that its key policy conditionalities,
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deregulation and capital account liberalisation, were objected to by the government 
(Stiglitz, 2001 and 2002).50 Third, the IMF argued public expenditure programmes 
were becoming unsustainable, because they are not matched by domestic revenue. If 
inflows of foreign savings cease, the economy will be left with a large unsustainable 
deficit. The IMF asked Ethiopia to deposit foreign savings in its reserves account. 
This made the reserve coverage of imports look better and imply that macroeconomic 
targets are achieved. Obviously, the Ethiopian government argued otherwise. It 
insisted that it needed vital social services and infrastructure and cannot limit its 
expenditure on revenue only (Stiglitz, 1998a). In a later account, Stiglitz (2001, p. 2) 
notes the IMF logic means “foreign aid does not lead to more schools or health 
clinics. Instead the money is, in effect, simply added to reserves. Surely this was not 
the intention of the international donor community.”
Reconciliation between the Ethiopian government and the IMF took place in 
1999 and the ESAF programme resumed. The concessions involved the Ethiopian 
government contracting out the management of the commercial bank to a foreign firm, 
but not to privatise the CBE or open up the financial sector to foreign competition. 
The IMF in turn was allowed to put a tight target on the expansion of money and 
credit. The IMF must have learned what Abegaz (1999, p. 41) mentioned:
“Aid does not also seem to buy good reform when the conditionalities are 
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to undermine the core of the regime’s ideology 
or its power base. Although the World Bank and other major donors 
understandably regret the lingering mindset of control over facilitation in the 
bureaucracy, slippage in economic management, and inefficiencies in the 
land lease system, they also chose to sidestep or soft-pedal some of the 
fundamental institutional or policy reforms to solve them. That is probably 
because they know that these and other reforms are unpalatable to the 
Government.”
What we learn from the above discussion is that the Letter o f  Intent and Policy 
Framework Papers paint a picture that the borrowing country assumes major 
responsibilities for the design and implementation o f stabilisation and adjustment 
policies. The role of the IMF is presented as advisory and its decisions to lend are 
based on its own assessment of the merits of the programme. However, programme 
failures and interruptions are too many to ignore that difficulties arise when the
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policies designed by the borrowing country and that envisaged by the IMF are 
substantially different. In this situation there is only one outcome: the IMF imposes 
conditionality and political influence, which overrides policies that are not in 
conformity with the neo-liberal agenda. Asymmetry of relationship and lack of 
ownership are the real causes of non-adoption. Where programmes are adopted, 
reluctantly, governments are forced to use repressive measures to dampen local 
opposition.
6.5.2 Conditionalities Nurture Repression
The incompatibility of conditionality and ownership implies, on one side, the 
possibility that the implementing governments do not believe in the policies in the 
first place. On the other side, the public do not believe in the policies, in which case 
the government uses repressive measures to carry out policies. The impact of neo­
liberal policies has been to incapacitate the state in a paradoxical way. Its strength was 
needed to carry out the unpopular stabilisation and adjustment policies. The capacity 
building and good governance projects have been used to strengthen state capacity to 
carry through neo-liberal reforms. But its ability to emulate the developmental states 
seen elsewhere is curtailed. By focusing on the regulatory functions of the state, neo­
liberalism eschews the role the state played in East Asia, which was more hands-on or 
developmental in its character. Since stabilisation and adjustment programmes require 
reversal of preceding policy regimes, the state becomes the force of change. As 
reversal of the status quo ante usually requires austere measures, revolt and rebellion 
are inevitable. It is such inevitability of opposition that requires a repressive state. 
Under stabilisation and adjustment programmes, the state transforms into a repressive 
agency, which advances the interest of international capital, inhibiting local 
opposition to it.
As set out in Franklin (1997, pp. 580-84), if IMF programmes are to succeed 
political repression is necessary. Franklin defines political repression as the “use of 
sanctions by a government against its inhabitants. Sanctions include the use of 
violence meant to kill or otherwise hami the targets and forceful acts meant to limit
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the freedom of action of the targets” (p. 579). His findings show: a) IMF-sponsored 
programmes are associated with protests and unrest; b) governments that implement 
IMF-sponsored programmes use political repression more than governments that do 
not have IMF programmes; c) countries and leaders that face more protest use greater 
repression; and d) IMF programmes make it difficult for governments to use non­
violent methods in response to opposition.51 It is now well documented that the 
response to stabilisation and adjustment programmes are strikes (organised labour); 
riots (urban organised and low-income groups); capital flight (private sector, 
importers); remittance withholding (migrant and skilled labour); and hoarding and 
unsecured borrowing (public sector enterprise). A number of studies show that IMF- 
supported reforms are followed by political repression (Morrisson et al., 1994).52 In 
Nigeria under General Ibrahim Babangida, in Ghana under Flight Lieutenant Jerry 
Rawlings, and in Guinea under General Lansana Conte, adjustment was associated 
with repression. These included, imprisonment of journalists, banning of political 
parties, and detaining of party leaders. Such “foreign paternalism only serves to 
reinforce the authoritarian nature of SAP” (Ibhawoh, 1999, p. 160).
The IMF seemingly favours democratic regimes and wishes to distance itself 
from repressive states. However, the IMF itself sets the tone for repression and human 
rights violations by insisting on politically difficult conditionalities in the 
implementation of economic reforms (Ibhawoh, 1999). Repression, therefore, is not 
only due to the reforming government but also to the IMF itself, which imposes 
conditionalities on heavily indebted and vulnerable countries. Stabilisation and 
adjustment policies, by encouraging repressive actions, may superficially appear to 
have succeeded. Yet, they allocate the state an increased repressive role, while calling 
for a minimalist state. Rolling back the state in economic terms has meant increasing 
its political dominance, which creates social costs in terms of human right violations, 
particularly by curtailing free speech and undermining political representation. Except 
for advocacy of minimalist state, the Washington consensus offers no theory for the 
emergence of the developmental state. It puts the state at the forefront of the reform 
process and uses state power enormously to reinvent society in its own image (Tsie, 
1996).53
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Perturbed by the many failures of stabilisation and adjustment programmes, in 
effect, the IFIs are arguing for financial assistance to countries where neo-liberalism is 
accepted without opposition or pushed through by a repressive state. The absence of 
opposition ostensibly shows there is broad consensus and ownership and, 
conveniently, few monetary variables are selected to show success. On the surface, 
liberalisation encompassing devaluation, cuts in public expenditure, relaxation of 
foreign exchange controls, raising of interest rates, and privatisation -  appear to have 
succeeded in keeping inflation rates low. However, the state is disengaged from its 
developmental role and fails to address the key developmental question of structural 
transformation.
6.6 Beyond the Repressive Pseudo-Developmental State
Continuous liberalisation of markets and depoliticisation of the state creates a 
chaotic policy environment that hinders even the market-led policies themselves 
(Chang, 1999). To use the same arguments as the “impossibility thesis” to explain 
success and failure of programmes also carries an ideological message of further 
disengaging the state, while, as shown in the previous Chapters, there is neither a 
strong theoretical case nor conclusive empirical evidence to justify the continuance of 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes. These programmes, which aim to attain 
macroeconomic stability and achieve static efficiency, nurture states far removed from 
key developmental principles reducing them to a function that focuses on short-term 
deflation. As Mkandawire (1998, p. 22) puts it:
“This focus on immediate determinants has been encouraged by the 
preponderance of stabilisation issues in current policy-making, with the 
result that “developmental fundamentals” and the institutional arrangements 
they call forth are subservient to short-term stabilisation policies, which 
often include the erosion of precisely those institutions that should guide the 
development process. Now, stabilization policies require much fewer actors 
than development strategies.”
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There is a clear anti-developmental driving force to stabilisation and 
adjustment policies. What is missing is a serious analysis of structural features within 
the IMF model and its neglect of the role the state can play in credit mobilisation, 
infrastructural developments, conflict management, coordination of change, provision 
of vision, institutional building, technological diffusion, and facilitation o f production 
with incentives and rewards (Johnson, 1982, 1989; Amsden, 1989, 1997; Chang,
1999). First, the IMF model excludes analysis of industrial finance. The difficulty in 
obtaining credit from the banking system cannot be solved by interest rate 
liberalisation alone. As the Ethiopian case shows, despite liberalisation efforts, banks 
still prefer to hedge risk not by varying interest rates but by seeking valuable collateral 
such as businesses and real assets. Credit to finance imports went up from 2 per cent 
in 1992 to 16.3 per cent in 1998. Surprisingly, in the same period, bank credit to the 
export sector fell from 8.6 per cent in 1993 to 3.7 per cent in 1998. Loan 
disbursements to industry declined from 28.9 per cent in 1993 to 13.1 per cent in 
1998. Credit flow to agriculture fell from 21.7 per cent in 1992 to 16.7 per cent in 
1998. The larger share of credit, 32 per cent, is flowing to the domestic retail-trading 
sector. The increasing loan disbursement to finance imports and retail trade implies 
that: 1) business activity focuses on quick entry and exit and not long-term 
commitment to manufacturing and heavy industry; and 2) lending is predominantly for 
short-term financing of working capital rather than for long-term financing of 
investment. Domestic credit mobilisation and investment capacity are stifled by 
institutional underdevelopment. There is a strong case against positive or very high 
interest rates in the face of investment uncertainty and low expectations. In such 
instances liberalisation results in “upward financial repression”, in which banks will 
hold excess liquidity or bad loans implying the economy is short o f profitable 
investment projects (Beckerman, 1988).
Similarly, in Uganda, lack of incentives and finance has shifted production for 
profit to retail trade. Trade-related credit mainly finances imports for the retail trade 
sector, while the share of credit advanced to the export and agricultural sectors has 
been falling. Most loans are advanced to the private sector on a short-term basis and 
lending to the agricultural sector in 2000 was only 2.4 per cent of total lending,
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despite its importance to the export sector. Although there have been increased 
deposits, credits, and financial depth, the financing requirements for investment have 
widened during the reform period.
To recap, South Korea’s experience between 1960 and 1980 suggests that 
although financial liberalisation increased savings it also increased the government’s 
involvement in the sector. Financial control was motivated by supervision but, most of 
all, the government used the increase in the proportion of savings under its control for 
policy purposes. Government intervention also helped to eliminate market 
imperfections and reduced transaction costs (Harris, 1988 and Cho, 1989; Cho and 
Khatkhate, 1989). The government managed to keep real interest rates positive and 
coordinated the flow of credit to the export-sector (Amsden and Euh, 1993; Wade,
1990). SSA economies need developmental states for the challenge of transforming 
institutional structures to exploit technological advances and market opportunities. 
The financial market reflects the actions of banks, consumers, savers, investors, trade 
unions, and government departments. Relationship and trust among these institutions 
are key to reducing information costs and uncertainty, rather than interest rate 
liberalisation (Soskice, 1991; Patrick, 1996). One example is where community-based 
indigenous networks and traditional kinship relationships provide insurance to private 
agents (Aryeetey and Nissanke, 1998). The underdevelopment of. formal financial 
arrangements and contractual enforcements restrict accumulation at its primitive level. 
Particularly where equilibrium is not instantaneous under the existence of asymmetry 
of information (Stiglitz, 1989). Where small-scale manufacturing and trading as well 
as subsistence agriculture dominate, formalisation of markets and their transformation 
requires concerted public effort (Aron, 1995).
Financial repression that imposes lending rate ceilings may actually lead banks 
to manage their deposit liabilities effectively. Banks may find that the only way to 
increase profit is to increase the volume of credit and deposits. Therefore the 
repression actually may bring about increased deposits through expansion of banking 
services (Demetriades and Luintel, 1996). The case of South Korea demonstrated that 
these arguments hold true (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). In the long-term, it was 
found that high lending rates discourage investment, increased mark-up prices, and
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depressing effective demand (Burkett and Dutt, 1991). Concluding from a nine set of 
sample case studies Mosley (1991a) and Mosley et a l (1991) emphasise that 
stabilisation can fail to improve investment, which is necessary for growth. What was 
needed was “state intervention to make land and smallholder credit available” rather 
than “stimuli for a private capitalist sector”:
“Our reading of the structural adjustment experience of the poorer 
developing countries, then, lead us to take inspiration from the Latin 
American structuralists of the 1950s, who advocated that the state itself 
should promote development by removing bottlenecks in the economy” 
(Mosley, 1991a, pp. 240-241).
Second, IMF intervention leads to a further reliance on primary exports, while 
imports continue to be valued higher than exports. Macroeconomic stability cannot 
disguise weak capacity to withstand terms of trade changes. While the policies 
recommended by the IMF may lead to a decline in import-substituting industries 
(exchange and trade liberalisation) and public ownership (privatisation), these are 
unlikely to be replaced by export-oriented manufacturing. In fact, as is the case in the 
rest of SSA, IMF-supported stabilisation and adjustment measures de-industrialise the 
existing manufacturing base without encouraging any significant replacement (Stein, 
1992, 1994).
For Ethiopia and Uganda, as shown in the previous chapter, there is no 
evidence that the share of output is growing for the manufacturing sector. Coffee 
accounts for about 73 percent of the total value of Ethiopia’s merchandise exports. In 
fact, in value terms the contribution of coffee has been steadily increasing throughout 
the liberalisation period. The share o f the five major export commodities, which are 
all agricultural, increased from 74 per cent in 1991 to 95 per cent in 1998 (World 
Bank, 2003). Despite large devaluations, the expenditure-switching and expenditure- 
reduction objectives fail to succeed as the elasticities of the demand for imports seems 
to be much greater than exports (Kibret, 1994). For instance, in 2002, of the US$9 
billion imports under the Africa Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA) - a duty-free 
scheme for African exports to the U.S. - 76 per cent were petroleum products, 
principally from Nigeria and Gabon. South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Gabon
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accounted for 93 per cent of AGOA exports. South Africa exports automobiles and 
Kenya a mix of apparels, textiles and agricultural exports.54 In contrast, only a single 
firm in Ethiopia is known to have exported under AGOA to the U.S. market at a value 
of about US$822,000 in 2002.55 Ethiopia liberalised its economy, but what is absent is 
analysis of how firms, infrastructure, and technology are combined to produce 
commodities to trade in the domestic as well as the international market.
About 70 per cent of the export revenue in Uganda comes from coffee, which 
makes it vulnerable to international coffee price and quantity fluctuations. Although 
the Ugandan economy is much more open, the impact of devaluation was not 
significant on diversification of exports. Traditional exports as a share of total exports 
are growing and at a higher rate than non-traditional exports. Non-traditional exports 
only make up 16 per cent of exports. In 1999, coffee exports as a share of total exports 
and agricultural exports as a share of total exports stood at 61.1 per cent and 81.7 per 
cent, respectively (World Bank, 2003). In the case of Uganda, where unilateral 
liberalisation of Uganda's import tariffs took place, the findings are: 1) the impact of 
liberalisation appears to be quite slight, albeit positive, largely because there is only a 
slight impact on the world prices of the agricultural commodities it exports; and 2) the 
principal gains actually arise from trade agreements that are essentially unilateral in 
nature (Dijkstra and van Donge, 2001; Gauthier, 2001).
Success of openness depends mainly on how the movements towards 
comparative advantage lead to activities that promote economic growth. Examples are 
the level of research and development expenditure, diversification of exports, and 
improving quality of products. The clear message is that economies that benefited 
from openness did so not just by dismantling trade barriers, but also through a 
concerted marrying of the opportunities offered by the international market with 
domestic investment capability. As witnessed in East Asia, China and India success 
was guaranteed through gradual opening of the economy to foreign products and 
investment and domestic institutional development. The positive relationship between 
open trade regimes and economic performances is seriously questionable (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995). In particular the absence of institutions and complementary policies 
constrain the impact of trade liberalisation. Integration of developing economies in the
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global market means greater exposure to external risk such as the cost of 
implementing World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards and requirements, which 
requires developed institutions. In fact, trade liberalisation is to be seen more than 
changes in tariff structures but as a broad institutional and policy change (Rodrik, 
1998 and 1999). The case of Zimbabwe and Zambia illustrates that infrastructural and 
credit support must go hand in hand with hade liberalisation (Winters, 2002).
An export-led strategy is commendable given the small size o f the market and 
heavy dependence on imported goods in many SSA countries. However, weaknesses 
in institutions, infrastructure, and available human resources constrain export 
performance. Even if macro policy is consistent and firms respond to the right 
incentives, the resulting productivity gains could be offset by declines in factor 
accumulation (Elbadawi, 1992; Martin, 1992). When trade liberalisation is lumped 
together with other liberalisation policies there will be confusion and too many 
incentives confuse those engaged in the tradable sector (see Helleiner, 1995; Amsden 
1989; Wade 1990). It has been found that the impact of hade liberalisation on export 
growth in developing countries is dehimental, while relative price changes and world 
income growth are much more important (Santos-Paulino, 2002). Little evidence was 
found to substantiate the claim that exchange rate liberalisation has remove the bias 
against exports, thus encouraging export expansion to fuel economic growth in SSA.
Fallacy of composition may set in as many countries liberalise hade in the 
same commodities at the same time (Cline, 1982; McKay et a l, 1997; UNCTAD,
2000). The adding-up problem holds due to a simultaneous commodity export 
expansion, particularly for coffee, cotton, cocoa, banana, tea, tobacco, copper and 
petroleum. The result is reduced prices turning the terms of hade against exporting 
countries (see Bleaney, 1993; Akiyana and Larson, 1994; Schiff, 1995; Weeks, 1995). 
SSA economies are open to counter the diseconomies of small size such as the 
inability to diversify exports. However they also face severe risks in terms of trade 
changes (Armstrong and Read, 1998). Almost 80 percent of the benefits of exchange 
rate depreciation disappear when other developing countries pursue similar policies. 
China’s membership of the WTO and entry of other South Asian economies into the 
export market also created extra supply in labour-intensive manufacturing (Mayor,
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2002). Primary commodity production, on the one hand, and long-term growth 
objectives such as technological learning, human capital development, industrial 
development and regional trade (which require increased public expenditure and co­
ordination) are incompatible (Stewart, 1992).56 Export diversification objectives can 
only be achieved by designing technology policy, improving organisational, marketing 
skills and human development, which the market cannot guarantee, and only an 
orchestrated public policy can (Wangwe, 1994).
Third, liberalisation is often followed by a shift from capital and intermediate 
goods to consumer goods imports. In both Ethiopia and Uganda, trade liberalisation 
and liberalised foreign exchange allocations meant increased imports by the private 
sector, mainly for domestic retail trade in the form of consumer goods and 
automobiles. The demand for imports of luxury goods rises, as control on luxury 
goods is at the same time removed through tariff adjustment. Skewed income 
distribution ensures that scarce foreign exchange is directed to finance consumer good 
imports rather than capital and intermediate goods. In Uganda, inequality, measured 
by the Gini coefficient, increased from 36.4 per cent in 1992 to 38.3 per cent in 2000 
(Appleton, 2001b). In Ethiopia, urban inequality increased from 0.34 per cent in 
1995/96 to 0.38 per cent in 1999/00 (MOFED, 2002).
Foreign exchange and trade liberalisations shrink resources available to 
manufacturing, making it even more difficult to reorient industrial policies. The data 
show that the import substitution sector itself becomes even more import-intensive. 
This has much to do with donor import-support, which encouraged import-intensive 
industries. The industrial sector receives a large proportion o f support and the sector is 
also the most import-intensive. In 1992, import intensity in Ethiopia, measured by the 
ratio of the value of imported input to total value of domestic inputs, has been 0.33. 
The figure increased to 0.44 in 1997 and grew by an annual average of 6 per cent 
between 1992 and 1997 (MEDaC, 1999). These findings concretise the fear that 
liberalisation alone cannot guarantee an “export-led” growth and selective subsidies as 
well as technological transfers are needed. The market alone cannot guarantee 
responsiveness of exports and imports so that capital and intermediate goods could be
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substituted by local production. Markets also do not release exportable goods from 
local consumption nor prevent imports from competing with locally produced goods.
Fourth, despite SSA economies suffering from severe under investment in 
social services and infrastructure, stabilisation and adjustment programmes emphasise 
austerity, which often lead to cuts in public investment and expenditure.57 One 
constant that runs through the developmental states of Asia is that the pre-requisite for 
industrialisation is sustained investment in social services and infrastructure. Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore made investment in communications, 
transport, utilities and research and development as key pre-requisites for 
industrialisation. The Japanese government directed resources to expand primary and 
vocational education. Its motto “Japanese spirit and Western Technology” and the 
Meiji education system stressed subservience to the state and the national project and 
the importance of technological acquisition (Seiya, 1965). The Japanese education 
system had a high rate of return to investment, mainly through promotion of 
democracy, human rights and gender equality (Nafziger, 1995). Taiwan’s industrial 
development is partly the result of investment in universal literacy, vocational and 
science-based learning. In the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan spent a significant proportion 
of its GDP on education and increased enrolment in vocational and science related 
qualification by about 50 per cent between 1950 and 1980 (Brautigam, 1995). 
Although, the government of Taiwan inherited an extensive network of rural roads, 
railways and ports, it also invested in additional extensive rural electrification that 
helped regional expansion of industry (Ranis, 1985).
By way of comparison, in 1998, 64 per cent of the Ethiopian population over 
fifteen years of age was classified as illiterate. Ethiopia's total road length, at 
28,300km, is the lowest in Africa and this makes access to markets and social and 
infrastructural facilities difficult (World Bank, 2003). It also contributes to the 
severity of poverty and the isolation and vulnerability of the poor, as manifested most 
tragically in the famines of 1973 and 1984 (as well as the current drought). In Uganda 
much of the poverty occurred under the background of land shortage, low levels of 
education, and limited access to markets. Unequal relationships within the household 
reflect not only cultural factors but also unequal access to education and physical
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assets such as land. Poverty also reflects society-wide phenomena including 
insecurity, the poor quality of public services, the lack of productive employment, and 
the absence of functioning markets (MFPED, 2000). The low density of rural roads, 
lack of application of fertiliser and pesticides, absence of seed variety, poor 
transportation, paucity of irrigation infrastructure and absence of agricultural research 
facilities are the main constraints. Farmers neglected by mainstream policy continue to 
destroy the environment in search of arable and cultivable land. Much has been said 
about government policy emphasising an export-led agricultural strategy that 
neglected small-scale farming: the participation of women in the provision of credit, 
fertiliser inputs, poor “choice” of investment, inefficient management, and low morale 
among workers (Cheru, 1992).58 hi many ways investment to overcome these 
obstacles is proving difficult in the environment of IMF-sponsored measures, mainly 
because tight fiscal policy is used as a key macroeconomic instrument to control 
inflation.
Real wages in Uganda and Ethiopia plummeted in some years due to a 
combination of devaluations and austerity and were maintained in other times. While 
the former may imply increased competitiveness, the decline occurred in an already 
poor standard of living. The experience of Uganda shows that the reduction in current 
government consumption under IMF-programmes, directly affected the working class, 
as the wage bill of the public sector was cut by 30 per cent through redundancies and 
direct cut in wages, and the introduction of increased taxes on pay (Mamdani, 1990 
and 1991). Under Ethiopia’s stabilisation programme public consumption was cut to 
compensate for increases in public investment. Wages and salary increments in the 
public sector were restrained as part of the SAF and ESAF programmes. This was 
supported by a fall in the employees engaged in public administration (MEDaC, 
1999). Retrenchments that usually followed stabilisation and structural adjustment 
affected the bureaucracy directly causing low moral, declining real wages and running 
down the governments’ institutional capability (Dia, 1993; Aron, 1995).
Fifth, the Asian experience shows that the developmental state was dependent 
on the response of domestic capitalists for successful growth. Capitalist accumulation 
takes place when such national bourgeoisie responds to the incentives introduced by
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the state. By contrast, SSA economies are the least beneficiaries of private domestic as 
well as foreign capital (ADB, 1997) and such capital does not flow to developing 
countries even though relative factor endowments suggest otherwise (Eatwell, 1996; 
Krugman, 1993). Thus, the need for nurturing private capital is fundamental. 
Capitalist accumulation will only commence if the state directs resources for 
supporting indigenous capitalist classes to gain access to labour, land, capital, 
infrastructure, finance and technology. Privatisation and financial and trade 
liberalisations, under the alleged reason of distortion removal have severely weakened 
the state’s developmental capacity. In Mozambique, for instance limiting state 
intervention thorough austere fiscal policies as well as the chaotic sale of public 
enterprises have contributed to loss of control over key policy variables (Wuyts, 1996; 
Carlos-Castelo, Cramer and Hailu, 2003).
Unfortunately, SSA is characterised by low productivity to attract foreign 
investment in manufacturing and agriculture (ADB, 1997). Deregulation and 
privatisation presuppose the existence of a capitalist class that is able and ready to 
undertake accumulation. While an entrepreneurial class has been identified in a 
handful of countries, Uganda and Ethiopia do not have the entrepreneurs to respond 
without deliberate state guidance. Liberalisation typically increases traders and not 
capitalists who invest for a longer period and engage in productive accumulation. A 
survey of a number of SSA countries shows that the post-privatisation period, in terms 
of profitability and efficiency, was not markedly different compared to the pre- 
privatisation period (Boubakri et a l, 2002). In fact, firms that are partially owned by 
the state perform better than privatised companies (Nellis, 1999). The success of 
private firms is limited where institutions are weak and performance is determined by 
how much other institutions are developed such as contract enforcement, competition, 
and regulation policy (Shirley and Adam, 2002). As noted by (Stein, 2000. p. 15):
“The Bank and IMF hope that privatisation and market reform will somehow 
stimulate a group of entrepreneurs just waiting for the opportunity to respond 
with investment and production. Here the architects of adjustment seem to be 
falling back on a Hayekian notion of entrepreneurs as risk takers or homo- 
economicus waiting to jump at opportunities created by the new climate. 
However, at the heart of any thriving capitalist economy are not risk takers 
that have always been in abundance in Africa but Schumpeterian
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entrepreneurs who are inventors and innovators. Entrepreneurship of this 
type thrives best in a fostering climate which includes research and 
development, highly trained human capital, access to finance etc all of which 
are poorly developed and even eroded under adjustment.”
Focus on stability of monetary aggregates and removal of market distortions 
does not address fundamental structural questions. A comparative analysis of Thailand 
and the Philippines show that the long-term scenario of development is that the initial 
period is dominated by inward-looking import substitution stage followed by a 
gradual liberalisation and export-orientation (Fei and Ranis, 1988). As Mosley 
(1991a) and Mosley et al. (1991) show that successful adjusters such as Turkey and 
Philippines were at their transition from inward-looking to export-oriented strategy 
when stabilisation and adjustment were introduced. On the other hand, adjustment 
was prescribed for Kenya and Malawi when they were still at their inward-looking 
stage, when infant industry protection made sense. Liberalisation may work in a 
middle-income country, but proves detrimental in low-income countries as is 
observed in Ethiopia and Uganda.
Given the limitations of primary commodity economies, SSA requires some 
form of state-led industrialisation to augment living standards. It is not sufficient to 
improve macroeconomic indicators as long as structural weaknesses constrain export 
performance, particularly manufacturing exports. Given the strong evidence that exists 
on the efficacy of the developmental states elsewhere, the question should not be 
whether the state can be instrumental in fostering industrialisation, but what kind of 
state is a developmental state and how it can be created and not encumbered. The 
issue also should not be a wholesale condemnation of the state but what it can achieve 
when the right ingredients for developmental state exist or even introducing 
“distortions” where necessary. Macroeconomic stability may be achieved through the 
stabilisation and adjustment policies, but developing into a competitive and 
technologically advanced enterprise as well as successful structural transformation 
requires a developmental state.
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6.7 Concluding Remarks
Stabilisation and adjustment programmes of the last three decades further 
weakened the state in its developmental role. Currently, the role o f the state is 
primarily attached to the mainstream approach, which focuses on a limited number of 
aggregate variables. It is not surprising that stabilisation and adjustment programmes 
call for a minimalist state. The theoretical framework, neo-classical economics, is 
interested in achieving general equilibrium under the assumption of self-seeking 
individual interaction in production and exchange. Neo-classical theories, which form 
the bulk of mainstream teaching in economics, are based on the general equilibrium 
theoretical assumption where markets arise spontaneously from atomistic interaction 
of self-seeking and profit-maximising individuals. The only information necessary for 
efficient production and consumption is on prices. These reflect opportunity costs 
allowing firms to respond to market signals and exploit comparative advantage 
internationally (Weeks, 1989; Stein, 2000). Information beyond prices, which 
emanates from state intervention and industrial organisation are redundant. State 
interventions to promote different industrial structures and to encourage more rapid 
growth and innovation are completely obliterated. The role of the state under the 
Washington consensus is confined to a regulatory function, such as central bank 
supervision of the payment system and the behaviour of the financial sector. The only 
radical role assigned for the state comes in the form of market augmentation through 
protecting property rights, where the transformation of markets requires an 
appropriate institutional framework (North, 1989).
The Washington consensus dismisses not only the developmental states of 
East Asia, but also post-war thinking on capitalist development that gave pride of 
place to government intervention. For instance, earlier modernisation theories that 
argued for the possibility of market augmentation by conscious planning to mobilise 
resources and achieve high levels o f investment and growth, as advocated by 
Rowstow (1960), are precluded. Influential works, which argued for a “big push” as 
industrial production is subject to indivisibilities and economies of scale, especially at 
the early stages of development where physical capital is the key incentive for 
entrepreneurship (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961), are completely ignored. The fact that
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government intervention is crucial for financing industry to ensure minimum 
efficiency under dynamic technological change (Gerschenkron, 1962), is left to profit- 
maximising and atomistic individuals. The current development paradigm emphasises 
wholesale liberalisation, which excludes the possibility of selective credit and subsidy 
to promote industrial development. Financial conservatism has been given 
prominence over supply of public goods and human capital development (Sen, 1998). 
The institutions, the infrastructure, and the capital needed for accumulation remain 
inadequate as a basis for developmental transformation.
IMF-supported stabilisation and adjustment programmes overlook the 
historically justified role for the developmental state. State allocation of credit, 
selective subsidies, protection of domestic industries and state-business relations are 
substituted by the neo-liberal inspired Washington consensus, which argues 
government failure is worse than market failure as the state is often influenced by 
powerful interest groups. This view advocates a minimalist state that will not 
introduce distortions and that precludes rent-seeking. The odious defaming of the state 
as patron-client as well as lacking developmental ideology and technocratic capacity 
provides the justification for prescribing IMF programmes. On the one hand, the 
Washington consensus views the state as incapable of directing and guiding 
development process through intervention. On the other hand, it sees the state as soft 
and susceptible to be captured by special interests, which becomes an impediment to 
the success of stabilisation and adjustment programmes. While offering a case for de­
linking the state, these views call for suppression of interest group demands, set the 
tone for repression and minimal state-society relations, which are the hallmark of the 
developmental state.
Backed by strong global political hegemonies and conditional finance, the IMF 
sets in motion policies, which are often opposed by the people they are supposed to 
help. Policy reforms such as reduction in public expenditure, credit restraint and 
devaluation are associated with upheavals, violent actions and political turmoil, which 
endanger the sustainability of reforms and cause complete policy reversals. The 
response from the neo-liberal camp is not on how the developmental state forges 
productive relationships with business and society at large, but on timing and
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sequencing of the same reforms that fail and cause public discontent. By identifying 
gainers and losers ex ante, the attempt is to implement policies where there is less 
opposition. The remedy for non-adoption and interruptions cannot simply be 
identification of costs and benefit and timing and sequencing of policies accordingly. 
At the heart of reform success is genuine ownership that must go beyond trying to 
reproduce stabilisation and adjustment programmes that are neither historically 
justified nor theoretically and empirically validated. This means the forcing of a 
reform agenda, which is often unacceptable and difficult to implement, and forming a 
state, which has to use repression to implement unpopular policies. Neo-liberal 
conditional finance precipitates the emergence of a repressive pseudo-developmental 
state.
As the Ethiopian and Ugandan cases studies show the IMF model excludes major 
structural features of these economies that require increased state intervention. First is 
the absence of analysis of industrial finance. In both countries bank credit mainly 
finances imports and the retail trade sector. The share of credit advanced to the export 
and agricultural sectors are falling. Domestic savings and investment remain low. 
Second, despite a series of devaluations and trade liberalisations the terms of trade has 
not improved and diversification of exports has not materialised. The share of the 
manufacturing sector remains at a low level. Third, trade liberalisation and liberalised 
foreign exchange allocations increased imports of consumer goods and not capital and 
intermediate goods needed for industrial development. Fourth, Ethiopia and Uganda 
suffer from severe under-investment in social services and infrastructure, which is an 
important pre-requisite for industrialisation. Fifth, domestic capitalists have limited 
access to labour, land, capital, infrastructure, finance and technology. These countries, 
and others, lack the entrepreneurial class that engages in productive accumulation and 
industrial transformation and IMF programmes are not much help.
East Asian developmental states transformed into capitalist economies 
through a mix of state-led and market-led policies. They achieved this as the 
prevailing ideology and U.S. tolerance allowed them to improvise. Most of all 
unconditional lending allowed them to develop their own home-grown policies and 
forge a unique alliance with key sectors of the economy. The SSA case is different:
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conditionalities seem inevitable in the face of scarce domestic an external finance to 
satisfy shortfalls in resource gaps and in an environment where private lending is hard 
to come by. The post-war development strategies in most SSA countries were state- 
led, mainly as a result of weak private sectors and the need for nation building. Given 
that most SSA countries won their independence in the first half of the 1960s, the 
national building project was young and the economic “revolutionary project” did not 
fully commence (Mkandawire, 1991 and Stein, 1995d). SSA states, although most had 
a developmental goal, have also been unfortunate in the sense that the poor 
performance of their economies damaged the reputation of state guidance, hi a way, 
the developmental state is good only as far as the economy performs well, while 
exogenous factors such as decline in the terms of trade may have been at work 
(UNECA, 1989; Sarkar, 1992; and Sender, 1999).
We learn from development history that by the 1970s a syndrome of 
dependency was identified as a constraint for the transition to capitalism. Developing 
countries in the periphery were unique in their economic structures and attachment to 
the capitalist system. Their attempts to industrialise resulted in the “development of 
underdevelopment”, where stagnation rather than growth featured. Therefore, the 
emergence of the developmental state was problematic as the state and domestic 
capitalist classes represented the centre’s interest than the periphery’s. The class 
structure that merged from the centre’s dominance created the “comprador 
bourgeoisie” that represented foreign capital (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). The global 
economic system constitutes “a unity, a whole-the world capitalist system” (Amin, 
1977, p. 181). Local policy-making reflects the dominant class in the global sense as 
well as the class of its cronies nationally. The compradorial class could not have its 
own ideological mission to mobilise resources, the transfer of technology and promote 
industrialisation, as aptly put in Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda by Nabudere 
(1980) and Fight My Beloved Continent by Shivji (1988). The success stories of the 
post-colonial capitalist economies have been seen as neo-colonial developments, 
particularly Kenya (Leys, 1975; Kitching, 1985).59
Whatever the validity and generality of the dependency framework, what is 
currently unfolding can be portrayed as another form of dependency, based on neo­
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liberal policies pushed through by a powerful constellation of economic and political 
forces. The dependency is exacerbated by conditionalities and disbursement of credit 
on tranche basis, which give the IMF a significant leverage. Stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes make governments unpopular and political repression 
becomes inevitable, through a process o f creating a technocracy to carry out policies 
whose efficacy is not conclusively determined. Any hope for the advent of the 
developmental state is dashed by a continuous reduction of the role of the state to a 
technocratic-regulatory machine rather than an agency for industrialisation and 
structural transformation. The question becomes: is there any hope for the possibility 
of the developmental state to re-emerge in SSA? The challenges ahead are complex. 
The lesson to be learned is that the case for the developmental state is justified and the 
appropriate institutional structures can be created to formulate policies in countries 
struggling to emerge out of the underdevelopment quagmire.
322
Chapter 6 The Developmental State is the Missing Link
Notes
1 Although the bureaucracy is crucial, the presentation of the two regions as weak 
and strong bureaucracies is “a crude caricature”. Latin American countries were integrated 
into the world trading system as exporters of primary commodities under import-substituting 
strategies. Altering these to export orientation and labour-intensive manufacturing meant 
changing major power relations, which proved difficult (Banuri, 1991, p. 9)
2 In the case of Japan, some studies show that the nongovernmental sector has 
recently begun to challenge bureaucratic dominance and reshape state-civil society relations 
(Hirata, 2002).
3 Pempel (1999) points to the heavy dependence of the Asian Tigers on the U.S. both 
politically (for their security) and for export markets.
4 According to Lai (1983, p. 16), "the very analysis which seemingly establishes a 
prima facie  intellectual justification for the Dirigiste Dogma provides, in its fullness, the 
antidote.”
5 The NPE is new in so far as it takes over where the “old” political economy of neo- 
Marxian left off (Toye, 1991).
6 Hoogvelt (1990) argues the Asian model is close to Listian mercantilism, which 
emphasised that late industrialisers will not benefit from unfettered trade. By implication free 
trade makes up the “dynamics of Third World poverty”
7 Nehru (1979) also argues “[Ljiberal democracy and the removal of poverty do not 
go together in a poor society because virtually the only way to ensure economic growth is to 
increase capital investment.”
8 Sorensen (1991) bases his argument on the case studies of China, Costa Rica and
India.
9 Countries, which are already democracies, experience no growth as further 
improvements in democracy lead to the emergence of special interests (Barro, 1999).
10 Latest advances in the profession, particularly inspired by the World Bank, also 
emphasise the importance of social capital in the development process. State versus market 
debates have been redirected to the absence of social capital. On the political sphere cultural 
attributes, traditions, customs, social networks etc. are considered as paramount to market 
symmetry (Fine, 2001b).
11 See Levy (1997) for a summary of new role for the state.
12 Earlier theories also emphasised technological advances in agriculture as critical 
support to rapid industrialisation (see Kuznets, 1968 and Kalecki, 1971).
13 The fall of the iron curtain prompted the “End of History” (Fukuyama, 1989 and 
1992). In the same light, towards the end of the 1990s the death of the developmental state 
was heralded, both as a triumph for the Washington consensus. But, no alterative strategy 
seems to be in place for, dwelling on metaphors, the realisation of late-late-late 
industrialisation in SSA.
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14 By kleptocracy Zack-Williams (1990) claims moonlighting by public employees, 
selling of public drugs and medicines to private clinics and the private use of public money 
(Pajaro culture).
15 Diamond et al. (1988) define democracy as a system of government where 
competition for election, participation by the electorate and civil and political liberty such as 
freedom of speech and expression are present. For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1994) 
distinguish a democracy with regular, free, and competitive elections on the one hand and a 
democracy with civil and economic liberties alone on the other. The latter is said to 
characterise most East Asian models! In contrast, in the constitutional multiparty democracy 
that is said to prevail in Botswana, policy decision is the outcome of harmonious 
relationships between legitimate politicians and independent bureaucracy (Gulhati, 1990, p. 
1152)).
16 For example, U.S. aid to Taiwan financed 59 per cent of domestic capital 
formation in agriculture mainly on water use and control, while aid in SSA, influenced by 
subsequent theories in the profession, focused on ineffective rural development programmes 
(Brautigam, 1995).
17 The government of Botswana intervened to: 1) diversify away from diamonds and 
cattle base; 2) improve gender equality in industry; 3) increase public participation in 
industrial projects; and 4) improve the regional distribution of industrial projects (Owusu and 
Samatar, 1997).
18 The metaphor illustrated by Allison (1971) reveals the working of the above 
models succinctly:
“Imagine a chess game in which the observer could see only a screen upon 
which moves in the game were projected, with no information about how the 
pieces come to be moved”. The rational actor model assumes “an individual 
chess player was moving the pieces with reference to plans and tactics 
toward the goal of winning the game”. The organisational process model 
would assume “the chess player might not be a single individual but rather a 
loose alliance of semi-independent organisations, each of which moved its 
set of pieces according to standard operating procedures.” Finally the 
government politics model would assume “a number of distinct players, with 
distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, could be determining 
the moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining” (p. 7).
19 Truman (1962) writing on the interaction between governments and the public in 
the United States argued interest groups need not be organised for their views to be reflected 
in policy reform “...many interest groups...in the course of their development...make their 
claims through or upon the institutions of government. Both the forms and functions of 
government in turn are a reflection of the activities and claims of such groups.... Interests that 
are widely held in society may be reflected in government without their being organised in 
groups. They are what we have called potential groups.” (p. 505-506 emphasis added). In the 
pluralist view of policy making each competing group is insulated from the influence of 
another group and only interacts with each other within the framework provided by the state.
20 Lipton’s urban bias notion was justified on the grounds of equity and efficiency: 
since the urban sector obtains a large proportion of the national income, redistribution or pro- 
urban policies increase equity as well as efficiency and eliminate poverty. Bates’ analysis of
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agricultural policy in Africa is based on “rational choice” theory in which the action of 
governments is consistent with political realities (for evaluation of Bates work see Stein and 
Wilson, 1993 and Bates, 1993). On the incorporation of the urban bias analysis into reform 
programmes of the 1980s see Toye (1994).
21 But the theorising about interest groups is not an exact science. Interest group 
pressures can only be effective depending on the level of organisation as well as the short- or 
long-term nature of the interests. Brautigam (2000, p. 2) notes:
“business interests are more likely to play a positive role in pushing for, and 
sustaining, growth-oriented reform when the business class has matured in 
number and experience and broadened to the point where it represents a 
sizable portion of the productive economy; when exporting interests make up 
a substantial sector of the business class; when its associations are broadly 
representative of the range of business interests in the country, and have 
technical capacity and credibility; and when government and business 
associations have institutionalised regular consultation.”
22 Panitch (2000), however, argues that;
“most of the critics of neo-liberalism, adopting the same impoverished state- 
market categories but inverting the values attached to them, did nothing to 
help. Lamenting the “eclipse” of the state by the market, they have restricted 
their contributions to extolling the success of “strong states” in East Asia or 
Northern Europe in contrast to the “statelessness” of the Anglo-American 
model, somehow hoping that by pointing to Japan or Germany they could 
prove neo-liberalism wrong” (pp. 6-7).
23 The “new political economy” view of the state according to Toye (1993, p. 89) 
“can make a powerful slogan. But, as a piece of economic and political analysis, it is wholly 
inadequate in understanding the two-way interaction between market and government 
failure.” According to Toye (1991), “[T]o suggest that all that was needed to give birth to the 
NPE was a process of gradual disillusion with the benevolence of the state in developing 
countries has the same simple-minded quality as the benevolent state assumption has itself’ 
(p. 329).
24 In contrast the patron-client relationship in the Philippines was found to be 
unpredictable and patrons were not state bureaucrats but oligarchs who had monopoly on 
rent-seeking (Hutchcroft, 2000). In Malaysia the state used rents to favour the Malays while 
discriminating against Chinese entrepreneurs. This was evident in the financial sector where 
poor lending was the outcome (Jomo and Gomez, 2000).
25 Toye (1992) supports his argument with the case of the presidents of Kenya 
(Daniel arap Moi) and Malawi (Kamuzu Banda) having a personal interest in the agribusiness 
industry.
26 The pluralist view of the state, which divides society into interest groups, has a 
political resemblance to imperfect competition as understood in neoclassical economics. As a 
perfectly competitive market is assumed to bring about Pareto efficient outcomes, the 
pluralist view sees political negotiations in the same vein: competing interests will bring the 
best outcome as far as policy choice is concerned. Therefore the role of the state is “...arbiter 
among competing interests...to respond to the pressures placed upon them by organised
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groups in society” (Grindle and Thomas, 1991, p. 23, emphasis added). The question is what 
is the relevance of policy conclusions derived from the NPE? As Colclough (1991) points out 
the main difference between the neo-liberal and other schools (structuralists and neo- 
Marxists) is the former’s “willingness to draw policy implications of a concrete kind whilst 
remaining at a very general level of analysis (ibid., p. 17).”
27 Nelson (1989b and 1990b) also argues that in addition to the response of 
influential groups, political sustainability depends on the commitment on the part of 
government to implement the right policies and the bureaucratic capability of the state in 
terms of elite unity, management and administration. See Gulhati (1990) for further 
discussion of “policy infrastructure”, that is institutional, organisational and human capacity 
of the state to implement successful policies with reference to Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia.
28 Brautigam (2000) concluded “low levels of industrialisation and few linkages 
between the independent business class and the state; neopatrimonial governance practices; 
suspicion of the private sector and concern about economic dominance by “outsider” groups; 
and an acute economic crisis, may make it more difficult for effective relations to develop 
between governments and their business sectors” (p. 17).
29 The “ponteiros” are merchants and recipients of land concessionaires.
30 Similarly, state ownership of productive assets and the opportunity for rent-seeking 
in Egypt have impeded the success of reforms (Bromely and Bush, 1994).
31 Havrylyshyn and Odling-Smee (2000, pp. 6-7) note that;
“One part of this strong opposition to completing reforms is the old party and 
managerial elite - ironically, not because they are the main losers, as 
predicted in 1990, but because they became, in fact, the winners of partial 
reform. More broadly, the heart of the opposition comprises groups that, 
having created dominant positions, have exploited their power to persuade 
governments and parliaments to prevent reforms that would threaten 
positions”...In the case of Russia “many former members of the 
nomenklatura and bureaucracy have become major opponents to continuing 
market reforms, not because they were the losers, but, paradoxically, they 
captured the process sufficiently to be the winners.”
32 Alesina and Drazen (1991) add;
“[Wjlien a stabilisation has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax 
increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socio-economic groups may 
attempt to shift the burden of stabilisation onto other groups. The process 
leading to stabilisation becomes a “war of attrition”, each group attempting 
to wait the others out and stabilisation occurring only when one group 
concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden” (p. 1170).. .When 
socio-economic groups perceive the possibility of shifting this burden, 
elsewhere, each group may attempt to wait the others out...Concession may 
occur via legislative agreement, electoral outcomes, or ceding power of 
decree to policymakers.” (p. 1171).
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33 A number of models have been presented for successful implementation of 
programmes. The traditional argument has been the idea of the “honeymoon” period and the 
“new broom sweeps clean” assumption. Others argue otherwise, established democracies 
have firm relations within the bureaucracy and can maintain continuity in decision-making 
processes. Given the political risks associated with policy reforms, incumbent governments 
can better risk unpopular policies than new comers (Haggard and Kaufman, 1989). Economic 
reforms may be best implemented immediately after an election when opposition is in 
“disarray” (Nelson, 1990b). In contrast, others argue, if the ancien regime has been 
suppressing wages, new transitional governments might find it difficult to resist the 
expectations and demands of repressed groups and can become expansionist and abandon 
austere reforms (Haggard and Webb, 1993). Transitional governments need to be concerned 
with introducing reforms, but also sustaining them for democratic consolidation: “there are 
simple yet compelling reasons why economic performance, and particularly economic 
growth, might also be important for long-term democratic stability and consolidation” 
(Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, p. 325). The idea is economic growth compensates losers and 
lessens frustration, conflict and alienation: a kind of trickledown theory.
34 These terms are used by Haggard and Webb (1993).
35 These terms are mentioned in Wolgit (1997).
36 The devaluation in Phase I and the resulting increase in prices is said to be offset 
by the reduction in the budget deficit and wage de-indexation, hence depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. In Phase II the structural adjustment policies are meant to restore the rate of 
growth.
37 Perraudin and Silbert (1998) present a theory of bargaining to analyse loan 
agreements between international lenders and national governments. The model suggests that 
when a country approaches, say, the IMF, it requires reform and the IMF, on the other hand, 
puts forward the reform as a condition for lending. There are two outcomes: either the 
country implements the reform or rejects it. In the latter case there will be revision of the 
reform package. The key hypothesis in the model is that that the behaviour of the lenders is 
unknown and the country’s benefit from not reforming is private information. And it is 
precisely because of these uncertainties that negotiations take place. The negotiations are 
focused on the lender, whether governments derive high or low benefit from reform. Hence, 
the costs of postponing agreement cause delays in averting crisis, which may cause further 
disaster or fears of contagion. This situation forces lenders to back down in negotiations, 
while borrowers get the upper hand to reject offers. According to Perraudin and Silbert;
“High-benefit governments postpone agreement because it is the only way 
they can signal their type and extract a better deal. Thus, in equilibrium, 
agreement may be delayed. We suppose lenders have a finite number of 
periods in which to bargain with the government and that economic 
conditions may change over time” (p. 193).
38 By “exit before entry” Johnson (1994) means for example, the exit by some firms 
from production of nontradable goods before other firms enter into production of tradable 
goods during adjustment.
39 On these points Waterbury (1989, p. 54) provides an example from Egypt - “where 
subsidies have been maintained on a whole range of items from a certain quality of bread to
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bus fares but the subsidised items and services themselves have gradually become 
unavailable, replaced by slightly modified but costlier ones.”
40 It is only the end of East-West political rivalry that has brought the issues of 
political conditionality in the form of democratic governance into the adjustment debate (see 
Green, 1991).
41 See IMF (1996)
42 The World Bank’s approach to the idea of ownership is to emphasise the 
participation of civil society in policy debates. Related to this are building democratic 
institutions such as parliaments, trade unions, NGOs and encouraging the private sector to 
foster popular ownership via consensus building. In this view of ownership the government 
facilitates the consultation process and provides leadership (see Johnson and Wasty, 1993 
and World Bank, 2001).
43 Quoted in Khan and Sharma (2001, p. 3).
44 Some writers note that politicians used conditionality as an excuse to avoid domestic 
political debate, which triggered the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to engage in 
issues of governance (in Africa and Indonesia); military expenditure (in Pakistan and 
Romania); “trust”, “strong informal networks”, and “crony capitalism” (in Asia) (James, 
1998).
45 These arguments also apply to the World Bank, which also imposes its own 
conditionalities (see Berg, 1991, Mosley, et aL, 1991 and Johnson and Wasty, 1993). World 
Bank conditionality imposing reforms on an otherwise unwilling recipient country results in a 
bargaining process similar to the principal-agent problem (Mosley, 1991b, 1992b and Mosley 
and Hudson, 1996). In fact the argument for the existence of the World Bank and multilateral 
lending in general is the ability to enforce conditionality (Rodrik, 1996b and Gilbert et aL, 
1996).
46 On conditionality Pauly (1999) argues:
“In practice, this means that for an increasing number of debtor states 
financial independence seems necessarily to imply rising pressure to 
accommodate certain core values shared by creditor states” (p. 416).
47 The evaluation also noted that strong ownership resulted in successful 
implementation of IMF programmes. These countries included Cote d’Ivoire (1994-1997) 
and Uganda (1990-1998) under ESAF. These latter countries were successful because of 
strong local ownership of policies as well as political commitment from the leadership that 
allowed broad stakeholder discussion in policy matters. In fact an earlier IMF study of 36 
countries which implemented ESAF programmes since 1986, found that two-third of the 
programmes were interrupted (IMF, 1997). Much of the interruption was blamed on domestic 
political expediencies and the government’s weakness to in succumbing to interest group 
demands.
48 The comment from a donor representative, as listed in Helleiner (2000, p. 2), reads:
“We want them to take ownership. Of course, they must do what we want. If 
not, they should get their money elsewhere. We have to pressure the local 
government to take ownership. We have to be realistic. Our taxpayers want
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to be sure their money is being used well. They want to know there's 
someone they can trust, a national of their own country, in charge. I routinely 
instruct my staff to draft terms of reference for technical cooperation projects 
and then spend half an hour with a local government official on it.”
49 Another problem is also associated with the nature of performance requirements 
being “front-loaded” while the flow of funds is “back-loaded” (i.e. in instalments). This, for 
instance, has contributed to a net transfer of resources from borrowing countries to the IMF, 
as repayment of previous loans is required, while programmes are underway (Feinberg, 1991 
and Taylor, 1997). The IMF's stance on these points is to stress its catalytic role. The 
expectation is that, during programme implementation, the IMF is not the sole provider of 
funds. Financing an adjustment programme requires resources from other bilateral and 
multilateral lenders. As soon as a country signs an agreement with the IMF, it should also 
obtain resources from other sources to cushion the adjustment process (Erb, 1986).
50 The IMF should have benefited from reading the government’s initial strategy, 
which stated;
“Major financial institutions that provide service to different sectors of the 
economy such as banks, insurance companies and other major financial 
institutions will be under state control in order to ensure that they will play 
their proper role in the process of economic development. However, 
domestic private capital will be encouraged to participate in banking and 
insurance activities (TGE, 1991, pp. 34 emphasis added)
51 Franklin (1997) also finds that countries under economic crisis experience higher 
incidence of repression than countries that are not in crisis; the degree of repression depends 
on whether leaders constitutionally assumed power or not. Those who come to power tend to 
use greater repression in their early years; and leaders with scarce resources tend to use more 
repression. He formulates an index of political repression to study its relationship with an 
IMF induced reform. He also tests the hypothesis that “conditions required of borrowing 
governments by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put those governments in a situation 
that encourages the use of political repression against dissidents” (p. 577). Political 
repression is defined as classified as the incidence (the action by the government), the 
intensity (the harshness of the repression), and the scope (the area affected by the repression). 
Political repression is also categorized as: 1) reactive political repression, which takes place 
in response to active opposition; and 2) pre-emptive political repression, which is meant to 
prevent future opposition. The results show that monetarist policies force governments to 
resort to political repression to counter opposition to, for instance, budgetary reductions and 
import induced inflations.
52 Morrisson et aL (1994) collect data for 23 countries in Africa to test the hypothesis 
that there is a strong relationship between economic policy and political instability. The 
methodological suspicion arises where the attempt is made to quantify political instability 
through allocating numerical values to demonstrations, strikes, summary killings, coup d’etat 
etc. The authors state, “we have built proxy indexes based on quantitative information 
gathered from specialised journals” (p. 179). However, it is not clear how the indexes are 
calculated and whether other purely political factors, that may cause demonstrations and 
strikes, are controlled for.
53 As Fine and Stoneman (1996, p. 7-8) put it: “the need to reduce the role of the state 
- has had the perverse effect of locating the state at the centre of the analytical stage, not least
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in the twin themes previously identified of success/failure which now command the field of 
development studies.”
54 The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law on May 
18, 2000 as Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000. The Act offers tangible 
incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build 
free markets. AGOA exports make up half of all SSA exports to the US and 36 countries are 
eligible.
55 Source: Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce: http://www.addischamber.com/
56 See Sarkar (1992) and Deaton (1999) for an account of the relationship between 
commodity prices and growth in developing countries, particularly SSA.
57 See Stein (1995a) for Asian industrial development and lessons for Africa
58 See Weeks (1992) for a discussion of investment choices.
59 East Asian and Latin American success stories, however, questioned the 
dependency syndrome and highlighted the possibilities for “associated dependent 
development” (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). In a similar vein, the possibilities for periphery 
development under the existing capitalist system were argued (Warren, 1980). In the context 
of SSA, evidence was presented that colonialism and imperialism were not impediments to 
capitalist accumulation (Sender and Smith, 1986).
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion
7.1 Rhetoric, Scholarship and Policy
The IMF was conceived at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 for the 
purpose of overseeing international trade and exchange rates. After the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system, which the IMF was the guardian of, its functions evolved 
to include regulation and surveillance of global monetary and exchange rates; 
technical assistance on macroeconomic policies; and financing balance of payments 
under short-term stabilisation and medium- to long-term structural adjustment 
programmes. Today, the IMF plays major roles the catalyst for other creditors, as the 
gatekeeper in debt negotiations, as crisis manager and crisis averter.
As the demand for multilateral finance increased, mainly as a result of 
liquidity problems in developing countries, the IMF took the opportunity to form 
macroeconomic policy making in most developing countries through conditional 
finance. Currently, the IMF is heavily involved in prescribing stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes, the objectives of which, according to the rhetoric, are to 
stabilise the economy in the short-run and stimulate growth in the medium- to long­
term. The main policy targets are the inflation rate, the balance o f payments and 
economic growth. The stabilisation package is aimed at maintaining equilibrium 
between imports and exports as well as between government spending and revenue 
through demand-side policies or instruments, which include the level of domestic 
credit and the exchange rate. In the mid 1990s, stabilisation have been complemented 
by “growth-oriented adjustment programmes”, intended for improving the efficiency 
of markets and changing the structure of economies via trade and financial 
liberalisation; removal of price controls and subsidies; and public sector reforms.
The implementation of stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes is 
often justified by the lack of alternatives, or by the assumption that the only other
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policy option is the status quo ante, which called for adjustment in the first place, hi 
other words, stabilisation programmes are implemented following a weak balance of 
payments position, overvalued exchange rates, high inflation and low rates of growth. 
Similarly, adjustment programmes are implemented in a situation where regulation of 
prices, supposedly, led to loss of international competitiveness; and where exchange 
controls led to rent-seeking and illegal transactions.
IMF stabilisation and structural adjustment policies base their argument for 
reform on government failure, which is said to be associated with the pre-adjustment 
policies adopted by most developing countries. This is despite the fact that orthodox 
based supply-side economic policies such as trade and financial liberalisation remain 
controversial. More specifically, the assumption that deregulated markets yield 
optimal allocative efficiency is yet to be vindicated. For instance, in East Asia, 
systematic regulation and some degree of government intervention have been 
successful development strategies.
The evolution of IMF macroeconomic thinking is not purely based on 
advances in technical exposition but reflects fundamentally different perspectives and 
ideologies. These fundamentally different visions of the functioning o f the economy 
can be thought of as paradigms. These paradigms consist of an organising set of 
axioms, concepts and explanations or theories (in the sense of Kuhn, 1962). One 
indication of this is that more than any other macroeconomic strategy, financial 
programming, backed by neo-liberal theorising and conditional finance, has dictated 
the course of development. State-led development associated with Keynesianism, 
welfarism, basic needs, and post-colonial developmental states became under attack 
and were swept away by the monetarist wave. Policy-making based on national 
priorities and with local expertise was all too soon reduced to a special case, forced to 
conform to the Washington consensus. This has had the disastrous effect of setting 
aside the role of the developmental state, which is justified by the theoretical, 
historical as well empirical literature. As the case studies in this thesis show, despite 
repeated prescription of IMF programmes, the economies of Ethiopia and Uganda 
remain structurally no different from their pre-IMF state. This has much to do with the 
neglect of the role the state can play, how firms are formed, what kind of incentives
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they need, how technologies are acquired and diffused, how export markets are 
exploited, and how domestic markets are protected.
7.2 The Conceptual Framework
The financial programming framework departed from the conventional 
treatments of the balance of payments by emphasising that monetary variables 
determine income and the balance of payments. The framework also showed the direct 
links between the domestic component of the money supply or domestic credit and the 
external sector. It was demonstrated that the evolution of IMF thinking in its 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes developed from Polak’s original model. 
Over the years, mainly the writers within the Research Department of the IMF and 
later the Chicago school, have added new variables and features. In summary, the 
policy conclusion is that when the level of domestic credit exceeds the demand for 
money, international reserves, hence the balance of payments will be affected. 
Therefore, domestic credit emerges as a key policy variable for maintaining the 
balance of payments at a pre-determined level. The complete FP framework also 
includes the exchange rate as a significant policy variable. The impact of exchange 
rate adjustments, mainly through the real balance effect or in reducing domestic 
absorption, are central to the stabilisation process.
The IMF’s entrance into adjustment and supply-side issues, which were the 
World Bank’s area of influence, took two different forms. First, there has been an 
attempt to conceptually merge the financial programming framework with the World 
Bank’s RMSM. Besides its apparent failure theoretically, this attempt failed to 
influence subsequent policy designs under “growth-oriented adjustment”. The second 
was to ascribe trade and financial liberalisation as well as price and market 
deregulations as part of the IMF programme. Advantage was taken of the neo-liberal 
resurgence and adjustment policies were borrowed from mainstream economics, 
which emphasised that unfettered markets provide the best solution for allocating 
scarce resources.
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The attempts to address long-term growth fail tragically. First, both in absolute 
terms and relative to best practice, the theory and rationale underlying IMF 
programmes have been inadequate. Second, even on their own terms, such models 
have failed to interrogate the relationship between short and long runs, and are totally 
unsuitable for addressing issues of structural transformation. Unlike the Keynesian 
model in which active policy or “fine tuning” is an essential policy strategy, the FP 
framework relies on the neoclassical aggregate supply function. Here is where 
austerity in the face of structural rigidities results in stagflationary and skewed 
distributional effects, for instance, in the case of devaluation. This reflects the over­
commitment of FP to financial austerity and a corresponding under-commitment to 
understanding development itself and the specificities attached to individual countries.
While the Washington consensus attacks state-led strategies for their 
inefficiencies and rent-seeking, it is unable to fundamentally change any different 
results from the pre-stabilisation period. The long-term involvement of the IMF under 
the guise o f supply-side policies, and recently poverty reduction strategies meant strict 
conditionalities and long-term involvement of the IMF in a nation’s policy decision­
making process. Moreover, the shift from short-term stabilisation to structural 
adjustment was merely a longer-term financial commitment rather than a major 
paradigm shift in ideological or theoretical terms. Despite Fischer’s (1997, pp. 26-27), 
claim that the IMF programmes “support a remarkable variety of exchange-rate 
systems, from currency boards to free floating”, it does use one single model in its 
financial programming and the same economic rationale for its adjustment exercise. 
Srinivasan (2000, p. 269) also note that, “[M]y evaluation of the Washington 
Consensus 10 years after its promulgation strongly suggests that its policy advice 
remains intact.” There is no sign of moving away from the traditional policy 
instruments and it is not clear how a financial institution such as the IMF embraces 
the twin goals of poverty reduction and environmental protection.
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7.3 The Empirical Evidence
Towards the end of the 1970s a literature that evaluates the impact of IMF 
programmes appeared. At the early developments of the literature the main focus was 
on assessing the effects of the stabilisation package. As the IMF moved into 
adjustment issues, the impact analysis also began to assess its impact. The 
methodologies were formalised by various studies and include the before-after, the 
with-without (also referred as the Control-Group), the multiple regression models, the 
structural model, the actual vs. target approaches and individual country case studies. 
These techniques are extensively attempt to capture the counterfactual and compare it 
with the results after programmes have been implemented. However, measuring the 
counterfactual proved problematic because the above methodologies have a number of 
limitations. The before-after method does not consider exogenous changes that affect 
pre-programme and programme periods. The with-without approach does not control 
for differences in programme and non-programme countries. The modified with- 
without approach only controls for observable differences between programme and 
non-programme countries and still leaves unobservable differences suffering from 
selectivity-bias. Programme discontinuity and ambitious targets also limit the actual 
vs. target approach from providing unbiased estimates of programme effects. The 
regression and structural models only show statistical dependence and suffer from the 
rigid assumption of parameter constancy.
Despite the use of different techniques, from sectoral analysis to model 
approaches, once again, there seems to be no straightforward answer to the negative or 
positive effects of macroeconomic stabilisation and adjustment policies, although 
there is a bias toward the negative. How one can prove the negative or positive 
impacts of macroeconomic policies, theoretically as well as methodologically, 
remains elusive. It leaves one to wonder why, despite employing roughly identical 
methodologies and the same data set, most studies differ in their conclusions.
It is clear that the various methods of assessment reflect different depths, but 
they engage in only a limited area while success and failure of programmes depend on 
complex interaction of various variables. Related to this issue is the reduction of
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development to statistical significance. Most of the formal studies use tests based on t- 
statistics to report success of IMF programmes. However, a statistically significant 
IMF policy instrument falls short of informing how economically significant it is. In 
other words, we do not know how much a devaluation, which is statistically 
significant when regressed against growth, means to development. Largely, the impact 
analysis is used to carry out “post-mortems” without sufficient attention given to 
feedback to policy design and formulation.
7.4 IMF Programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda
The Ethiopian and Ugandan case studies not only paint the same picture as the 
survey of the empirical evidence in Chapter 4, but also show that a fundamental 
development question has not been addressed. Using the before-after and with- 
without methdologies, this thesis found that IMF programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda 
positively impacted on real GDP per capita and real GDP growth rates in the initial 
three years under SAF programmes compared to the previous three years. 
Nonetheless, growth rates for both countries were no better than countries that did not 
adopt IMF programmes. Uganda reduced its high rate of inflation in the second ESAF 
after six years under IMF programme. Ethiopia’s inflation rate is significantly 
different compared to the average for countries without IMF programmes, but 
Ethiopia always had historically low inflation rates. The current account deficit for 
Ethiopia and Uganda showed no significant improvement under IMF programmes. In 
some years the current account deteriorated under IMF programmes. These 
programmes have had positive and significant impact on the reserve holdings of both 
countries, but these improvements are not statistically different from those observed in 
Botswana and in countries without IMF programmes. Countries that did not 
implement IMF programmes actually performed better and improved their external 
sectors. Apart from depreciation in the exchange rate, none of the policy variables, the 
flow of domestic credit or the fiscal deficit, were significantly different compared to 
the years before IMF programmes -  casting doubts on full implementation of IMF 
programmes.
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The partial achievements in macroeconomic variables are at the core of the 
IMF rhetoric. However, both countries did not show significant difference compared 
to countries which did not implement IMF programmes. The findings lead us to 
conclude that IMF programmes did not meet their stated objectives nor are these 
objectives sensible in terms of concrete economic development. The sensibility of 
IMF programmes is questionable as both Ethiopia and Uganda showed no structural 
transformation since the 1960s. Manufacturing output in national income, a measure 
of structural transfonnation, shows that the Ethiopian economy de-industrialised while 
that of Uganda economy stagnated. In the case of Ethiopia the share of manufacturing 
in GDP declined by 1 per cent; comparing the years with IMF programmes to those 
without. The 1 per cent increment for Uganda is insignificant compared to the late 
1960s and early 1970s.
7.5 The Developmental State is Missing Link
The inconclusiveness o f the impact analysis as well as the findings of the two 
country case studies clearly lay bare the fact that IMF-supported stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes miss a fundamental factor in development. This thesis argues 
that an additional element is added to previously established rationale for going 
against state-led strategies in SSA, which included the neo-liberal ascendancy, the 
unfounded claim that developmental state is impossible to emerge in Africa, and 
rejection of the East Asian non-market industrialisation. By embracing new political 
theories, which divide society into competing interests, the Washington consensus 
time and again seeks a way out of the development impasse. This is done through 
blaming state-society relations as impediments to successful implementation and 
outcome of IMF programmes. Added to its usefulness to defend programme failure, 
viewing state-society relations in this manner offers a further validation for de-linking 
the state. This is despite conclusive evidence that intervention has contributed to 
industrialisation, contrary to the strategy outlined in the stabilisation and adjustment 
policies of the IMF.
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Both in absolute terms and relative to concomitant best practice, the 
macroeconomic theory and rationale underlying IMF programmes have been 
inadequate, especially in the context of developmental needs beyond low inflation and 
positive growth. IMF programmes have failed to link the short run measures with long 
run objectives, and are totally inappropriate for addressing issues of structural 
transformation. Despite justifiable criticisms as well as inconclusive empirical work 
on the impact of its programmes, the IMF’s response is increasingly to search for 
developments in neo-liberal political theory to vindicate its standpoint. Interest-group 
pressure and lack of political commitment are seen as causes of failure and non­
adoption, which have left the major weaknesses of the programmes unexposed. 
Zealous approach to financial austerity and neglect of systematic intervention and the 
specificities attached to individual countries have set aside the developmental role of 
the state, despite conclusive evidence that it has contributed to industrialisation in 
other parts of the world, not least East Asia. Under the guise of being faithful to the 
market, IMF programmes are smokescreens behind which highly interventionist 
policies alter state-society relations, yielding a set of confusing paradigms in the study 
of development.
7.6 Directions for Future Research
The IMF, since its birth fifty years ago, has constantly been evolving. While its 
primary mission remains intact, it has also entered into areas that were traditionally 
outside of its remit. One such emerging area is poverty as shown by recent 
requirement of PRSPs before approval of programmes. In December 1999, IMF and 
the World Bank introduced the PRSP, as the new programme modality on the basis of 
which further lending is to be agreed upon. The declared objective of the PRSP is to 
institute poverty reduction strategies that are country-owned, partnership-based, 
result-oriented, comprehensive, and framed within a long-tenn perspective including 
structural, sectoral, and social considerations. The PRSP is to be integrated in 
macroeconomic frameworks setting out poverty reduction measures and policies 
spanning a three-year time frame (IMF, 2002c).
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In future research, it will be interesting to see how PRSPs have been 
incorporated within the IMF models. Upcoming research will benefit from the 
observations made in this thesis. First, stabilisation and adjustment based on neo­
liberal reasoning are not the only development models. Second, each country and its 
economy are unique. Thus its special needs, constraints and opportunities must be 
recognised. Third, economic modelling must take account of this distinctiveness and 
avoid applying general models to specific cases. Fourth, cross-section empirical 
studies are futile as data inconsistencies and sample variance provide inaccurate 
results. Case studies of the impact of each stabilising and adjusting country are much 
more useful in identifying failure and success and their causes. Fifth, development is 
the outcome of conflict among the state, foreign and domestic interests. However, 
these conflicts should not be presented as impeding reforms solely for explaining 
success and failure, but as major inputs in policy design based on best practice and 
scholarship.
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